^1. An earlier version of this paper was read by Robert N. Bellah, William Brinner, Wolfram Eberhard, C. H. and Katherine George, H. A. R. Gibb, Wells Keddie, Joseph R. Levenson, James Liu, and Benjamin I. Schwartz, all of whom gave encouragement and helpful suggestions for revision. The addition of bibliographical footnotes was at the sug gestion of some of these readers. These footnotes make no claim to completeness, and in clude only Western language works I have read and found useful. Responsibility for opinions and errors is of course mine.

^2. Among analytical books in English which deal entirely or in part with modern Asian intellectual history are (I) ISLAM: Charles C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt (London, I933); George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (Philadelphia, I939); Edward G. Browne, The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia (Cambridge, I9I4); Richard N. Frye (ed.), Islam and the West (‘s-Gravenhage, I957), G. E. von Grunebaum, Islam, and (ed.), Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization (both Chicago, I955); William R. Polk et al., Backdrop to Tragedy (Boston, I957); E. E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks (Princeton, I957); W. C. Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton, I957), and Modern Islam in India (London, I946); and T. Cuyler Young (ed.), Near Eastern Culture and Society (Princeton, I95I). (2) INDIA: Joan V. Bondurant and Margaret W. Fisher, Indian Ap proaches to a Socialist Society (Berkeley, I956); W. Theodore de Bary et al., Sources of the Indian Tradition (New York, I958); D. Mackenzie Brown, The White Umbrella (Berkeley, I958); and J. N. Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements in India (New York, I9I5). (3) FAR EAST: John K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, China's Response to the West (Cambridge, Mass., I954); Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance (Chicago, I934); Nobutaka Iko, The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan (Baltimore, I950); Joseph R. Leven son, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate (Berkeley, I958) and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China (Cambridge, Mass., I953); George B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan (New York, I950), Arthur Wright (ed.), Studies in Chinese Thought (Chicago, I953); and Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (Stanford, I957). (4) SOUTHEAST ASIA: R. Emerson et al., Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (New York, I942); W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition (The Hague, I956) and Eastern and Western World (The Hague, I953). Two useful dissertations from the University of California, Berkeley, are G. H. Razi, "Religion and Politics in Iran," and Fred R. von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism in Indonesia." The works cited by Brown, Browne, de Bary, and Fairbank contain extensive original selections. Such selections are also found in the Asian country supplements to the Atlantic Monthly and in special issues of Life and Letters. Journals with frequent scholarly articles on modern Asian intellectual history include the Journal of Asian Studies, the Journal of the History of Ideas, the Journal of World History, the Middle East Journal, and Middle Eastern Affairs.

Translations of original material are scarce for the Middle East in English. The maga zines mentioned, the American Council of Learned Societies Near Eastern series, and some poetry and fiction, particularly Persian and Egyptian, help fill the gap. Egypt is included here because of its close ties with Arab Asia. Translations for most other areas are easier to find.

^3. On religious similarities, see Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan, Past and Present (New York, I946), especially p. 60: "It is, indeed, a curious fact that the popular Buddhism of feudal Japan had in many ways come to resemble Christianity more than historic Bud dhism. Reversing the basic pessimism of the early faith, it had come to stress a real after-life and salvation through faith. And the early religious reformers, in their translations of the scriptures, their creation of lay congregations, their marriage of the clergy, their militant sectarianism, and ther nascent nationalism, resembled to a surprising degree the Protestant reformers of Europe. These religious trends, coupled with the development of a feudal system which found much closer parallels in medieval Europe than in East Asia, make the early feudal period in Japan a time for startling comparisons with Europe and strong con trasts with other countries of the Far East." See also Robert N. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion (Glencoe, Ill., I957). On the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Japan see E. H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State (New York, I940), and Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan (Stanford, I955), which revises Norman's conclusions about the classes responsible for the Meiji restoration.

^4. To a large extent the argument over Asian progressivism has become a Communist-anti-Communist one, with each side possibly having a priori commitments. The Commu nists stress the monolithic development of all history and, like some Asian nationalists, the negative role of the Western impact. Anti-Communists are often committed to belief in a special, stable type of Asian society and stress the progressive role of the West. It seems to me that neither side has given enough evidence to prove its point and that the truth might even lie between the two, i.e., that Asia was changing, but so slowly that capitalism would not have developed for centuries, or that some Asian countries were changing fundamen tally, while for others this cannot be proved.

^5. This and some other trends noted here are discussed in relation to China in Levenson, Confucian China, and in Mary Matossian, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities," Economic Development and Cultural Change, VI (April, I958), 2I7-28. As Matossian notes, one can make comparisons between modern Asia and other areas confronted with problems of westernization. Russia, in particular, seems to have an intellectual history comparable to later developments in Asia, with the Slavophils and westernizers similar to the neotraditionalists and iconoclastic nationalists in China and else where. The resemblance between Tolstoi and Gandhi is striking; Russia, like Asia, shows the appeal of Marxism not only to radicals but to liberals (i.e., the "Legal Marxists"), probably because it provides a non-insulting explanation of backwardness and a weapon against reactionary government.

^6. The romanticism and new content of modern Confucianism is stressed in Levenson, Confucian China, and Mary Wright, op. cit., in their discussions of its recent use by con servative nationalists. Gibb, op. cit., p. I05, notes the "paralyzing romanticism" of even modernist Islam.

^7. Among other possible similarities between several Asian countries are: (I) Popular messianic movements which may appear shortly after the first strong Western impact and incorporate either borrowed ideas or new concepts of social equality and religious universalism. Among these are the Babis in Iran, the T'ai-p'ings in China, and movements for a ratu adil (just prince) in Indonesia, all of which were rebellious. The Ahmadiyya move ment in Muslim India shows some similarities. (2) A tendency to blame either foreigners or historic accidents for the corruption of one's own basically good culture. Cf. Sayed Kotb, Social Justice in Islam (Washington, I953), p. 229: "The change which overtook the system and the development of politics … was the product of an unfortunate mis chance. The mischance was that control should fall into the hands of the Umayyads." Iranians often blame the Arabs, the Mongols, and the West, and similar ideas are found elsewhere. (3) The appeal of Marxism and socialism to liberals as well as to radicals. Reasons for this are noted in n. 5, and the wide use of socialist slogans today is also partly opportunistic and based on a need to differentiate one's position from the capitalist West. In countries where neotraditionalism is strong, socialism is often identified with the local tradition and presented as a "third way" between the Soviet Union and the West.

^8. W. C. Smith, Modern Islam, p. I70: "Just as the Hindū middle classes, developing earlier, had earlier produced in the Brāhmo Samāj their parallel to Sir Sayyid Ahmad's universalist movement; so they now produced, again earlier, in the Arya Samaj and its fellows, their parallel to aggressive Islamic ‘liberalism.' Politically, the parallel is between the Bengal radicalism and the later Khilafat movement."

Westerners, thinking of men like Nehru, often overestimate the westernism of Indian thought. For the extreme of rejection of Western values by Gandhi, see the several cita tions in Matossian, op. cit. Even liberal Indians are often defensive about such things as the past role of caste, reading into it such virtues as cultural autonomy, individualism, and democracy. Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought (London, I940), in a typical passage on the four varnas: "The social organism expected from each man his duties but guaranteed to each subsistence and opportunity for self-expression. The spirit of competition was unknown. Regulative control, even if coercive, is less tyrannical than blind competition. It secures for the largest number of individuals effective freedom in non-economic and cultural spheres…. In a real sense, the fourfold scheme is democratic. Firstly, it insists on the spiritual equality of all men…. Secondly, it makes for individual ity in a positive sense…" (pp. 367-68).

^9. Von der Mehden, op. cit., notes Buddhism as a strong feature of nationalism in Ceylon, Indo-China, and Burma and discusses at length Islamic nationalism in Indonesia (pp. 3I-34 ff.).

^10. In countries which discourage dissent it is difficult to distinguish intellectual trends from government policies. In general, it can be said that Nasser, Ataturk, and Mao Tse-tung represent trends which had strength among intellectuals before becoming governmental, while this is less true of Chiang or Japan in the I930's. Only the former group will be dis cussed as reflecting major intellectual trends.

^11. See the discussion of Turkey in W. C. Smith, Islam.

^12. There are differences of opinion about contemporary Iranian intellectuals. According to F. Kazemzadeh in Frye, op. cit.: "As far as the educated classes are concerned, it would be safe to say that they have turned their backs completely on Islam…. The unmitigated poverty of the masses, humiliation before the West, the loss of traditional Islamic values, all have produced among Iranian intellectuals a state of mind which is best described as Baza rovshchina, a type of cultural, and sometimes moral nihilism…. Such an attitude rejects not only Islam but also the classical traditions of Persian culture…. What a part of Russia's intelligentsia experienced a hundred years ago, some Iranian intellectuals are experiencing now" (pp. I96-96). L. P. Elwell-Sutton, "Nationalism and Neutralism in Iran," MEJ, XII (I958), p. 3I, however, stresses that more intellectuals are reviving traditional Iranian values because of hostility to the West, while T. C. Young, "The Problem of Westernization in Modern Iran," MEJ, II (I948), 47-59, takes an intermediate position. It would seem that Islam has little influence on intellectuals and what revival there is, is either nationalist, which is always strong in non-colonial countries, or non-intellectual in its appeal.

^13. On Iranian bitterness toward the West see Elwell-Sutton, op. cit.

^14. See N. Berkes, "The Historical Background of Turkish Secularism," and D. A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey I920-I955," in Frye, op. cit.; on the secularism of Iranian revolutionaries see particularly the discussion of the Persian Revolution in Razi, op. cit.

^15. Cf. Seyyid Jamal ed-Din al-Afghani, Refutation of the Materialists (in French trans.; Paris, I942), pp. 23, 25: "But Ahmed Kahn and his companions, just as they incited others to abandon religion, despised the interests of their country and made it easier to submit souls to what foreigners wanted…. These materialists became for the English government a sort of army in India…. The English saw that this means was the most rapid to attain their goal: the weakness of Islam and the Muslims." Similar ideals were held by Tilak and Hindu groups about the Moderates and R. M. Roy. A recent extreme example of this view is Muhammad al-Ghazzali, Our Beginning in Wisdom (Washington, I953), pp. xv, 54: "At last it has become clear to us that there exists a widespread conspiracy plotted by religious and cultural imperialism against Islam. The purpose of this conspiracy has been to destroy the position which Islam occupies in the hearts of the faithful and annihilate every hope in those who fight against infidelism and imperialism … the faction which works for the separation of Egypt from Islam is really a shameless, pernicious, and perverse group of European puppets and slaves."

^16. Dr. U Kyaw Thet, "Continuity in Burma: The Survival of Historical Forces," Atlan tic (February, I958), II7-2I, notes that Buddhism could change its nature after its alliance with the local monarchy was ended by British rule. He also notes the new use of Buddhism for national identification: "Painfully aware that their national pride—even their continued existence—was manifestly debatable, the Burmese had to produce something tangible and traditional to justify their future as a separate entity. They found what was needed in Bud dhism. The assorted Europeans might be richer, stronger, better trained, but it was com forting to know that all this was as nothing because they did not possess the jewel of the true faith. Buddhism began at this stage to acquire nationalist overtones, and, at the same time, its individualism became increasingly significant" (p. II9).

^17. Cf. Wertheim, op. cit., chap. viii, on the role of Dutch rule in spreading Islam. Islam became first a means of self-identification and later a base for nationalism.

^18. The role of the Palestine problem in the Arab reaction against Western liberalism is noted by Polk, op. cit. Just before World War II, "the growing feeling of desperation over Palestine had produced a retreat from Westernization. It was the glorious days of the Arab Empire and the hardihood of the bedouin warrior which dominated the emotions of the young men in those days…" (p. 28I). And after the Palestine War, the "vast majority of Arabs blamed the West entirely for their defeat…. Arab inability to stop this process had itself been a result of trying to become Western" (p. 303).

^19. I have not seen the argument on India and China developed elsewhere. It is suggested in B. I. Schwartz, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the Acceptance of the Modern West," JHI, XII (January, I95I), p. 67.

^20. Bernard Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," in von Grunebaum, Unity and Variety, notes the strong traditional identity of the Turks with Islam and (p. 3I2) the importance of the fact that Turkey has never been colonial in explaining their westernism. Elsewhere Lewis notes long Turkish contacts with the West and Turkish character as other reasons for westernism. Arguments based on national character seem doubtful when character is assessed after an intellectual change is noted which may itself have affected "character."

^21. Cf. Polk, op. cit., p. 260: "The Arab young men who also studied in the West felt much the same way as the ‘Young Turks' and if one substituted the word ‘Arab' for ‘Turk' their opposition programs read almost identically." Lewis, op. cit., notes that to I9I8 the Turks and Arabs shared in westernization, but, he says: "Since I9I8 there has been a com plete divergence. In Turkey the stream has been broadened and deepened; elsewhere it has been deflected or turned back" (p. 3I3).

^22. On Ch'en see Schwartz, op. cit., and Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cam bridge, Mass., I95I). Lu Hsun's "Ah W," "Diary of a Madman," and other stories available in English show great bitterness to the Chinese past, while Pa Chin's The Family is equally bitter. The stories of Tagore, the novels of Narayan, and the voluminous writings of M. N. Roy are easily available in English.

^23. On imperialism as a cause of communalism see W. C. Smith, Modern Islam, Part II, chap. i.