

WESTERN RULE VERSUS WESTERN
VALUES: SUGGESTIONS FOR
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ASIAN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY¹

Cross-cultural comparisons are more difficult in intellectual than in economic or social history both because patterns of belief vary even more than patterns of society and because there is no valid way to prove the relative importance of different ideas. In Asia, perhaps even more than elsewhere, the borders between intellectual history and political expediency are also often cloudy, so that it may be necessary to deal on the same terms with new ideas and with political propaganda which may not even be firmly believed by its author. The particularly close ties

1. An earlier version of this paper was read by Robert N. Bellah, William Brinner, Wolfram Eberhard, C. H. and Katherine George, H. A. R. Gibb, Wells Keddie, Joseph R. Levenson, James Liu, and Benjamin I. Schwartz, all of whom gave encouragement and helpful suggestions for revision. The addition of bibliographical footnotes was at the suggestion of some of these readers. These footnotes make no claim to completeness, and include only Western language works I have read and found useful. Responsibility for opinions and errors is of course mine.

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between intellectual, political, and social issues in modern Asia, however, mean that analytical studies of intellectual history can shed light on the whole transformation of Asian society. The very difficulty of finding valid comparisons should encourage attempts to do so in order to help explain the bewildering series of intellectual changes which have occurred in each Asian culture. A scholarly comparative study of intellectual history would require extraordinary linguistic ability and patience. The growing number of works on various aspects of modern Asian intellectual history and of translations of sources, however, enables scholars to attempt generalizations regarding the basis of material available in Western languages.² Such generalizations can illuminate specific problems of intellectual history and can indicate basic

2. Among analytical books in English which deal entirely or in part with modern Asian intellectual history are (1) ISLAM: Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (London, 1933); George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (Philadelphia, 1939); Edward G. Browne, *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia* (Cambridge, 1914); Richard N. Frye (ed.), *Islam and the West* ('s-Gravenhage, 1957), G. E. von Grunebaum, *Islam*, and (ed.), *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (both Chicago, 1955); William R. Polk et al., *Backdrop to Tragedy* (Boston, 1957); E. E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks* (Princeton, 1957); W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton, 1957), and *Modern Islam in India* (London, 1946); and T. Cuyler Young (ed.), *Near Eastern Culture and Society* (Princeton, 1951). (2) INDIA: Joan V. Bondurant and Margaret W. Fisher, *Indian Approaches to a Socialist Society* (Berkeley, 1956); W. Theodore de Bary et al., *Sources of the Indian Tradition* (New York, 1958); D. Mackenzie Brown, *The White Umbrella* (Berkeley, 1958); and J. N. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India* (New York, 1915). (3) FAR EAST: John K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, *China's Response to the West* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance* (Chicago, 1934); Nobutaka Iko, *The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan* (Baltimore, 1950); Joseph R. Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate* (Berkeley, 1958) and *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953); George B. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan* (New York, 1950), Arthur Wright (ed.), *Studies in Chinese Thought* (Chicago, 1953); and Mary C. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism* (Stanford, 1957). (4) SOUTHEAST ASIA: R. Emerson et al., *Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1942); W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition* (The Hague, 1956) and *Eastern and Western World* (The Hague, 1953). Two useful dissertations from the University of California, Berkeley, are G. H. Razi, "Religion and Politics in Iran," and Fred R. von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism in Indonesia." The works cited by Brown, Browne, de Bary, and Fairbank contain extensive original selections. Such selections are also found in the Asian country supplements to the *Atlantic Monthly* and in special issues of *Life and Letters*. Journals with frequent scholarly articles on modern Asian intellectual history include the *Journal of Asian Studies*, the *Journal of the History of Ideas*, the *Journal of World History*, the *Middle East Journal*, and *Middle Eastern Affairs*.

Translations of original material are scarce for the Middle East in English. The magazines mentioned, the American Council of Learned Societies Near Eastern series, and some poetry and fiction, particularly Persian and Egyptian, help fill the gap. Egypt is included here because of its close ties with Arab Asia. Translations for most other areas are easier to find.

similarities and differences in the Western impact on different Asian countries.

At one time it seemed to many that modern Asian intellectual history showed "traditionalism" giving way gradually to "westernization." This belief has the virtue of simplicity and can still stand as the most elementary level of generalization. Since the late nineteenth century, however, "westernization" has been complicated by the rise of communism and of right-wing irrationalism to challenge nineteenth-century middle-class beliefs. To Asians communism is partly a Western value system aiming, as did liberalism, at a thorough reorganization of traditional society; but it is special in several ways. For purposes of the following discussion, the fact that communism has not been associated with Western imperialism is most crucial. Right-wing reaction in Asia is much further away from what has been considered Western, since it is associated with a passionate defense of supposed traditional values rather than a literal adoption of new Western ideas.

Not only does the growing complexity of what may be meant by Western values challenge the picture of progressive adoption of these values by Asians, but so also does the fact that many Asian intellectuals have abandoned Western ideas in favor of what are thought to be traditional ones. In every Asian country, notably in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century India and Indonesia and more recently in the Arab countries and Pakistan, intellectuals have reasserted traditional, particularly religious, values as a better guide for their peoples than the Western liberalism espoused by many of their predecessors. Generalizations on modern Asian intellectual history must therefore go beyond the simple view of progressive westernization in order to be truly applicable.

I

Since the hypothesis to be examined in detail in this paper concerns differences between Asian countries, some common features in the intellectual contact between Asians and the West will first be noted to prevent a distorted emphasis.

The traditional value systems of Asia show certain similarities in social and political approach, for all their rich variety in metaphysics and ethics and in popular belief. These similarities reflect certain social and economic similarities in premodern Asia. Thus, most dominant Asian

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value systems before the Western impact were tradition-oriented and favored social stability and some form of social hierarchy. Progress was no more a feature of Asian thought before the nineteenth century than it was of European before the eighteenth. Defections from traditional systems were likely to be mystical or utopian-messianic, individualist or rebellious, rather than revolutionary.

Japan was exceptional in both intellectual and social development. There a transition from feudalism to capitalism was apparently well along before 1853, and intellectual similarities to Protestantism have been noted for the period before Western contact.³ Japan became the only country to modernize successfully under an ideologically neotraditional government, the relation of modernizing to traditional intellectual trends differing sharply there from the rest of Asia. Japanese intellectual life has therefore been exceptional and can be tied only tentatively to some of the generalizations to be made about Asian intellectual history.

Some have argued that other Asian countries were also moving toward capitalism. In the intellectual sphere, such things as Chinese scientific textual criticism in the early Ch'ing and Indian movements which resemble Protestantism have been noted (and denied) as evidence of basic change.⁴ Whatever the merits of such claims, it seems clear that

3. On religious similarities, see Edwin O. Reischauer, *Japan, Past and Present* (New York, 1946), especially p. 60: "It is, indeed, a curious fact that the popular Buddhism of feudal Japan had in many ways come to resemble Christianity more than historic Buddhism. Reversing the basic pessimism of the early faith, it had come to stress a real after-life and salvation through faith. And the early religious reformers, in their translations of the scriptures, their creation of lay congregations, their marriage of the clergy, their militant sectarianism, and their nascent nationalism, resembled to a surprising degree the Protestant reformers of Europe. These religious trends, coupled with the development of a feudal system which found much closer parallels in medieval Europe than in East Asia, make the early feudal period in Japan a time for startling comparisons with Europe and strong contrasts with other countries of the Far East." See also Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion* (Glencoe, Ill., 1957). On the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Japan see E. H. Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York, 1940), and Thomas C. Smith, *Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan* (Stanford, 1955), which revises Norman's conclusions about the classes responsible for the Meiji restoration.

4. To a large extent the argument over Asian progressivism has become a Communist-anti-Communist one, with each side possibly having a priori commitments. The Communists stress the monolithic development of all history and, like some Asian nationalists, the negative role of the Western impact. Anti-Communists are often committed to belief in a special, stable type of Asian society and stress the progressive role of the West. It seems to me that neither side has given enough evidence to prove its point and that the truth might even lie between the two, i.e., that Asia was changing, but so slowly that capitalism would not have developed for centuries, or that some Asian countries were changing fundamentally, while for others this cannot be proved.

social and intellectual change had not gone far in most of Asia at the time of early Western contact and that the problems of social and intellectual transition involved a more serious break with the past for the rest of Asia than for Japan.

The intellectual impact of the West was due largely to the economic, social, and political changes which Western control brought to Asian society. Modern Asian intellectual history does not evidence simply traditional cultural borrowing of ideas. Rather, society was transformed with unprecedented rapidity; new social classes developed, while old groups saw their traditional status transformed, often in a cruel and bewildering way. The Western impact created the possibility and desire for fundamental social change. At the same time, however, the West was an oppressor, discouraging the very change for which it provided the prerequisites, and this complicated the role of borrowing.

The ambivalence of Asian intellectual reaction to the West is partly a response to the contradictory role of the West in Asia. On the one hand, many Asians are attracted to the values and achievements of Western society, while, on the other hand, they dislike most of what the West has done in Asia. In addition to this dichotomy in attitudes there is another basic split in Asian intellectual reactions. There must be some accommodation of traditional to modern ideas, since a complete break with the cultural past is impossible. Intellectuals often try to work out a synthesis between their own and Western value systems and even to make what is foreign appear indigenous. The propensity to deny a foreign parentage for a modern idea is strengthened by the fact that the foreigner is already disliked as an oppressor.⁵

There is a tendency, particularly in those countries which have adopted Western value systems most completely, to speak of new ideas as "modern" rather than "Western." Although this paper uses the more usual Western term, it should be noted that the use of "modern" has a scientific and not just psychological validity. Once Asian countries had

5. This and some other trends noted here are discussed in relation to China in Levenson, *Confucian China*, and in Mary Matossian, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VI (April, 1958), 217–28. As Matossian notes, one can make comparisons between modern Asia and other areas confronted with problems of westernization. Russia, in particular, seems to have an intellectual history comparable to later developments in Asia, with the Slavophiles and westernizers similar to the neotraditionalists and iconoclastic nationalists in China and elsewhere. The resemblance between Tolstoi and Gandhi is striking; Russia, like Asia, shows the appeal of Marxism not only to radicals but to liberals (i.e., the "Legal Marxists"), probably because it provides a non-insulting explanation of backwardness and a weapon against reactionary government.

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developed new internal needs and potentialities, new ideas were applicable to them, not because they were Western, but because they were valid or useful in a new situation. In fact, some of the similarities between modern Asian and Western thought are not based on borrowing but on a reaction to similar circumstances. The attempt, noted below, of Asian modernists to purify their traditions of "corrupting" accretions, for example, was usually not based on conscious analogy with Protestantism. Traditional and recent Asian contributions to scientific advance and social theory should also not be ignored, and as time goes on "modern" will increasingly be a more accurate term than "Western."

The tensions of ambivalence toward the West and toward one's own culture produced a number of similar reactions in Asia. In each country there have been those primarily concerned with defending the old tradition, those who try to alter the tradition to bring it more in line with Western values, and those who reject tradition.

Among those who are primarily defenders of tradition and who recognize the Western challenge the following common trends can be noted in different Asian countries:

1. A tendency to merge originally divergent traditions to meet the Western attack. Schools of thought which once conflicted are robbed of much positive content, and defenders of tradition often take their ideas from many unconnected sources. In part this reflects a tendency in Asia toward less intellectual or religious exclusiveness than in the West. (The Chinese idea that a man is a Confucian while in office and a Taoist when out of office, the simultaneous worship of Buddhist and Shinto deities in *The Tale of Genji*, and the latitude of Hindu belief all come to mind.) But the modern tendency is found even among the "exclusive" Shi'a and Sunni Moslems in pan-Islam, and in all Asia eclecticism seems to cover an unprecedented range of philosophic and religious traditions. There has been a similar trend in the West where Christians, in response to attack, have tended to gloss over denominational differences. Both Christians and Asians have also claimed that all religions are basically the same. In the eighteenth century this claim was an attack on positive religion, but today it is primarily a defense of religion in the face of non-religious alternatives.

2. The defense of tradition as more of a romantic attachment to the past than as a coherent set of ideas and beliefs. This goes with the merging of traditions, since the grandeur of a tradition is more important than its consistency or efficacy. As W. C. Smith has noted in *Islam in*

Modern History, traditional ideas become sources of consolation and admiration rather than a guide to positive action or consistent belief. Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Shinto also get romantic homage. And, as others have noted, romantic admiration for a tradition in itself changes the role of the tradition. What was once a practical guide of universal applicability becomes a consoling proof of a special national genius.⁶

3. The early idea of taking from the West only material things while retaining the spiritual and intellectual content of one's own culture. This later develops into denunciations of the West as materialistic and praise of the East as spiritual. Various degrees of East-West eclecticism with emphasis on the superiority of the Eastern contribution grow up on the basis of the spiritual-material dichotomy.

4. The use by some of appeals to tradition as a means of denying or suppressing class and social conflict. This is seen particularly where "neotraditionalism" is used to bolster a government, as in Japan from 1868 to 1945, Kuomintang China from 1927 to 1949, and contemporary Pakistan. In countries where peasants are strongly attached to tradition, this can be quite effective. Appeal to tradition as a means to social stability is also found in Western conservatism since Burke.

Among those thinkers and trends concerned more with modernizing than simply with defending traditions, there may also be noted common trends in different Asian countries:

1. A tendency to look for the "secret of the West" in certain things which might with relative ease be adopted in one's own country. Constitutionalism was often advocated as a panacea, and such things as separation of church and state or self-rule have also been looked upon as the solution to all problems. Such simplification was necessary to build successful political movements combining people with different interests and levels of understanding. The simplifications, however, seem to have been believed by many intellectuals, who could not be expected to comprehend in a short time the bases of Western differences from Asia.

2. A reinterpretation of dominant traditions to bring them more in line with Western ideas and new realities. This includes "purification" of the tradition of "corrupting" elements and reliance on a few original

6. The romanticism and new content of modern Confucianism is stressed in Levenson, *Confucian China*, and Mary Wright, *op. cit.*, in their discussions of its recent use by conservative nationalists. Gibb, *op. cit.*, p. 105, notes the "paralyzing romanticism" of even modernist Islam.

figures and writings. The purification usually does bring the tradition more in line with modern ethical and social standards, since most traditions at one time were powerful reform movements. It also weakens the authority of the priesthood or other existing conservative interpreters of traditions and, since only a few writings or individuals are accepted as authorities, opens the way for wider latitude of opinion. The purification trend is seen in Confucian reformism, modern Hinduism, and Islamic modernism. In some ways it is comparable to Protestantism.

Along with purification, there is a tendency to represent one's tradition as progressive—welcoming social, intellectual, and religious change. This can be seen in K'ang Yu-wei's discussion of three stages of society in Confucianism, Iqbal's dynamic interpretation of Islam, and the insistence of many Islamic modernists on the possibility of change through a consensus of the community. There is also a tendency to read the present into the past, in maintaining that one's tradition was scientific, democratic, and, latterly, even socialist. The West has seen similar reinterpretations of tradition, but the psychological need to justify the new by the old has not been as great in the West, where the new was indigenous.

3. The modernists have shown what might be called "negative" eclecticism toward their tradition. They have, that is, rejected or often simply ignored most of their tradition but, on the other hand, have extracted ideas from the most varied sources to support the contention that their tradition is basically compatible with Western values.

Some intellectuals fall between the clearly modernist and the clearly traditionalist, and there are also certain common trends which cannot be discussed under the exclusive headings of traditionalism and modernism. Among these are:

1. The rise of nationalism, which may be primarily traditional, reforming, or iconoclastic, depending on the relations of the country concerned to the West and the social role of the nationalist ideology in question. All except iconoclastic nationalism make a selective use of cultural material from the past to support present demands. Within each country there is tension between iconoclastic and pro-cultural nationalism, which never seems to be resolved completely.

2. A change, often in the same individual, from early admiration and support of Western values to a later defense of tradition and rejection of the West. Reassertion of the superior value of one's own culture often appears after an event showing the moral and social culpability of the

West—suppression of a national movement, a world war, or an economic depression.

3. The strong impact of certain historical events of Asian social thought in nearly all countries. Among these were the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution of 1905; World War I and the Russian Revolution of 1917; the world economic depression of the 1930's; and the emergence of Asia as an independent world force after World War II. Each of these has encouraged nationalism and revolutionary thought in Asia.

4. Rapid passage in Asian countries deeply affected by the West from one intellectual position to another. The answers of one generation to the Western challenge are nearly always inadequate for the next generation. Older thinkers may be admired and appealed to as authorities, but their ideas are generally altered by their admirers. That "intellectual obsolescence" has been even more rapid in Asia than in the West is largely because Asians have travelled a greater social and intellectual distance in the last hundred years. Also, Asians today are faced with problems for which both traditional Asian and traditional Western solutions are inadequate.

Any of the foregoing generalizations might have to be modified in the light of more detailed study, but such study should also indicate similarities in Asian ideas which have not been noted.⁷ Enough has been said to indicate that there existed comparable responses to comparable economic, social, and political challenges in different Asian countries, however varied the traditions of these countries may have been.

7. Among other possible similarities between several Asian countries are: (1) Popular messianic movements which may appear shortly after the first strong Western impact and incorporate either borrowed ideas or new concepts of social equality and religious universalism. Among these are the Babis in Iran, the T'ai-p'ings in China, and movements for a *ratu adil* (just prince) in Indonesia, all of which were rebellious. The Ahmadiyya movement in Muslim India shows some similarities. (2) A tendency to blame either foreigners or historic accidents for the corruption of one's own basically good culture. Cf. Sayed Kotb, *Social Justice in Islam* (Washington, 1953), p. 229: "The change which overtook the system and the development of politics . . . was the product of an unfortunate mischance. The mischance was that control should fall into the hands of the Umayyads." Iranians often blame the Arabs, the Mongols, and the West, and similar ideas are found elsewhere. (3) The appeal of Marxism and socialism to liberals as well as to radicals. Reasons for this are noted in n. 5, and the wide use of socialist slogans today is also partly opportunistic and based on a need to differentiate one's position from the capitalist West. In countries where neotraditionalism is strong, socialism is often identified with the local tradition and presented as a "third way" between the Soviet Union and the West.

II

For all the similarities to be found in intellectual developments in different parts of Asia, there remains the fact that differences seem to be as striking as resemblances. Such differences are partly due to the specific local traditions, which varied widely on such things as the importance of religious as compared to secular thought, belief in social mobility or hereditary hierarchy, individualistic or communally organized religion, the relation of church and state, and many other questions. Divergent traditions could only be expected to react differently to the Western impact, and it is this basis of different reactions which has most often been noted.

Another reason for differences in Asian reaction has been the particular history of each country. When did the Westerners first arrive, what Western ideas were spread, how close was each country geographically to a liberal or revolutionary country, how bad were economic and social conditions? Such questions bear on the divergence of intellectual trends. The time sequence of a country's relations with the West may also affect intellectual developments. Even the common features noted above occurred at different times and often with a different sequence in various countries.

This paper will be primarily devoted to a hypothesis which helps explain the divergencies in intellectual approach in different Asian countries. This hypothesis will try to point out a rational pattern in these divergencies, and may supplement consideration of the specific local tradition and the details of each country's modern history. In presenting a hypothesis, the author tries to avoid questions about the value of either particular Asian traditions or Western ideas. Those who hold on to or reshape old traditions undoubtedly believe they do so because of the value of those traditions, but we still need an explanation of why other traditions with important values have given way more completely to ideas from the West.

The hypothesis, aimed at helping to explain why intellectuals in some countries have been more westernizing and in others have turned from early Western tendencies to neotraditionalism, is:

In countries without direct colonial experience but with extended contact with the West intellectual leaders have tended increasingly to drop traditional values and adopt Western values. In colonial countries, however, an early trend toward identification with the West has been re-

versed by many thinkers and met by a reaffirmation of modified traditions.

To state the basis for this hypothesis most briefly: In India, the early westernizing religion and reformism of Ram Mohan Roy and of moderates like Gokhale and Ranade was countered with increasing effectiveness, first, in the religious sphere by men like Dayananda Saraswati, Ramakrishna, and Vivekananda and, then, in the political by neotraditionalists like Tilak and Gandhi. Among Indian Moslems the development has been similar, from the pro-British westernism of Sir Seyyid Ahmad Khan and his followers to the neotraditionalism of the Khilafat movement and the later supporters of an Islamic state. Among Moslems the development took place later, largely for socioeconomic reasons, whereas among Hindus there has already been a considerable movement back toward westernization.⁸ Powerful assertions of the superiority of traditional Indian political and moral ideas are still found, however, even among professed socialists.

In another colonial area, the Arab world, one can see similar trends, occurring later than in India and Pakistan. The modernism of Muhammad Abduh and, even more, the westernism of many political and intellectual leaders in the interwar period have since been replaced by increasing appeals to the Arab-Islamic past as the source of inspiration.

It seems unnecessary to deal at length with the question of the sincerity of certain appeals to Islam or traditional Hinduism. It may be true that the average Arab or Pakistani intellectual is hardly more religious than his Turkish counterpart or that appeals for cow-protection

8. W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam*, p. 170: "Just as the Hindū middle classes, developing earlier, had earlier produced in the Brāhmo Samāj their parallel to Sir Sayyid Ahmad's universalist movement; so they now produced, again earlier, in the Āryā Samāj and its fellows, their parallel to aggressive Islamic 'liberalism.' Politically, the parallel is between the Bengal radicalism and the later Khilāfat movement."

Westerners, thinking of men like Nehru, often overestimate the westernism of Indian thought. For the extreme of rejection of Western values by Gandhi, see the several citations in Matossian, *op. cit.* Even liberal Indians are often defensive about such things as the past role of caste, reading into it such virtues as cultural autonomy, individualism, and democracy. Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (London, 1940), in a typical passage on the four *varnas*: "The social organism expected from each man his duties but guaranteed to each subsistence and opportunity for self-expression. The spirit of competition was unknown. Regulative control, even if coercive, is less tyrannical than blind competition. It secures for the largest number of individuals effective freedom in non-economic and cultural spheres. . . . In a real sense, the fourfold scheme is democratic. Firstly, it insists on the spiritual equality of all men. . . . Secondly, it makes for individuality in a positive sense. . . ." (pp. 367-68).

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by Indian neotraditionalists were based more on hope of popular support than on conviction of the sacredness of cows. The fact that colonial nationalists speak much more in neotraditional terms than do non-colonial nationalists still merits explanation.

The author is not familiar enough with other Asian colonies to state a case with certainty. In Burma, however, Buddhism has been an extremely strong element in national revival until today. In Indonesia, also, early westernism was replaced by Islamic nationalism in such organizations as the Sarekat Islam, and there is still a movement for an Islamic state.⁹ In Indonesia, as in India, the stage of domination of the national movement by neotraditionalism has already passed.

Since time differences in different colonies' reactions have been mentioned, it should be noted that neotraditionalism seems to be particularly strong at two points in the development of a colonial or recently liberated country: (1) at the beginning of a radical nationalist movement, when neotraditionalism provides an effective alternative to the Western ideology of the colonial power, and (2) when the community feels itself under attack, either by the West or by another powerful rival. Since these periods do not coincide in different colonies, both the timing and duration of neotraditionalism will vary. Differences between traditions and the details of local history may also be responsible for variations in the relative strength and duration of neotraditionalism.

In non-colonial countries with extensive contact with the West, however, traditionalism has tended to be strongest in the early period of extensive Western contact—just when Western liberalism was appealing to many colonial intellectuals. The appeal of traditionalism and neotraditionalism has gradually eroded, however, and Western values have found increasing adoption. There have been temporary or minor reincorporations of tradition, to be sure, but these have tended to stress popular rather than dominant traditions and have not reached the extent or intensity of colonial neotraditionalism.

To take China first, defense of tradition was the leading strain among Chinese thinkers until K'ang Yu-wei, and even he is best classified as a neotraditionalist. The nineteenth-century self-strengtheners were most anxious to preserve Confucian values while only borrowing material necessities from the West. In Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Sun Yat-sen there

9. Von der Mehden, *op. cit.*, notes Buddhism as a strong feature of nationalism in Ceylon, Indo-China, and Burma and discusses at length Islamic nationalism in Indonesia (pp. 31-34 ff.).

appear more westernizing notes, while the May Fourth movement and subsequent radical nationalism and communism were primarily iconoclastic. To be sure, Chiang K'ai-shek's government stressed neotraditionalism, but this was much more a governmental than an intellectual trend.¹⁰

In Turkey, also, early traditionalism gave way first to attempts to blend Eastern and Western values and later to antitraditional secular nationalism. In the case of Ataturk, official policy went in the direction of intellectual trends. And, even though there is much talk of Islamic revival today, there is little similarity now between Turkish and Arab intellectuals. The former are nearly all convinced of the value of a secular state and devote little time to Islamic apologetics.¹¹

The cases of Japan and Iran are a bit more cloudy but seem to go along with the general non-colonial tendency. As has been mentioned, in Japan modernism and traditionalism existed in an exceptional combination. Still, if we speak primarily of "free" intellectuals rather than government propagandists, it seems that the appeal of Western values has progressively grown in Japan, though not without some contrary swings of the pendulum.

Iranian intellectual life has not been characterized by as thoroughgoing westernization as that of modern Japan, China, and Turkey; but in this century there has never been the domination of intellectual life by Islamic neotraditionalism that there has been in the Arab countries or in Pakistan, despite the temporary political strength of Khashani. On the whole, Western secular ideals, or simply cynicism which might be considered either Western or Iranian, have been stronger among intellectuals than has neotraditionalism.¹²

10. In countries which discourage dissent it is difficult to distinguish intellectual trends from government policies. In general, it can be said that Nasser, Ataturk, and Mao Tse-tung represent trends which had strength among intellectuals before becoming governmental, while this is less true of Chiang or Japan in the 1930's. Only the former group will be discussed as reflecting major intellectual trends.

11. See the discussion of Turkey in W. C. Smith, *Islam*.

12. There are differences of opinion about contemporary Iranian intellectuals. According to F. Kazemzadeh in Frye, *op. cit.*: "As far as the educated classes are concerned, it would be safe to say that they have turned their backs completely on Islam. . . . The unmitigated poverty of the masses, humiliation before the West, the loss of traditional Islamic values, all have produced among Iranian intellectuals a state of mind which is best described as *Bazarovshchina*, a type of cultural, and sometimes moral nihilism. . . . Such an attitude rejects not only Islam but also the classical traditions of Persian culture. . . . What a part of Russia's intelligentsia experienced a hundred years ago, some Iranian intellectuals are experiencing

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It is possible to explain the slightly divergent case of Iran without much damage to the colonial–non-colonial theory. Iran has probably been closer to being a colony for a long period of time than has any other Asian non-colonial country. The Russo-British division of spheres of influence in 1907, the Russian suppression of the revolution in 1911 and continued military occupation of Iran, the presence of foreign troops and governmental control during both world wars, and the continuing dominant influence of foreign oil interests have brought Iran almost within the colonial sphere. Western interests were also strong in China but not quite so all-pervasive; nor was there the same feeling of helplessness among the six hundred million Chinese as there is among many of the twenty million Iranians. Iranian bitterness and belief in continued Western control is strong today, and dislike of the West may pass over into either anti-Western traditional revivalism or into cynicism.¹³

The point is not that a country is colonial if it “feels” colonial and hence may take on some attributes of colonial intellectual history. In most cases the feeling is based on reality, and Iran cannot be said to be free in the same sense as India or Indonesia are today.

It may be that other areas of Asia do not fit the hypothesis, but it seems to work for most countries. It remains to examine why colonialism should have the effect here attributed to it.

III

The most obvious reason why colonialism should lead to neotraditionalism and non-colonialism to Western ideas may be summarized as follows: In colonial countries the West is the main oppressor, and neotraditionalism is an alternative to the oppressive West and its ideology. In non-colonial countries traditional rulers are the main oppressors and westernization is the logical progressive alternative to traditional misrule. As a corollary to this, in the colonies it was gradualists who wanted to work with Western rulers for reform who first adopted Western

now” (pp. 196–96). L. P. Elwell-Sutton, “Nationalism and Neutralism in Iran,” *MEJ*, XII (1958), p. 31, however, stresses that more intellectuals are reviving traditional Iranian values because of hostility to the West, while T. C. Young, “The Problem of Westernization in Modern Iran,” *MEJ*, II (1948), 47–59, takes an intermediate position. It would seem that Islam has little influence on intellectuals and what revival there is, is either nationalist, which is always strong in non-colonial countries, or non-intellectual in its appeal.

13. On Iranian bitterness toward the West see Elwell-Sutton, *op. cit.*

ideas, and revolutionary nationalists had to provide a different ideology for national identification. In non-colonial countries gradualism was associated with traditionalism and radical nationalism was westernizing.

Thus, to start with non-colonial China, Confucianism was associated with a traditional government and way of life which proved inadequate for the modern world. True, some early twentieth-century revolutionists thought of “foreign” Manchu misrule rather than Confucian misrule, but on the whole the inability of Confucianism to reform or meet the problems of the modern world became increasingly evident. Similarly, in Turkey traditional Islam was associated with misrule by the sultan and the reactionary clergy, and the halfway measures of reforming ministers proved as ineffective as similar efforts in China. The ideas of Turkish intellectuals became increasingly westernizing and secular as the impossibility of reform within the old framework was proved. In Iran, also, radical nationalism has been associated with westernization since the Revolution of 1905–11.¹⁴ In all three cases the guardians of the main tradition were the “reactionary” classes who had to be uncompromisingly opposed by thoroughgoing nationalists and reformers. Advocacy of reforming the tradition proved impracticable and came increasingly to mean compromise with the reactionaries. It became necessary to be in sharp opposition to the old regime ideologically as well as in practice, and Western progressivism was the best expression of such ideological opposition.

In the colonies, on the other hand, the main enemy of progressive nationalists was the Western government. With Westerners as the chief reactionaries, nationalists had to have a non-Western ideology to support their struggle. Here again ideological compromise implied political compromise, as with the moderates and Seyyid Ahmad Khan.¹⁵ With

14. See N. Berkes, “The Historical Background of Turkish Secularism,” and D. A. Rustow, “Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920–1955,” in Frye, *op. cit.*; on the secularism of Iranian revolutionaries see particularly the discussion of the Persian Revolution in Razi, *op. cit.*

15. Cf. Seyyid Jamal ed-Din al-Afghani, *Refutation of the Materialists* (in French trans.; Paris, 1942), pp. 23, 25: “But Ahmed Kahn and his companions, just as they incited others to abandon religion, despised the interests of their country and made it easier to submit souls to what foreigners wanted. . . . These materialists became for the English government a sort of army in India. . . . The English saw that this means was the most rapid to attain their goal: the weakness of Islam and the Muslims.” Similar ideals were held by Tilak and Hindu groups about the Moderates and R. M. Roy. A recent extreme example of this view is Muhammad al-Ghazzali, *Our Beginning in Wisdom* (Washington, 1953), pp. xv, 54: “At last it has become clear to us that there exists a widespread conspiracy plotted by re-

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a different alternative to oppose, a different nationalist solution was found, one which stated the superiority of the traditional culture to the West. Since the traditional culture was no longer particularly associated with an oppressive ruling class, as it had been before colonial conquest, it could be accommodated to new goals more easily than it could in the non-colonial countries. Nationalist leaders could win over the population to *their* interpretation of Hinduism or Islam, whatever some brahmans or the ulema might say, and could introduce reforms into the tradition more easily than in the non-colonial countries. In the latter, not only would reinterpretation appear as compromise with oppression, but reformed traditionalists had to compete with a ruling elite which had the power of the state to back up its interpretation of tradition.¹⁶

The foregoing explanation does not ignore the fact that Western governments and traditional ruling classes were usually allied in both colonial and non-colonial countries. This fact helps account for many of the intellectual similarities in the two groups. But the primary ruler and oppressor were different in the two. In the non-colonial countries the overthrow of traditional governments which were amenable to Western control was a necessary prelude to ending that control. Here the case of Turkey, where the rejection of the sultan-caliph was needed to save the country from Western dismemberment and control, is a clear example. In the colonies the foreign government was the primary oppressor, and its overthrow had to precede attack on the old ruling classes who profited from foreign rule. Opposition to their own government thus had priority among non-colonial nationalists, and opposition to the foreign government came first among colonial nationalists.

ligious and cultural imperialism against Islam. The purpose of this conspiracy has been to destroy the position which Islam occupies in the hearts of the faithful and annihilate every hope in those who fight against infidelism and imperialism . . . the faction which works for the separation of Egypt from Islam is really a shameless, pernicious, and perverse group of European puppets and slaves."

16. Dr. U Kyaw Thet, "Continuity in Burma: The Survival of Historical Forces," *Atlantic* (February, 1958), 117-21, notes that Buddhism could change its nature after its alliance with the local monarchy was ended by British rule. He also notes the new use of Buddhism for national identification: "Painfully aware that their national pride—even their continued existence—was manifestly debatable, the Burmese had to produce something tangible and traditional to justify their future as a separate entity. They found what was needed in Buddhism. The assorted Europeans might be richer, stronger, better trained, but it was comforting to know that all this was as nothing because they did not possess the jewel of the true faith. Buddhism began at this stage to acquire nationalist overtones, and, at the same time, its individualism became increasingly significant" (p. 119).

In some cases the factor of national identification and differentiation from the colonial ruler was as important as the actual venerability of the ideas appealed to. In Indonesia, Islam was barely pre-Western in time and spread along with Western conquest, perhaps even largely because of it. Islam was thus more a system which differentiated Indonesians from Europeans than it was a tradition in the usual sense.¹⁷ To be sure, an anti-Western ideology had to appeal to something deeply felt by the people at the time, but this feeling did not necessarily have to go very far back in time.

In colonial countries, also, the inadequacy of traditional methods to meet modern needs was never shown up in political practice, as it was in non-colonial countries. This fact plus the tendency to glorify tradition as an alternative to Western misrule meant that some anticolonial radical movements had surprisingly reactionary ideals, as did Tilak and the Bengal extremists. An example which clearly shows up the colonial-non-colonial difference is the Khilafat movement among Indian Moslems after World War I. At the very time when Turkish nationalists were throwing off traditional rule and abolishing the caliphate, Moslem Indian nationalists took as their primary aim the restoration of the caliph to his prewar powers. In Turkey pan-Islam and the caliphate were tied to reaction and opposed by progressives. Indian Moslem radicals adopted them in opposition to British imperialism, not having experienced their practical failure to lead to any progressive goal.

Another reason for the colonial-non-colonial difference lies in attacks by missionaries and civil servants on local customs and traditions. Their attitudes, as revealed admiringly in Kipling and deprecatingly in Forster, could not but lead to defensive reactions among colonial nationalists. Seeing his tradition both defeated and disparaged, anyone who did not want to be a mere imitation Westerner without national ties would naturally try to defend that tradition. The disparagement was often so extreme and uninformed that a great part of the defense of tradition was more balanced and intelligent than were the attacks. But to lead a counterattack on Western rule, it was not enough to say "Our values are as good as those of the West." This would leave anyone free to choose among values and their advocates. Rather, it was necessary to say, "Our values are better," and furthermore, that they

17. Cf. Wertheim, *op. cit.*, chap. viii, on the role of Dutch rule in spreading Islam. Islam became first a means of self-identification and later a base for nationalism.

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can incorporate anything that is good from the West. Thus defense changed into counterattack.

Although the Western attack also existed in the non-colonial countries and called forth some of the same response, it did not have the same devastating and humiliating effect which it did in the conquered colonies. This is symbolized by the fact that in the colonies the man who came to be despised as an opportunist was the one who aped the Westerners for personal advancement, while in non-colonial countries the opportunist was more often the mullah or scholar who used *traditional* beliefs for personal advance. Those who supported the ruling ideology were suspect, and those who wanted change had to counter this ideology.

Despite disparagement of the traditional culture by many civil servants and missionaries in colonial countries, official policy was not to interfere in religion or custom in most cases. Even where missionaries and officials tried to change popular belief, they had little success, and the example of Indonesian Islam indicated that peasants, like intellectuals, may have resisted westernization because it was associated with an alien, oppressive ruler. Despite much greater contact with Westerners, colonial peasants have certainly not been more westernizing than have non-colonial; if anything, the trend seems to be the opposite. This meant that when the middle classes arrived at neotraditionalism as a reaction against colonial insults, they were bolstered in this reaction by the continuation of peasant traditionalism, which they could then join in a large popular movement.

A final reason for the colonial–non-colonial difference was growing disillusionment in the colonies with Western practice, which could not so easily be separated from Western theory as it could in the non-colonial countries. The Chinese might dissociate Western gunboats and Western liberalism, but the Indians, who heard liberalism preached by the same men who oppressed them, could hardly do so. It was naturally felt that there must be something wrong with theories which produced such bad practice, and the charges of immorality and materialism came to be laid against Western theory as well as against Western deeds. The Indian Mutiny and the Bengal struggles tended to disillusion Indians, while the two world wars had similar effects in all Asia. The Arabs, who saw themselves as twice betrayed by the West, were particularly embittered. Morality and higher goals were associated with the local tradition or sometimes with communism, which was equally inimical

to the ideologies of the colonial powers. Communism was also appealing in the non-colonial countries, and so it is the traditionalist revulsion from the West which is to be stressed here.

The importance of colonialism and the continuation of Western attacks in encouraging defensive anti-westernizing reaction is seen in the persistence of this reaction among the Arabs compared to the growing concern with more practical questions in India. Feeling for Arab unity is so strong that most Arab intellectuals regard French attacks on Algeria, British control of the Trucial Coast, and perhaps recent expeditions into the Suez, Jordan, and Lebanon as attacks of colonialists on their "nation." They particularly so regard Israel. In this atmosphere most Arab intellectuals are more aggressively defensive, if there can be such a phrase, than are most Indian intellectuals.¹⁸ Even those who basically approve secular and Western values are increasingly pushed to such defensiveness.

To be sure, Pakistan, which is not directly threatened, also sees persistent traditionalism. But this is in part official conservative traditionalism, not shared by the intellectuals, and in part a reflection of the fact that Pakistan's whole existence is based on an "Islamic nation" idea.

If Westerners are inclined to regret the excesses to which defense of tradition may go in Asia, they should remember that this is partly a response to Western excesses. The less humiliated and threatened a people has felt, the less defensive have been its intellectual reactions. Witness the change in Indian nationalism from the extreme defense of the past and tradition in the early twentieth century to a self-critical and reforming approach to tradition as the nationalist movement grew self-confident. The West cannot expect the assessment of traditional and Western values to be completely realistic in areas where the West still poses a strongly feared threat.

The colonial-non-colonial distinction and its causes seem to make sense out of many phenomena which are otherwise hardly explicable. Particularly, they help explain why in China, Turkey, and Iran revolutionary nationalism was associated with attacks on tradition and with

18. The role of the Palestine problem in the Arab reaction against Western liberalism is noted by Polk, *op. cit.* Just before World War II, "the growing feeling of desperation over Palestine had produced a retreat from Westernization. It was the glorious days of the Arab Empire and the hardihood of the bedouin warrior which dominated the emotions of the young men in those days. . ." (p. 281). And after the Palestine War, the "vast majority of Arabs blamed the West entirely for their defeat. . . Arab inability to stop this process had itself been a result of trying to become Western" (p. 303).

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Western ideas, while in India, Indonesia, and the Arab countries revolutionary nationalists have often defended tradition, as they interpret and modify it. The peculiar “revolutionary-reactionary” nature of the ideas of men like Tilak, Gandhi, and Iqbal is a logical reaction to oppressive Western government, while the iconoclastic nationalism of many modern Turks, Iranians, and Chinese is a logical reaction to oppressive traditional government. The fact that neither group can stop at pure westernism or pure antiwesternism is an indication that many of the same problems underlie the intellectual history of both.

IV

It would not be fair to conclude without stating some possible objections to the colonial–non-colonial hypothesis and an attempted response.

One objection is that traditional attitudes are the most important determinant of a country’s reaction to the West. In relation to differences between India and China, the argument could be stated about as follows: India’s dominant cultural tradition has been religious; religion has had strong emotional ties for the masses, making it difficult for an Indian to abandon traditional ways and still be a mass leader. Also, the “proof” of traditional Indian ideas lies outside the world of practice, and appeals to practical failures cannot discredit them. In China, on the other hand, the dominant intellectual tradition was basically secular and drew its justification from practical efficacy. Once this effectiveness was gone, it could be only a matter of time until the theory crumbled. And since religion was less universal and institutionalized in China, there could be no national appeal on a religious basis.¹⁹

This argument has some validity but also presents several difficulties. As has been noted, early intellectual response to the West in India was much more westernizing than in China. Thus what must be explained is an actual reversion from this trend among many Indian thinkers, not merely a conservative love for traditional beliefs.

Some may claim that this reversion came about in order to bring leaders in closer contact with the masses. Tilak, for example, successfully used religious beliefs and festivals to gain support for political ends and combined traditional religious ideas with advocacy of national-

19. I have not seen the argument on India and China developed elsewhere. It is suggested in B. I. Schwartz, “Ch’en Tu-hsiu and the Acceptance of the Modern West,” *JHI*, XII (January, 1951), p. 67.

ism and some social reform. Most of the thinkers who restated traditions were not primarily political leaders concerned with mass appeal, however, and even those who were, such as Tilak, Gandhi, and the Ali brothers, cannot be accused of insincerity in their beliefs. And, to take an example from the other side, the liberal secularism of Nehru has not prevented him from being popular. The reversion from liberal ideas must have other roots than an opportunistic desire for popularity at the expense of truth, however much this may have operated in some cases.

Other inadequacies in the religious–non-religious contrast can be stated. Are there real historical grounds for believing that popular Chinese commitment to religious and other traditional beliefs was weaker than was popular Indian commitment to their beliefs? To say that the fact that the Chinese dropped old beliefs more quickly “proves” this is to argue in circles. Are there grounds for believing that popular Chinese beliefs were more varied, and hence less amenable to use as the basis of a nation-wide political movement, than popular Indian beliefs were? Here most of the evidence seems to be to the contrary. Not only is Hinduism divided into myriad sects and castes with differing beliefs and practices, but the general cultural unity of India has been much less than that of China. Also, the large percentage of non-Hindus in India has made appeal to Hindu tradition as much a divisive as uniting factor and from this point of view should perhaps have been avoided by those who wanted a united India. Cultural minorities who might have been offended by appeals to traditional Chinese beliefs are much smaller.

Also, modern Hinduism did appeal to this world for its justification, and hence the idea that its “otherworldliness,” as contrasted to Confucian practicality, was responsible for its longer life does not hold up. What the neotraditionalists appealed to was not really traditional religion but a synthetic new set of ideas, strongly influenced by the West and by new social realities. Various Hindu revival movements tried to provide Hinduism with a new universal viewpoint, to include ideas like opposition to the existing caste system, a new missionary, social service, practical spirit, and a new nationalism. The appeal of Gandhi was based partly on traditional features such as veneration for the ascetic and truth-seeker, partly on ideas which made up a small part of the Hindu tradition and were used in a new way (i.e., non-violence), and partly on ideas outside the main Western tradition, from Thoreau, Ruskin, and Tolstoi. He also provided a new type of political leader-

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ship which was eminently practical and this-worldly. Lessons were read into the Hindu past by most of the neotraditionalists and then applied to practical new goals.

The foregoing could be illustrated with greater detail and accuracy, but the main point is this: There was no intrinsic reason why combinations of Western ideas with Confucian or popular beliefs could not have been more successful in China; the intellectual obstacles were no greater than in India. Such syntheses might even seem more feasible in China than in India. Chinese practicality, social-mindedness, and belief in social mobility might have been molded into a synthesis with modern ideas which would have both traditional and popular roots. Much greater ingenuity was required to make Indian traditions appear equalitarian and cohesive.

Finally, the religious–non-religious dichotomy does not explain any of the other areas mentioned and is particularly inapplicable to the Arabs and Turks, whose past was so similar. However strongly original cultural differences may have affected Chinese and Indian reactions to the West, these differences do not seem to be an adequate explanation of modern intellectual divergencies.

In the case of the Arabs and the Turks, their differences have been seen as due to the longer contact of the Turks with the West and the peculiar identification of the Arabs with Islam. On the latter point, it is not entirely convincing to point to recent evidence, which may be explained on other grounds, to prove that the Arabs have always felt more tied to Islam than the Turks have. The Turks were also strongly identified with Islam, their pre-Islamic experience being even more prehistorical and dimly recalled than that of the Arabs. The Turks were the chief Islamic rulers for many centuries, possessing the caliphate and other Islamic institutions. Purely on the basis of pre-Western experience, the Turks might have been as defensive about Islam as the Arabs were. The Arabs, on the other hand, might equally as well as the Turks have stressed their pre-Islamic achievements, or they could have emphasized those parts of the Islamic tradition which stressed free thought, philosophical and religious innovation, and scientific discovery.²⁰ Even granting the Arabs a tendency to identify somewhat

20. Bernard Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," in von Grunebaum, *Unity and Variety*, notes the strong traditional identity of the Turks with Islam and (p. 312) the importance of the fact that Turkey has never been colonial in explaining their westernism. Elsewhere Lewis notes long Turkish contacts with the West and Turkish character as other reasons for westernism. Arguments based on national character seem doubtful when character is assessed after an intellectual change is noted which may itself have affected "character."

more strongly with Islam, this hardly seems sufficient to account for the radical difference in intellectual output between the Arabs and the Turks since World War I.

The longer contact of the Turks with the West probably did help inculcate Western ideas, but this could only happen under non-colonial conditions. In most of the world it is the colonies, such as India and Indonesia, which have had the longer and deeper contact with the West and yet have shown strong anti-Westernizing tendencies. Also, Arab and Turkish intellectual trends were quite close in the period before World War I and have only diverged strongly since the Asian Arabs came under Western colonial domination.²¹ The Arab intellectual experience is anything but a later repetition of Turkish experience.

A second objection to the colonial–non-colonial hypothesis is that intellectuals in both colonial and non-colonial countries have appealed to past traditions. Even the westernizing Turks have claimed the glories of all Turkish-descended dynasties, such as the Moghuls, and from Zia Gökalp on have made huge claims for Turkish achievement. Here a distinction must be made between the universal phenomena of nationalism, which tends to invent or revive long-forgotten glories, and traditionalism, which appeals to living religious and intellectual traditions, however modified. It is the latter that tends to be stronger in colonial than in non-colonial countries. To be sure, there is often no clear line between the two, and both may be found in each country, often in the same individual. The difference can be seen, however, between the revival of old Iranian and Turkish achievements by nationalists and the appeal to strongly believed religious sentiments in India and the Arab countries. The former deliberately bypasses living traditions and constructs a new, artificial tradition, often with official sanction, as in Atatürk's Turkey or Japan before World War II. The latter is non-official—at least in origin—popular, and with much deeper roots. The traditionalism of India, Pakistan, and the Arab countries tends more to synthesize living traditions and nationalism than primarily to revive dead national glories.

To make the contrast between the two kinds of traditionalism clearer, take a single country, Iran, which has been noted as something of a

21. Cf. Polk, *op. cit.*, p. 260: "The Arab young men who also studied in the West felt much the same way as the 'Young Turks' and if one substituted the word 'Arab' for 'Turk' their opposition programs read almost identically." Lewis, *op. cit.*, notes that to 1918 the Turks and Arabs shared in westernization, but, he says: "Since 1918 there has been a complete divergence. In Turkey the stream has been broadened and deepened; elsewhere it has been deflected or turned back" (p. 313).

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borderline case between colonialism and non-colonialism. Nationalist traditionalism is seen in the efforts of Reza Shah and his followers to revive Achaemenian and Sassanian traditions. What might be called "traditional traditionalism" or simply neotraditionalism is seen in the Islamic nationalism of Kashani. In Iran, as elsewhere, neotraditionalism tends to speak of the spiritual superiority of the local tradition rather than to emphasize past imperial achievements. Appeals to past national glories support neotraditionalism, but moral and spiritual superiority to the West is a more important feature.

Another possible objection to the hypothesis is that traditional and westernizing trends exist in all Asian countries. In fact, Western values now seem dominant in India and Indonesia, while non-colonial Turkey is seeing a new stress on Islam. In response to this, first, the hypothesis applies to trends, not to absolutes. China has had intellectuals like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who have become disillusioned with Western values, but it has nothing like India's century-long record of appeals to tradition against Western values. The Indian reaction extends from the Arya Samaj through Ghose, the Extremists, and Gandhi, and is still alive in men like Radhakrishnan and Bhave. The difference between trends in China and India is symbolized by the hostile reception given Tagore by Chinese students after World War I and the subsequent insistence by many Chinese that Western industrial civilization was more "spiritual" than an Eastern tradition which forced most men into a life of unremitting toil and poverty. Those who bitterly attacked tradition in China included both intellectual-political figures like Ch'en Tu-hsiu and fiction writers like Lu Hsun and Pa Chin. In India authors have been more sympathetic to tradition; witness Tagore and R. K. Narayan. Bitterness toward Indian tradition is rare, M. N. Roy being the only example that comes immediately to mind.²²

As for Islamic revival in Turkey, it seems to have few of the passionate traditionalist overtones, particularly among intellectuals, found in Pakistan and the Arab countries. The effort is rather to find a form of Islam which will not conflict with nationalism, modernization, and a secular state.

22. On Ch'en see Schwartz, *op. cit.*, and *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951). Lu Hsun's "Ah W," "Diary of a Madman," and other stories available in English show great bitterness to the Chinese past, while Pa Chin's *The Family* is equally bitter. The stories of Tagore, the novels of Narayan, and the voluminous writings of M. N. Roy are easily available in English.

Lastly, in regard to this objection, it has been noted that colonial or ex-colonial countries are likely to see strong neotraditionalism in periods of early nationalism or in response to a Western threat. When these conditions are gone, particularly after colonial rule has ended, neotraditionalism may well lose strength. The hypothesis does not imply any prediction that differences between colonial and non-colonial intellectual trends will remain of the same nature long after colonial or traditional rule has ended.

A final objection is that it is not colonialism but internal threats, particularly communal rivalry, which have strengthened appeals to tradition. Thus, the argument would run, in India the Hindu-Moslem conflict, in the Middle East the long dispute over Palestine, and in Southeast Asia hostility to economically favored Chinese or Indians have bolstered appeal to communal tradition. Here it should be stressed that bitter communalism has itself been largely a colonial phenomenon, and so this point in a way strengthens the colonial–non-colonial hypothesis. The encouragement of foreign immigrants or specific local communities as middle-class middlemen has been a feature of colonial policy, as have divide-and-rule tactics of other sorts. Vying for favors—which were never sufficient to go round—by different communities has also fostered colonial communalism.²³ Communalism has recently been a factor in traditionalism, but it has hardly been an independent or sufficient cause of traditionalist revival.

Also, communal causation does not hold up in some areas where communalism was strong. Hindu revival was not originally or primarily a response to a Moslem threat, and, insofar as most Hindus wanted a united India, Hindu traditionalism tended to frustrate its achievement. And even for Moslem revival the case is cloudy. The early westernizers among the Moslems were more zealous about protecting Moslem rights and more worried about the Hindu threat than were the neotraditionalists who led the Khilafat movement while co-operating with Gandhi.

The Arab-Israeli example tends to support rather than contradict the hypothesis, since the Arabs see Israel as an outpost of Western colonialism. The Arab intellectual response has been about the same as if a Western power had permanently occupied and colonized part of a

23. On imperialism as a cause of communalism see W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam*, Part II, chap. i.

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small Arab country. Attacks on Western values and defense of Islam have risen along with the rise of Israel.

To forestall other possible objections, it should be noted that the hypothesis speaks only of non-colonial countries with extended contact with the West, so that those whose contacts are either weak or mainly recent are excluded as unlikely to show especially strong intellectual trends toward westernization. Some other small countries not mentioned may not fit the pattern, although it is likely that special reasons could be found for exceptions. Finally, the hypothesis does not deal with political practice or forms of government, which may often be most westernizing in the ex-colonies, even though political theory has been largely neotraditionalist.

V Conclusion

If the hypothesis presented here is correct, the impact of Western rule is shown to be contradictory not only in its social and economic effects but also in cultural and intellectual life. Those countries with the longest and closest contact with the West have often shown the greatest reversion from Western values. The shock of having to adapt rapidly to new strains and new potentialities has produced different responses depending upon whether traditional or foreign rulers were the primary bar to effective progress. In the latter case, even a desire to emulate some features of Western life was often clothed in anti-westernizing terms. Political institutions may be as Western in the ex-colonies as in the non-colonies, or even more so, but political and social theory usually is not. Among the paradoxes of imperialism, its intellectual effect is surely not the least.

Comments on the foregoing hypothesis or on the details of this article will be welcomed. The paper necessarily involves oversimplification, but it is to be hoped that this does not vitiate its main points.