This book is presented as “a study in ethno-metaphysics,” an exploration of the worldview of Canada's Native peoples. In offering this as a work of philosophy rather than of cultural anthropology or Native spirituality, authors Rabb and McPherson take as their point of departure anthropologist A. I. Hallowell's claim that a cultural worldview is a “cognitive orientation” from which a set of metaphysical claims might be deduced—even if it is not consciously recognized as such by those who live within it (p. 3). In other words, the guiding premise of this work is that something recognizable and significant as a metaphysical theory can be massaged out of the cultural belief-systems of Canada's Native peoples.

Recent breakthroughs in the history and sociology of science have begun to help us to appreciate the vast complexity and intricate character of empirical endeavours in the sciences. The days when philosophers could blandly gesture towards “observation statements” or “falsification,” as if they were some readily understood phenomena or set of procedures, are gone, happily. This does not mean we can merely use the Duhem-Quine thesis as a shibboleth, however: we are now much more sensitive to immense difficulties in establishing viable claims to replication (Chen 1994) or establishing the absence of selectivity bias, or convincing others of adequacy of experimental controls. Yet, even so, I would still assert that modern science studies, with only a very few exceptions, have ignored the problem of the constitution of error in the context of precision quantitative measurement. While rather broad claims have been made concerning measurement by Hacking, Cartwright, Franklin and others, none goes so far as to examine the actual manipulation of the numerical data. More distressingly, in the areas of economics and economic methodology, we have not even got so far as have the researchers in science studies. This fact alone should provide grounds for scepticism about the claim in Cartwright (1989) that philosophy of scientific inference has something to learn from the history of econometrics.

Commençons par saluer la parution de cet ouvrage, qui propose au lecteur francophone les traductions de quatorze articles de Hintikka (dont deux écrits en collaboration avec G. Sandu), couvrant la période 1976-1990, qu'on peut pour l'essentiel répartir en deux rubriques; les six premiers articles constituent à des titres divers un plaidoyer pour l'introduction d'un nouveau cadre conceptuel, ou «paradigme», en linguistique, destiné à rem-placer le programme de la grammaire générative, et capable (selon l'auteur) d'expliquer et de prédire un grand nombre de phénomènes linguistiques plus ou moins négligés par l'approche traditionnelle, liée au pré-jugé selon lequel la créativité du langage est essentiellement d'ordre récursif. La seconde partie du recueil a pour thème central les limites de la logique du premier ordre (théorie de la quantification), et esquisse ce que devrait être une logique du premier ordre plus générate, en ce qu'elle accueille dans ses notations des phénoménes d'independance relative des quantificateurs et des connecteurs (Independence-friendly Logic, en abrégé IF). Á travers les deux révolutions dans la pensée qui sont ainsi proposées, Hintikka développe (et c'est ce qui fait l'unité profonde de l'ouvrage) les conséquences proches et lointaines de la sémantique qu'il a introduite dans les années 1970 (Hintikka, 1973), et initialement appliquée á la logique du premier ordre, sémantique fondée sur l'utilisation de concepts de la théorie des jeux (Game-theoretical Semantics, en abrégé GTS). Quels que soient par ailleurs ses grands mérites, la traduction française ici utilisée par N. Lavand, «sémantique des jeux», voile plus qu'elle ne révèle les rapports exacts entre la théorie mathématique desjeux, les langages, naturels ou formalisés, pour lesquels on construit une sémantique dite «formelle», et les concepts de stratégic et d'information, en particulier, tirés précisément de l a théorie des jeux et appliqués á l'interprétation du vocabulaire logique de ces langages. II est vrai qu'il y a lá une difficulté de traduction.

A “hypothetical imperative” tells what to do to get a certain result. Equivalently, it says what is the “right” thing to do to achieve that result. Insofar as achieving that result is the sole end in view, wondering what is the right thing to do to achieve it just is: wondering what to do. Insofar as it is the sole end in view, deciding what is the right thing to do to achieve it is simply deciding what to do. Something's being the right thing to do to achieve a certain goal does not, of course, guarantee that it actually will succeed in achieving that goal: the meaning is only that, in the existing circumstances, it is more apt to achieve the goal than any available alternative.

Le concept au centre du dernier ouvrage d'Otfried Höffe publié en français est celui d'impératif catégorique juridique. Höffe souhaite, en effet, approfondir son apologie des principes juridiques catégoriques déjà developpée dans son précédent ouvrage La justice politique en éclaircissant ses sources kantiennes. Alors que dans l'ouvrage de 1991 la figure tutélaire de Kant était restée en retrait, Höffe a voulu expliciter son rapport à Kant ét montrer la façon dont la réflexion contemporaine sur le droit et le politique devrait elle-même se dire kantienne.

Shortly before he died Alberto Coffa said he was writing “a very grumpy book.” It has turned out to be grumpy indeed, but also funny and deep and wonderful. When he began his work nearly 20 years ago he chose what must have seemed the most unpromising topic imaginable: the history of the a priori, both in the nineteenth century and especially among the logical positivists in the decade following 1925. In the early 1970s it was risky for a promising young philosopher of science to concentrate on historical topics. The nineteenth century was, with a few notable exceptions, terra incognita to analytically inclined philosophers. The positivists were pariahs. And many philosophers were convinced that there was no such thing as the a priori to be studied. Times have changed a bit, but this book still covers new territory. And though I cannot accept all of his conclusions, Coffa has much to teach, perhaps especially to those who would have found the whole investigation unpromising.

Is the endeavour to probe the meaning of modernity other than a form of self-obsession, a kind of collective and conceptual narcissism, characteristic of the perhaps peculiarly modern preoccupation with abstract notions and inwardness? And whatever the motivation and origin, is the endeavour likely to issue in something better than doubtful or empty pronouncements, true to the extent that they are platitudes and false or obscure for the rest? Encountering the title Modernism as a Philosophical Problem one can imagine a Rortyean reading: modernism a philosophical problem?—and the commentary: well, if you think that, you do have a problem, namely, philosophical pretentiousness and an affliction for foundations, for ultimate principles that, if truly ultimate, are unattainable and also unnecessary. In a different voice, a similar cynicism can be heard, the Lyotardean lament at the announcement of yet another unneeded philosophical meta-narrative, a new, idle tale about history, ideas and development, culminating in grand notions confounded by facts.

Le falsificationnisme est une philosophié des sciences dont l'un des traits fondamentaux est de proposer la falsifiabilité comme critère permettant de différencier les énoncés scientifiques des énoncés non scientifiques. Selon ce critère, une théorie, une loi ou une hypothèse ne seront considérées comme scientifiques qu'à la condition d'être falsifiables. Or, l'importance croissante, depuis une cinquantaine d'années, de l'utilisation des hypothèses statistiques dans les théories économiques pose un problème évident à l'application de cette philosophie en sciences économiques, puisque les hypothèses statistiques sont logiquement non falsifiables.

Vers la fin des années cinquante, un jeune érudit jésuite publia un article intitulé «Are Apeiria and Aoristia Synonyms?» qui allait être le premier d'une longue série de travaux portant sur une problématique à laquelle il s'attaquait en véritable pionnier: la doctrine de l'infinité divine dans l'Antiquité et au Moyen Âge. Certes, les historiens s'étaient déjà intéressés quelque peu à cette question, mais ils l'avaient fait sans une conscience claire de sa complexité. Force était donc de reprendre la problématique à nouveaux frais. C'est ce que fit Leo Sweeney, qui publiera, sur une carrière de plus de trentecinq ans, une quantité impressionnante d'articles étudiant les conditions de l'émergence de l'infinité divine au Moyen Âge, ainsi que la conception de l'infíni chez les grandes fígures de l'Antiquité et du christianisme médiéval. Ce sont ces articles, dont certains ont fait l'objet de profonds remaniements, et auxquels viennent s'ajouter deux travaux inédits, qu'a réunis l'éditeur Peter Lang dans un ouvrage de près de six cents pages, dont il faut bien dire qu'il constitue une manière d'événement dans le monde des études anciennes et médiévales.

Group rights have long been of special concern to Canadians. Quebec has maintained a distinct language and civil law system, and Canada's Aboriginal Peoples have always had (“enjoyed” is perhaps the wrong word here) different legal rights from those of other Canadians. Former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau sought to reduce the significance of these special protections. He argued that they were the product of historical compromise and political wrangling rather than of any principled vision ofjustice. As a result, he opposed any special status for Quebec in favour of nationwide bilingualism, and sought to dismantle the reserve system for the First Nations. He sought to replace both with the idea of universal citizenship.

In this paper I shall develop a formal description of the theory-data confrontation in economics. Theory-data confrontations may happen in many different situations. In some of them we find economists aiming to establish the empirical relevance of a theory. In others we meet econometricians in search of theoretical explanations for observed regularities in their data. In still others we encounter economic researchers producing evaluations of performance and forecasts for business executives and government policy makers. We label these situations, respectively, hypothesis testing, scientific explanation and prediction. I shall show that there is a unifying framework within which the activities in these situations can be characterized.

Daniel Dennett's theory of mind divides into two parts: a theory of mental content, which is provided by his intentional systems theory, and a theory of consciousness, the latest presentation of which is brought together in an exciting recent work, Consciousness Explained. This book, combined with his 1987 The Intentional Stance, constitutes the third execution of Dennett's overall program, the first two being Content and Consciousness (1969) and Brainstorms (1978). Consciousness Explained is a veritable treasure of fascinating ideas, fresh perspectives and striking illustrations, many of which are sure to be much discussed by philosophers in years to come.

Marjorie Hope Nicolson's The Conway Letters is, simultaneously, a work of so many different kinds, and offers itself to so many distinct cultural and intellectual constituencies, that it is difficult to include them all, and impossible to assign them priority or precedence. It is first of all, though, a delightful and important book. It has been out of print for a great many years, the original edition of 1930 long ago sold out. So its reappearance in a new edition, with extensive revisions and additions by Sarah Hutton, is very much to be applauded and welcomed.

Traditionnellement, une théorie de la signification doit rendre compte à la fois des conditions de vérité des phrases des langues naturelles et des relations évidentes qu'entretiennent le langage et la pensée. À ce titre, le paradigme frégéen est un modele du genre. Une phrase y est dite exprimer une pensée, laquelle lui sert de valeur cognitive et a une valeur de vérité. Différentes occurrences d'une même phrase expriment une même pensée. Si cette phrase a une occurrence dans un contexte d'attitude propositionnelle, elle réfère à la pensée qu'elle exprimerait en contexte ordinaire. La théorie de la référence directe a fait voler en éclats cette image aussi simple que claire de la relation entre langage et pensée. C'est sur cet arrière-plan que prend place le livre de François Récanati, Direct Reference. Une bonne partie des efforts de l'auteur est en effet consacrée à rétablir des liens aujourd'hui étiolés.

En ce cinquième centenaire de la mort de Jean Pic de la Mirandole, il peut être pertinent de présenter quatre ouvrages récents ayant trait à l'œuvre du Mirandolien. Trois d'entre eux présentent des traductions, qui en partie se recoupent, en partie sont complémentaires, et qu'il est intéressant de comparer entre elles de facon analytique et critique. Le quatrième ouvrage propose un vaste exposé systématique de l'œuvre de Jean Pic. Vu son ampleur, il mérite d'être considéré séparément des trois autres.

Philip Kitcher's new book is very ambitious in scope, more ambitious, certainly, than any of his previous books. Unlike Kitcher's Abusing Science: The Case against Creationism (1982), this is not a book that focusses on just one single issue in contemporary science or educational policy; nor is it, like his The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge (1983) and Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature (1985), a book that emphasizes just one relatively narrow philosophical topic. The Advancement of Science presents a complete, and quite general, position within the philosophy of natural science. Its purpose is much closer to Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) or even to Nagel's The Structure of Science (1961) than it is to any of Kitcher's earlier books. Kitcher starts off with an explicit epistemology, moves to a “goal” for science based on that epistemology, and then uses this epistemic goal as the target for the various methodological and social or institutional strategies that he offers.

Both Hausman and Rosenberg reject McCloskey's contention that economics is no more than rhetoric, and do so with cogent reasons drawn from old-fashioned views about truth and objectivity (R, pp. 30–55; H, pp. 266–67). (Hausman's treatment of McCloskey is more nuanced, but neither of them, I think, make enough allowance for McCloskey's playfulness or for the power, on his less provocative side, of his intermittent argument for a reasonably respectable pragmatism.) Rosenberg holds, very plausibly, that the ambitions of economists run higher than rhetoric in any of its current received senses (R, pp. 51–52; H, pp. 81–82) and run closer to affiliation with natural science, though economists may, in their conception of natural science, be persisting in positivist views. (McCloskey does not deny this; on the contrary, he attributes the same ambitions to economists, but he wants them to abandon the ambitions, unless—as if this were the only way of advancing beyond positivist views—they advance to a rhetorical view of natural science [McC, pp. 16–19, 32–35, 54–57].)

Annette Baier should have entitled her book A Progress of Reason and Sentiments instead of A Progress of Sentiments, because one of her chief concerns is the role and significance of reason in Hume's philosophy. She says in the Preface that her aim in the book is “to present Hume's work as exhibiting a progress of thought and sentiment, and acquiring ‘new force as it advances‘” (p. viii). Because the issue of reason in Hume's philosophy is central to her concern, Baier initiates a discussion of it in Chapter 1 and relentlessly pursues the discussion throughout the book. I think it is fair to say that Baier wishes to answer the question “How, if at all, does cognitive reason function in Hume's philosophy?” To answer this question she begins by contrasting Hume's method of conducting philosophy with the method of the Cartesian or intellectualist tradition. She shows that solipsism is, to borrow Gilbert Ryle's expression, the “ineluctable destiny” of the kind of philosopher who glorifies the intellect while denigrating the other human capacities, the individual who indulges in abstract speculation over practical matters. According to Baier, this solipsistic predicament i s what Hume's protagonist articulates towards the end of his intellectual adventure in Book I, Part IV of the Treatise in saying: “Where am I or what? From what causes do I derive my existence?…” Here, Baier affirms, is pure (read unsociable) reason trapped in a miasma of self-doubt, perplexities, bewilderment and desolation from which it cannot extricate itself.

The commonalities of Douglas Walton's Slippery Slope Arguments and James Davies's Ways of Thinking are obvious: both are written by Canadian philosophers; both lie within the broad field of informal logic; and both make appeals in support of dialogical reasoning. But there the similarities end. The former is the work of a prolific author writing a treatise focussing narrowly on one topic within informal logic; the latter is the product of a newcomer to book-writing, and his is a textbook intended for beginning students.