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Annette Baier on Reason and Morals in Hume's Philosophy*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 April 2010
Extract
Annette Baier should have entitled her book A Progress of Reason and Sentiments instead of A Progress of Sentiments, because one of her chief concerns is the role and significance of reason in Hume's philosophy. She says in the Preface that her aim in the book is “to present Hume's work as exhibiting a progress of thought and sentiment, and acquiring ‘new force as it advances‘” (p. viii). Because the issue of reason in Hume's philosophy is central to her concern, Baier initiates a discussion of it in Chapter 1 and relentlessly pursues the discussion throughout the book. I think it is fair to say that Baier wishes to answer the question “How, if at all, does cognitive reason function in Hume's philosophy?” To answer this question she begins by contrasting Hume's method of conducting philosophy with the method of the Cartesian or intellectualist tradition. She shows that solipsism is, to borrow Gilbert Ryle's expression, the “ineluctable destiny” of the kind of philosopher who glorifies the intellect while denigrating the other human capacities, the individual who indulges in abstract speculation over practical matters. According to Baier, this solipsistic predicament i s what Hume's protagonist articulates towards the end of his intellectual adventure in Book I, Part IV of the Treatise in saying: “Where am I or what? From what causes do I derive my existence?…” Here, Baier affirms, is pure (read unsociable) reason trapped in a miasma of self-doubt, perplexities, bewilderment and desolation from which it cannot extricate itself.
- Type
- Critical Notices/Études critiques
- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , Spring 1995 , pp. 367 - 380
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1995
References
Notes
1 References to Hume are to the Selby-Bigge, /Nidditch edition of his A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978)Google Scholar. This work is hereafter cited as T, with page numbers given in parentheses. The following alternative method of citation is also used: T, 1.1.1, meaning Treatise, Book 1, Part 1, section 1. I will also make reference to his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals in the Selby-Bigge, /Nidditch edition of the Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975)Google Scholar. The citation will be E, with page numbers given in parentheses.
2 Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1949), p. 16Google Scholar.
3 Donald T. Siebert suggests that this section of the Treatise is autobiographical. See his “‘Ardo r of Youth’: The Manner of Hume's Treatise,” in The Philosopher As Writer, edited by Ginsberg, Robert (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehana University Press, 1987), especially pp. 181–82Google Scholar. In light of Baier's interpretation it would seem that this reading is anything but accurate.
4 As Capaldi puts it, “The classical perspective, carried over into modern philosophy by Descartes, is the I Think perspective, i.e. the perspective of the egocentric, outside, disengaged observer.” Contra this perspective, Hume adopts a We Do perspective according to which he views human beings fundamentally “as agents, as doers, immersed in both a physical world and a social world along with other agents.” Moreover, continues Capaldi, “Hume saw mankind's primary task as practical, not theoretical” (Capaldi, Nicholas, Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy [New York: Peter Lang, 1989], chap. 1, pp. 22–23 [emphasis in the original])Google Scholar.
5 As will be seen shortly, Hume is ambiguous in his use of the term ‘imagination’, and this ambiguity poses a problem for the interpretation of his view.
6 Note that Hume often distinguishes between empirical and a priori reason in speaking of the reason that is concerned with the relation among ideas and the reason that is about matters of fact. He will draw upon this distinction in elaborating the reason that he thinks is involved in moral processes, namely, factual or empirical reason.
7 Ardal, Pall, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), chap. 2Google Scholar . See especially pp. 27–30, in which Ardal discusses the causal conditions for the experiencing of pride in Hume's system; Bricke, John, “Emotion and Thought in Hume's Treatise” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1 (supplement), pt. 1, (1974): 53–71Google Scholar ; and Davidson, Donald, “Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride,” The Journal of Philosophy, 73 (1976): 744–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
8 The nature of the causality between thought and feeling needs to be explored. Is it contingent? Necessary? It would seem the latter if, by definition, a reflective impression is a feeling that is aroused by reflection.
9 As Baier points out, “Book Two's turn (or continuation of the turn) from solitary reason to sociable passions answers Book One's despairing questions, and makes light of the intellectual puzzles found in the ‘Appendix’” (p. 142).
10 For more on this see my “Yet Another Look at Cognitive Reason and Moral Action in Hume's Ethical System,” Journal of Philosophical Research, 17 (1992): 225–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
11 See Kemp-Smith, Norman, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941), p. 11CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; cf. pp. 84-85. For a contrasting view, see Norton, David Fate, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), chap. 3Google Scholar.
12 It is of course possible that the issue I am raising is only terminological, since the idea of replacement is not at all congruent with the overall drift of Baier's analysis. But this suggests all the more that extreme caution ought always to be taken i n formulating Hume's views on morality; otherwise one might inadvertently promote the veryfancfof misinterpretation that one is anxious to correct. Perhaps Baier might wish to clarify this point in a later edition of the book.
13 Cf. Baier's observation in Chapter 8 (“Contemplation of Character”). She writes: “If we also remember Hume's Book One reduction of judgments to ideas (T. 96, note), then we see that ‘sentiments’ and ‘passions,’ as Hume uses those terms, are far from excluding thought and judgment… Hume's terms ‘passion’ and ‘impression of reflection’ explicitly unite feeling and thought” (pp. 180–81).
14 See, for example, Norton, David Hume; and also my “Yet Another Look at Cognitive Reason.”
15 For example, Pall Ardal charges that Baier's claim about Hume offering an enlarged conception of reason as he progresses in the Treatise entails that Hume's Treatise is a kind of “improved and extended rationalism.” See his “Depression and Reason,” Ethics, 103 (April 1993): 540–50. On the other hand, Paul Russell is generally full of praise for the work even in spite of his disappointment at what he describes as Baier's “lack of interest in the wider contextual issues raised by her interpretation” and what he deems her failure to situate Hume's discussion within historical context. See his critical notice of A Progress of Sentiments, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23, 1 (03 1993): 107–23Google Scholar.
16 I read the original version of this paper on May 31,1993, in a symposium with David Braybrooke, Louise Marcil-Lacoste and Annette Baier, at the 37th Annual Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association held at Carleton University, Ottawa. I acknowledge my fellow symposiasts and especially Annette Baier, for the graciousness with which she received my comments. I also wish to thank Nathan Brett for inviting me to participate in the symposium and Sheldon Wein and Tina Johnson for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.