1 Harris, Errol E., “Metho d and Metaphysics in Spinoza,” Studia Spinozana, 2 (1986), 129–50.Google Scholar

2 I have used Spinoza Opera, edited by Gebhardt, Carl, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925);Google ScholarBaruch Spinoza: The Ethics and Selected Letters, translated by Shirley, Samuel (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1982); and theGoogle ScholarCollected Works of Spinoza, Vol. 1, edited and translated by Curley, Edwin (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). The following abbreviations will be used: E = Ethics, TIE = Treatise on the Emendation of the Ethics, Ep = Correspondence, KV = Short Treatise on God, Man and His Weil-Being, CM = Appendix Containing Metaphysical ThoughtsGoogle Scholar.

3 For one explanation of this method see Bennett, Jonathan, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1984), p. 20. Harris offers another in “Method and Metaphysics in Spinoza,” pp. 141-42. He says that the hypothet-ico-deductive method involves the postulation of an arbitrary hypothesis from which other hypotheses and observable predictions are deduced. These predictions are tested by observation and experiment which corroborate or refute the hypothesis. Those hypotheses which remain unrefuted survive until there is evidence against themGoogle Scholar.

4 Vance Maxwell argues that substance is not a hypothesis or postulate but the ground of all hypothesis or postulation (“The Philosophical Method of Spinoza,” Dialogue, 27 [1988]: 89–110).

5 In this work, Spinoza tells us that the mind can start from a true idea, advance to other true ideas, and then attain knowledge of the most perfect being (§30-48). Deduction is the development of the connection between ideas. For an explanation of this development, see my paper “The Philosophical Method of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Its Application to the Ethics” ot appear in Philosophy and Theology, 7, 3 (1993): 311-22.

6 I take it that Spinoza in these statements is not talking about different subjects. If he were, he would be careful enough to use different words to express different subjects.

7 I take dialectic in the sense I am using it to be a method of seeking the trut h by reasoning. On a given topic, different statements are made, each of which is supposedly true. These statements seek to express the essence of each thing. Dialectic is an internal process. In this sense it is not so much an investigation with someone else but an investigation in one's own mind. Dialectic in Harris's sense i s a world process and a process in thought, and I believe this process is expressed in Spinoza's mind through different propositions he makes, some of which conflict with one another. These conflicting statements are the ones I wish t o deal with. Obviously, Spinoza's geometrical style is not itself dialectical, but in his propositions in the Ethics and other works, he sometimes offers different or conflicting views in an attempt to describe the nature of reality and our knowledge of it.

8 Spinoza says in ElDef6Exp that substance involves no negation. Negation must pertain to an attribute or mode. For Hegel the dialectic occurs when substance negates itself. Substance for him includes affirmation and negation within itself. See Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. III, translated by Haldane, E. S. and Simson, Frances H. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1896), pp. 252–90Google Scholar.

9 John De Lucca applies the dialectical method as presented by Richard McKeon t o some principal features of Spinoza's philosophy and shows how he reconciled conflicting doctrines of his day. For example, Spinoza eradicated the conflict between the theological conception of God and the scientific conception of God with his conception of substance, thus identifying nature with God. The relation between will and understanding becomes subordinate to the oneness obtained n i intuitive knowledge. Mind and matter become two manifestations of a single substance. See Lucca, John De, “Wolfson on Spinoza's Use of the More Geomet-rico,” Dialogue, 6 (1967): 89–102. I argue that underlying this use of the dialectical method is another method which reveals conflicts in Spinoza's own philosophy, some of which are not really resolvedGoogle Scholar.

10 Pollock, Frederick states that we cannot seriously apply a conception of substance to anything short of the whole sum of being (Spinoza [London: Kegan Paul, 1880], p. 162).Google ScholarWolfson, Harry identifies God with the wholeness of nature (The Philosophy of Spinoza, Vol. 1 [Cleveland, OH: World Publishing, 1934], p. 97).Google ScholarHampshire, Stuart calls substance an all-inclusive totality that is identified with the universe as a whole (Spinoza [Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1951], p. 36).Google ScholarHarris, Errol tells us that substance means the whole of reality that is absolutely complete and all-comprehensive (Salvation From Despair [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973], p. 36).CrossRefGoogle ScholarHart, Alan states that God is all-inclusive and runs through all the attributes (Spinoza's Ethics [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983], pp. 26–27).Google ScholarYovel, Yirmiyahu calls substance the totality of the universe taken as God who is identical with all there is and encompasses all the aspects and dimensions of reality (Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Adventures of Immanence [Princeton University Press, 1989], p. 6)Google Scholar.

11 I argue that although there are other views of substance present in Spinoza's writings, this view is the predominant one. See my “Ambiguity in Spinoza's Concept of Substance,” Studia Spinozana, 7 (1991): 169-81.

12 Curley, Edwin takes the view that substance denotes only the active part of nature, and states that there is very little evidence for the alternative view—that substance denotes the totality of things (Spinoza's Metaphysics [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969], pp. 42–43; The Collected Works of Spinoza, Vol. 1 [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985], p. 33, n.56; and Behind the Geometrical Method [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988], p. 37). He also says in The Collected Works of Spinoza that Martial Gueroult identifies substance or the attributes of substance with the first elements of the whole of nature, not the whole of nature itself, but only its active part (natura naturans). Cf. footnote in Gueruolt, Spinoza, Vol. 1 (Paris: Aubier-Montaign, 1968), p. 169.CrossRefGoogle ScholarKashap, S. Paul also argues that substance or God is not identical with nature as a whole (Spinoza and Moral Freedom [Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987], pp. 25–28)Google Scholar.

13 It should be noted that in KV1/8 Spinoza divides the whole of nature intonatura naturans and natura naturata. This suggests that the whole of nature is more than just substance if substance is going to be identified with natura naturans.

14 There is a difference between a thing being what it is and another thing being in it. The planet Earth is in the universe but it is not the universe.

15 There are two senses of “inadequate idea” in Spinoza. One is expressed by Spinoza in E3P1D where he says that ideas that are inadequate in our mind are adequate in God. This sense of “inadequate” expresses incompleteness. God has many more adequate ideas than we do. There is another sense of “inadequate” which means false, inaccurate, having the wrong idea, perceiving things by means of the imagination and so forth. God does not have any of these ideas, so these inadequate ideas are not modes of God.

16 As far as I know, no one has noted this distinction.

17 The intellect and will are infinite, immediate modes in the attribute of thought. In substance the distinction collapses.

18 John Caird and James Martineau argue that Spinoza never really solved the problem of the relation between thefiniteand infinite. See Caird, John, Spinoza (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1888), p. 187, andGoogle ScholarMartineau, James, A Study of Spinoza (1895; rpt. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), p. 209.Google Scholar There are a number of proposed solutions to this problem. Harold Joachim regards finite modes as unreal or illusory. They must be seen as inherent in substance and i n that case they are complete (A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza [1901; rpt. New York: Russell and Russell, 1964], pp. 76-80). Harry Wolfson says that there is no such thing as the procession of the finite from the infinite in the sense that the finite exists apart from substance. Infinite substance contains within itself the finite modes (The Philosophy of Spinoza, pp. 376-77). E. M. Curley holds that what is required is an infinite series of finite modes and afiniteseries of infinite modes. Both series are needed to explain the relation between the infinite and finite modes (Spinoza's Metaphysics, p. 42). Martial Gueroult says that when the understanding knows modes in and through substance and how they follow from inside substance, the immanent cause, then the modes appear infinite. If we consider the modes through the imagination, they appear finite (“Spinoza's Letter on the Infinite [Letter 12 to Louis Meyer]” in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Grene, Majore [New York: Doubleday, 1973], pp. 185–87).Google Scholar I offer another solution in “On the Finite and Infinite in Spinoza,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 20,1 (1982): 61-73. There I suggest that we can talk about degrees of infinity. Modes descending from substance become progressively less infinite. Another suggestion I would like to make is to treat the infinite and finite as beings of reason and not real beings independent of the mind.

19 In CM1/6 Spinoza calls truth and falsity extrinsic denominations of things.

20 Errol Harris presents this view. See, for example, his “Body-Mind Relation in Spinoza's Philosophy,” in Spinoza's Metaphysics, edited by Wilbur, James (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1976), pp. 13–28Google Scholar.

21 For this view see Barker, H., “Notes on the Second Part of Spinoza's Ethics” in Studies in Spinoza, edited by Kashap, S. Paul (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 160–64.Google Scholar

22 According to David Savan, Spinoza's views on words and language make it impossible for him to hold that his writings or anyone else!'s can be a direct or literal exposition of philosophic truth. See his “Spinoza and Language” in Studies in Spinoza, edited by Kashap, S. Paul (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 236–48Google Scholar.

23 S. Paul Kashap says that contingency does not have to do with a thing being represented to our mind as uncaused but with the essential nature of an individual thing (Spinoza and Moral Freedom, p. 146). A thing that depends for its cause upon something external to its nature is contingent. Edwin Curley takes a certain kind of contingency to be axiomatic in Spinoza (Behind the Geometrical Method, pp. 49-50).

24 When we use the imagination we can talk about the existence, temporality and duration of the mind and body. The mind continues to exist as long as the body exists and, when the body ceases to be, so does the mind. A number of people present the view that the human mind is not eternal but it may have an idea of eternity. See Pollock, Frederick, Spinoza, p. 294Google Scholar; Roth, Leon, Spinoza (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1929), pp. 153–54,Google ScholarSaw, Ruth, The Vindication of Metaphysics (London: Macmillan, 1951), p. 131Google Scholar; Hampshire, Stuart, Spinoza, pp. 172–75;Google ScholarHarris, Errol, Salvation from Despair, pp. 231–44.Google Scholar Harris states that immortality is not an extended duration beyond the temporal life of the body (“Spinoza's Theory of Human Immortality,” in Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation, edited by Freeman, Eugene and Mandelbaum, Maurice [La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1975], p. 261). It consists in the mind's transcendence of the body's infinite limits. Consciousness has an inherently transcendental characterGoogle Scholar.

25 Martha Kneale and Alan Donagan take eternity to mean that God and the human mind have some sort of duration. Kneale says that Spinoza uses words like “remains” and “duration” when he talks about the eternity of the human mind (“Eternity and Sempiternity,” Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Grene, Majore [New York: Doubleday, 1973], pp. 236–37).Google ScholarDonagan, tells us that since Spinoza uses the term “always” eternity means something exists at all moments in the passage of time (“Spinoza's Proof of Immortality,” in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Grene, Majore [New York: Doubleday, 1973], pp. 244–45). More recently Wallace Matson defends Kneale's view and says that there is no coherent alternative. See hisGoogle Scholar“Body Essence and Mind Eternity in Spinoza” in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, edited by Curley, Edwin and Moreau, Pierre-Francois (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), pp. 82–95.Google Scholar Henry Allison attacks this view in “The Eternity of the Human Mind: Comments on Matson on Spinoza,” ibid., pp. 96-101. C. L. Hardin attacks the Kneale-Donagan interpretation in “Spinoza on Immortality and Time,” Spinoza: New Perspectives, edited by Robert Shahan and J. I. Biro (Norman, University of Oklahoma, 1978), pp. 129–38.

26 Harold Joachim holds that all modes are timelessly actual or eternal insofar as they are necessarily dependent on God (A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, pp. 226–27). Yovel, Yirmiyahu says that a finite thing is eternal by being an eternal essence in the infinite intellect of God (Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 160–71). I hold that since substance is eternal and the human mind can only be conceived i n substance, the human mind is also eternal (“Spinoza on the Eternity of the Human Mind,” Philosophy and Theology, 5, 2 (1990): 103-13).Google ScholarRice, Lee C. suggests that reflexively grasped true ideas may outlive their possessor while bearing some features of one's consciousness (“Mind Eternity in Spinoza,” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, 41 (July 1992): 319–34)Google Scholar.

27 See my paper “The Activity and Passivity of the Mind and Body,” Philosophical Inquiry, 14, 1-2 (1992): 11-23.

28 For this view see Joachim, , A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, pp. 148–49.Google Scholar

29 I want to thank the following people for their advice in writing this paper: Piotr Hoffman, Vance Maxwell, Frank Tobin, and two readers from Dialogue.