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Scepticism and Vain Questions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 June 2010
Extract
In this paper I shall consider Hume's claim that it is in vain to ask “Whether there be body or not ?’ I have often been puzzled by this interesting remark; puzzled as to just what he meant by it, why he said it, and whether he was right. I don't expect to do any more than explore some of the possibilities and suggest some tentative answers in this discussion. Hume seems to have argued that we can't take this question seriously because we could never sincerely believe what we said if we denied that “body” exists; and that we can't have any genuine doubt on this head because “certain trivial qualities of the fancy” (p. 217) lead us inevitably into a “gross illusion” (ibid). We are thus stuck having to believe what we can prove to be false. Reason mocks us like a palsied hand, knocking away precisely what it tries hardest to grasp. This, I say, is what Hume seems to have argued. But let's see what else we can do with his words. I shall begin by giving a brief account of this belief in “body”. I shall then explore some senses in which the question of the existence of body might turn out to be vain.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 13 , Issue 4 , December 1974 , pp. 657 - 673
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1974
References
1 Hume, , A Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford 1888), p. 187. All references in parentheses are to this edition of the Treatise.Google Scholar
2 In a recent paper it has been argued that something quite like this is the Humean view: “We are all just stuck with the fact that we must unreasonably infer the existence of something when we can have no idea what that something is.” Robison, W. L., “Hume's Scepticism”, Dialogue, Vol. XII (Mar., 1973) p. 97.Google Scholar
3 Price, H. H., Hume's Theory of the External World (Oxford, 1940), p. 13.Google Scholar
4 The claim has been rather thoroughly criticized (on four different grounds) by Price. (Ibid., pp. 11–13).
5 Loc. cit., Chapter IV: “The Existence of Unsensed Sensibilia.”
6 For a defense of Hume's critique of the concept of substance see my “Substance and Mental Identity in Hume's Treatise,” Phil. Quarterly, Vol. 22. No. 87 (April, 1972) pp. 111–116.
7 Descartes' attempt to prove the existence of an external world by way of claims about the nature of God, is a good example of this kind of appeal to obscurity, as Hume remarks in the Enquiry. Selby-Bigge edition (Oxford, 1902), p. 153.
8 Even the principles of association are such that we can, by reflection, discover their operation; Hume attempts to give illustrations which bring their operation before our reflective view.
9 Hume does not suggest that these are meaningless hypotheses. I think that it would be quite unfair to stick him with all of the difficulties of the verifica-tionist criterion of meaning. Hs point here is that the issue is irresolvable, not that it can't even be raised.
10 Of course, if we really must assume the existence of body in all our reasoning, then it might seem that there is nothing more to be said, for all arguments in favour of this conclusion would be circular. But this is just sophistry. If someone said that we must assume that there are evil spirits, if we are to reason at all, he would not escape legitimate doubts with this sort of maneuver. I can at least request that he make explicit this supposed dependence.
11 I will not defend the latter part of this claim. I suspect that Hume's own argument is unsound.