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Maximal propositions and the coherence theory of truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

James B. Freeman  and
Charles B. Daniels
James B. Freeman
Affiliation:
University of Victoria
Charles B. Daniels
Affiliation:
Victoria, B.C.
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Extract

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains that “The world is all that is the case.” Some philosophers have seen an advantage in introducing into a formal language either a constant which will represent the world, or an operator, e.g., ‘Max’, such that (Max p) indicates that p gives a complete description of the actual world, of the world at some instant of time, or of a possible world. Such propositions are called world propositions, possible world propositions, or maximal propositions. For us, a maximal proposition is a possible world proposition; it gives a complete description of one way the world might be. A maximal proposition p is not logically false, and for any proposition q, either p entails q or p entails not-q.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 17 , Issue 1 , March 1978 , pp. 56 - 71
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1978

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References

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