Hostname: page-component-5f745c7db-nc56l Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-07T05:03:07.975Z Has data issue: true hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Materialism, Functionalism and Supervenient Qualia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Ausonio Marras
Ausonio Marras
Affiliation:
University of Western Ontario
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Qualia are phenomenal properties of sensations and perceptual states: they are whatever it is that gives such states their “felt,” qualitative character. (In speaking of sensations, I speak of course not of mental objects or mental contents, but of mental events—of sensings, not sensa.)

Type
Qualia and Materialism/Les Qualia et le matérialisme
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 32 , Issue 3: Philosophy of Mind , Summer 1993 , pp. 475 - 492
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1993

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Armstrong, D. 1968 A Materialist Theory of Mind. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Block, N. 1980a Troubles with Functionalism.” In Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1. Edited by Block, N.. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Block, N. 1980b “Are Absent Qualia Impossible?” Philosophical Review, 89: 257–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Block, N., and Fodor, J. A. 1972 “What Psychological States are Not.” Philosophical Review, 81: 151–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Churchland, P. M., and Churchland, P. S. 1982 “Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality.” In Mind, Brain, and Function. Edited by Biro, J. I. and Shahan, R. W.. Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press.Google Scholar
Davidson, D. 1969 “The Individuation of Events.” In Essays in Honor of Carl Hempel. Edited by Rescher, N.. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
Dennett, D. C. 1971 “Intentional Systems.” Journal of Philosophy, 58: 87–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dennett, D. C. 1987 “True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works.” In The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Dennett, D. C. 1988 “Quining Qualia.” In Consciousness and Contemporary Science. Edited by Marcel, A. and Bisiach, E.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Feldman, F. 1974 “Kripke on the Identity Theory.” Journal of Philosophy, 71: 665–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harrison, B. 1967 “On Describing Colors.” Inquiry, 10: 38–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haugeland, J. 1981 “The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism.” In Mind Design. Edited by Haugeland, J.. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Horgan, T., ed. 1984 The Spindel Conference 1983: Supervenience.Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22, Supplement.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, F. 1982 “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, J. 1976 “Events as Property Exemplifications.” In Action Theory. Edited by Brand, M. and Walton, D.. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
Kim, J. 1984 “Concepts of Supervenience.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45: 153–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, J. 1989 “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 63, 3: 31–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, J. 1990 “Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept.” Metaphilosophy, 21: 1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, J. 1992 “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52: 1–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, S. 1982 “Naming and Necessity.” In Semantics of Natural Language. Edited by Davidson, D. and Harman, G.. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1972 “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. 1990 “What Experience Teaches.” In Mind and Cognition. Edited by Lycan, W.. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Lycan, W. G. 1987 Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Marras, A. 1993a “Supervenience and Reducibility: An Odd Couple” Philosophical Quarterly, 43: 215–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marras, A. 1993b “Psychophysical Supervenience and Nonreductive Materialism.” Synthese, 95: 275–304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marras, A. 1993c “Nonreductive Materialism and Mental Causation.” Unpublished manuscript, Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario.Google Scholar
Pollock, J. 1989 How to Build a Person. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1967 “Psychological Predicates.” In Art, Mind, and Religion. Edited by Capitan, W. H. and Merrill, D. D.. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar
Pylyshyn, Z. 1984 Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Seager, W. 1991 Metaphysics of Consciousness. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Shoemaker, S. 1975 “Functionalism and Qualia.” Philosophical Studies, 27: 291–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shoemaker, S. 1981 “Absent Qualia are Impossible.” Philosophical Review, 90: 581–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shoemaker, S. 1982 “The Inverted Spectrum.” Journal of Philosophy, 79: 357–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wimsatt, W. 1972 “Teleology and the Logical Structure of Function Statements.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 3: 1–80.Google Scholar