No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Are There Really Two Logics?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 June 2010
Extract
As a historian of logic, I am frequently puzzled by the things which people have to say about the relationship between mathematical logic and some other kind of logic which is variously described as ‘intentional’ and ‘traditional.’ Part of my puzzlement arises from my failure to understand precisely what kind of system is being offered under the guise of intentional logic. I have always taken it that logic is concerned with valid inferences, with showing us how we may legitimately derive a conclusion from a set of premisses; yet the validation of inferences seems to be the least of the concerns of the intentional logician. He says that it can be done, but he does not bother to show us how. My purpose in this paper is to list some of the sources of my puzzlement in the hope that an exponent of intentional logic will show me how they can be resolved, and how their resolution will contribute to the building of a system (however informal) in which different types of argument can be validated.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 1973 , pp. 100 - 109
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1973
References
1 See Veatch, H. B., Intentional Logic: A Logic based on Philosophical Realism (New Haven, 1952)Google Scholar; Veatch, H. B., Two Logics: The Conflict between Classical and Neo-Analytic Philosophy (Evanston, 1969)Google Scholar; Wade, F. C., Introduction to John of St. Thomas, Outines of Formal Logic (Milwaukee, Wisconsin 1955)Google Scholar; Centore, F. F., “There are Two Logics: A Reply to J. J. Romano's “How Many Logics are there?”,” The New Scholasticism 45 (1971) 343–347.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 For details see Risse, W., Die Logik der Neuzeit. I. 1500–1640 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1964).Google Scholar
3 See Delgado, V. Muñoz, Lógica Formal y filosofia en Domingo de Soto 1494–1500 (Madrid, 1964)Google Scholar; Delgado, V. Muñoz, La lógica nominalista en la universidad de Salamanca 1510–1530 (Madrid, 1964)Google Scholar; Delgado, V. Muñioz, La obra lógica de Pedro de la Serna 1583–1642 (Madrid, 1966)Google Scholar. He has also written fifteen articles, most of which appear in Estudios (the journal of the Ordén de la Merced, Madrid).
4 John of Thomas, St., Cursus Philosophicus I. Ars Logica (Turin, 1930), Q.VI art. 3, 177Google Scholar; Q.I art. 5 105, 107.
5 John of St. Thomas, op.cit., Q I art. 5, 105–106.
6 John of St. Thomas, op.cit., Q VI art. 3, 177.
7 I am ignoring material and improper supposition. For a full discussion of the theory of supposition, see my paper “The Doctrine of Supposition in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophic 51 (1969) 260–285.Google Scholar
8 It is, of course, possible to produce a system capable of both intensional and extensional interpretation, and Leibniz seems to have done this. See Rescher, N., “Leibniz's Interpretation of his Logical Calculi”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 (1954) 1–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
9 John of St. Thomas, op.cit. Q VII art. 2, 192.
10 John of St. Thomas, op.cit., Q VII art. 3, 194. He did not use this particular example, which appears frequently in earlier logicians.
11 For fuller details see my paper “The Theory of Consequence in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (forthcoming).
12 For fuller details see my paper “Andreas Kesler and the Later Theory of Consequence”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (forthcoming).
13 de Fonseca, Pedro, Institugoes Dialecticas. Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo, edited and translated into Portuguese by Gomes, J. Ferreira (Coimbra, 1964) I, 204–206.Google Scholar
14 John of St. Thomas, Formal Logic, 97–98.
15 Wade, op.cit., 18.
16 Sommers, F., “The Calculus of Terms”, Mind 79 (1970) 1–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar