Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T23:21:38.314Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Analysing with Subjunctives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Nollaig MacKenzie
Affiliation:
Glendon College, York University

Extract

It would not be surprising to find a philosopher deploying subjunctive conditionals in defence of a position or as part of an analysis of a concept. One might defend the view that events in the far past, or objects on the other side of the moon, are observable in principle by pointing out that if an observer had been present, or if an observer were on the other side of the moon, he would have made, or would make, certain observations. Similarly, someone might argue that a statement to the effect that there are mountains on the other side of the moon simply means “If there were an observer on the other side of the moon, he would have such and such experiences” (no doubt the claim would be that this subjunctive and many others gave the meaning of the original statement). In the same vein, one might argue that “x wants Φ” means “If such and such were the case, x would do A”.

Type
Discussions/Notes
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Note

1 “Counterfactual Conditionals,” in Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951).Google Scholar