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Illusions of Consciousness*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Stewart Nicolson
Stewart Nicolson
Affiliation:
University of Manitoba
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Extract

Daniel Dennett's theory of mind divides into two parts: a theory of mental content, which is provided by his intentional systems theory, and a theory of consciousness, the latest presentation of which is brought together in an exciting recent work, Consciousness Explained. This book, combined with his 1987 The Intentional Stance, constitutes the third execution of Dennett's overall program, the first two being Content and Consciousness (1969) and Brainstorms (1978). Consciousness Explained is a veritable treasure of fascinating ideas, fresh perspectives and striking illustrations, many of which are sure to be much discussed by philosophers in years to come.

Type
Critical Notices/Études critiques
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , Fall 1995 , pp. 769 - 776
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1995

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References

Notes

1 Dennett, Daniel, Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969);Google ScholarDennett, Daniel, Brainstorms (Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books, 1978);Google Scholar and Dennett, Daniel, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, 1987).Google Scholar

2 Searle, John R., The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books), p. 20.Google Scholar

3 Nagel, Thomas, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

4 McGinn, Colin, The Problem of Consciousness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).Google Scholar

5 Jackson, Frank, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1982): 127–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar