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A defence of Cartesian doubt
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
Extract
Just As it is, I believe, a legitimate philosophical enterprise to engage in a “rational reconstruction” of some term or concept in ordinary language, which will, although similar in many ways to the original concept, be a better concept than the original, in that it will, among other things, be free of ambiguities, vagueness and philosophically irrelevant associations of the parent concept, so there is, I believe, a similar enterprise in the history of philosophy. Here, it is legitimate to reconstruct a philosopher's views about some matter the philosopher has written on in such a way as to defend it from certain criticisms so long as the reconstruction remains faithful to the main thrust of the views in question. In particular this is so when the philosopher is acknowledged to be a very great and influential one, and if the criticisms, were they correct, would be inconsistent with the philosopher's acknowledged greatness. The defence of the philosopher from such criticisms is even more legitimate if it can be shown that although the philosopher has written in places in a way that makes the criticism in question seem correct, he has written elsewhere in a way which makes the criticism seem mistaken.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 17 , Issue 3 , September 1978 , pp. 480 - 489
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1978
References
Notes
1 Cf. Hans Reichenbach's Experience and Prediction. The University of Chicago Press, 1938, p. 5. Reichenbach credits the term's origin to Carnap.
2 All reference in this paper to Peirce's writing are from: Collected papers, Charles Sanders Peirce. Volume V, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1934. Edited by Hartshorne, Charles and Weiss, Paul.Google Scholar
3 Especially see On Certainty. Basil Blackwell, 1969. See also Wittgenstein by Anthony Kenny. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973. See especially, Chapter 11. In the opening pages of that chapter, Kenny advances a view of Cartesian Doubt which is the same as Peirce's (cf. pp. 203–205). Kenny is somewhat more cautious in his own book on Descartes. (Descartes. Random House, New York, 1968.) In Chapter Two, Kenny raises the question as to the degree of seriousness with which Descartes entertains his doubt. Kenny concludes that the only difference between Cartesian doubt and ordinary doubt is only that the former is “contemplative and not practical.” This is a fairly common interpretation. Cf. e.g. “Epistemic Appraisal and the Cartesian Circle.” Feldman, Fred. Philosophical Studies, 1975, esp. pp. 37–40Google Scholar.
4 All references to Descartes are from The Philosophical Works ofDescartes, ed. and trans, by Haldane, Elizabeth S., and Ross, G.R.T., Dover Publications, 1955Google Scholar (Two Volumes).
5 Op. cit. p. 296.
6 ibid. p. 232.
7 ibid. p. 305, also p. 362.
8 ibid. p. 357.
9 ibid. p. 157.
10 ibid. p. 359.
11 ibid. p. 195, also p. 361.
12 Haldane and Ross. Vol. II, p. 206.
13 ibid.
14 ibid. Vol. II, p. 143.
15 ibid. Vol. I, p. 145.
16 Except the proposition that, (on the supposition that ‘empiricism’ is true), I can be certain of any proposition.
17 The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Atheneum, New York, 1962, pp. 185–189.Google Scholar
18 Or knowing one has, which is, I think, a different matter. See below.
19 What Descartes' criterion for impossibility of doubt is, is notoriously puzzling. On the evidence of the Cogito, however, it seems to be this: It is impossible to doubtp, if trying to doubt thatp is necessarily unsuccessful, i.e. it is impossible to succeed in doubting p if when one tries to doubtp, p itself is entailed. That is, it is impossible for A to doubt that A exists, because A doubts A exists entails A exists.
20 “Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas.” in Leibniz edited by Philip P. Wiener. Chas. Scribner's sons, New York, I95i,p. 283.
21 Op. cit. p. 249.
22 ibid. Vol. II, p. 39.
23 The central idea of this paper is mainly due to discussions with Robert Meyers. I am grateful also to him as well as to Fred Feldman, Steven Davis, and Robert Howell for their generous comments on earlier versions of this paper. I thank too, two of my graduate students, Howard Zilber and Bruce Johnston, for helpful criticism.