2.1. Technological frames

Technological frames were introduced by Bijker (Reference Bijker, Bijker, Hughes and Pinch1987) in his study of the development of bakelite as a commercially viable synthetic resin by Leo Baekeland. For Bijker, technological frames refer to the ways in which relevant social groups (or stakeholders) attribute various meanings to an artifact (Pinch and Bijker, Reference Pinch, Bijker, Bijker, Hughes and Pinch1987). As such, the frames are located “between actors” (1987, p. 172) and relate to the interaction of various actors.

The (potentially) different technological frames of each social group help explain the subsequent evolution of the artifact. For example, the successful development of bakelite, according to Bijker, built on the technological frame of earlier Celluloid based research as well as Baekeland’s inclusion in an electrochemical technological frame. This alternative frame enabled him to undertake a systematic investigation of the factors bearing on the chemical reactions he was using (1987, pp. 170–171).

Bijker’s approach has been extensively adapted to show how technological frames shape the development of information systems (Orlikowski and Gash, Reference Orlikowski and Gash1994). For example, one study examines the determination of requirements for new information systems (Davidson, Reference Davidson2002). That paper looks at the requirements determination process and technological frames act to direct attention and to filter out contextual information inconsistent with the existing worldview of the developers.

Similarly, Lin and Silva (Reference Lin and Silva2005) see technological frames as a “cognitive device that enables individuals to comprehend, understand, and explain the world around them. Individuals rely on frames to make sense of their world” (2005, p. 50). As a consequence, they find that successful implementation of an information system will be facilitated by achieving congruent technological frames, adding that these understandings, interpretations, and expectations of information systems are “framed and reframed through the exercise of power” (2005, p. 58).

Guenduez et al. (Reference Guenduez, Mettler and Schedler2020) apply technological frames to public administration in relation to decisions as to whether to use big data analytics. They find that there are both incongruities between the frames used by different stakeholders and shared thought patterns across groups. One consequence is that if these similarities and differences are not articulated or discussed, they can often result, sometimes unintentionally and unknowingly, in misaligned expectations or even contradictory actions. In development contexts, where resources and capabilities can be in short supply, misaligned and contradictory actions between relevant social groups can be incredibly wasteful and perpetuate inequalities (Martin and Taylor, Reference Martin and Taylor2021).

2.2. Expectations and imaginations

A related literature examines the role of imagination and expectation in shaping the development and adoption of new systems (Brown and Michael, Reference Brown and Michael2003; Borup et al., Reference Borup, Brown, Konrad and Van Lente2006). This research seeks to “engage with the future as an object of critique in its own right, refraining entirely from attempts to predict or envisage the future of today’s emerging innovations” (2003, p. 5). It shows that “expectations may be seen to exhibit certain material and social path dependencies (lock–in or irreversibility) becoming the basis for future envisioning, a predisciplining of the imagination through the legacy of former expectations” (Borup et al., Reference Borup, Brown, Konrad and Van Lente2006, p. 293).

Thus, for Berkhout (Reference Berkhout2006), “expectations are inscribed into all social and political action… This is especially the case for activity that sets out to be innovative, where the intention is to act on the world and to change it” (2006, p. 299). He notes that expectations and visions (cf. Swanson and Ramiller, Reference Swanson and Ramiller1997) can take many forms including entirely private, tacit and unformulated phenomena as well as “visualised, disseminated and debated ideas” such as the digital identity principles studied in this paper.

Berkhout suggests that such imaginary future visions have three characteristic features: objectives which are the qualitative or quantitative expression of novel future outcomes; orders which are a set of social and institutional relationships in which these objectives can be met; and technologies which are the means for achieving objectives (2006, p. 302). These three features can play a number of roles in systems innovations including for mapping a “possibility space” or as a stable frame for target setting and monitoring progress. They can also play a role in bringing together various stakeholders such as symbols, narratives, and moralities that bind together communities of interest and of practice and, more generally, as a narrative for bringing together and focusing resources (capital, knowledge, networks, skills, etc.). He also explicitly links expectations and imaginations with framing that points “to the technical, institutional and behavioural problems that need to be resolved in order for a particular vision to be realised” (2006, p. 305).

2.3. Developmental discourse

Literature on international development also highlights the importance of ideas and imagination in shaping the goals and aspirations of efforts to enable change and progress. However, this literature that explores efforts to enable planned or intentional processes often also includes interrogation that focuses around the imagined goal of such efforts to ask “What is intended by development?” (Cowen and Shenton, Reference Cowen and Shenton1996, p. xiii). Highlighting the importance of individual and institutional power, it also asks a further question: “Who decides what development should be?” (Crewe and Axelby, Reference Crewe and Axelby2013, p. 4). Such questions inform the exploration of development doctrines in general, as well as the interrogation of “assumptions on the nature of ICT innovation and on the way such innovation contributes to development” (Avgerou, Reference Avgerou2010, p. 1) or whether ICT is actually a force for good that does not cause harm to disadvantaged people (Masiero, Reference Masiero2022).

While until recently there was limited attention to the notion of what constitutes development in studies of information and communication technologies (Masiero, Reference Masiero2022), there has been a drive, in part by the post or decolonialist turn in studies of information and communication technologies in development, to emphasize the importance of paying attention to alternative perspectives on notions of development and innovation (Santos, Reference de Sousa Santos2014; Wyse, Reference Wyse2015; Jimenez and Roberts, Reference Jimenez, Roberts, Nielsen and Kimaro2019). This literature highlights the importance and insight to be gained from critically examining the expected goals and standards of development interventions.

2.4. Sociopolitical configurations

Taken together, these literatures on technological frames, expectations, and imaginations and developmental discourse describe what this paper calls the sociopolitical configurations that lie behind various interventions, such as the digital identity principles explored below. These configurations are neither good nor bad, but also never neutral—they necessarily embody a subtle politics that ought to be carefully examined, especially to help identify gaps and assumptions and their consequences for development.

Technological frames introduce the notion of relevant social groups. For the digital identity principles studied in this paper, the main relevant groups are the authors and sponsors of the principles. However, there is no guarantee that the technological frame of this group is congruent with the technological frames of other relevant social groups, including policy makers and implementation entities. Thus, drawing on insights from developmental discourse it is important to question what form of developmental goals are implied by the principles (and the group that produced them) and how open they are to alternative perspectives on notions of development and innovation from other relevant social groups.

From the perspective of the expectations and imaginations, this questioning also applies to consideration of the objectives of the digital identity principles, the social and institutional orders within which they can be met as well as their narratives for bringing together and focusing resources. Finally, the questioning continues in relation to the technologies which are seen to be the means for achieving the objectives.

These elements are summarized in Table 1 and are the means by which the paper operationalizes Renieris’s exhortation to contest the underlying imaginations that shape any given technological system. The table combines analytic categories from the literature on technological frames and expectations and imaginations with developmental discourse to generate a series of questions that enable us to explore, as Renieris suggests, the implications of the imaginations the digital identity systems documents represent.

Table 1. Sociopolitical configurations

3.1. World economic forum

The “WEF” document describes itself as a publication that reflects the collective insights of public and private stakeholders committed to shared cooperation around digital identity intended for “decision–makers and practitioners.” The document “takes stock of where we are today and identifies gaps in coordination across sectors and stakeholders. It outlines what we have learnt to date on what user centricity means and how to uphold it in practice. It attempts to offer a shared working agenda for leaders: an initial list of immediate–term priority actions that demand cooperation. It reflects, in short, the first stage in collective learning and the creation of shared goals and paths” (2018, p. 4). The document, in other words, aims to reflect on the state of the field of digital identity and to outline a framework for what “good” digital identity should look like.

The document consists of four chapters—with the first outlining the importance of digital identities, the second exploring what “good” digital identity looks like along five dimensions of value to individuals, the third is forward looking and describes the opportunities and challenges that arise from the widespread use of digital identities. Chapter four concludes with six priority areas for public–private collaboration in support of digital identities.

The document describes identity as something that is both individual—“personal history, innate and learned beliefs” (2018, p. 9)—and also social—“a bundle of cultural, family, national, team, gender or other identities” (2018, p. 9). Nevertheless, throughout the document, the importance and value of digital identity are overwhelmingly framed as something primarily of individual value, even when discussing the social contract between the individual and the state.

This is seen, for example, in how identity is related to individual rights: “how individuals are represented in society has been the bedrock for reimagining and renegotiating the rights, freedoms and responsibilities of individuals and the organisations to which they relate” (2018, p. 9) continuing that “Any discussion on shaping digital identities should start and end with the individual” (2018, p. 9 emphasis added). “What good looks like” is based on values “that respect individual freedoms” (2018, p. 9 emphasis added). Moreover, the document defines the five elements of “Good ID” as fit for purpose, inclusive, useful, offers choice and is secure (2018, chap. 2). All of these are framed in terms of the value they offer to individuals.

However, despite claiming that any discussion on shaping digital identities should start and end with individuals, the document also makes claims about using digital identity to create value for business and governments as well as individuals: “For businesses, verifiable identities create new markets and business lines, better customer experiences, improved data and a tool against fraud. For governments, they offer a new way of governing: better delivery of services, a more engaged citizenry and a tool against corruption and crime” (2018, p. 10).

This tension between the value that accrues to the individual compared to the value that accrues to the system owner was noted by Crosby (Reference Crosby2008) who proposed identity assurance as “a consumer–led concept, a process that meets an important consumer need without necessarily providing any spin–off benefits to the owner of any database” (2008, p. 3) whereas for more traditional identity management systems the benefits accrue to the system owners.

Interestingly, almost all the examples of real-world identity systems quoted in the document (BankID in Sweden, NADRA in Pakistan, UNHCR’s refugee ID, Aadhaar in India) are ones which can be seen primarily as initiatives that are of value to issuing institutions/owners of the identity database. For example, Aadhaar was promoted as addressing leakages in various social welfare schemes (Bhatia and Bhabha, Reference Bhatia and Bhabha2017), the work of UNHCR seeks to manage refugee populations on behalf of nation states (Martin et al., Reference Martin, Sharma, Peter de Souza, Taylor, van Eerd, McDonald, Marelli, Cheesman, Scheel and Dijstelbloem2022).

The document includes an appendix detailing design considerations for practitioners which is focused on designing and constructing user-centric systems that are useful, inclusive, secure, fit for purpose, and offer user choice and control.

3.2. GSMA

The “GSMA” document “explores the connection between digital identity and sustainable development” (World Bank et al., 2016, p. 7). Consisting of three parts, the first part explores the opportunities of digital identity as well as the challenges to realizing those benefits, the second outlines the “digital identity lifecycle” and design considerations while the third part concludes by proposing some common principles for “unlocking the value of digital identity.”

For the GSMA document, what is meant by value is taken from an earlier report (GSMA and Secure Identity Alliance, 2014) which talks about digital identity unlocking the potential of the digital economy. That document sees the economic value of identity in terms of how identity systems help the economy function effectively, where services such as automation, tax collection, and digital signatures are just some of the ways that governments across the globe can save money (2014, p. 6).

In the main GSMA document, identity is framed as a key to inclusion and its absence to exclusion. The document argues that the private sector has an important role to play resulting in “evolving models of public–private partnerships to build and strengthen identification in poor countries” (2016, p. 10 emphasis added), with a key role for “private sector innovations in new technologies to strengthen the ability of remote or vulnerable populations to access key services” (2016, p. 10 emphasis added).

The GSMA document identifies the “identity gap” as the main issue limiting the potential of digital identity to realize promised benefits, arguing that identity exclusion leads to exclusion from other services, benefits, and entitlements. It argues that the private sector has a key role to play in bridging this gap to realize the benefits of digital identity. Given the interests of the industry associations contributing to the document, it is unsurprising that the document argues that the private sector has an important role to play in advancing inclusion. It is also important to acknowledge that the private sector’s primary goal is profit and shareholder value. With contributors to the report coming from a unit that sees its mission as leveraging “mobile technology as an enabler of digital identity and associated services which provide social and commercial value in developing markets” (Mobile for Development, 2022 emphasis added) and mobile operators often partnering with countries in the developing world and leveraging their nationwide network to help increase access and inclusion at reduced cost, it is perhaps unsurprising that the document also suggests that successful initiatives depend on the private sector partnering with governments to ensure the resulting systems are “effective, secure, inclusive and trustworthy” (2016, p. 10).

The document also emphasizes the political economy of change, noting that existing identity systems will have vested interests that may be resistant to change and that in order to overcome this there is a need for a “unified vision and approach that can overcome the common fragmentation of identity by ministries, departments, regions, or donor funded projects related to identification” (2016, p. 14). There is thus an acknowledgement that the private sector is not positioned to resolve these issues and an implicit suggestion that private sector companies do not themselves contribute to this fragmentation as there is no recommendation for how the private sector can also play a role in resolving it. Despite this, some donor funded projects that work with mobile operators may produce sector specific fixes that institutionalize the fragmentation.

The document also notes that “creating a digital identity system is a costly project that may require extensive investment in building or updating infrastructure and technology” (2016, p. 15). The ICT for development literature recognizes that “top–down, technology–centric, goal–diffuse approaches to ICT contribute to unsatisfactory development results” (Dodson et al., Reference Dodson, Sterling and Bennett2013, p. 19) yet the document argues for investment in building or updating infrastructure includes “strategies to reach remote areas and ensure ‘last mile connectivity’” (2016, p. 15), although nonmobile phone and offline alternatives are also in scope. In other words, technology remains at the core of the document’s argument for the role of digital identity technologies in international development, for example, noting that “mobile technology is uniquely positioned to enable accessible and inclusive digital identity” (Mobile for Development, 2022 emphasis added). Other approaches in the international development policy and literature promote a “holistic model of civil registration, vital statistics and identity management” which emphasizes a lifecycle approach to registration from birth to death rather than technical measures in and of themselves (UN Legal Identity Expert Group, 2022; Wersum, Reference Wersum2022).

Although the principles of “good” ID are framed in the document in terms of individual value, overall the document is dominated by discussion of institutional value and technologically led interventions. For example, Table 1 includes a long list of institutional stakeholders and roles whose primary goals are not individually focused but instead highlight institutional benefits such as fraud reduction and consistent identity management.

3.3. Access now

The Access Now document is a critical challenge to the dominant, mainstream discussions around digital identity, written in the form of a letter to which there are over 110 organizational and nearly 200 individual signatories. The short two page letter aims to highlight key concerns and to frame some specific questions that need to be addressed in order to answer the question of “Why ID?”. These concerns are expanded in their detailed review of the Indian identity system, Aadhaar (Access Now, 2021).

The document argues that there is “a generalised assumption that certain kinds of digital identity programmes empower users” but notes that while benefits can be scalable, so too can harms, particularly as “single points of truth” can also become single points of failure or a means “to track and log the everyday activities and transactions of a user” (Access Now, 2020).

The Access New document highlights the importance of being clear about the specific technologies and models of identity schemes, a common critique of many identity system proposals (Whitley and Hosein, Reference Whitley and Hosein2010). The document also flags concerns around specific technologies, highlighting concerns around biometrics specifically, noting that although they have become increasingly popular, they pose greater risks because unlike passwords, “biometric indicators cannot simply be reset or changed as needed.” This can result in greater risk because it “becomes increasingly difficult to repair the damage done by leaks or hacks of biometric data.”

Moreover, the Access Now document notes that all too often assumptions about benefits lack strong “supportive evidence of the promised benefits.” For example, a widely cited report from McKinsey (2019) estimates the value of digital identities to be between 3 and 13% of GDP in 2030. However, the McKinsey report also states that the value estimates “assume the digital ID program enables multiple high value use cases, attains high levels of usage, is established with individual consent, and protects user privacy and ensures control over personal data” (McKinsey Global Institute, 2019, p. vii). It is unclear what benefits will accrue to digital identity systems if not all assumptions are met.

The Access Now document is particularly concerned about the routine deployment of digital identity systems in less developed economies at a time when they have been widely questioned and opposed in other countries (Bennett and Lyon, Reference Bennett and Lyon2008; Lyon, Reference Lyon2009; Whitley et al., Reference Whitley, Martin, Hosein, Boersma, Fonio and Wagenaar2014). Moreover, their de facto mandatory use in many circumstances risks excluding those who are already vulnerable, such as those unable to access supporting identification documents to prove their identity or who have limited access to digital technologies (Khera, Reference Khera2019; Rao, Reference Rao2019; Manby, Reference Manby2021; Martin and Taylor, Reference Martin and Taylor2021) and thus the benefits, services, and rights they function as gatekeepers for. This highlights how digital identification technologies can “amplify’ existing vulnerabilities. This “amplification” effect of technologies in international development is well recognized (Toyama, Reference Toyama2011).

Although both of the previous documents emphasized the need for trustworthiness coupled with effective data protection laws, the Access Now document notes that the surveillance and discrimination risks are accentuated in contexts “with a lack of comprehensive privacy and surveillance frameworks, compromised institutional standards, and weak independent enforcement” (2020). This echoes Kak et al.’s (Reference Kak, Ben-Avie, Munyua and Tiwari2020) concerns about the tendency to “experimentation with tech in low–rights environments” (2020, p. 3).