This article argues that squadrismo represented a central feature in the ideology and politics of Fascist Italy, influencing the whole period of the dictatorship. In the second half of the twenties, many squadristi became political prisoners, accused of being ‘bad Fascists’: it looked like the end of squadrismo. Despite punishments and (brief) periods of imprisonment, the squadristi actually continued to play an important part in the fascistisation of Italian society, in particular during the intransigent 1930s. By disciplining the blackshirts while continuing to make use of their particular skills, Fascism hoped to ‘tame the revolution’.

Rather surprisingly, Mussolini's blackshirts (the squadristi) have never really received the attention accorded to Hitler's paramilitary groups. It is interesting, therefore, to read an article that seeks to remedy this situation. Millan argues that the traditional view of squadrismo as important before the March on Rome but of less relevance in later years – indeed, as something of a liability – is too simplistic and needs revision. He sees the influence of squadrismo as permeating the regime throughout its existence and suggests that historians have been too quick in seeing the death of squadrismo in the supposed ‘subordination’ of the Fascist Party to the state in the years immediately following 1925.

This article explores the pre-war background of the Swiss, Swedish and Danish men who volunteered for the Nazi Waffen-SS combat formation during the Second World War. Through a detailed biographical examination of officer corps volunteers, this article contradicts what I call the myth of the volunteers – a long-standing popular and to some extent scholarly interpretation that perceives the volunteers as lower-class, social outsiders of a criminally inclined or mentally unstable nature. Instead this article demonstrates that these men held a distinctly European outlook and were characterised by a high level of education, intellect and their strong personal character. Moreover, they had with few exceptions developed a longing for a radical reorganisation of the European political, social and economic landscape before joining the Waffen-SS. This longing was amplified by what these men perceived as a threat to the core of European civilisation coming not only from the Bolshevik East but also from the Anglo-Liberal West.

State projects aimed at technological innovation and social renewal were a widespread phenomenon in inter-war Europe. This is exemplified by the practice of internal colonisation – the construction of new settlements within state territories – in the Netherlands. This article examines one such case, the reclamation and colonisation of the Wieringermeer in the 1930s, in detail. In doing so, it reveals that the principle of state abstention, which prevailed throughout the inter-war period, was abandoned on reclaimed land. Politicians and experts perceived these territories as a clean slate on which they could experiment with new forms of government intervention. This article focuses on state policies of social planning and the technocratic governance of reclaimed land, and examines whether these could be reconciled with democratic notions of sovereignty and citizenship in the minds of the planners, the politicians and, last but not least, the pioneers themselves.

This article examines the relations between the Turkish State Planning Organisation (SPO) and the Western economic system during the first two decades of national planning in Turkey (1960–1980). It traces how the SPO, established with the guidance and full endorsement of international economic institutions came to vehemently oppose Turkish participation in one of their pillars: the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the European Union. It argues that the shift in the SPO's world-view was founded upon two distinct understandings of the Turkish nation and its development, situates these understandings within the intellectual history of Turkey's past ambivalence towards the West, and, in doing so, provides a historical case-study of the ideological clash between modernisation and dependency theories of development.

This article argues for a less EU-centric form of writing European integration history. More specifically, it scrutinises the ways in which the interconnections with other international organisations have energised, complemented or rivalled the efforts of the European Communities/EU. This approach also allows for a reassessment of the alleged sui generis character of European integration. It demonstrates that it was not the precise competences, its effects or its institutional uniqueness that made the EC stand out, but rather the way in which it self-fashioned and surrounded itself with a great sense of expectancy.