Most theories of revolution seem to agree that certain preconditions must be met if a revolutionary situation is to arise. The peculiar contribution of Ernesto Che Guevara to understanding revolutions is that according to him such preconditions can be created [1: 4]. Few men in the world today would be better qualified than Guevara to sustain such theory with empirical evidence from his own participation in revolutions. After his experience in Guatemala, Cuba, the Congo and, perhaps, other parts of the world, Guevara was considered, by friends and enemies alike, as one of the world's top-ranking guerrilla fighters of the twentieth century. By the time he started a new daring experiment in Bolivia he was reckoned as one of the most articulate theorists in the field. The death of Guevara in the mountains of Bolivia on October 9,1967, brought commotion and mixed feelings to his enemies and admirers the world over. His enemies were exultant, first because the dreaded Guevara was dead, and second because his death was ‘clear evidence’ that his theories were wrong. His admirers were sad because he was dead, but were also elated because the puzzle of his disappearance had been unraveled and because his death at the hands of Bolivian rangers trained by a U.S. military mission, far from being ‘evidence’ that his theories were wrong, was ‘evidence’ that they were right.

An official, albeit implicit, Chinese critique of Che Guevara's methods in Bolivia in 1966–67 can be found in Peking's praise in 1969 for a Bolivian Communist Draft Peasant-Agrarian Program. Peking stresses Bolivia's feudal character and its domination by American imperialism. That is, the revolution should ally with bourgeois nationalism. Consequently it must be based on a minimalist program to attract a maximum of support. The National Liberation Front in Vietnam follows that course. The Cuban revolution of Fidel Castro took that road. Nonetheless, R6gis Debray insists that ‘Cuba remembered from the beginning that the socialist revolution is the result of an armed struggle against the armed power of the bourgeois state’. While Peking Review agreed on the need for an ‘armed struggle… rely[ing] firmly on the peasants’, it did not propose making the middle classes the main target of that fight. By stressing socialism instead of alliance with nationalistic capitalists, Che isolates himself from a potential source of support and forces those rich entrepreneurs to help reactionary militarists and landed oligarchs whom they may abhor. Nationalist anti-imperialism is a major issue in Latin America as most everywhere else in the world. Yet there is no necessary reason why narrowly based Che-style guerrillas must win the nationalist mantle. It has been the bourgeois parties and interests in Latin America which usually have expropriated Yankee businesses. It is the native national bourgeoisie who are most obviously hurt by Yankee competition. But if the guerrillas cannot appear as the nationalists, they will not win the thousands upon thousands of patriotic youth needed to educate, organize, lead and die.

Historians generally dislike lost causes. They seek to explain what happened, rather than what might have been, and have consequently neglected the story of political emigrations. Granted, the study of dmigres is full of methodological pitfalls for the unwary: biased accounts of past issues, outright forgeries of documentary evidence, personal recriminations that serve to distort political reality, and a pervasive mood of bitterness, acrimony, nostalgia, and endless hope. Yet it is an important story, not only because of its intrinsic merit as a political phenomenon worth studying, but also because of the effect that exiles have had both in their place of refuge and in their homeland when they have been able to return. He who would ignore the émigrés might do well to recall that the experience of exile helped fashion the political careers of Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky, as well as of Charles II and Louis XVIII.

When the British first became involved officially in the Malay States in 1874 they were represented there by a very small and oddly assorted group of men quite separate and different from, and only loosely controlled by, the official colonial establishment in the Straits Settlements. By the time of the Japanese occupation this had grown to a group which was very large by normal British colonial standards and had become much more homogeneous, conformed much more closely to general Colonial Office type, and also ruled in the Colony. It is the aim of this paper to trace this development, with an eye to the part played by the M.C.S. (as the Malayan Civil Service was always called) in Malayan history during the early twentieth century. I would myself contend that the corporate role of the M.C.S. was so important that this period of Malayan history, and especially the events of the 1920s and 1930s, cannot be understood without it. But I shall not here have time to explore this role fully, merely to indicate the sphere in which it was important and how it came to be so. The main themes will be the growth in numbers, the emergence of a distinctive esprit de corps, and the efforts, largely successful, to maintain a certain degree of independence–or at any rate internal self-government–which sometimes led it into disputes or open clashes with Whitehall, with the High Commissioner in Singapore, or with the rest of the European community in Malaya itself.

Few sociologists would quarrel with Dr. Allen's use of the term bureaucracy in his analysis of the Malayan colonial government. Nor could one argue that he has failed to come to grips with certain central sociological issues in the analysis of bureaucracies. On the contrary, Dr. Allen has given us an excellent case study that illuminates some of the dynamics of the bureaucratic processes.

Students of peasant society recognize the importance of the market economy for understanding decision-making processes within the house- hold and the nature of articulation between the peasant sector and the national society. We intend to describe market behavior in Northeast Brazil and to relate such behavior to changes in the agricultural economy in general. The ultimate goal is to understand how peasants are integrated into the national economy as commodity producers and consumers of manufactured goods. By concentrating on the internal marketing system for food staples in Northeast Brazil we hope to refine earlier views of peasants and to suggest a definition of peasantry based on economic integration rather than on partial participation in the national culture.