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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2021
For several decades, scholars of Plato's dialogues have focussed their efforts on understanding Socrates’ philosophy by unravelling the arguments used to establish it. On this view, Socrates’ philosophy is presented in his arguments, and, as Gregory Vlastos says, ‘Almost everything Socrates says is wiry argument; that is the beauty of his talk for a philosopher.’ In this paper I raise questions about what can be learned about Socrates’ philosophy through analysis of his arguments. One critic of what he views as traditional interpretations of Plato—‘the sole frame of reference used by most interpreters of Plato from antiquity to the present’—describes this approach as follows:
(i) reading the dialogues to discover Platonic or Socratic doctrines, and
(ii) the logic of the arguments on which these doctrines are based.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a conference at Virginia Tech and at the University of Leeds. I am grateful to participants at both events for valuable comments and suggestions, especially to Jamie Dow and Carl Fox.
1 For simplicity's sake, I assume that, in the cases that concern us, there is little distance between the views of Socrates and of Plato, and I discuss the two figures interchangeably.
2 Vlastos, G., ‘Introduction’, in Ostwald, M. (transl.), Plato: Protagoras (Indianapolis, 1956), vii–lviii, at xxxiGoogle Scholar.
3 Press, G., ‘Principles of dramatic and non-dogmatic Plato interpretation’, in id. (ed.), Plato's Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations (Lanham, MD, 1993), 107–28, at 125Google Scholar ([i] and [ii] supplied).
4 Such works include Press (n. 3); Corlett, J. Angelo, Interpreting Plato's Dialogues (Las Vegas, NV, 2005)Google Scholar; Griswold, C. (ed.), Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings (State College, PA, 2001)Google Scholar; and Ausland, H.W. and Benitez, E. (edd.), Who Speaks for Plato? Studies in Platonic Anonymity (Lanham, MD, 2000)Google Scholar. An excellent non-sceptical analysis of the implications of the dialogue form is Frede, M., ‘Plato's arguments and the dialogue form’, in Klagge, J. and Smith, N. (edd.), Methods of Interpreting Plato and his Dialogues (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume) (Oxford, 1992), 201–19Google Scholar.
5 For good defences of these claims, see Rutherford, R.B., The Art of Plato: Ten Essays in Platonic Interpretation (Cambridge, MA, 1998), 25–9Google Scholar; and Smith, N., ‘Introduction’, in id. (ed.), Plato: Critical Assessments. Vol. I, General Issues of Interpretation (London, 1998)Google Scholar.
6 Euthyd. 278d–282d, 288d–292e; Lysis 207d–210e; Prt. 351b–360e.
7 For the Socratic paradoxes, see Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, 6 vols. (Cambridge, 1962–81), 3.450–62Google Scholar; Santas, G., Socrates: Philosophy in Plato's Early Dialogues (London, 1979)Google Scholar.
8 A troublesome aspect of the argument in the Protagoras just noted is its dependence on Socrates’ espousal of hedonism. On this, see Zeyl, D., ‘Socrates and hedonism: Protagoras, 351b–358d’, Phronesis 25 (1980), 250–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Irwin, T., Plato's Ethics (Oxford, 1995), 81–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar; id., Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford, 1977), 110–14.
9 The intentions and perceptions that are attributed to Socrates and his interlocutors throughout this paper are those imputed to them by the commentator, in accordance with reconstruction of their mental processes.
10 The quoted words are from Vlastos, G., Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1973), 348Google Scholar, in reference to an argument that appears in the Parmenides; his procedures are similar in regard to arguments that appear in the early dialogues.
11 Klosko, G., ‘Criteria of fallacy and sophistry for use in the analysis of Platonic dialogues’, CQ 33 (1983), 363–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 On the ad hominem character of the elenchos, see especially Robinson, R., Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1953), 15–17Google Scholar; Stokes, M., Plato's Socratic Conversations: Drama and Dialectic in Three Dialogues (Baltimore, 1986)Google Scholar.
13 Grg. 472b–c, 482b–c, 516d; Alc. 1 (which I assume is genuine) 118b; see 112c–113a, 116d.
14 E.g. Vlastos, G., ‘Unity of the virtues’, in id., Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1973), 221–65, at 223 n. 5Google Scholar; Taylor, C.C.W. (ed.), Plato: Protagoras, rev. ed. (Oxford, 1991), 158Google Scholar; Stewart, M.A., ‘Plato's sophistry’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 51 (1977), 21–44, at 21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
15 Kraut, R., Socrates and the State (Princeton, 1987), 5Google Scholar.
16 Sharvy, R., ‘Euthyphro 9d–11b: analysis and definition in Plato and others’, Nous 6 (1972), 119–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cohen, S.M., ‘Socrates on the definition of piety: Euthyphro 10A–11B’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 9 (1971), 1–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar = repr. in Vlastos, G. (ed.), The Philosophy of Socrates (Garden City, NY, 1971), 158–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
17 Cf. Taylor's response to Stokes, who views the content of the Socratic dialogues, including the Protagoras, as entirely or almost entirely ad hominem. Taylor argues that this is not the whole point of the dialogues. The Protagoras also presents Socrates’ teaching (Taylor [n. 14], xiv–xv). I agree with this claim, although I differ from Taylor in making less direct connection between Socrates’ teaching and the specific steps in the flawed arguments he uses in this work.
18 Cornford, F.M. (ed. and transl.), The Republic of Plato (Oxford, 1941), vii–viiiGoogle Scholar; cf. Tht. 143b–c.
19 J. Burnet (ed.), Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito (Oxford, 1924), on Euthphr. 11a7; see the articles cited in n. 16 above.
20 Euthphr. 6d–e; see Allen, R.E., Plato's ‘Euthyphro’ and the Earlier Theory of Forms (London, 1970)Google Scholar.
21 ‘There would be no need of resorting to [an interpretation that turns on Socrates’ use of sophistry] if we could understand the Socratic formulae in a way which purges them of their offensive features.’ (Vlastos [n. 10], 221–69, at 223; see also 233). This article is cited hereafter as UVP.
22 Taylor (n. 14), 119
23 Taylor (n. 14), 119. Perhaps gesturing in the direction of this paper, J. Ferejohn criticizes Vlastos for ‘not taking seriously what [Socrates] says’ in the Protagoras (‘The unity of virtue and the objects of Socratic inquiry’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 20 [1982], 1–21, at 4–7).
24 I.M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, 2 vols. (London, 1962–3), 1.26; see also 1.23–4. T. Irwin presents a similar statement of principle in the Preface to his edition of the Gorgias (Oxford, 1979).
25 Guthrie (n. 7), 4.225, 4.223.
26 Vlastos appeals to Protagoras’ understanding of various points in the discussion at UVP, 224, 242 n. 57, 244 n. 68.
27 Kraut (n. 15), 40 (cited hereafter as SS).
28 E.g. Irwin, T., ‘Socratic inquiry and politics’, Ethics 96 (1986), 400–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar; G. Vlastos in the Times Literary Supplement, 24 August 1984, 931–2; Rutherford (n. 5), xxx.
29 Cf. Kraut's remarks in SS, 110; he should be criticized for overlooking questions concerning an interpretation's degree of fidelity to an author's intentions.
30 See Kraut, SS, ch. 3; however, even if we grant much of Kraut's reading, his conclusions are overly strong. He says the Laws ‘welcome dissent’ (166); their position ‘invites dissent’ (181). I see no textual warrant for such claims.
31 Cf. Young, G., ‘Socrates and obedience’, Phronesis 19 (1974), 1–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Young's position is close to mine, in holding that Socrates’ proofs must be assessed according to their intended effects upon Crito, although I believe that many of his specific interpretations are improbable.
32 As Rutherford says (of arguments in the Euthydemus), ‘Plato leaves some of the work for the reader to do’ ([n. 5], 116).
33 E.g. Penner, T., ‘The unity of virtue’, Philosophical Review 82 (1973), 35–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.