The absence of a systematic programme has been a distinctive feature of China's economic reform process. The Chinese did not set out to develop a step-by-step plan of reform to be phased in over a period of years. Instead they adopted a number of strategic goals, and in 1978 launched incremental and pragmatic changes aimed at realizing them. Essentially the strategy adopted had four main aspects: a shift from economic growth expressed mainly through statistical targets towards an emphasis on satisfying the consumption needs of the population; a change from extensive development based on new investment towards intensive development through greater efficiency; an acceptance of greater economic autonomy for producers, with a broader mix of methods of economic management and types of ownership; and the adoption of a much more open economy. The reforms adopted over the succeeding years have all been consistent with these objectives, but they have not been implemented through a carefully planned series of stages. Overall the process has been marked by different rates of reform across sectors, by occasional pauses and even retreats, and by problems generated by the interaction of the differing rates of reform. Enterprise managers, for example, have found that plan controls over their production or sales have disappeared at a faster rate than controls over their supply of inputs. Given the dual price system and the continuing role of the central government in the supply of strategic materials and energy, the impact of the uneven pace of change on managers’ behaviour has therefore been very complex.

Just over three decades ago Joseph Berliner, in his book Factory and Manager in the USSR, explored the world of the socialist manager. Drawing on interviews with Soviet emigres, he illuminated a world of informal management behaviour hidden beneath the seemingly formidable confines of a highly centralized system. The Soviet manager of the 1930s and 1940s employed a number of deceptive strategies made rational by a taut system of output planning and by chronic supply shortages: hoarding of plant capacity, labour and inventories; “storming” at the end of plan periods, in order to meet quotas; neglect of customer needs in favour of products easy to produce; and an overriding concern with the procurement process, relying heavily on procuring agents (tolkachi) who employed personal connections (blat) at other plants in order to secure inputs. Despite extensive social and economic change in the Soviet Union since that time, this pattern of managerial behaviour has survived, albeit in slightly altered form, into the 1980s.

In the field of Chinese foreign policy, the debate continues over the importance of domestic and international factors in policy–making. Scholars arguing in favour of the special importance of domestic politics in the formulation of policy point to the existence of elite differences over foreign policy and contend that the shifting fortunes of individual leaders and the leadership turnover associated with succession politics can significantly shape China's security policy. Other scholars stress the importance of such international factors as shifting global balances of power, changing alliance patterns, and relative bargaining strengths in Beijing's foreign policy.

Between 1937 and 1945 higher education was one of the main arenas of struggle between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Both sides regarded it as an important area to be controlled. The Bureau of Investigation's 1951 report suggested that KMT support from youth in schools was “the key to success or failure.” The Chinese Communist Party also regarded the work of winning over intellectuals as vital for the Party's future. In 1939 Mao Zedong said that “without the participation of intellectuals victory in the revolution is impossible.” Thus, the two parties competed both overtly and covertly in colleges and universities to win the support of both staff and students.

For a variety of reasons, still hotly debated by social anthropologists and social historians, both Guangdong and Fujian have been home to many large tightly-organized lineages since at least the 17th century. For a variety of reasons, overseas Chinese emigration in the pre-1949 period was also more prevalent in Guangdong and Fujian than in other Chinese provinces.

The Kuomintang (KMT) held its 13th Party Congress from 7 to 13 July 1988 on Taiwan. The Congress departed from its predecessors in several significant ways: a majority of its delegates had been directly elected by party members; a local-born Taiwanese was officially confirmed as Party leader; the Central Committee was elected at the Congress by secret ballot; after which it appointed its own Standing Committee, the majority of whom were local-born Taiwanese and for the first time included a woman.