This issue brings together an outstanding group of European scholars interested in China who recently presented at a conference the European perspective on the development of Chinese-European relations since China embarked on its open policy and the European Union evolved into the major economic and political force in Europe. The conference, held 17–19 May 2000, was hosted by the Instituto do Oriente, in the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas at the Universidade Técnica de Lisboa. The China Quarterly wishes to warmly thank the head of the Institute, Prof. Narana Sinai Coissoró and his assistant, Sra. Ana Cristina Dias Alves, as well as Sra. Andrea Sofia da Cruz Valente and Sr. André Filipe Reynolds Castel-Branco da Silveira. The papers also benefited from the participation of Hugh Baker, Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Ana Maria Gonzalo Castellaños, Stefan Friedrich, Wolfgang Pape, Klaus Rupprecht, and the rapporteur's report done by John Ingerson. The contributions in this volume largely are the revised versions of the conference papers.

During the last quarter of the 21st century, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the European Community/European Union (EC/EU) have been similar and different, compatible and incompatible players at the same time. Both remain “unfinished” international actors, China because of a lack of functioning state institutions, and the EU because its component members survived as nation states. And whereas the partial opening-up of the vast Chinese market under Deng Xiaoping very much corresponded to structural changes in Western Europe and two European recessions, their respective approaches to world order issues were mutually contradictory in fundamental respects. On the European side, stable democracies had subscribed, as a matter of principle, to the liberal paradigm of non-violent conflict solution and to the universal applicability of human rights. At the same time, the PRC had judged it necessary to strengthen its sovereignty in the interest of a national agenda that bordered on the nationalistic and irredentist, thus keeping its option open, as a matter of principle, to resolve conflicts through force. During the 1980s, Sino-American irritations followed by the gradual demise of the Soviet bloc slowly invalidated the basic strategic framework for EU-China relations. Subsequent attempts at building a new framework have thus far remained unconvincing.

More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, both the European Union (EU) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are usually regarded as important political and economic actors in a globalizing international environment. While the United States as the third important partner is heavily divided in its China policy between proponents of a policy of containment and their opponents favouring engagement, European countries have without exception followed a policy of “constructive engagement” towards China. The PRC in return is strengthening its relations with Europe, seeking not only improved trade relations, but also a deepened political dialogue and intensified co-operation. Apart from policy statements, however, Europe is far from implementing a consolidated and integrated China policy.

This article seeks to examine certain aspects of the role of human rights in relations between China and Europe. Specifically, the article focuses on the debate whether or not to co-sponsor a resolution critical of China at the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) or alternatively to base policy around a human rights dialogue with China. This debate has dominated the discussions of member states of the European Union on human rights and China for the past five years at least.

Looking at the history of European-Chinese relations, there have been times of rapprochement and co-operation but also of tension and conflict. Both China and the European Union (EU) have gained specific profile as international actors over the last two decades, be it in economic or political terms. Amongst Asian states, China has reached a dominant position on the EU's external relations agenda. Economic relations between the two sides have reached significant importance and in 2000 China was, for exports as well as imports, the EU's third largest non-European trading partner, behind the United States and Japan. This has not happened by accident, but is part of a process in which EU-China relations were progressively deepened. As early as in 1973 the Chinese government had invited the then European Commissioner Christopher Soames to visit China. In November 1974 the European Commission forwarded a memorandum to China, including a draft for a possible trade agreement. After diplomatic relations had been established between the EC and China in 1975, recognizing the People's Republic as the only government of China, the Trade Agreement between the EC and China followed in 1978. In 1985 this agreement was replaced by the Agreement on Trade and Economic Co-operation between the EC and China. The European Commission opened its representation in Beijing in 1988, and ever since there has been a continuous deepening of economic and trade relations.

In the course of the last 20 or more years the intensity of economic exchange between the People's Republic of China (henceforth China) and the various European economies has increased dramatically. This development was triggered largely by the economic policy changes introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. Since then, China has freed itself from its former self-imposed isolation and gradually integrated with the world economy. The market-oriented transformation process initiated in China in the late 1970s created the preconditions for the resumption of economic contacts that had been largely stagnant in the preceding years. The gradual establishment of a market-based economic framework has step-by-step allowed economic entities to exploit the comparative advantages of the economies concerned and enlarge the scope of division of labour with China.

The return of Hong Kong by Britain in 1997 and of Macau by Portugal in 1999 formally marked the end of one era of Sino-European relations and the beginning of another. Both events had been preceded by protracted negotiations, detailed bilateral treaties and, in the history of imperial withdrawal, extended transition periods. Consequently, since the signing of the Joint Declarations (JD), the local, national and international implications of the two events have been the foci of historical assessment, strategic analysis, contingency planning and policy reformulation.

All European countries, with the exception of the Holy See, have established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and, consequently, have developed non-official ties with Taiwan. The latter are limited to the economic and cultural sphere, and should leave aside any move or transaction suggesting that Taiwan is anything else than a part of China under the PRC's rule. This article will broadly confirm this picture.Unless otherwise stated, this article is based on interviews carried out in Taipei in July 1989, October 1991 and October 2000.

The Development of Taiwan's European Trade and Outward Investment in a Global Perspective

Analysis of Taiwan's economic experience since the 1950s highlights the critical importance of the external orientation of Taiwan's development strategy. In particular, foreign trade has played a pre-eminent role in generating economic growth and associated structural changes. From the late 1950s until the 1980s, in common with the other East Asian “dragon” economies (South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore), Taiwan exhibited some of the classic hallmarks of trade dependence. Few would deny that the performance of its foreign trade sector – especially the linkages that were forged between the expansion and diversification of trade links overseas, and domestic industrial transformation and modernization – have been a key ingredient in the emergence of a “Taiwan development model.”

Cultural relations, foreign cultural policy and cultural diplomacy are often thought of as synonymous, but while cultural relations include foreign policy and diplomacy, they in fact go far beyond the scope of purely governmental activities. They comprise much more than foreign cultural policy, in which culture is used mainly as a tool to promote the interests of one country and frequently reflects the domestic policies of whichever political party happens to be in power. Cultural relations encompass the mutual influence and exchange of cultures on and between two (or more) states or nations as well as both private and public initiatives to promote the culture of the individual state or nation and to organize cultural exchanges.