The discovery of a bronze tripod in 113 B.C. was one of the first recorded occasions on which imperial Chinese authorities expressed an official interest in the material evidence of earlier stages of their civilization. The event was hailed as a highly favourable portent for the Han dynasty and it was commemorated by the restrospective adoption of the regnal title Yuan–ting, which was applied to the years 116 to 111 B.C. Other discoveries which have been of sufficiently great importance to attract the eye of a contemporary chronicler have included the find of several versions of the Classical Scriptures during the Han period, of the uncorrupt body of one of the Han kings of Ch'ang–sha (c. A.D. 225), and of manuscript copies of certain historical texts (c. A.D. 280).

Rectification as an approach to inner–Party discipline emphasizes persuasive methods and education, but it does not eschew coercive measures including the purge. As students of Chinese politics are well aware, this form of coercive persuasion was comprehensively developed in the early 1940s as Mao Tse–tung consolidated his leadership, rectification theories were expounded, and the first rectification campaign of 1942–44 was carried out. Official histories and much scholarly analysis identify rectification with Mao while asserting that other leaders advocated sharply contrasting approaches. Thus CCP leaders before 1935 purportedly pushed coercive disciplinary methods – dubbed “ruthless struggles and merciless blows “ – while Mao attempted to foster systematic education. Mao's undoubted contributions to rectifi cation notwithstanding, the following analysis argues that this view both overstates actual differences and overlooks the developing nature of Mao's position.

The sudden emergence of a sellers' market for world hydrocarbons, the Arab oil export embargo after the Yom Kippur War and the sharply increasing price of all forms of commercial energy have affected the very foundations of advanced economies. While the west and Japan are struggling to keep their technological societies, built on an uninterrupted flow of cheap energy, smoothly afloat, the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) is watching with uninhibited satisfaction and derision. “ Energy crisis ” is for Peking just another proof of the ultimate crisis of the capitalist system, something that could not happen in China.

Claims by the Chinese authorities that annual grain production has been in the region of 250 or more million tons in the past few years have been greeted with scepticism by some foreign analysts. However, this level of grain production is now possible because of agro-technical change in “high and stable yield” areas ana regions with improved agriculture.

The Chinese have released a new figure for grain output in 1974 that is far larger than output claimed for any previous year. At an FAO conference held in Rome in mid-November 1975, the vice-minister of agriculture and forestry, Yang Li-kung, reported that total grain output was 274.9 million tons. And a 10 December Reuters dispatch from Peking speculated on the basis of this 1974 figure that China's 1975 harvest could be more than 280 million tons.