In recent decades, China has transformed from a relatively egalitarian society to a highly unequal one. What are the implications of high levels of inequality for the lives of children? Drawing on two nationally representative datasets, the China Family Panel Studies and the China Education Panel Survey, we develop a comprehensive portrait of childhood inequality in post-reform China. Analyses reveal stark disparities between children from different socio-economic backgrounds in family environments and in welfare outcomes, including physical health, psychosocial health and educational performance. We argue that childhood inequality in China is driven not only by the deprivations of poverty but also by the advantages of affluence, as high socio-economic status children diverge from their middle and low socio-economic status counterparts on various family environment and child welfare measures.

Human capital refers to the skills, knowledge and values that individuals acquire in formal schooling, in the workplace and in other settings that raise their productive capacity. In an increasingly global economy, investment in human capital is seen as one of the major strategies for enhancing the economic competitiveness of firms and nations and a major factor in determining the extent of economic polarization among social groups and nations.

What is the nature of central–provincial relations in China? How have they evolved during the era of reform and opening? How can we begin to measure and assess the dynamic changes empirically and consistently? This article tackles these questions by examining year-to-year changes in aggregate trends of provincial presence at the Communist Party Central Committee from 1978 to 2002. After first sketching its formal workings, it highlights how the centre is institutionally empowered to exert political leverage over the provinces at the Central Committee. Drawing upon a new dataset that differentiates among three types of Central Committee membership, it shows evidence of declining provincial shares in full Central Committee membership, a conventionally used indicator of provincial clout at the centre, but rising shares in its alternate membership and Politburo full membership. It concludes, on balance, that central political strength remains resilient in this period.

Until the collapse of the Soviet Union ignited an explosion of interest in Central Asia, most outsiders considered the region a political backwater, an amorphous place of exotic peoples whose time of greatest power had long passed and whose future could have little impact on international affairs. This perception began to change during the 1980s when China's concern over the stirrings of ethnic separatism in Xinjiang helped focus international attention on Islamic revivalism in Central Asia.

China's state sector reform process is examined through the key sector of agriculture. A preview of aggregate statistics and broader reform measures indicate the declining role of the state. However, a systematic analysis of administrative, service and enterprise structures reveal the nuances of how the state has retained strong capacity to guide development of the agricultural sector. State and Party policy makers aim not only to support the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of farmers, but also to pursue agricultural modernization in the context of rapid industrialization. These goals are unlikely to be achieved through a wholesale transfer of functions to the private sector, so the state has maintained or developed new mechanisms of influence, particularly in the areas of service provision and enterprise development.

Comparing ethnographic and interview data in three contrasting production arrangements in a labour-intensive factory in South China, this article argues that while the mobile phone constitutes a new contested terrain on the shop floor and facilitates control and resistance between capital and labour simultaneously, the dynamics of control and resistance is contingent upon the exact arrangements of production. While the management strictly prohibit line operators in the assembly line department from using their mobile phones, they turn a blind eye towards mobile phone use among workers in the hardware department, and mandate mobile workers who are not fixed at work stations in both departments to use mobile phones. Diverse managerial control tactics have generated different patterns of worker resistance. Workers in the assembly line department employ strategies to evade managerial surveillance and continue to use mobile phones at work covertly. They also contest the double standards of mobile phone use displayed by the management. Workers in the hardware department challenge the boundaries of legitimate mobile phone use, and mobile workers use tactics to escape being tracked down by the management via their mobile phones. Mobile phones also facilitate the strategy of resistance through exit among all workers.

Despite the general consensus on problems with official income statistics, quantitative data on the falsification of income statistics have been scarce. This article draws on original survey data from 2001 to provide estimates of the extent and magnitude of income data falsification by village cadres and uses statistical analysis to identify factors that are correlated with the inflation of village income per capita. Evidence from survey data as well as village case studies suggests that village cadres were less likely to inflate village income per capita when they were cadre-entrepreneurs, when they were located in villages with well implemented elections, when they were embedded in village-wide solidary groups such as temples and lineages, when they experienced less direct supervision from township officials, and when they relied less on revenue from village levies.

Reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the world's two largest countries requires feasible governance pathways that integrate politics, policy and administration. Using examples of successful mitigation at the local level in China (Guangzhou) and India (Gujarat), this article identifies integrated governance solutions that work in both cases through different types of linkages. In China, it is mainly intra-governmental linkages, while in India it is mainly state–society linkages. In neither case do international negotiations concerning emissions targets have significant effects, while national frameworks have only marginal effects. Approaching the problem in this comparative manner helps to clarify how greenhouse gas governance operates in each country, the lessons for central–local environmental relations, and the implications for international assistance.

While China's Constitution says everyone is treated equally before the law, employment discrimination continues to exist. This paper breaks new ground by analysing a quantitative survey of more than 10,000 lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people, the largest dataset of its kind to date in China. Only 5.1 per cent of respondents were completely open about their gender and sexuality at work. More than one-fifth reported experiencing negative treatment in the workplace. Transgender and intersex people reported higher rates of negative treatment, as did respondents with lower educational levels and lower incomes and those residing in towns. Employer policies against discrimination were rare, but when in place, they were significantly associated with less negative treatment. These findings highlight an almost completely neglected segment of the workforce and document discriminatory experiences that could be addressed by changes in discrimination law and by employer policies and practices related to diversity and inclusion.

Since their formal organization in February 1949, the “Field Armies” of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have fascinated various students of the Chinese Communist political process. Unfortunately their roles, other than those associated with combat, have never been carefully studied or defined. One of the consequences has been that most observers, especially Western observers, have neglected these institutions in their search for the origins and parameters of contemporary formal and informal power, collective and individual. In part, this neglect has reflected a dearth of essential research on Chinese Communist military biography and military history, without which neither the 1949 nor the 1968 military-political significance of the Field Armies could emerge from the superficial picture of them as triumphant masses of combat forces sweeping across the Mainland in 1950.

This essay provides a brief sketch of continuity and change in the study of political elites and institutions in the PRC. Rather than a full literature review, it offers only a few illustrative references to some prominent scholarship. The first sections contain an extended discussion of the study of political elites and institutions in China, considering the way recent work resembles or differs from earlier work on the subject. This is followed by brief suggestions of several reasons for some of the changes in current scholarship. Finally, some implications for the research agenda in the coming years are offered.

During the past decade, the Chinese government has pursued greater engagement with a range of international legal regimes. China's expanded participation in international regimes for trade and human rights, for example, can provide deeper understanding of the factors influencing China's international behaviour. Building upon scholarly perspectives about institutional compliance with treaty texts and the influence of local conditions on China's policies and practice, this article examines China's participation in international legal regimes for trade and human rights in light of dynamics of normative engagement and the paradigm of selective adaptation. Normative tensions help explain China's policies and practices on compliance with the WTO trade regime, while the imperative of normative engagement helps explain much about China's international human rights diplomacy.

Chinese communities resident in Mexico and Cuba face a common problem: their dealings with business partners in China are perceived as a threat to national interests. In Mexico this concern emanates from manufacturers unable to compete with Chinese imports, and is evident in antagonistic news media and acts of hostility against Chinese businesses. In Cuba it stems from the state's stewardship over economic sovereignty, and is evident in efforts to assimilate Havana's Chinatown and its entrenched informal sector into a centralized scheme of commercial regulation. Interviews with policy makers, local officials and Chinese entrepreneurs indicate that the “rationalization” of Chinese ethnic allegiances for the greater public good is a critical step towards alleviating tensions. I conclude that both countries can leverage benefits from overseas Chinese communities, but to do so they must support their entrepreneurial activities, harness their networks to promote targeted imports and exports, and develop more culturally sensitive regulations.

Power seized with violence has to be maintained with violence. This truth has been repeatedly proved in the course of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. The suppression of the counterrevolutionary movement in the 1950–53 period was the first campaign launched by the PRC aimed at cleansing opposition elements. This article re-examines Mao Zedong's policies and practices, and the interaction between China's central and local authorities during the campaign. It assesses whether the campaign met its goals and its implications for the future use of suppression by the regime.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its organizational infrastructure in the private sector, revealing the dynamics of CCP-style institutional change. Party building follows a distinct version of adaptive governance. Hesitant to rely on innovative tools alone, organizers productively tinker with traditional and disparate elements. Grassroots Party organs, sanctified by their venerable history, are redeployed – initially for modest purposes that fall short of their original revolutionary potential. The Party's surge in private-sector firms was triggered by technocrats overhauling Leninist systems to reconnect to Party members; the search for a broader mission came later. To empower CCP organs in companies, organizers use tactical precedents ranging from incentives to negotiations around Party financing, and membership discipline. Combining tactics from different eras, overseas Party building deploys old organizational arrangements to new ends, whereas digitization gives time-worn procedures a second life. The inclination for institutional bricolage is a deeply rooted hallmark of innovation in Chinese statecraft.

The recent two-decade-long march of “global China” – manifested as outward flows of investment, loans, infrastructure, migrants, media, cultural programmes and international and civil society engagement – has left sweeping but variegated footprints in many parts of the world. From “going out,” officially announced in the year 2000, to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Made in China 2025, and from the developing world to advanced industrialized democracies, state-endorsed campaigns are but tips of a much more momentous iceberg. Numerous Chinese citizens and private corporations have also participated in a global search for employment, business, investment and educational and emigration opportunities. International reactions to the increasingly ubiquitous presence of China and the Chinese people in almost every corner of the world have evolved from a mixture of anxiety and hope to a more explicitly critical backlash. Terms such as “sharp power,” “debt-trap diplomacy” and the “new Cold War” bespeak the West's dominant perception today of China as a threat to be contained.

This paper explores the emergence of a highly networked and capable non-governmental organization (NGO) community in disaster relief in China. It provides a review of the growth of non-governmental actors in the relief field since the 2000s and examines the most important platforms and networks in the field, focusing on their strategies of maintaining a broad-based partnership, developing their own capacity, and enhancing overall inter-organizational connectivity. With an in-depth look at a successful joint non-governmental relief operation in Lushan in 2013, the paper also explicates how NGOs can break the state monopoly over disaster information management, public donations and relief operations. This research finds that during crisis times, non-governmental actors carry out relief missions effectively in parallel with state agencies. The rise of non-governmental disaster relief sheds light on one of many trajectories of civil society development in China where social autonomy is earned by innovation, public support and improved capacity.

In 1920 Wang Guangqi(1892–1936), a founder member of the Young China Association (Shaonian Zhongguo Xuehui) in 1918, wrote that in the past few years a clear division had arisen among Chinese overseas students. Those studying in the United States, having been influenced by the philosophy of “worshipping money” (baijin zhuyi) wanted to build a “capitalist” China on the American model when they returned. The work-study students in France, however, were concerned with practical training and participation in the labouring world. While Chinese students in the United States received regular government scholarships and enjoyed material comforts, Wang continued, those in France spent their time “sweating and working in factories.” Since the former sought their models in the “oil barons” while the latter looked to the workers for inspiration, Wang concluded, it was inevitable that whereas students returning from the United States would be capitalists, work—study students returning from France would promote “labour-ism” (laodong zhuyi) and become part of the labouring classes.

This issue brings together an outstanding group of European scholars interested in China who recently presented at a conference the European perspective on the development of Chinese-European relations since China embarked on its open policy and the European Union evolved into the major economic and political force in Europe. The conference, held 17–19 May 2000, was hosted by the Instituto do Oriente, in the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas at the Universidade Técnica de Lisboa. The China Quarterly wishes to warmly thank the head of the Institute, Prof. Narana Sinai Coissoró and his assistant, Sra. Ana Cristina Dias Alves, as well as Sra. Andrea Sofia da Cruz Valente and Sr. André Filipe Reynolds Castel-Branco da Silveira. The papers also benefited from the participation of Hugh Baker, Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Ana Maria Gonzalo Castellaños, Stefan Friedrich, Wolfgang Pape, Klaus Rupprecht, and the rapporteur's report done by John Ingerson. The contributions in this volume largely are the revised versions of the conference papers.