In 2010, according to the sixth Chinese census, the sex ratio at birth (SRB) was 118 males for every 100 females. The global SRB average is about 105. Thus, the gap between 118 and 105 is made up of “missing girls.” Scholars present three main explanations for the skewed SRB statistic: sex-selective abortion, infanticide and delayed or late registration. Most studies take a demographic and cultural approach to explain the high SRB. However, we believe the story of the “missing girls” is also an administrative one and adopt the street-level bureaucrat theory of policy implementation to explain the pervasiveness of late registration in rural China. We use descriptive statistics derived from the 1990, 2000 and 2010 census data to identify the “missing girls.” We believe the combination of late registration and unreported births may point to a larger proportion of “missing girls” than previously reported from the SRB statistic.

While Chinese academic excellence is gaining increasing international recognition, plagiarism, corruption, nepotism and other negative practices are reportedly rampant in academia in China. Many point the finger at fundamental flaws within the tizhi, the highly structured Chinese socio-political system. I propose re-examining Chinese academia and its practices by applying and expanding Pierre Bourdieu's notion of field as this framework helps to identify the predicament of the “deep water” in which Chinese scholars and institutes find themselves. The four fields I outline – ideological, quasi-official, fame–profit and guanxi fields – spotlight academic practices with “Chinese characteristics.” I elaborate on my own experiences and reflections as both an insider and outsider to these practices, a position which I refer to as a third-eye perspective. I argue that despite the constraints of the “deep water,” the field-oriented angle of investigation reveals that the depths and types of “deep water” vary from one institute to another and also that the internally generated ongoing initiatives promise a step-by-step transformation in Chinese academia. To provoke further thought, I contend that the Chinese case is both a non-exception and alternative to the Western (and other) practices. In so doing, I call for a balanced perspective to re-examine Chinese academic ecology.

Japanese rule transformed Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, laying the foundations for the post-1950 “economic miracle,” but there is little consensus about the impact on the welfare of Taiwan's ethnic Chinese. A difficulty with past studies is the adequacy of economic indicators to measure the standard of living. Instead of conventional economic data, we use average adult height, an indicator of nutritional status. The rise in the average height of the Chinese indicates welfare improved under colonialism, but the static average height from 1930 highlights the negative effect of the shift in economic policy during the late colonial period.

The entrepreneurial “second generation” of Chinese policy research institutes (often called think tanks) that emerged during the 1980s played a pivotal role in the policy process of reform. Since Tiananmen, China's growing commercialization is spawning a “third generation” of think tanks characterized by even more ambiguous links to sponsoring leaders and institutions, greatly expanded commercial links, greater exposure to Western theories and techniques, and the gradual emergence of wide-ranging “policy communities.” The extent of this change varies greatly across policy sectors, however. Generational change is evident in China's previously unstudied network of public security (police) think tanks. Though clearly still of the “second generation” variety, these institutes have been in the forefront of importing and incorporating more sophisticated crime-fighting techniques and less class-based and conspiratorial theories of crime and social unrest.

The aim of this article is to analyse China's engagement in global sport through an examination of the case of elite football. Although many studies exhibit a quite proper concern with the extent to which the deep structure of culture is affected by sports globalization, they generally fail to give significant consideration to the role of the state, because of excessive emphasis on other aspects of globalization such as commercialization, commodification and cultural homogenization. We attempt, therefore, to refocus on the role of the state and to investigate its relationship with global sport by adopting the theoretical framework of Held et al. (1999) as the main analytical tool for this study. By taking strategic approaches in the economic and cultural/ideological fields, the Chinese government has demonstrated, to some degree, its capacity to find effective ways to manage its relationship with global football. This was demonstrated particularly by the setting up of new governmental commercial agencies, updating sport and football regulations, and strengthening Chinese communist ideological education.

This article examines how Chinese reformers have used a set of “fatality indicators” to deal with the serious work safety situation in the past two decades. It argues that the system of fatality indicators is a prudent strategy to tackle the responsibility deficiencies in the previous work safety regulatory system and strengthen the central government's supervision over local safety management. The primary purpose of implementing the fatality indicators is to shift local officials' focus from a GDP-centred growth mode to a new mindset of achieving a balance between economic development and social stability in local governance. The article also indicates that the decline in work-related fatalities in recent years is evidence of the effectiveness of the fatality indicators. These achievements aside, however, the introduction of fatality indicators is closely associated with an increase in local officials' dishonest reporting of real death tolls and the fluctuation in very serious accidents.

With the proclamation of Document 1, 1983, reform of marketing became one of the major targets of agricultural policy in China. This official emphasis on the need to liberalize the marketing system was, however, little more than a confirmation of a process which was already taking place. The initial reforms of labour management and prices in 1978 had led to a decentralization of economic authority to the household level. The commune system was in decline and the number of small-scale free markets was increasing rapidly as peasants took advantage of their new-found freedom to trade their surplus production as they wished. Responding to the economic stimulus offered by the new structure of prices and to the organizational flexibility offered by the decentralization of management, some households began to plan at least part of their production for sale on the market, there by initiating a process of specialization and commercialization. Once begun, this process fed backwards into production by encouraging further specialization and diversification and forwards into marketing by stimulating the emergence of longdistance trade carried out by specialist merchants and traders. In effect, the free market began to act as an engine of economic change, shaping both the structure of agricultural production and employment and the network of new economic linkages through the emerging hierarchy of market centres.

This study explains the institutional structure and mechanism of economic regulation in China's telecommunications basic service industry. The case of telecoms basic service provides an excellent window to explore how Chinese leadership governs strategic state sectors whose assets and profits are central to the national economy. Challenging the ideational model of independent regulator, this study argues that the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) explains much of the telecoms business regulation, as the authority of the Ministry of Information Industry has been circumscribed by other party-state institutions. The SASAC's regulatory power suggests that the primary goal of the Chinese industrial economy is the best protection of state assets through the creation of large and strong state firms, not the protection of consumers' interests by breaking up the monopoly in markets.

The literature on the political and economic transition from Communism, developed largely in the context of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, has been dominated by the idea that horizontal forms of social and political association displace the vertically structured, segmented forms of social control and organization which are characteristic of traditional Communist systems. Social forces, by linking together in broadly based, horizontally structured associations such as industry-wide labour unions and associations of private entrepreneurs, are able to break out of the vertical structures of control and strengthen their collective bargaining position vis-a-vis the state. New associations of entrepreneurs, workers, religious organizations and eventually political parties emerge and coalesce and further strengthen the power of civil society against the state. Economic liberalization is seen as a particular catalyst to this process. Market reforms weaken the state's centralized control and enable social forces to mobilize autonomously.

The three articles which follow provide a review of the development of the study of domestic Chinese politics over the last decade. The first, by Elizabeth Perry of the University of California at Berkeley, is on state-society relations. The second, by Avery Goldstein of the University of Pennsylvania, deals with political elites and institutions. The third, by Peter Moody of the University of Notre Dame, addresses the study of political culture. Although the three essays do not claim to provide an exhaustive survey of the analysis of Chinese politics, they do offer a reasonably comprehensive overview of the field in the early 1990s.

Has survey nonresponse caused scholars to overestimate political trust in China? We analyse item nonresponse for sensitive questions on trust in government from our original survey of villagers conducted in China in 2012. We also analyse nonresponse in four other comparable surveys conducted in China between 1993 and 2014. We examine the association between nonresponse to politically sensitive questions and individual characteristics such as sex, level of education, Party membership and cosmopolitanism. We find that less privileged groups may be underrepresented in survey data generally. We find mixed results regarding the association between cosmopolitanism and nonresponse. We conclude that our understanding of political trust in China has been compromised by high rates of item nonresponse, leading to artificially high estimates of trust in the centre and exaggerated accounts of the gap between trust in central and local leaders.

China's long-term history – social, economic, political, and intellectual – has been interwoven from the start with its environment. In counterposed fashion, the history of the Chinese environment has been entwined with that of anthropogenic forces. The Chinese landscape was one of the most transformed in the pre-modern world as the result of its reshaping for cereal cultivation, re-engineering by hydraulic works for drainage, irrigation and flood-defence, and deforestation for the purposes of clearance and the harvesting of wood for fuel and construction.

Have workers of minority status suffered labour market discrimination in China? Do all actors in the state sector discriminate against minority workers? What are the rationales for discrimination? To address these questions, I compare two ethnic groups (Han Chinese and Uyghur) with regard to job attainment in the state sector. Data are from a 2005 survey (N = 2,947) conducted in Ürümchi, China. Data analysis shows that controlling background characteristics does not remove the Uyghur–Han difference in job attainment in state firms. However, there is no ethnic variation in employment in redistributive agencies. This contrast is explained with reference to post-1978 market transition and the resulting differentiation in the institutional tasks between state firms and government agencies.

Starting in 2005, the largest “Olympic education” programme ever implemented by an Olympic host country was carried out in schools in Beijing and across China. By looking at the ways in which the policies for this programme were created and implemented, this article challenges the common perception that there was a “master plan” surrounding all aspects of the Beijing Olympics that was imposed by the party-state from the top down with the singular goal of promoting nationalist and communist ideology. It makes the point that by contrast with the suzhi (“quality”) education that preceded it, Olympic education contained a de-politicized patriotic education that linked national identity with sports heroes rather than political systems, and re-situated Chinese national identity within an international community in which it would now take its place as an equal partner.

While most mainland Chinese today have extremely few direct contacts with either America or Americans, their indirect contacts with both, via globalized American popular culture, are increasing rapidly. Do daily parasocial contacts with American celebrities shape Chinese views of America? Based on two experimental studies, this paper argues that even indirect, subconscious exposure to American celebrities via popular magazine covers shapes Chinese views of America. However, the impact of that exposure depends upon both the specific nature of the bicultural exposure and the psychological predispositions of the Chinese involved. Not all Chinese are alike, and their personality differences shape whether they experience American popular culture as enriching or threatening, leading to integrative and exclusionary reactions, respectively.

Since 2015 rights-based NGOs, lawyers, feminists and journalists have endured the most stringent crackdown since 1989. Simultaneously the Xi Li administration has pushed forward a series of laws, policies and regulatory changes to enable service-oriented NGOs to apply for government contracts to provide welfare services. This seemingly Janus-like policy of welfarist incorporation can be traced back to the Hu–Wen period, often described as a lacklustre period, despite significant efforts to tackle issues of poverty and inequality. This article argues for a more balanced appraisal of this period by exploring in depth the complex politics underpinning efforts to pluralize welfare provision by involving service-oriented NGOs. It explores three sets of politics influencing this policy process: inter-institutional politics; state/non-state actor politics; and domestic/external politics. Furthermore, it considers processes of gradual institutional change adopted by key political actors to achieve these ends.

In 1996, the Sino-Japanese conflict over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands intensified to the point where the American mass circulation periodical Time asked: “Will the next Asian war be fought over a few tiny islands?” That such a question could be asked seems incredible given that the Diaoyu Islands, which lie north-east of Taiwan and west of Okinawa, consist of only five small islands and three rocky outcroppings with a total landmass of no more than 7 square kilometres or 3 square miles. Apart from their miniscule size, the islands are uninhabited, are incapable of supporting human habitation for an extended period of time and are unlikely to support any economic life of their own from indigenous resources.

This article presents a qualitative empirical study of the impact of corruption and anti-corruption on the efficiency of China's bureaucratic system in developing a local economy. Drawing on 40 in-depth interviews and 98 days of participant observation, it first investigates the significance of extravagant position-related consumption in building personalized bureaucratic ties (patronage networks) and mobilizing resources for local economic development. It then examines the causal link between President Xi's campaign against corruption and extravagance and the rise of bureaucratic slack in local governments. The anti-extravagance campaign reduces the level of corruption in local government but it discourages local officials, who are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid risk and ensure political survival, from using banquets and gift-giving to build patronage networks, attract investment and mobilize development resources. The article concludes that corruption may contribute positively to the efficiency of a fragmented Chinese bureaucracy in fostering development at the local level, while the anti-corruption campaign compels local cadres to develop a new coping strategy – bureaucratic slack – for implementing policies and developing local economies.

The orthodoxy of the day is that Chinese politics is now pragmatic. The China that was once the ultimate in ideological politics in both the intensity of her passions and the follies of her principles has vanished as by the wave of a conjurer's hand. The primacy of ideology, the hallmark of Chinese Communism under Chairman Mao Zedong, has been replaced by the no-nonsense philosophy of Deng Xiaoping who does not care about the “colour of the cat” so long as it catches “the mice.” With near unanimity scholars of contemporary China welcome the change. It promises not only liberation for the Chinese people from the heavy hand of doctrinal politics but also the prospect that analysis of Chinese developments can emerge from the realm of murky esoteric interpretation into the fresh air of reasoned policy evaluation.

In the course of the last 20 or more years the intensity of economic exchange between the People's Republic of China (henceforth China) and the various European economies has increased dramatically. This development was triggered largely by the economic policy changes introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. Since then, China has freed itself from its former self-imposed isolation and gradually integrated with the world economy. The market-oriented transformation process initiated in China in the late 1970s created the preconditions for the resumption of economic contacts that had been largely stagnant in the preceding years. The gradual establishment of a market-based economic framework has step-by-step allowed economic entities to exploit the comparative advantages of the economies concerned and enlarge the scope of division of labour with China.