¹ The chronology of the Sino-Soviet dispute is too long and complex to summarize here, and its development up to the end of November 1963 has already been treated in detail. Several points about it, however, are especially important for understanding 1964–1965 developments. For 1962–1963, and for a fuller reconstructed chronology and analysis, with bibliography, on which this brief historical introduction is primarily based, see Griffith, William E., The Sino-Soviet Rift (London: Allen and Unwin; Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964)Google Scholar. For the earlier part of the dispute, see Zagoria, Donald S., The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961 (New York: Atheneum, 1964)Google Scholar; Griffith, William E., Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963)Google Scholar; Hudson, G. F., Lowenthal, Richard and MacFarquhar, Roderick, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1961)Google Scholar; and Dallin, Alexander, ed., Diversity in International Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963)Google Scholar. For an enlightening reconsideration of the historical background, see Mehnert, Klaus, Peking and Moscow (New York: Mentor, 1964)Google Scholar. See also Lowenthal, Richard, “The Prospects for Pluralistic Communism,” in Drachkovitch, Milorad M., ed., Marxism in the Modem World (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 225–274Google Scholar; Labedz, Leopold, ed., International Communism after Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965)Google Scholar; Scalapino, Robert A., ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963)Google Scholar; Doolin, Dennis J., Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict (Stanford, Cal.: The Hoover Institution, 1965)Google Scholar; and Griffith, William E., ed., Communism in Europe, Vols. 1 and 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964 and 1966)Google Scholar.

² Quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 29 (07 17, 1964), p. 26Google Scholar. For the above, see generally the penetrating analysis by Schwartz, Benjamin, “Modernization and the Maoist Vision,” The China Quarterly, No. 21 (01–03 1965), pp. 3–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ See Simon, Joseph, “Ferment among Intellectuals,” Problems of Communism Vol. XIII, No. 5 (09–10 1964), pp. 29–37Google Scholar.

⁴ See Munro, Donald J., “The Yang Hsien-chen Affair,” The China Quarterly, No. 22 (04–06 1965), pp. 75–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also “The Purge,” China News Analysis, No. 506 (02 28, 1964)Google Scholar; “Yang Hsien-chen,” ibid., No. 535 (October 2, 1964); “Maoism Rejmposed: On Reviews,” ibid., No. 559 (April 9, 1965); “The Purge in Action,” ibid., No. 561 (April 23, 1965); and “Chairman Mao and the Heretics,” Current Scene, Vol. Ill, No. 13 (02 15, 1965)Google Scholar.

⁵ For the above, and for Chinese internal policy generally, see Lewis, John Wilson, “Revolutionary Struggle and the Second Generation in Communist China,” The China Quarterly, No. 21 (01–03 1965), pp. 126–147CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ A. M. Halpern, “China in the Postwar World,” ibid. pp. 20–45; Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, and Halperin, Morton H. and Perkins, Dwight H., Communist China and Arms Control (both New York and London: Praeger, 1965)Google Scholar.

⁷ Not that the United States and Belgium were allied with South Africa; but in fact all three worked toward the rebellion's suppression.

⁸ For Soviet military policy, including detailed discussion of forces levels, Vietnam, and air- and sea-lift capacity, see Wolfe, Thomas H., Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Trends in Soviet Thinking on Theater Warfare, Conventional Operations, and Limited War,” RAND Memorandum RM-4305-PR, December 1964; “The Soviet Union and the Sino-Soviet Dispute,” RAND Paper P-3203, August 1965; and “Soviet Military Policy Under Khrushchev's Successors,” RAND Paper P–3193, August 1965. I have profited greatly from discussions with Drs. Wolfe and Herbert Dinerstein of the RAND Corporation and with my colleague Dr. Ernst Halperin.

⁹ Cf. Brahm, Heinz, “Das Tauziehen um die dritte kommunistische Weltkonferenz,” Europa Archiv, Vol. XIX, No. 16 (08 25, 1964), pp. 605–614Google Scholar.

¹⁰ This account is primarily based on Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 207–230Google Scholar; for the Sino-Soviet territorial issue see also Doolin, , op. cit., pp. 31—33Google Scholar. I have since had the opportunity of reading an unfortunately still unpublished manuscript by Christian Duevel on this same episode, in which two additional important points are made: First, some time between September 12 and 24 there was passed for the press the annual yearbook of the Institute of World Academy and International Relations of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, in which a listing of the socialist countries, for the first and only time before or since (to my knowledge), omitted China, North Korea, and Albania (but not North Vietnam). Second, the November 1963 issue of Probtemy Mira i Sotsialisma (passed for the press October 19, 1964) (World Marxist Review, Vol. 6, No. 11), which contained the article by Rumanian Premier Maurer opposing the conference, also reproduced excerpts from declarations by various parties calling for such a conference. Duevel deduces from this that the Soviets were unable to gain a majority in the editorial board of the journal to exclude the Maurer article, a fact that contributed toward, and indeed may have been primarily responsible for, Khrushchev's abandonment of the meeting; I would rather think it probably reflected some intermediate stage in Khrushchev's retreat from it. For the October 26 Chou Yang speech, see p. 16 and note 14.

¹¹ Moreover, despite the signing of a new trade protocol between Moscow, and Peking, in April 1965 (see Pravda, 04 30, 1965)Google Scholar, Sino-Soviet economic relations nave apparently continued to worsen. The trade turnover in 1964 was 405 million rubles as compared to 540·2 for 1963. See Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR za 1964 god (Moscow, 1965), pp. 228–236Google Scholar; j. c. k. [Kun, Joseph C.], “Further Decline in Sino-Soviet Trade,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 10 28, 1965Google Scholar; “History of Sino-Soviet Economic Relations,” China News Analysts, No. 522 (06 26, 1964)Google Scholar; and The Times (London), 10 27, 1965Google ScholarPubMed.

¹² The parallel to the agreed formulation for the second Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement is striking. (See Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 47 and 85–87.)Google Scholar

¹³ CPSU Central Committee to CCP Central Committee, November 28, 1963, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 19 (05 8, 1964), pp. 18–21, at pp. 19 and 21Google Scholar. For the same generally conciliatory tone, but few of the November 29 letter's specific proposals, see “The Marxist-Leninist Program of the Communist Movement,” Kommunist, No. 17, 11 1963, pp. 12–24Google Scholar, and “For the Unity and Solidarity of the International Communist Movement,” Pravda, 12 6, 1963Google Scholar. Conversely, the November 17–December 3 National People's Congress session in Peking indicated that the Chinese neither intended to renew Soviet economic aid nor expected help (see Peking Review, Vol. VI, No. 49 [12 6, 1963], pp. 10–11)Google Scholar, while Mao's January 12, 1964, statement on the U.S.-Panamanian crisis indicated an adamant CPR foreign policy stand (ibid., Vol. VII, No. 3 [January 17, 1964], p. 5).

¹⁴ Yang, Chou, “The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in Philosophy and the Social Sciences,” Jen-min Jih-pao, 12 27, 1963Google Scholar, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 1 (01 3, 1964), pp. 10–27, at pp. 12, 15, and 21–22Google Scholar. The first Chinese announcement concerning the Fourth Expanded Conference of the Department of Philosophy and Social Science of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, at which Chou Yang delivered the speech, mentioned his participation and gave the title but not the contents of his speech. See Ibid., Vol. VI, No. 49 (December 6, 1963), pp. 26–28.

¹⁵ “Declaration of Australian Marxist-Leninists” (November 11, 1963), ibid. pp. 20–25; “To All Marxist-Leninists Inside the Ceylon Communist Party” (November 17, 1963), ibid., Vol. VI, No. 50 (December 13, 1963), pp. 15–17; “Belgian Marxist-Leninists Decide to Rebuild Communist Party “ (declaration of Brussels conference, December 22, 1963), ibid., Vol. VII, No. 3 (January 17, 1964), pp. 26–27. For the 1963 CPR support of the dissident Brazilian Communist Party, see Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., p. 128Google Scholar; for simultaneous ideological and political escalation (in Soviet-Albanian relations), see Griffith, , Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 60–88Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 3 (01 17, 1964), pp. 11–22Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Griffith, William E., “Africa,” Survey, No. 54 (01 1965)Google Scholar, reprinted in Labedz, op. cit., pp. 168–189, at p. 187.

¹⁸ November 28 speech by Cheng-chih, Liao, Peking Review, Vol. VI, No. 49 (12 6, 1963), pp. 12–15Google Scholar; “Two Different Lines at the Warsaw Session,” ibid., Vol. VI, No. 60 (December 13, 1963), pp. 13–15; Pravda, November 29–December 4, 1963 (excerpts in Current Digest of the Soviet Press [hereafter cited as CDSP], Vol. XV, No. 48 [12 25, 1963], pp. 29–31)Google Scholar; and, re the protest against homage to the late President Kennedy by the Chinese and their allies, Reuters from Warsaw, in The New York Times, 11 29, 1963Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Trud, December 24, 1964; Khrushchev, in Pravda, 12 22, 1964Google Scholar.

²⁰ One of the earliest indications was Slavik, Václav, Freed, Norman, and Kouwatli, Mourad, “Unity Is the Guarantee of Success,” World Marxist Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (01 1964), pp. 3–8Google Scholar. See also the attack on “neutrality” by Jaime Perez, “The CPSU in the Vanguard of the World Communist Movement,” ibid., pp. 9–15.

²¹ See note 65.

²² Griffith, , The SinoSoviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 227–229Google Scholar.

²³ “Peaceful Coexistence—Two Diametrically Opposed Policies. Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU, (6),” Jen-min M-pao and Hung Ch'i, December 12, 1963, and Peking Review, Vol. VI, No. 51 (12 20, 1963), pp. 6–18Google Scholar.

²⁴ For example, “The Moscow Declaration—Invincible Banner of the Struggle Against Imperialism and Revisionism,” Zëri i Popullit. December 6, 1963, reprinted in Jen-min Jih-pao, December 25, 1963 (SCMP 3129, December 31, 1963).

²⁵ Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i, February 4, 1964, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 6 (02 6, 1964), pp. 5–21, at pp. 9, 11 and 14Google Scholar.

²⁶ The most complete summary is in the report of Franz Muhri to the Austrian Communist Party Central Committee plenum of May 6, 1964, Volksstimme (Vienna), 05 13, 1964 (JPRS 25, 084, June 15, 1964, pp. 11–21, at pp. 14–15)Google Scholar. A briefer Soviet summary is in the February 22, 1964, CPSU Central Committee letter, cited in note 34; and still briefer references are in the Rumanian Central Committee statement published on April 27, cited in note 71, and the February 20 CCP Central Committee letter, cited in note 32. Whether the CPSU Central Committee actually approved this letter is not clear; the only published reference to the letter's discussing Sino-Soviet relations is on February 15, when the CPSU Central Committee approved the resolution discussed below.

²⁷ This probably was an eventual Chinese goal, but a more distant one that that of the Soviets of mobilizing their own bloc against Peking.

²⁸ Pravda, April 3, 1964; quoted (with a minor revision) from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 13 (04 22, 1964), pp. 5–16, at p. 5Google Scholar, and Vol. XV, No. 14 (April 29, 1964), pp. 3–17, at pp. 8 and 14–17. The late Otto Kuusinen declared at the same plenum that in China there was “ no dictatorship of the proletariat and no leading role of the Communist Party; rather, there is a dictatorship of the individual [that is, Mao].” (Pravda, May 19, 1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 20 [06 10, 1964], pp. 3–4 and 10, at p. 4Google Scholar [Pravda's italics].

²⁹ The plenum was very “expanded”; it was also attended by hundreds of other party. and governmental officials (Pravda, February 11, 1964). Furthermore, the Suslov report was given in the larger Congress Palace rather than in the Supreme Soviet meeting place, where the plenum first met (Tatu from Moscow in Le Monde, February 18, 1964), and Moscow later declared that “6,000 activists” were present (CPSU Central Committee to CCP Central Committee, March 7, 1964, cited in note 39). In view of Khrushchev's October 2, 1964, expanded Presidium session, including some thousands (Pravda, October 2, 1964), one may perhaps speculate that Suslov also spoke to such large audiences that the Central Committee may have felt itself to have been packed.

³⁰ See note 71.

³¹ “On the Struggle of the CPSU for the Solidarity of the International Communist Movement,” resolution of plenum of CPSU Central Committee, adopted February 15, 1964, Pravda, April 3, 1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 13 (04 22, 1964), p. 4Google Scholar.

³² CCP Central Committee to CPSU Central Committee, February 20, 1964, Jen-min Jih-pao, May 9, 1964, and Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 19 (05 8, 1964), pp. 10–11Google Scholar.

³³ Izvestiya, February 25, 1964.

³⁴ M CPSU Central Committee to CCP Central Committee, February 22, 1964, Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 19 (05 8, 1964), pp. 22–24Google Scholar.

³⁵ CCP Central Committee to CPSU Central Committee, February 27, 1964, Ibid., Vol. VII, No. 19 (May 8, 1964), pp. 11–12.

³⁶ TANJUG in English, Belgrade. February 27, 1965 (text in Doolin, , op. at., p. 37.)Google Scholar

³⁷ Jen-min Jih-pao, March 1, 1964, and Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 10 (03 6, 1964), pp. 27–29Google Scholar.

³⁸ CCP Central Committee to CPSU Central Committee, February 29, 1964, Jen-min Jih-pao, May 9, 1964, and Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 19 (05 8, 1964), pp. 12–18Google Scholar.

³⁹ CPSU Central Committee to CCP Central Committee, March 7, 1964, Jen-min Jih-pao, May 9, 1964, and Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 19 (05 8, 1964), pp. 24–27Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ For the above, see the Rumanian April 27 resolution, cited in note 71.

⁴¹ “The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism—Comment on the Open Letter of the CPSU (VIII),” Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i, March 31, 1964, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 14 (04 3, 1964), pp. 5–23Google Scholar.

⁴² The accompanying April 3, 1964, Pravda editorial, “Fidelity to the Principles of Marxism-Leninism,” was only notable because it omitted any mention of an international conference, concerning which, however, Suslov's formulations were repeated in the long “For the Unity of the International Communist Movement on Principles of Marxism-Leninism,” Kommunist, No. 5, 03 1964Google Scholar (signed to the press April 4, 1964), pp. 13–52 (JPRS 24, 404, April 30, 1964). For Chinese reaction see Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 18 (05 1, 1964), pp. 13–19Google Scholar. In March the CPSU Institute of Marxism-Leninism had (opportunely, to say the least) discovered Marx's and Engels' previously undiscovered 1872 amendments to the First International's rules, which provided for the suspension of national federations by the general council. See World Marxist Review, Vol. 7, No. 4 (04 1964), pp. 34–36Google Scholar.

⁴³ See ibid., Vol. VII, No. 5 (May 1964), pp. 44–49.

⁴⁴ Pravda, May 16, 1964.

⁴⁵ See the Kommunist article cited in note 42.

⁴⁶ Pravda, June 9, 1964. See also r. r. g. [R. Rockingham Gill], “A Conference Becomes Necessary” and “Problems of the Conference,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, May 19 and June 10, 1964, respectively.

⁴⁷ “Proletarian Internationalism Is the Banner of the Working People of All Countries and Continents,” Kommunist, No. 7, 05 1964 (signed to the press April 29, 1964)Google Scholar; “On Certain Aspects of Party Life in the Communist Party of China,” Pravda, April 28 and 29, 1964; “Marxism-Leninism Is the International Doctrine of the Communists of All Countries,” ibid., May 10, 11 and 12, 1964.

⁴⁸ Pravda, April 4, 1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 15 (05 6, 1964), pp. 7–8, at p. 7Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Jen-min Jih-pao, May 7, 1963, and Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 19 (05 8, 1964), pp. 7–10Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ NCNA, April 28, 1964, cited from Doolin, , op. cit., pp. 40–41Google Scholar, Document 10.

⁵¹ Indian Information Service, April 4, 1964, and TASS in Russian, April 8, 1964, cited from Doolin, , op. cit., pp. 38–40Google Scholar, Documents 10 and 11.

⁵² TASS, May 27, 1964, cited from Doolin, , op. cit., p. 41Google Scholar, Document 13.

⁵³ Zëri i Popullit, May 27, 1964 (in a speech delivered on May 24).

⁵⁴ NZCP National Committee resolution, “On the World Ideological Differences and a Meeting of the World Parties,” July 26, 1964, in New Zealand Communist Review, August 1964, quoted from the full text in Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 35 (08 28, 1964.) pp. 26–27Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Ovchinnikov, from Tokyo, in Pravda, 09 13, 1964Google Scholar; “Has the Pravda Editorial Department No Sense of Shame?” Jen-min Jih-pao, September 21, 1964, and Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 39 (09 25, 1964), pp. 13–14Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Sekai Shūhō (Tokyo), 08 11, 1964Google Scholar, quoted from Doolin, , op. cit., pp. 42–44Google Scholar, Document 14, at pp. 43–44.

⁵⁷ The NCNA news item, len-min Jih-pao, July 11, 1964 (SCMP 3258, July 15, 1964), only reported that the conversation had taken place.

⁵⁸ Asahi Evening News, July 13, 1964 (Doolin, , op. cit., pp. 43–44)Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Sekai Shūhō (Tokyo), 08 11, 1964Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ “Concerning Mao Tse-tung's Talk with Japanese Socialists,” Pravda, September 2, 1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 34 (09 16, 1964), pp. 3–7Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Chou had also said in the same interview (which Pravda did not mention) that when he had been in Moscow in January 1957 he had “requested that the USSR make proper arrangements for the territorial issues covering Japan, China, the Middle East, and the Eastern European countries including Finland” but “could not get a satisfactory answer.” See Asahi Shimbun, August 1, 1964, quoted from excerpts in Doolin, , op. cit., pp. 45–46Google Scholar, Document 16.

⁶² In a speech in Prague, September 4, 1964, in Pravda, September 5, 1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 36 (09 30, 1964), pp. 6–8, at p. 7Google Scholar.

⁶³ For the statement on a weapon of unlimited destructive power, see AFP from Moscow, , Le Monde, 09 17, 1964Google Scholar; for Khrushchev's, declaration that he was misquoted, Pravda, 09 22, 1964Google Scholar (his speech to the World Youth Forum). Soviet text in Pravda, September 20, 1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 38 (10 14, 1964), pp. 3–7Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ TASS, September 23, 1964 (excerpts in Doolin, , op. cit., pp. 72–74, Document 27)Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ For example, the April 8, 1964, declaration of the New Zealand Communist Party and the pro-Chinese Belgian Communist Party leader Jacques Grippa's editorial, in Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 19 (05 8, 1964), pp. 35–36Google Scholar. In the case of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), Peking profited from Moscow's continued support of the pro-Soviet Shiga splinter group. When JCP deputies Yoshio Shiga and Ichizo Suzuki on May IS, 1964, voted in the Diet for ratification of the partial nuclear test ban treaty, they were expelled by the pro-Peking majority. (Akahata, May 23, 1964, in Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 22 [05 29, 1964], pp. 17–21.)Google Scholar Thereupon first Moscow, (Partiinaya Zhizn, No. 14, 07 1964, pp. 8–9)Google Scholar and then the JCP (Akahata, August 8, 1964, and September 2, 1964, in Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 37 [09 11, 1964], pp. 27–28Google Scholar, and Vol. VII, No. 38 [September 18, 1964], pp. 12–19) published a long exchange of letters between the two, and polemics on both sides intensified greatly.

⁶⁶ Lao Dong Central Committee circular letter of April 21, 1964, to all communist parties, ibid. p. 34.

⁶⁷ I am grateful to Dr. Ruth McVey for discussions on the PKI. See a PKI Central Committee resolution, “Marxist-Leninists of the World Unite, Continue to Smash Revisionism,” Peking Review, VoL VII, No. 5 (01 31, 1964), p. 17Google Scholar. On the JCP, see the exchange of letters with the CPSU cited in note 65, and “T. Timofeyev and American Imperialism,” Akahata February 26, 1965 (JPRS 29, 426, April 5, 1965).

⁶⁸ I a perceptive communist analysis, see Mieczystaw F. Rakowski (editor of Polytika and PZPR Central Committee candidate member) in Kamena (Lublin), No. ½, 01 31, 1965, pp. 1 and 10 (JPRS 29, 309, March 26, 1965)Google ScholarPubMed.

⁶⁹ Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 137–141 and 185–186Google Scholar, and Communism in Europe, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 12–13 (both with bibliographic notes). Rumanian developments will be covered in detail in a forthcoming study by Fischer-Galati, Stephen and Montias, John Michael, The New Romania (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966)Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ See, for example, the careful compromise formulas in Jarosiewicz, Piotr, “The Council for Mutual Economic Aid—an Instrument of Cooperation Between Socialist Countries,” World Marxist Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 (03 1964), pp. 3–8Google Scholar, and Stanistaw Kuzinski, “Specialization of Production in the World Socialist System,” ibid., Vol. 7, No. 6 (June 1964), pp. 18–23.

⁷¹ “Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movement,” Scînteia, 04 27, 1964, quoted, with revisions, from an official translation (Bucharest: Meridiane, 1964)Google Scholar; hereafter cited as “Statement.”

⁷² And it did: At the June 1964 Geneva UN World Trade Conference Rumania voted with and tried to join the group of 75 underdeveloped countries. See East Europe, Vol. XIII, No. 7 (07 1964), p. 47Google Scholar.

⁷³ Quoted from “Statement,” pp. 30–32, 52–53.

⁷⁴ Even so, the strength and subtlety of Bucharest's position was demonstrated by the fact that Moscow evidently felt compelled to publish a carefully edited summary of the statement in World Marxist Review, Vol. 7, No. 7 (07 1964), pp. 60–64Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ “Concepts Contrary to the Basic Principles Guiding Economic Relations Between Socialist Countries,” Viata Economica, No. 24, 1964Google Scholar (reprinted in Jen-min Jih-pao, July 26, 1964, and Peking Review, Vol. III, No. 31 [07 31, 1964], pp. 28–40)Google Scholar, attacking Valev, E. B., “Problems of the Economic Development of the Danube Districts of Rumania, Bulgaria, and the U.S.S.R.,” Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, No. 2, 03–04 1964Google Scholar, and the Fourth Congress of the Soviet Society of Geography, May 25–30, 1964; and (for radio polemics) Radio Moscow in Rumanian, May 30, 1964, and Radio Bucharest, June 5, 1964, and C. K. [Christian Kind], “Rumänische-sowjetische Meinungsverschiedenheiten,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, June 9, 1964.

⁷⁶ Gobomolov, O., “Study in Greater Depth of the Problems of Cooperation among the Socialist Countries,” Izvestiya, 07 4, 1964Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ “Les Roumains censurent la ‘revue de Prague,’” Est & Ouest, Vol. XVI, No. 328 (10 16–31, 1964), p. 5Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ For example, , C. K. [Kind, Christian], “Moskaus Werburg um Rumänien,” Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 05 29, 1964Google Scholar, and V. M. [Viktor Meier] from Moscow in ibid., July 8, 16, 1964.

⁷⁹ See a Vienna dispatch [by Dessa Bourne] in The Times (London), 06 8, 1964Google ScholarPubMed.

⁸⁰ Reuters from Geneva, , Neue Zürcher Zeilung, 06 14, 1964Google Scholar; Geneva, dispatch in The New York Times, 06 7, 1964Google Scholar.

⁸¹ Bucharest, clearly at least as independent of Moscow as Belgrade, appeared by October 1964 to be moving toward even looser relations with the Soviet Union. The Chinese were of course jubilant, as well they might be. They had contributed toward the greatest blow to Soviet influence in East Europe since die Soviet-Yugoslav break in 1948.

⁸² See Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., p. 179Google Scholar, and Communism in Europe, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 33–34, Giorgio Galli, “Italian Communism,” in Griffith, , Communism in Europe, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 301–384Google Scholar; and for more recent developments, Willenz, Eric and Uliassi, Pio, “Western Europe,” Survey, No. 54 (01 1965)Google Scholar, and Labedz, , op. cit., pp. 51–64, at pp. 58–64Google Scholar; Griffith, , Communism in Europe, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 34–36Google Scholar, and Kevin Devlin, “The Italian Position,” “The PCI's Ideological Diplomacy,” and “The Independent Italians,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, May 6, 1964, July 17, 1964, and May 18, 1965, respectively.

⁸³ Togliatti's press conference in Belgrade, , L'Unità, 01 22, 1964Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ Ibid., April 1, 1964.

⁸⁵ Togliatti to the PCI Central Committee, L'Unità, April 23, 1964, quoted from Information Bulletin, No. 11, 06 6, 1964, pp. 41–63, at pp. 60–62Google ScholarPubMed.

⁸⁶ From an interview with TogUatti in Rinascita, Vol. XXI, No. 26 (06 27, 1964), p. 9Google Scholar (JPRS 25, 576, July 24, 1964, pp. 53–56).

⁸⁷ “Contro il dogmatismo,” L'Unità, May 24, 1964 (JPRS 25, 316, June 30, 1964, pp. 36–39).

⁸⁸ Pajetta, Giancarlo, “L'errore dei comunisti cinesi,” Rinascita, Vol. XXI, No. 38 (09 26, 1964), pp. 1–2Google Scholar (JPRS 27, 635, October 22, 1964).

⁸⁹ Ingrao, Pietro, “Democrazia socialista e democrazia interna di partito,” Rinascita, Vol. XXI, No. 17 (04 25, 1964), pp. 3–6Google Scholar (JPRS 24, 751, May 26, 1964).

⁹⁰ Gruppi, Luciano, “Le tesi di Lenin e di Engels sullo Stato,” Rinascita, Vol. XXI, No. 30 (07 25, 1964), pp. 27–28Google Scholar.

⁹¹ See an interview with his “compagna” Jotti, , L'Unità, 10 23, 1964Google Scholar.

⁹² “Promemoria sulle questioni del movimenio operaio internazionale e della sua unità,” Rinascita, Vol. XXI, No. 35 (09 5, 1964), pp. 1–4Google Scholar; also in Unità and The New York Times, September 5, 1964; see Devlin, Kevin, “From Memorandum to Testament,” and “Togliatti's Testament: Challenge to Moscow,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, both 09 10, 1964Google Scholar; Kx. [Kux, Ernst], “Togliatti's politische Testament,” Neue ZUrcher Zeitung, 09 15, 1964Google Scholar; Lamberg, Robert F., “Das politische Testament Palmiro Togliattis,” Aussenpolitik, Vol. XV, No. 12 (12 1964), pp. 849–856Google Scholar.

⁹³ Pravda, September 10, 1964. See Pajetta, Giuliano, “II dibattito internazionale sul documento di Yalta,” Rinasctta, Vol. XXI, No. 39 (10 3, 1964), p. 9Google Scholar, and Longo, Luigi, “The Italian Communist Party and Problems of the International Communist Movement,” World Marxist Review, Vol. 7, No. 11 (11 1964), pp. 3–10Google Scholar.

⁹⁴ L'Unità, September II, 1964, quoted from Devlin, Kevin, “Moscow and the Italian CP,” Problems of Communism, Vol. XIV, No. 5 (09–10 1965)Google Scholar.

⁹⁵ L'Unità, October 15, 1964 (JPRS 27, 299, November 5, 1964).

⁹⁶ Politika, September 5 and 6, 1964.

⁹⁷ Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. dt., pp. 182–183Google Scholar, and Communism in Europe, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 9–11; Viktor Meier, “Yugoslav Communism,” in ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 19–64, and his running coverage in Neue Zürcher Zeitung.

⁹⁸ For a significant pro-Yugoslav Soviet article see “Yugoslav Today,” World Marxist Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 (03 1964), pp. 65–73Google Scholar.

⁹⁹ AFP from Belgrade, , Le Monde, 06 27, 1964Google Scholar; Bourne, Eric from Vienna, in The Christian Science Monitor, 06 23, 1964Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁰ See Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 184–185Google Scholar; Stehle, Hansjakob, “Polish Communism,” in Griffith, , Communism in Europe, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 85–176Google Scholar; and Griffith in ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 15–16.

¹⁰¹ The small group of Polish Stalinists condemned at the Fourth PZPR Congress were not pro-Chinese, although they may have been in contact with the Chinese or Albanian embassies in Warsaw. See the excerpts from their clandestine pamphlet in East Europe, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (03 1965), pp. 7–15Google Scholar.

¹⁰² Trybuna Ludu, June 16, 1964.

¹⁰³ , J. F., “Eastern Europe,” in Labedz, , op. cit., at p. 77, note 7Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁴ Karol, K. S., “Le nouveau drame de ‘Wiestaw’ Gomulka,” Le Monde, 07 3, 1964Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁵ Trybuna Ludu, June 25, 1964.

¹⁰⁶ For the above, see Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 198–202Google Scholar, Halperin, Ernst, ”Latin America,” Survey, No. 54 (01 1965)Google Scholar, and Labedz, , op. cit., pp. 154–167Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁷ In an interview in Cairo with Rouleau, Eric, Le Monde, 10 11–12, 1964Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁸ Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 179–182Google Scholar (with bibliography); Willenz, and Uliassi, , op. cit., pp. 50–54Google Scholar; running analyses by Devlin, Kevin of Radio Free Europe, Munich, and his “Schism and Secession,” Survey, No. 54 (01 1965)Google Scholar, and Labedz, , op. cit., pp. 29–50Google Scholar; chapters on Nordic communism in Griffith, , ed., Communism in Europe, op. cit., Vol. 2Google Scholar; statements by Norwegian and Swedish Communist parties, April 1964, in Information Bulletin, No. 12, 07 2, 1964, pp. 22–29Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁹ See p. 26.

¹¹⁰ “On the Nature of Relations Between Socialist Countries: The Policy of Unity Against the Policy of Schism,” lzvestiya, June 6, 1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 23 (07 1, 1964), pp. 5–7, at p. 6Google Scholar.

¹¹¹ “Against Splitters, For Unity of the Communist Movement,” Partiinaya Zhizn, No. 11, 06 1964, pp. 8–20Google Scholar, reprinted, slightly abridged, in Pravda, June 3 and 4, 1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 22 (06 24, 1964.) pp. 3–8, at p. 7Google Scholar. The full English text is in Information Bulletin, No. 17, 08 25, 1964, pp. 5–19Google Scholar.

¹¹² Zhukov, Yury, “The Chinese Wall,” Pravda, 06 21, 1964Google Scholar, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 25 (07 16, 1964), pp. 3–4, at p. 4Google Scholar.

¹¹³ CPSU Central Committee to CCP Central Committee, Kommunlst, No. 10, 07 1964, pp. 9–20Google Scholar, and Pravda, July 17, 1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 30 (08 19, 1964), pp. 5–10, at pp. 5–6Google Scholar. See also the even more general article by Ponomarev, Boris, “Proletarian Internationalism—a Powerful Force in the Revolutionary Transformation of the World,” World Marxist Review, Vol. 7, No. 8 (08 1964), pp. 59–70Google Scholar, and the rejection of “excommunication” by Y. Tsedenbal and O. Vargas in ibid., Vol. 7, No. 9 (September 1964), pp. 3–10 and 11–14.

¹¹⁴ “On Khrushchev's Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World. Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (9),” Jen-miti Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i, July 13, 1964, and Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 29 (07 17, 1964), pp. 7–28, at pp. 8, 9, 13, 15 and 26Google Scholar. Cf. An Tzu-wen, , “Cultivating and Training Revolutionary Successors Is the Strategic Task of the Party,” Hung Ch'i, No. 17/18, 09 23, 1964, pp. 1–13Google Scholar (JPRS 27, 143, October 29, 1964).

¹¹⁵ Jen-min Jih-pao, July 31, 1964, and Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 31 (07 31, 1964), pp. 5–11Google Scholar. Peking simultaneously published the June 15, 1964, CPSU letter.

¹¹⁶ Text only in Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 13 (03 26, 1964), pp. 19–20Google Scholar. The August 10, 1964, Pravda editorial, “An International Conference Is the Path to the Solidarity of the Communist Movement,” which announced that the conference had been summoned, was much more polemic in tone than the letter, but it added nothing substantively new to it.

¹¹⁷ Ilichev, Leonid, “Revolutionary Science and Our Age. Against the Anti-Leninist Course of the Chinese Leaders,” Kommunist, No. 11, 07 1964Google Scholar (signed to the press July 31, 1964), pp. 12–35. The article was “a report delivered in June 1964 at a scientific session on the “Struggle of the CPSU for the Purity of Marxism-Leninism” sponsored jointly by the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Social Science Institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, “with some additions.” It is quoted here from the text in Information Bulletin, No. 21, 10 1, 1964, pp. 21–52Google Scholar. (The date of its publication in the latter would indicate that the Ilichev article remained the official Soviet position until a few weeks before Khrushchev's fall, that is, that Khrushchev had only organizationally, but not otherwise, scaled down his objectives.)

¹¹⁸ Ilichev, op. cit., p. 23.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 24.

¹²⁰ Ibid., pp. 24–25.

¹²¹ Ibid., pp. 29–30.

¹²² Ibid., pp. 32–33.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 37.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 40.

¹²⁵ Pravda and Jen-min Jih-pao, August 6, 1964. See China News Analysis, No. 530 (08 28, 1964), pp. 2–6Google Scholar.

¹²⁶ NCNA in English, Peking, August 30, 1965 (SCMP 3293, September 4, 1964, pp. 33–35), and Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 36 (09 4, 1964), pp. 6–7Google Scholar. The Chinese simultaneously published the Soviet July 30 letter.

¹²⁷ Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee, “100th Anniversary of the First International: 1864–1964 (Theses),” Pravda, September 11, 1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 37 (10 7, 1964), pp. 3–11, at pp. 8 and 10Google Scholar. Cf. r.r.g. [R. Rockingham Gill], “Theses on the First International,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, September 15, 1964. The extremely anti-Chinese September 1964 speech of Gus Hall, head of the CPUSA, which called for “a system of exchanges and inter-national relations” among communist parties rather than “autonomy,” can probably be explained by pressure on the CPUSA from pro-Chinese and Fidelista currents like the Monthly Review and the Progressive Labor Movement rather than as a reflection of any Soviet view. Hall's speech, curiously, appeared in Information Bulletin (Toronto), No. 27, 12 17, 1964, pp. 39–51Google Scholar, that is, after Khrushchev's fall. For the CPUSA see the authoritative article by Starobin, Joseph R., “North America,” Survey, No. 54 (01 1965,)Google Scholar reprinted in Labedz, op. cit., pp. 144–153.

¹²⁸ “Proletarian Internationalism Is the Revolutionary Banner of Our Era,” Pravda, September 29, 1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 40 (10 28, 1964), pp. 14–17, at p. 17Google Scholar. Cf. the similar Andropov, Yuri, “Proletarian Internationalism Is the Battle Flag of the Communists,” Kommunlst, No. 14, 09 1964Google Scholar (passed for the press September 30, 1964), pp. 11–26 (JPRS 27, 133, October 28, 1964).

¹²⁹ Quoted from Schram, Stuart R., The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 256Google Scholar.

¹³⁰ Quoted from ibid., p. 56.

¹³¹ See Ra'anan, Uri, “Moscow and the ‘Third World,’” Problems of Communism, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (01–02 1965), p. 24Google Scholar.

¹³² Chinese Communist Party, “A Proposal Concerning the General Line of theInternational Communist Movement,” June 14, 1963, quoted from Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., p. 270Google Scholar.

¹³³ See an interview with En-lai, Chou in Marcha (Montevideo), 12 13, 1963, p. 14Google Scholar (JPRS 22, 813, January 20, 1964). I owe this reference to Schwartz, Benjamin, “The Polemics Seen by a Non-Polemicist,” Problems of Communism, Vol. XII, No. 2 (03–04 1964), pp. 102–106, at p. 106Google Scholar.

¹³⁴ As an aspect of this general approach, Chinese economic policy toward the under-developed areas was further elaborated at a series of Afro-Asian Economic Seminars by their spokesman Nan Han-ch'en, who generalized the Chinese model of economic development for all underdeveloped countries. In a speech at the Second Seminar at Pyongyang on June 20, Nan struck the keynote:

The fundamental way of developing an independent national economy is to carry on economic construction on the basis of self-reliance… to rely mainly on the enthusiasm, initiative and creativeness of the masses and… the internal resources and the accumulation of capital in the country.…

In other words, Peking recommended labor-intensive economic development, plus, as Nan added, mutual Afro-Asian economic assistance (without either Soviet or American economic aid). American economic aid, he continued, was given in order to plunder the Afro-Asian countries by keeping them underdeveloped and their raw material resources in foreign capitalist hands, by manipulating the terms of trade so as to keep prices of raw materials low and those of imported finished goods high, and by cooperating with the “modern revisionists” (that is, the Soviet Union) to “manipulate the United Nations or other world or regional economic organizations.” See NCNA in English, Pyongyang, June 20, 1964 (SCMP 3245, June 24, 1964, pp. 26–29). See also Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 27 (07 3, 1964), pp. 18–22Google Scholar, and a speech by Fang Yi at a June 16 Geneva meeting of the Economic Preparatory Meeting for the Second Afro-Asian Conference, ibid.. Vol. VII, No. 26 (June 26, 1964), pp. 8–10. For a Soviet reply see Donteev, K., “Peking's False Tone,” Izvestiya, 07 12, 1964Google Scholar. For Chinese economic aid policy see Ching-chu, Ai, “China's Economic and Technical Aid to Other Countries,” Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 34 (08 21, 1964,) pp. 14–18Google Scholar.

¹³⁵ The subject of Chinese atomic strategy and capacity is too complex to be treated within the limits of this study. Fortunately it has been authoritatively covered by Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb. op. ctt., and “Chinese Nuclear Strategy: The Early Post-Detonation Period,” Asian Survey, Vol. V, No. 6 (06 1965)Google Scholar, and Adelphi Papers, No. 18, 05 1965Google Scholar; and by Halperin, and Perkins, , op. cit., pp. 48–74Google Scholar.

¹³⁶ For this and subsequent developments in this area, when bibliographic citations are not given, see the penetrating analyses by Ra'anan in “Moscow and the ‘Third World,’” op. cit., and “Tactics in the Third World,” Survey, No. 57 (10 1965), pp. 26–37Google Scholar. See also Richard LöwenthaL “Die Haltung der Sowjets zu den Einparteisystem der Entwicklungsländer,” Aus Politlk und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage, Das Parlameni), June 16, 1965 (hereafter cited as Lowenthal “Haltung”), republished in Entwicklungslander zwischen Ost und West (Schriftenreihe des Forschungsinstituts der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung) (Hannover: Verlag fiir Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1965), and Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, “Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the National Liberation Movement,” in Labedz, op. cit., pp. 190–204.

¹³⁷ Kremnyov, Mikhail, “Africa in Search of New Paths,” World Marxist Review, Vol. 6, No. 8 (08 1963), pp. 72–76, at pp. 75–76Google Scholar, cited in Löwenthal, , “Haltung,”p. 10Google Scholar, q.v., pp. 10–11, for citation of pro-FLN Algerian Communist declarations.

¹³⁸ See Westen, Klaus, Der Stoat der nationalen Demokratie (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1964)Google Scholar.

¹³⁹ “For the Unity and Solidarity of the International Communist Movement,” Pravda, December 6, 1963, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 47 (12 18, 1963), pp. 15–19, at p. 17Google Scholar. See Duevel, C., “Moscow on the Defensive,” Radio Liberty, Munich, 12 11, 1963Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁰ “Replies of N. S. Khrushchev to Questions of Editors of Ghanaian Times, Alger Rtpublicain, Le Peuple, and Botataung,” Pravda and Izvestiya, December 22, 1963, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 51 (01 15, 1964), pp. 11–16, at p. 13Google Scholar. See Ra'anan, “Moscow and the ‘Third World,’” op. cit., pp. 22–31, which outlines similar but less explicit early 1963 developments.

¹⁴² See “Algeria: A ‘Fruitful Dialogue,’” The Mizan News Letter, Vol. 6, No. 2 (02 1964), pp. 1–7Google Scholar (with full bibliography) and Lowenthal, , “Haltung,” pp. 10–11Google Scholar. See also Griffith, , “Africa,” op. cit., pp. 183–185Google Scholar.

¹⁴² L'Unità, June 30, 1964.

¹⁴³ By being reprinted in the World Marxist Review supplement, Information Bulletin, No. 16, 08 18, 1964, pp. 18–22Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁴ Which, however, the L'Unità interviewer referred to as “keynoted by ideas of scientific socialism.”

¹⁴⁵ Another, if less clear-cut, example may be seen in Soviet policy toward the UAR. Detailed accounts of Nasser's relations with the communist world include Wolfgang Berner, “Nasser und die Kommunisten,” Europa ArcMv, Vol. 20, No. 15 (08 10, 1965), pp. 569–578Google Scholar; Reinhard Kapferer, “Nassers Schwierigkeiten mit” positiven Neutralisms “und ‘arabischen Sozialismus,’” ibid., Vol. 19, No. 20 (October 25, 1965), pp. 759–766; and Peter Meyer-Ranke, “Nasser am Tor des sozialistischen Lagers,” Aussenpolilik, Vol. 16, No. 3 (03 1965), pp. 153–162Google Scholar. For the general Soviet rapprochement with the Arab world, and controversies among Soviet and Arab Communists concerning it, see Ra'anan, “Moscow and the ‘Third World,’” op. at., and “The Union Between the Forces of Socialism and the National Liberation Movement,” Kommunist, No. 8, 05 1964, pp. 3–10Google Scholar; also “The USSR and the Middle East Arab States in 1965,” Mizan, Vol. 7, No. 4 (04 1965), pp. 1–13Google Scholar (with bibliographic citations).

¹⁴⁶ For a penetrating and detailed analysis, with bibliographic citations, particularly from the Institute's journal Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyie Otnosheniya, see Ra'anan, “Moscow and the ‘Third World,’” op. cit. See also “New Thoughts on the New States,” The Mizan News Letter, Vol. 6, No. 6 (06 1964), pp. 1–7Google Scholar; “Soviet Reappraisal,” ibid., Vol. 6, No. 8 (September 1964), pp. 1–9; “Khrushchev and the Developing Countries,” ibid., Vol. 6, No. 9 (October 1964), pp. 1–5. The same eclectic position was increasingly taken toward European social democracy. See A. Chernyayev, “Communists and Socialists: Prospects for Cooperation,” Kommunist, No. 7, 05 1964, pp. 107–118Google Scholar. For the explicitly antWXP aspects of the Khrushchev position see Nassar, Fuad and al-Hajj, Aziz, “The National Liberation Movement and the World Revolutionary Process,” World Marxist Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 (03 1964), pp. 9–15,Google Scholar and W. Sheppard, “The One-Party System and Democracy in Africa,” ibid., pp. 86–90. For a summary, with quotations, of Khrushchev's visit to the UAR, see The Mizan News Letter, Vol. 6, No. 5 (05 1964), pp. 57–66Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁷ Khrushchev in Pravda, January 4, 1964; see also “Why Mislead?” Ibid., January 30, 1964. The Chinese press did not mention Khrushchev's proposal (Doolin, , op. cit., P. 20)Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁸ See especially Young, M. Crawford, “The Congo Rebellion,” Africa Report, Vol. X, No. 4 (04 1965), pp. 6–11Google Scholar, and Howe, Russell Warren, “The Eastern Congo's Phony Rebellion,” The Reporter, 03 11, 1965, pp. 35–36Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁹ See especially Longo, Luigi, “La rivoluzione algerina verso il socialismo,” Rlnascita, Vol. XXI, No. 4 (01 25, 1964), pp. 12–13Google Scholar (the “vanguard” FLN “constructing socialism”).

¹⁵⁰ Yugoslav activity became less significant as CPSU-LCY rapprochement intensified.

¹⁵¹ For Soviet exclusion at Jakarta, see Ho, Chung, “Triumph of the Bandung Spirit,” and the Djarkarta communiqué, Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 17 (04 24, 1964), pp. 5–7Google Scholar. For Sino-Soviet exchanges see the Soviet April 24 government statement (to the CPR) on the Jakarta meeting, Pravda, May 5, 1964; a May 30 CPR statement, Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 23 (06 5, 1964), pp. 6–8Google Scholar, with accompanying Pravda and Jen-min Jih-pao editorials; “Splitters' Maneuvers,” Pravda, July 11, 1964; and “In Whose Interests?” (re the Pyongyang Second Asian Economic Seminar), ibid., August 18, 1964. For background see Adie, W. A. C., “China and the Bandung Genie,” Current Scene, Vol. III, No. 19 (03 15, 1965)Google Scholar.

¹⁵² For the above see particularly the penetrating study by Weinstein, Franklin B., “The Second Asian-African Conference: Preliminary Bouts,” Asian Survey, Vol. V, No. 7 (07 1965), pp. 359–373CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for background, Adie, “China and the Bandung Genie,” op. cit.

¹⁵³ See Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “Victory of the Clerks,” The New Republic, Vol. CLI, No. 20 (11 14, 1964), pp. 15–18Google Scholar; Conquest, Robert, Russia after Khrushchev (New York and London: Praeger, 1965), pp. 109–123Google Scholar; Rush, Myron, Political Succession in the USSR (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 208–214Google Scholar; Lowenthal, Richard, “The Revolution Withers Away,” Problems of Communism, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (01–02 1965), pp. 10–16Google Scholar, and comments in the two subsequent issues; Reddaway, Peter, “The Fall of Khrushchev,” Survey, No. 56 (07 1965), pp. 11–30Google Scholar; a series of articles in Osteuropa, Vol. XIV, No. 11 (11 1964), pp. 777–813Google Scholar (by Richard Lowenthal, David Burg, and Herman Achminow), and Vol. XIV, No. 12 (December 1964), pp. 877–902 (by Giinther Wagenlehner and Erich F. Pruck); and especially a series in Osteuropa by Meissner, Boris, “Chruschtschowismus ohne Chruschtschow,” Vol. XV, No. 1/2 (01–02 1965), pp. 1–15Google Scholar, Vol. XV, No. 3 (March 1965), pp. 138–165, and Vol. XV, No. 4 (April 1965), pp. 217–227.

¹⁵⁴ See the obviously inspired press agency dispatches from Moscow in The Times(London), Le Monde, and Neue Ziircher Zeitung, October 31, 1964. The most detailed account of the “29 points” was in a Moscow dispatch in Paese Sera (Rome), October 30, 1964; as to their doubtful authenticity, see a denial by Pancaldi from Moscow in L'Unità, October 30 and 31. 1964 (JPRS 27, 590, November 30, 1964).

¹⁵⁵ Irhali, , chairman of the Hi Kazakh autonomous chou, on 08 26–29, 1964Google Scholar, in Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 37 (09 II, 1964), pp. 5 and 26Google Scholar (excerpts in Doolin, , op. dt., pp. 65–66Google Scholar, Document 24).

¹⁵⁶ Radio Urumchi, October 1, 1964, in Doolin, , op. dt., pp. 75–76Google Scholar, Document 29.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 76. I do not, however, share the view of some scholars that this indicates that Khrushchev was preparing to either invade Sinkiang or bomb the Chinese atomic faculties there and was therefore removed by his associates; there does not seem to me, at least as yet, to be sufficient evidence to make this conjecture probable.

¹⁵⁸ Marchais and Waldeck-Rochet in VHumcmitt, November 9, 1964 (JPRS 27, 590, November 30, 1964); Neues Deutschland, October 18, 1964; Rudt Prdvo, October 20, 1964, and Frankel from Prague in The New York Times, November 1, 1964; Trybuna Ludu, October 29, 1964, and Frankel from Warsaw, The New York Times, November 8, 1964; Nipszabadsdg, October 25, 1964; L'Espresso, November 15, 1964; interview with Berlinguer, Der Spiegel (Hamburg), November 11, 1964, statement by Berlinguer upon his return from Moscow, ibid., November 4, 1964, and his press conference, Avantil, November 4, 1964 (all in JPRS 27, 590, November 30, 1964); Fiirneberg to the Austrian Communist Party Central Committee, Volksstimme (Vienna), November 6, 1964 (JPRS 27, 590, November 30, 1964); Bucharest dispatches [by Bourne, Dessa] in The Times (London), 11 14 and 16, 1964Google Scholar; and for a roundup of reactions, Salisbury in The New York Times, October 21, 1964. See also Osteuropa, Vol. XV, No. 4 (04 1965), pp. 228–240Google Scholar, for PCF, PZPR, and Rumanian Communist Party reactions.

¹⁵⁹ CPR statement, October 16, 1964 in Jen-min Jih-pao, October 17, 1964, and Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 42 (10 16, 1964), pp. ii–iiiGoogle Scholar; see “The Savior of Mankind,” China News Analysis, No. 538 (10 23, 1965), pp. 1–3Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁰ “…duty… of wide cooperation in all spheres of economic… life… an international conference of oH communist parties [my italics—W.E.GJ,” in “Unshakeable Leninist General Line of the CPSU,” Pravda, October 17, 1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 40 (10 28, 1964), pp. 3 and 6, at p. 6Google Scholar.

¹⁶¹ China News Analysis, No. 542 (11 27, 1964), p. 2Google Scholar.

¹⁶² Koleka, Spiro in Zëri i Poputtit, 10 23, 1964Google Scholar; “The Fall of Khrushchev Did Not Entail the Disappearance of Khrushchevian Revisionism,” ibid., November 1, 1964; and “Let Us Raise High the Victorious Banner of the Ideas of the Great October,” ibid., November 7, 1964.

¹⁶³ Pravda, November 7, 1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 43 (11 18, 1964), pp. 3–9Google Scholar. The conference call was repeated in “In the Vanguard of the Struggle for Communism and Peace,” Pravda, November 10, 1964. The first post-Khrushchev reaffirmation of Soviet support for a conference of “all” communist parties was much more general and made no reference to timing. See “Soviet Progress Reviewed on the Eve of the 47th October Revolution Anniversary,” Kommunist, No. 15, 10 1964Google Scholar (passed for the press October 26, 1964), pp. 3–9 (JPRS 27, 466, November 20, 1964).

¹⁶⁴ Pravda, October 18, 1964. They did not refer to the partial test ban treaty or to international detente.)

¹⁶⁵ For example, the Soviet-Cuban communiqué of October 18 (ibid., October 19, 1964), which listed the anti-imperialist struggle before the reinforcement of peace. (See Michel Tatu, “La politique soviétique sans M. Khrouchtchev, II. Vers une reprise de contact avec la Chine?” Le Monde, November 4, 1964.) The same was true of “Foreign Policy and the Contemporary World,” Kommunist, No. 3, 02 1965Google Scholar (passed for the press February 22, 1965), pp. 3–14, but it also reaffirmed (in italics) a view Peking rejected, that “The question of peace has been and remains the overriding issue of all contemporary life.”

¹⁶⁶ Jen-min Jih-pao, November 7, 1964 (SCMP, 3335, November 12, 1964, pp. 27–28).

¹⁶⁷ For the Chinese position see j.c.k. [Joseph C. Kun), “The Pros and Cons of Reconciliation,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, November 9, 1964, and China News Analysis, No. 542 (11 27, 1964), pp. 2–3Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁸ Jen-min Jih-pao, November 7, 1964, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 46 (11 13, 1964), pp. 14–17Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁹ See Devlin, Kevin, “Pro-Chinese Factions Intensify Struggles,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 11 19, 1964Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁰ Radio Belgrade in Serbo-Croat, November 6, 1964, 1830 GMT.

¹⁷¹ Pravda, November 14, 1964; Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 47 (11 20, 1964), pp. 5–6Google Scholar (SCMP 3393, November 18, 1964, p. 39).

¹⁷² In an interview with Karol, K. S. in Peking, in late March 1965 (The New Statesman, 03 26, 1965)Google Scholar.

¹⁷³ “Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on ‘United Action,’” Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i, November 11, 1965, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 46 (11 12, 1965), pp. 10–21, at p. 12Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁴ “The Testament of P. Togliatti, the Crisis of Modern Revisionism, and the Struggle of Marxists-Leninists,” Zërl i Popullit, November 13, 1964. Not reprinted by the Chinese; see Griffith, Communism in Europe, op. cit., Vol. 2, Appendix to Chapter 1.

¹⁷⁵ “Why Khrushchev Fell,” Hung Ch'i, Nos. 21/22, November 21, 1964, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 48 (11 27, 1964), pp. 6–9Google Scholar. The reference to “contributions” is to East European Communist leaders statements about Khrushchev, but it implied that the new Soviet leadership took the same view. For analysis see China News Analysis, No. 542 (11 27, 1964), pp. 3–7Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁶ See, for example, the December 1 PKI refusal in Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 52 (12 25, 1964), pp. 17–18Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁷ Pravda, December 12, 1964, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 13 (03 26, 1965), pp. 21–22Google Scholar. The letter also contained the information that China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Albania had previously refused to participate in any international meeting, that the Japanese and Indonesian parties had “requested further information” (and, in fact, did not participate), and that Rumania refused to participate unless all others did—that is, in fact refused. See also the implicitly anti-Chinese “ The State of the Whole People,” Pravda, December 6, 1964.

¹⁷⁸ Zëri i Popullit, November 1, 1964. See also j.c.k. [Kun, Joseph C.], “Khrushchev's Fall—As Seen From Peking,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 11 21, 1964Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁹ Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 48 (11 27, 1964), pp. 18–19Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁰ The New Republic, Vol. CLII, No. 9 (02 27, 1965), p. 17–23, at p. 21Google Scholar.

¹⁸¹ “On a Series of New Attacks on Our Party by Prokharov and Others,” Akahata, December 28, 1964, reprinted in Jen-min Jih-pao, January 20, 1964.

¹⁸² “Revolutionary Marxism Will Triumph in Europe,” Zëri i Popullit, January 6, 1965, reprinted in Jen-min Jih-pao, January 21, 1965.

¹⁸³ “Another Glaring Exposure of the Indian Government's Reactionary Features,” ibid., January 17, 1965, and Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (January 22, 1965), pp. 5–6.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. pp. 17–18.

¹⁸⁵ Zëri t Popullit, February 2, 1965, which included: the texts of a January 5, 1965 note from Warsaw to Tirana and a January 15 Tirana reply with a long letter to the Warsaw Pact meeting; a Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee decision of January 20; and a final brief Albanian note of January 29 to the Warsaw Pact. (As it was not reprinted by the Chinese, this may well, like other Albanian moves, have been somewhat more extreme than Peking desired.

¹⁸⁶ For the March 1963 incident, see Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. at., pp. 117–118Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁷ Honey, P. J., Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963)Google Scholar; Kux, Ernst, “Nordvietnam,” in Kux, Ernst and Kun, Joseph C., Die Satelliten Pekings (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1964), pp. 25–189Google Scholar; Donnell, John C., “North Vietnam: A Qualified Pro-Chinese Position,” in Scalapino, The Communist Revolution in Asia, op. cit., pp. 140–172Google Scholar; Chen, King, “North Vietnam in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1962–1964,” Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 9 (09 1964), pp. 1023–1036CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 128–130Google Scholar and 192–193. See also P. J. Honey's regular “Quarterly Survey” in China News Analysis.

¹⁸⁸ For example, Ho Chi Minh to Hoxha, VNA in English, November 28, 1964, 1918 GMT.

¹⁸⁹ See an interview with its head, Minh, Dang Quang, in Sovetskaya Rossiya, 05 27, 1965Google Scholar. Yet the Soviet representative at the NLFSV mission's arrival was low level (TASS, April 23, 1965).

¹⁹⁰ For the above, see the detailed analysis, with bibliography, by Honey, P. J., “Cross Purposes in Hanoi,” China News Analysis, No. 555 (03 12, 1965)Google Scholar.

¹⁹¹ “Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on ‘United Action,’” p. 15. (Judging by past Chinese statements the revelations in this article are probably true in general, but not the whole truth.)

¹⁹² See Zagoria, , The Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. at., pp. 200–224Google Scholar.

¹⁹³ See Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 60–63Google Scholar.

¹⁹⁴ The Viet Cong will be treated at length in a forthcoming book by Douglas Pike, to be published by the M.I.T. Press. For its control by the People's Revolutionary Party, a branch of the Lao Dong, see the evidence cited by Topping, Seymour, The New York Times, 07 31, 1965Google Scholar.

¹⁹⁵ For the role of Hanoi in the Sino-Soviet dispute, see Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., and Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 128–130Google Scholar. For general views on Vietnam and American policy with respect to it, see Honey, , “The New Phase of the War,” China News Analysis, No. 568 (06 11, 1965)Google Scholar (North Vietnam Quarterly Survey, No. 16), “The New Situation in Vietnam,” China News Analysis, No. 588 (11 12, 1965)Google Scholar, and “aVietnam Argument,” Encounter, Vol. XXV, No. 5 (11 1965), pp. 66–69Google Scholar; Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “Peace, Morality and Vietnam,” The New Leader, Vol. XLVII, No. 8 (04 12, 1965), pp. 5–6Google Scholar; Griffith, , “Containing Communism—East and West,” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 215, No. 5 (05 1965), pp. 71–75Google Scholar; Kahin, George Mc T. and Lewis, John W., “The United States in Vietnam,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XXI, No. 6 (06 1965), pp. 28–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Morgenthau, Hans, “Vietnam: Shadow and Substance,” New York Review of Books, 09 16, 1965, pp. 3–5Google Scholar; Dallin, Alexander, “Moscow and Vietnam,” The New Leader, Vol. XLVII, No. 10 (05 10, 1965), pp. 5–8Google Scholar; an anti-U.S. policy symposium in Dissent, Vol. XII, No. 4 (08 1965), pp. 395–404Google Scholar; and Lowenthal, Richard, “America's Asian Commitment,” Encounter Vol. XXV, No. 4 (10 1965), pp. 53–58Google Scholar. For U.S. policy see particularly an interview with President Johnson by Drummond, Roscoe, The Washington Post, 08 30, 1965Google Scholar.

¹⁹⁶ For detailed treatment of recent Soviet pronouncements on Vietnam see “Soviet Comment on the Vietnam Situation,” The Yuva Newsletter, Vol. IV, No. 4 (07 1965) pp. 1–6Google Scholar.

¹⁹⁷ In an interview with Edgar Snow in Peking in January 1965, The New Republic, Vol. CLII, No. 9 (02 27, 1965), pp. 17–23, at p. 22Google Scholar.

¹⁹⁸ Jui-ch'ing, Lo, “Commemorate the Victory Over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism Through to the End!” Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 20 (05 14, 1965), pp. 7–15Google Scholar.

¹⁹⁹ For the most extreme (and pro-Chinese) Hanoi position see two articles by Truong Chinh, , “Let Us Raise High the Creative Marxist-Leninist Banner and Hold Fast to the Party's Military Line,” Quart Doi Nhan Dan (Hanoi), 02 4, 1965Google Scholar, and another article in Nhan Dan, September 2, 1965, summarized in Honey, “The New Situation in Hanoi,” op. cit. Although Hanoi's position has been moderately and conditionally pro-Chinese since May 1963 (see Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 128–130 and 192–193)Google Scholar, a December 1963 Lao Dong Central Committee communique (Nhan Dan, January 21, 1964, and Jen-min Jih-pao, January 23, 1964) carefully distinguished between “the Tito revisionist clique, a lackey of imperialism,” and “… a mistaken people within the international Communist movement… who commit the error of revisionism or right-wing opportunism [that is, the Soviets].” The former are to be exposed and opposed, the latter struggled with “for the sake of unity.” See j.c.k. [Joseph C. Kun], “North Vietnamese Still on the Fence,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, January 27, 1965.

²⁰⁰ Pravda, February 11, 1965, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 6 (03 3, 1965), pp. 9–11, at p. 9Google Scholar.

²⁰¹ UPI dispatch from Saigon in The New York Times, February 17, 1965.

²⁰² This became particularly clear as a result of Le Duan's April 1965 visit to Moscow. See Kx. [Ernst Kux], “Höhere Einsatz Moskaus gegen Peking,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, April 20, 1965.

²⁰³ Edward Crankshaw in The Observer (London), 11 14, 1965, p. 5Google ScholarPubMed. Crankshaw gives extensive quotations from a CCP letter replying to an April 17 CPSU one; but, with the exception of the above (and one other point—the April 3 Soviet proposal for a USSR-CPR-DRV summit meeting), they add nothing of significance to “Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on ‘United Action,’” op. dt. For China's rejection of the Soviet air base proposal, see also Liao Cheng-chih at a press conference in Peking, July 15, 1965, reported by Radio Tokyo, July 15, 1965, 1000 GMT; Richard Hughes from Hong Kong, The Sunday Times (London), 07 25, 1965Google Scholar. By April 1965 Soviet weapons were moving through China to North Vietnam (The New York Times, April 2, 1965).

²⁰⁴ For example, Nhan Dan, March 18, 1965.

²⁰⁵ For example, “Let Us Heighten Our Revolutionary Ardor and Advance toward Winning New Successes,” Hoc Tap, February 1965; the Lao Dong Central Committee message to the PKI, VNA in English, May 23, 1965, 0545 GMT; Nhan Dan endorsement of the Chinese position on the Indo-Pakistani conflict, VNA in English, September 23, 1965, 0555 GMT.

²⁰⁶ Radio Hanoi in Vietnamese, April 13, 1965, 1300 GMT.

²⁰⁷ VNA in English, April 28, 1965, 0150 GMT.

²⁰⁸ See the report by Eric Severeid on his August 12, 1965, conversation with Adlai Stevenson in his “ The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai,” Look, November 30, 1965, pp. 81–86, at p. 84, and Washington dispatches in The New York Times, November 16 and 17, 1965.

²⁰⁹ See, for example, the USSR-DRV communique Pravda, April 17, 1965 (” unity of action… of the socialist countries “), and the April 20, 1965, Nhan Dan editorial; for a relatively pro-Chinese statement see Hoang Van Hoan in NCNA, Peking, July 13, 1965; for neutrality, Ho Chi Minn speech, VNA in English, April 16, 1965, 0838 GMT, and his interview in Pravda, June 19, 1965; and Le Due Tho at the Rumanian Communist Party congress, VNA in English, July 18 and 19, 1965.

²¹⁰ See, for example, the appointment as foreign minister of (presumed pro-Chinese) Nguyen Duy Trinh (The New York Times, April 8, 1965).

²¹¹ By early April 1965 Soviet aid was moving uninterrupted through China (ibid.). Another indication of how Hanoi now gauges its relations with socialist countries on the basis of its aid requirements was the deterioration of Rumanian-North Vietnamese relations subsequent to Rumania's cutting down its exports to Hanoi. See j.cJc. [Joseph C. Kun], “Strained Rumanian-Vietnamese Relations,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, July 5, 1965.

²¹² VNA in English, July 18 and 19, 1965, cited from j.c.k. [Joseph C. Kun], “Vietnamese, Korean Delegates Demonstrate Neutral Attitude”, Radio Free Europe, Munich, July 23, 1965.

²¹³ Texts in The New York Times, February 9, 1965.

²¹⁴ See Kosygin's speech after his Hanoi trip, Pravda, February 27, 1965 (CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 9 [March 24, 1965], pp. 3–6); Borba, February 21, 1965.

²¹⁵ “Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on ‘United Action,’ “ op. cit., pp. 15–16.

²¹⁶ “Certain people assert that only a new world war will lead to the consolidation of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement. We resolutely reject such a point of view.” (Pravda, May 8, 1965, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 19 [06 2, 1965], pp. 4–7Google Scholar, at p. 6.)

²¹⁷ “The point of view according to which the unity of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement would be restored only in case of a war is in our view not only an expression of the theory of spontaneity but damaging and dangerous for the cause of peace and socialism.” (Neues Deutschland, March 28, 1965, tr. from text in SBZ Archiv, Vol. XVI, No. 8 [2. Aprilheft], pp. 127–128, at p. 128.)

²¹⁸ Pravda, September 15, 1965.

²¹⁹ “ Pravda and Jen-min Jih-pao, February 14, 1965.

²²⁰ Jen-min Jih-pao, February 16 and 19, 1965, and Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 802 19, 1965), p. 12,Google Scholar and Vol. VIII, No. 9 (February 26, 1965), p. 4.

²²¹ Pravda, February 17, 1965.

²²² “Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on ‘United Action,’” op. cit., p. 16. Note the simultaneity of dates between public Soviet and Chinese declarations and private Soviet and Chinese moves. For a detailed analysis of this simultaneity of public ideological declarations and secret political and economic moves, see Griffith, , Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 60–88Google Scholar.

²²³ Paris dispatch in The Times (London), 02 25, 1965Google ScholarPubMed; Henri Pierre from Moscow in Le Monde, February 26, 1965; and “Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on ‘United Action,’” op cit., p. 16.

²²⁴ Andrfé Fontaine in Le Monde, February 27, 1965, and Jen-min Jih-pao, February 19, 1965.

²²⁵ Ibid., February 25, 1965 (SCMP 3407, March 2, 1965).

²²⁶ Jen-min Jih-pao, February 26, 1965 et seqq. For a summary see China News Analysis, No. 567 (06 4, 1965), pp. 3–4Google Scholar.

²²⁷ Lee, Chong-Sik, “Stalinism in the East,” in Scalapino, , The Communist Revolution in Asia, op.cit., pp. 114–139Google Scholar (the most recent and authoritative analysis); Kun, Joseph C., “Nordkorea,” in Kux and Kun, Die Satelliten Pekings, op. at., pp. 190–253Google Scholar; and j.c.k. [Joseph C. Kun], “North Korea's Neutral Course,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, August 25, 1965. For bibliography see also Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., p. 192, note 56Google Scholar.

²²⁸ For example, Kim Il-song at a banquet for Sukarno, KCNA in English, November 1, 1964, 1234 GMT, and DPRK telegram to USSR, KCNA in English, November 6, 1964, 1032 GMT.

²²⁹ Kim to Hoxha, KCNA in English, November 28, 1964, 1618 GMT.

²³⁰ Minju Choson, December 30, 1964 (KCNA in English), December 30, 1964, 0526 GMT

²³¹ “Strengthen the Unity of the International Communist Movement and Intensify the Anti-Imperialist, Revolutionary Struggle,” Nodong Shinmun, December 3, 1964 (KCNA in English, December 3, 1964, 0550 GMT). See also Nodong Shinmun on Lenin, April 22, 1965 (KCNA in English, April 22, 1965, 0515 GMT); and especially Kim Il-song to the PKI Aliarcham Academy of Social Science, Djakarta, April 14, 1965 (KCNA in English, April 19, 1965, 1013 GMT) (for which see also j.c.k. [Joseph C. Kun], “Nort h Korea: Back in the Middle?” Radio Free Europe, Munich, May 7, 1965), and Kim against the pro-Soviet Yoshio Shiga in an interview on June 18, 1965, with Akahata (KCNA in English, June 19, 1965, 0608 GMT).

²³² j.ck. [Joseph C. Kun], “Soviet-North Korean Trade Protocol for 1965,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, December 3, 1965, citing Radio Moscow, December 1, 1965.

²³³ Kosygin at Pyongyang, Pravda, February 13, 1965; Kim, KCNA in English, February 11, 1965, 1615 GMT; joint communiqué, Pravda, February 15, 1965.

²³⁴ TASS in Russian, May 31, 1965, 1526 GMT.

²³⁵ For example, the celebration of the fourth anniversary of the Korean-Chinese friend-ship treaty, KCNA in English, July 9, 1965, 1648 GMT.

²³⁶ Kim Kwang-hyop at the Rumanian Communist party congress, Agerpres, July 21, 1965, quoted from j.c.k. [Joseph C. Kun], “Vietnamese, Korean Delegates Demonstrate Neutral Attitudes,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, July 23, 1965.

²³⁷ For example, Mun-song, Pak in Nodong Shinmun, 09 17, 1964Google Scholar (KCNA in English, September 17, 1965, 0516 GMT), and a North Korean-Indonesian parliamentary delegations' communiqué, KCNA in English, September 28, 1965, 1720 GMT.

²³⁸ j.c.k. [Joseph C. Kun], “Peking Snubs North Korean Anniversary,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, August 13, 1965, and l.z. [Louis Zanga], “Albania Snubs North Korean Liberation Anniversary,” ibid., August 17, 1965. For the Chinese greeting message, less enthusiastic than in 1964, see NCNA in English, August 14, 1964 (SCMP 3282, August 19, 1964, p. 31), and a Hong Kong dispatch in The New York Times, August 17, 1964. The DPRK also took the Chinese side in the Indo-Pakistani and Indonesian crises.

²³⁹ For North Korea's furthering its own influence, see j.c.k. [Joseph C. Kun], “North Korea's Drive for Recognition in the Developing World,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, December 11, 1964, and “The Kim Visit: North Korean Diplomatic Offensive,” ibid., April 12, 1965.

²⁴⁰ Pravda, January 19, 1965. The communiqué took pro-Soviet and implicitly anti-Chinese positions on the international conference issue, cessation of polemics, and other points. It was, however, more favorable to the Fidelista advocacy of armed struggle than the Moscow-oriented Latin American Communist parties previously had been. See Ferrari, A., Fortuny, J. M., Lima, P. Matta and Ferreto, L., “The Cuban Revolution and the Anti-Imperialist Struggle of the Latin American Peoples,” World Marxist Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (01 1965), pp. 29–35Google Scholar. Yet Fidelista versus pro-Soviet Communist party tension still exists in Latin America; see, for example, the antiguerrilla article by the Argentinian Ernesto Judisi, “The Revolutionary Process in Latin America,” ibid., Vol. 8, No. 2 (February 1965), pp. 15–22; Halperin, Ernst, The Peaceful and the Violent Road: A Latin American Debate (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 09 1965)Google Scholar; a Guatemalan Communist Party appeal against the “Trotskyite” guerrillas led by Sosa, Yon, Information Bulletin, No. 56, 10 20, 1965, pp. 41–47Google Scholar; and Uceda, Luis F. de la Puente, “The Peruvian Revolution: Concepts and Perspectives,” Monthly Review, Vol. 17, No. 6 (11 1965), pp. 12–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and James D. Cockcroft and Eduardo Vicente, “Venezuela and the FALN since Leoni,” ibid. pp. 29–40.

²⁴¹ See the March 13 Castro speech, reprinted by Pravda on March 18, which by implication criticized Soviet lack of aid to Hanoi but which contained sharp if implied criticism of Peking for its “splittism” and its spreading of Chinese propaganda in Cuba. See Fritz Ermarth, “Fidel, the Giant Killer,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, March 20, 1965. “The Communiqu6 testifies to a triumph of the revisionist Togliattist theses and tactics, clearly outlined in the ‘Testament’ ofP. Togliatti, which came out against the monocentrist line of the Soviet leadership. (“The Splitting Revisionist Meeting of One Man,” Zeri i Popullit, March 18, 1965.)

²⁴² For the following see, in addition to the treatment (with bibliography) of the pre-November 1963 period in Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 60–62Google Scholar, 198–202, the following subsequent material: Draper, Theodore, Castroism Theory and Practice (New York, Washington, and London: Praeger, 1965)Google Scholar; Halperin, Ernst, Nationalism and Communism in Chile (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965)Google Scholar and The Peaceful and the Violent Road: A Latin American Debate, op. cit.; Goldenberg, Boris, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1965)Google Scholar; and a series of articles by Lazitch, Branko, “Retouches a la politique soviaique au sein de l'internationale,” Est & Ouest, No. 344 (06 16–30, 1965), pp. 7–9Google Scholar; “Tactique ‘chinoise’ et obedience sovi&ique. L'exemple du Guatemala,” ibid.. No. 336 (February 16–28, 1965), pp. 10–12, “Le Parti Communiste VenfaueTien et le conflict sino-sovietique,” ibid., No. 335 (February 1–15, 1965), pp. 1–7, and “ Les repercussions de la querelle sino-sovie'tique dans les partis communistes d'Ame'rique latine,” ibid.. No. 333 (January 1–15, 1965), pp. 3–10.

²⁴³ The Albanians attacked the November 1964 Havana meeting as one organized “with diabolic aims” by the “Soviet revisionists” for “their anti-Marxist plans.” (Zëri i Popullit, February 16, 1965.)

²⁴⁴ Reprinted in full in Pravda, March 18, 1965.

²⁴⁵ See especially the PURS-PO communique' in L'Vnith, June 9, 1965.

²⁴⁶ See Griffith, , Communism in Europe, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 4Google Scholar, note 4.

²⁴⁷ In an interview with al Tali'ah (the Cairo theoretical journal of the Arab Socialist Union), April 1965, summarized (with extensive quotations), in William McLaughlin, “Guevara on Factionalism in Cuba and Economic Revisionism in East Europe,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, July 29, 1965.

²⁴⁸ Hoy and Revoluión, October 4, 1965.

²⁴⁹ See Ernst Halperin, The Peaceful and the Violent Road, op. at.

²⁵⁰ Pravda, March 2, 1965.

²⁵¹ Daily Worker (London), 01 11, 1965Google Scholar; excerpts in Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (01 22, 1965), pp. 19–20Google Scholar; and The Sunday Times (London), 02 28, 1965Google ScholarPubMed.

²⁵² Bufalini, and Berlinguer, upon their return from Moscow, in L'Unità, 11 8, 1964Google Scholar. See also the questioning of the extent of the leading role of the CPSU in Boffa, Giuseppe, “La funzione del PCUS nella societa sovietica,” Rinasdta, Vol. XXI, No. 44 (11 7, 1964), pp. 11–12Google Scholar, and Amendola's request for limitations on criticism of the Soviet Union, ibid., pp. 3–4.

²⁵³ Mario Alicata, “II dialogo del PCI con i partiti fratelli,” ibid.. Vol. XXI, No. 40 (October 10, 1964), pp. 5–6; Enrico Berlinguer's rejection of PCF leader Leroy's criticism of the Togliatti Testament, especially concerning the conference, in L'Unita, october 24, 1964, and Rinascita, Vol. XXI, No. 42 (10 24, 1964), pp. 7–8Google Scholar (JPRS 27, 299, November 10, 1964); and three Radio Free Europe, Munich, analyses: j.c.k. [Kun, Joseph C.], “Italian Party Delegation to Hanoi,” 04 11, 1965Google Scholar, McLaughlin, William, “French Left Looks at Italian Communism,” 05 13, 1965Google Scholar, and Devlin, Kevin, “The PCI's Ideological Diplomacy,” 05 18, 1965Google Scholar.

²⁵⁴ Amendola, Giorgio, “Ipotesi sulla riunificazione,” Rinascita, Vol. XXI, No. 47 (11 28, 1964), pp. 8–9Google Scholar.

²⁵⁵ g.c.p. [Giancarlo Pajetta), “Pubblicita del dibattito,” ibid., Vol. XXII, No. 5 (January 30, 1965), p. 13.

²⁵⁶ “Italian Communist Party Discusses the Creation of a Single Party of the Working Class,” Kommunist, No. 1, 01 1965, pp. 97–104Google Scholar (JPRS 28, 914, February 26, 1965).

²⁵⁷ Berlinguer to thePCI Central Committee, L'Unità, 02 19, 1965Google Scholar (JPRS 29, 136, March 16, 1965), and the PCI Central Committee resolution, ibid., February 20, 1965 (JPRS 29, 215, March 22, 1965). The initial PCI reaction to Moscow's December 1964 postponement of the meeting had been noncommittal (Rinascita, Vol. XXI, No. 50 [12 19, 1964], p. 2)Google Scholar.

²⁵⁸ “Foreign Policy and the Contemporary World,” Kommunist, No. 3, 02 1965 (signed to the press February 22, 1965), pp. 3–14Google Scholar, quoted from JPRS 29, 538, April 12, 1965.

²⁵⁹ Pravda, December 12, 1964.

²⁶⁰ ibid., February 28, 1965. For earlier indications of Soviet retreat, see Billoux, François, “Some Urgent Problems of the International Communist Movement,” World Marxist Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (01 1965), pp. 9–14Google Scholar. The Japanese Communist Party has stated that it was “orally” informed on February 26 that the meeting would not be a “drafting committee” but a “consultation.” See Akahata, April 13, 1965, cited from McLaughlin, William, “China's ‘Vanguard,’” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 05 19, 1965Google Scholar.

²⁶¹ See in general Duevel, C., “March 1 Conference Overshadowed by Pending Ideological Blast from Peking,” Radio Liberty, Munich, 03 2, 1965Google Scholar.

²⁶² Berlinguer, Enrico, “La posizione del PCI all' incontro di Mosca,” Rinascita, Vol. XXII, No. 11 (03 13, 1965), pp. 3–5Google Scholar.

²⁶³ The hypotheses as to the line-up represent deductions from the positions of these parties before and after the meeting.

²⁶⁴ “Communiqué on the Consultative Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow,” Pravda, March 10, 1965, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 9 (03 24, 1965), pp. 7–8Google Scholar; “Statement on Events in Vietnam by Participants in Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties,” Pravda, March 4, 1965. See Duevel, Christian, “First Class Funeral for World Communist Conference,” Radio Liberty, Munich, 03 10, 1965Google Scholar; r.r.g. [Gill, R. Rockingham], “Not with a Bang, But a Whimper,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 03 10, 1965Google Scholar; and “United about What?” The Economist (London), 03 13, 1965Google ScholarPubMed.

²⁶⁵ Daily Worker (London), 03 15, 1965Google ScholarPubMed; De Waarheid (Amsterdam), 03 10, 1965Google Scholar; L'Unità, March 10, 1965; see McLaughlin, William, “West Europe CP's and the Conference,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 03 23, 1965Google Scholar.

²⁶⁶ “An Important Step toward the Consolidation of the World Communist Movement,” Pravda, March 11, 1965. See also “The Ideological Weapon of the Party,” Kommunist No. 4, 03 1965, pp. 3–14Google Scholar, and “A Vitally Necessary Matter,” ibid., No. 5, March 1965, pp. 3–15.

²⁶⁷ See Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 174–176Google Scholar.

²⁶⁸ The New York Times, March 5, 1965.

²⁶⁹ CPR note, Jen-min Jih-pao, 03 7, 1965Google Scholar, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 11 (03 12, 1965), p. 16Google Scholar.

²⁷⁰ Soviet note, Pravda, 03 13, 1965Google Scholar, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 10 (03 31, 1965), pp. 4–5Google Scholar.

²⁷¹ Jen-min Jih-pao, March 17, 1965, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 12 (03 19, 1965), pp. 7–8Google Scholar.

²⁷² Ibid. pp. 8–9.

²⁷³ Pravda, March 21, 1965, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 10 (03 31, 1965), p. 6Google Scholar.

²⁷⁴ Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 10 (03 5, 1965), pp. 27–31Google Scholar, and Vol. VIII, No. 11 (March 12, 1965), pp. 11–12. The Albanians again signaled the Chinese position. On March 18 they declared that the March Moscow conference “of hardened conspirators… decisively tore the mask from the present Soviet leadership.…Alongside N. Khrushchev and with him, they are the greatest plotters and splitters the history of the international Communist movement had known, revisionists and incorrigible renegades of Marxist-Leninism, allies and auxiliaries of imperialism.” (Zeri i Popullit, March 18, 1965.)

²⁷⁵ Jen-min Jih-pao, March 9, 10, 12 and 13, 1965. See also the introduction to the third volume of Khrushchev's, works, Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 10 (03 5, 1955), pp. 11–12Google Scholar.

²⁷⁶ NCNA in English, Peking, March 19, 1965 (SCMP 3423, March 24, 1965).

²⁷⁷ “A Comment on the Moscow Meeting,” Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i, March 22, 1965, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 13 (03 26, 1965), pp. 7–13Google Scholar (italics in original). See j.c.k. [Kun, Joseph C.], “Chinese to Increase Factionalism and Continue Polemics,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 03 22, 1965Google Scholar. It was preceded on March 18 by a similar Zëri i Popullit editorial, “The Splitting Revisionist Meeting of 1 March—A Great Plot Against Marxism-Leninism and International Communism.”

²⁷⁸ Crankshaw, Edward, The Observer (London), 11 14, 1965, p. 5Google Scholar.

²⁷⁹ See the joint USSR-DRV communiqué, Pravda, 04 18, 1965Google Scholar, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 16 (05 12, 1965), pp. 14–15Google Scholar, at p. 13. See also the Kosygin, speech, Pravda, 04 20, 1965Google Scholar. Brezhnev had earlier (ibid., March 24, 1965), apparently in response to a March 22 NLF request for volunteers, hinted that Soviet volunteers might be sent.

²⁸⁰ Lo Jui-ch'ing, “Commemorate the Victory Over German Fascism!” op. cit..

²⁸¹ The New York Times, April 8, 1965.

²⁸² Text in ibid., April 14, 1965.

²⁸³ “What's All the Fuss about?” Pravda, April 10, 1965.

²⁸⁴ See En-lai's, Chou message, via Algiers, to U Thant, The New York Times, 04 7, 1965Google Scholar, and Ch'en Yi's interview with Karol, K. S., Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 23 (06 4, 1965), pp. 14–15Google Scholar.

²⁸⁵ Pierre, Henri from Moscow in Le Monde, 03 19, 1965Google Scholar, and The Times (London), 03 17, 1965Google ScholarPubMed.

²⁸⁶ Tanner, Henry from Moscow in The New York Times, 03 29, 1965Google Scholar.

²⁸⁷ Anthony Lewis from London in ibid., April 13, 1965.

²⁸⁸ “Observer,” “What Shastri's Soviet Trip Reveals,” Jen-min Jih-pao, May 27, 1965, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 23 (06 4, 1965), pp. 17–19, at p. 19Google Scholar.

²⁸⁹ Communiqué of May 14, 1965, in ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 21 (May 21, 1965), p. 6.

²⁹⁰ “A Comment on the 17-Nation Appeal,” Jen-min Jih-pao, April 22, 1965, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 18 (04 30, 1965), pp. 10–12Google Scholar, at p. 12.

²⁹¹ Cambodia had originally requested the convening, but only to guarantee its neutrality, on March 15; of the two cochairmen, Moscow agreed on April 3 and London on April 26. By that time London was hoping to use the conference to negotiate on Vietnam, whereupon Moscow hesitated, and Sihanouk, presumably under Chinese pressure, on April 24 declared that not Saigon but the NLF must represent South Vietnam, thus ending the whole affair. See Tanner, from Moscow in The New York Times, 04 15, 28, 1965Google Scholar; The Times (London), 04 27, 1965Google ScholarPubMed; and a CPR government statement of May 2, 1965, in Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 19 (05 7, 1965), pp. 11–12Google Scholar, a commentary on a May 1 Cambodian government statement.

²⁹² Lo Jui-ch'ing, “Commemorate the Victory Over German Fascism!” op. cit. For other anti-Soviet attacks see “A Great Victory for Leninism,” Hung Ch'i, No. 4, 04 1965Google Scholar, and Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 19 (05 7, 1965), pp. 7–10Google Scholar; “The Historical Experience of the War Against Fascism,” Jen-min Jih-pao, May 9, 1965, and Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 20 (05 14, 1965), pp. 15–22Google Scholar; and statements by Yi, Ch'en and Ch'en, P'eng in a Hong Kong dispatch in The New York Times, 05 30, 1965Google Scholar.

²⁹³ “The Traitorous Group of Soviet Revisionists Supports American Imperialists in the Aggression Against Vietnam, ,” Zeri i Popullil, 04 20, 1965Google Scholar. See Griffith, , Communism in Europe, op. cit., Vol. 2Google Scholar, Appendix to Chapter 1.

²⁹⁴ At the Afro-Asian Economic Seminar, February 22–28, 1965, and the Fourth Inter-national Teachers' Conference, April 8–18 (NCNA in English, April 21, 1965, 1901 GMT).

²⁹⁵ At the April 15–21 WFDY meeting (NCNA in English, May 2, 1965, 2041 GMT) and the May 4 AAPSO conference (NCNA in English, May 9, 1965, 1905 GMT, and May 18, 1965, 2200 GMT); “Hold Still Higher the Afro-Asian People's Revolutionary Barrier of Solidarity Against Imperialism,” Jen-min Jih-pao, May 19, 1965 (SCMP, 3464, May 25, 1965, pp. 22–23); speech of Cheng-chih, Liao, Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 21 (05 21, 1965), pp. 14–17Google Scholar; resolution, ibid., pp. 17–19; Hsien Pien, “Success of the Fourth Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference,” ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 22 (May 28, 1965), pp. 13–15; and resolution on Vietnam, ibid. pp. 15–16.

²⁹⁶ Akahata, April 2 and 14, 1965.

²⁹⁷ in an April 13 Chinese Foreign Ministry memorandum to the Soviet embassy in Peking (NCNA in English, May 5, 1965, 1741 GMT).

²⁹⁸ NCNA in English, May 6, 1965, 1301 GMT. Hanoi did not make any reference to the incident.

²⁹⁹ For example, Grose, Peter from Moscow in The New York Times, 06 13, 1965Google Scholar.

³⁰⁰ Chen, p'eng in Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 24 (06 11, 1965), p. 20Google Scholar.

³⁰¹ “Carry the Struggle Against Khrushchev Revisionism Through to the End,” Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i, June 13, 1965, and Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 25 (06 18, 1965), pp. 5–10Google Scholar.

³⁰² See p. 43.

³⁰³ Chen, p'eng, in his speech at the PKI Higher Party School (op. cit., p. 18)Google Scholar, modified this conclusion somewhat (but presumably only for tactical purposes) by prefacing the same statement with: “We still place some hope in the leadership of the CPSU, and will welcome the day when they admit and rectify their mistakes.… But it seems that this day is still far off.”

³⁰⁴ Pravda, June 7, 1965, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 23 (06 30, 1965), pp. 19–20Google Scholar.

³⁰⁵ See “On Results of the March 1–5, 1965 Consultative Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties—Resolution of Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee Adopted March 26, 1965,” Pravda, March 27, 1965 (CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 11 [04 7, 1965], pp. 5 and 13)Google Scholar.

³⁰⁶ French Communist Party Politburo communiqué, Pravda, March 13, 1965; declaration of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, ibid., March 19, 1965; Finnish Central Committee resolution, ibid., March 25, 1965; CPSU Central Committee plenum resolution, ibid., March 27, 1965; resolution of the plenum of the French Communist Party, ibid., April 3, 1965; National Council of the Communist Party of India resolution on the Moscow meeting, ibid., April 7, 1965; the Greek Communist Party Central Committee resolution, ibid., April 9, 1965; and the French-Portuguese Communist communiqué, ibid.. May 14, 1965.

³⁰⁷ Uruguayan Communist Party editorial on the Moscow meeting, Pravda, 03 14, 1965Google ScholarPubMed, and Information Bulletin, No. 42, 05 13, 1965Google Scholar; Communist Party of Germany, Pravda, 03 18, 1965Google Scholar, and Information Bulletin, No. 47, 07 6, 1965Google Scholar; statement by the Eleventh Congress of the Communist Party of Norway, Pravda, 03 29, 1965Google Scholar, and Information Bulletin, No. 43, 06 3, 1965Google Scholar; thirty-first plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia, Pravda, 04 6, 1965Google Scholar, and Information Bulletin, No. 46, 06 30, 1965Google Scholar; statement of the Communist Party of Spain, Pravda, 04 10, 1965Google Scholar, and Information Bulletin, No. 43, 06 3, 1965Google Scholar; Czechoslovak Communist Party plenum, Pravda, 04 25, 1965Google Scholar, and Information Bulletin, No. 44, 06 4, 1965Google Scholar; and Canadian Communist Party Secretary-General's report to the National Committee, Pravda, 04 29, 1965Google Scholar, and Information Bulletin, No. 48, 07 16, 1965Google Scholar.

³⁰⁸ Pravda, June 13, 1965.

³⁰⁹ The Worker, May 9, 1965, andInformation Bulletin, No. 47, 07 6, 1965Google Scholar.

³¹⁰ Ibid., No. 52, August 26, 1965.

³¹¹ Daily Worker, March 15, 1965, andInformation Bulletin, No. 39, 04 23, 1965Google Scholar.

³¹² L'Unità, March 10, 1965, andInformation Bulletin, No. 38, 04 21, 1965Google Scholar.

³¹³ See theFrench-Bulgarian communiqué, Pravda, 07 7, 1965Google Scholar, and the resolution of the Brazilian Communist Party, ibid., August 27, 1965.

³¹⁴ For example, theCPSU-Chilean Communist Party communiqué, Pravda, 07 10, 1965Google Scholar(CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 28 [08 4, 1965], p. 26)Google Scholar, stressed that both parties considered the Moscow March meeting an important step in the direction of unity without referring to a new international conference or the proposed preliminary meeting of 81 parties. Considering that an earlier Chilean-Bolivian declaration (Pravda, June 3, 1965) had specifically endorsed the initiative for convening a consultative conference of the 81 Communist and workers' parties, the omission was clearly Soviet inspired. Moreover, the CPSU-Chilean communiqué' followed by only a few days the French-Bulgarian communiqué', stating that “the organization of a new conference of the international Communist and workers' parties fully corresponds to the interests of the international Communist movement.”

³¹⁵ Pravda, September 30, 1965.

³¹⁶ Ibid., September 16, 1965, and Neues Deutschland, September 28, 1965.

³¹⁷ Content note on trade agreements, also Soviet-Rumanian joint comuniqué, Pravda, September 14, 1965 (excerpts in CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 37 [10 6, 1965], pp. 19–21.)Google Scholar

³¹⁸ Pravda, September 11, 1965 (CDSP, ibid. p. 17).

³¹⁹ Pravda, September 15, 1965 (CDSP, ibid. p. 22).

³²⁰ Pravda, ibid. (CDSP, ibid.).

³²¹ Pravda, ibid. (CDSP, ibid. p. 24).

³²² GDR-USSR joint communiqué, op. cit.

³²³ Pravda, September 30, 1965.

³²⁴ Ibid. June 13, 1965.

³²⁵ Bugayev, Ye. in Partlinaya Zhizn, No. 7, 1965Google Scholar (quoting Lenin, , Sochineniya, Vol. XIII, pp. 66–67)Google Scholar, cited from r, r.g. [Gill, R. Rockingham], “B and K Against a Second Cominform,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 06 1, 1965Google Scholar.

³²⁶ Pajetta, Giancarlo in L'Unità, 05 20, 1965Google Scholar, quoted from JPRS 30, 437, June 7, 1965, pp. 1–14, at p. 5.

³²⁷ PURS-PCI communiqué, Havana, June 4, 1965, in L'Unità, June 9, 1965, quoted fromDevlin, Kevlin, “The Rome-Havana Entente,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 06 12, 1965Google Scholar.

³²⁸ I have profited greatly in writing the above from conversations with Mr. Ra'anan and with Professor Marshall Goldman. See alsoHottinger], A. H. [Arnold, “Moskaus Einfluss in der arabischen Welt,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 02 28, 1965Google Scholar, and “Die Strategie der Kommunisten im Mittleren Osten,” ibid., September 3, 1965; and, for ideological formulation, Polyansky's, October Revolution anniversary speech in Pravda, 11 7, 1965Google Scholar, and “The Supreme International Duty of the Country of Socialism,” ibid., October 27, 1965, both discussed later. (Although the 1963 and 1964 figures were higher in part because of long-term commitments for steel mill construction in India and Iran, the 1965 decline in aid commitments was still very substantial.)

³²⁹ See L'Unità, L'Humanite, and Pravda, June 20, 1965, et seqq.; Castro on Radio Havana, June 26, 1965;La Voix du Peuple (Brussels), pro-Chinese, June 25 and 07 2, 1965Google Scholar; Zëri I Popullit, July 10, 1965; and NCNA, June 20, 1965. The best analytical treatment of communist reaction to the coup is in a series of Radio Free Europe, Munich, papers: Devlin, Kevin, “The Communists and the Coup,” 06 27, 1965Google Scholar; and McLaughlin, William, “The Irrelevant Communists,” 06 30, 1965Google Scholar, and “Algeria and the Sino-Soviet Rift,” July 14, 1965. See also Gallagher, Charles F., “The Franco-Algerian Agreements,” American Universities Field Staff Reports, North Africa Series, Vol. XI, No. 1 (08 1965)Google Scholar.

³³⁰ SeeHerreman, Philippe, “Les origines de la campagne anti-communiste,” Le Monde, 10 10–11, 1965Google Scholar.

³³¹ Burlatsky, Fedor, “The Liberation Movement and Scientific Socialism,” Pravda, 08 15, 1965Google Scholar, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 33 (09 8, 1965), pp. 3–5Google Scholar, at p. 5. See also Ermarth, Fritz, “Who Has the Patent on Socialism?” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 08 20, 1965Google Scholar, and Midtsev, V., “Guinea on a New Path,” Kommunist, No. 12, 08 1965, pp. 85–93Google Scholar.

³³² See the OctoberSlogans, (Pravda, 10 23, 1965)Google Scholar; Duevel, Christian, “Comparison of October Slogans, 1964–1965,” Radio Liberty, Munich, Daily Information Bulletin, No. 2112 (10 27, 1965)Google Scholar; and Polyansky, op. at.

³³³ Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, op. cit., and The Peaceful and the Violent Road, op. cit.; andLee, Joseph J., “Communist China's Latin American Policy,” Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 11 (11 1964), pp. 1123–1134CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Griffith, , Communism in Europe, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 4Google Scholar, note 4.

³³⁴ It was so stated in the secret Chinese military publication Kung-tso T'ung-hsun (Bulletin of Activities), quoted byLewis, John Wilson, “China's Secret Military Papers: ‘Continuities’ and ‘Revelations,’” The China Quarterly, No. 18 (04–06 1964), pp. 68–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 78.

³³⁵ w. A. C. Adie, “Chou En-lai on Safari,” ibid. pp. 174–194.

³³⁶ For Chinese activities in Africa seeScalapino, Robert A., “Africa and Peking's United Front,” Current Scene, Vol. III, No. 26 (09 1, 1965)Google Scholar, and “Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 4 (07 1964), pp. 640–654CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cooley, John K., East Wind Over Africa (New York: Walker, 1965)Google Scholar; Klein, Donald W., “Peking's Diplomat in Africa,” Current Scene, Vol. II, No. 36 (07 1, 1964)Google Scholar; “China and Africa,” The Mizan News Letter, Vol. 6, No. 9 (10 1964), pp. 15–19Google Scholar; Prybyla, Jan S., “Communist China's Economic Relations with Africa 1960–1964,” Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 11 (11 1964), pp. 1135–1143CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Griffith, , “Africa,” op. cit., pp. 168–189Google Scholar, at pp. 185–189; and j.c.k. [Kun, Joseph C.], “Chinese Frustration in East Africa,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 07 28, 1965Google Scholar, and “Chinese Troubles in Mali?” ibid., September 29, 1965.

³³⁷ See Chou En-lai's January 24, 1965 speech and Ch'en Yi's January 26 one inPeking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 5 (01 29, 1965), pp. 5–7Google Scholar, and a Chinese-Indonesian communiqué of January 28, 1965, and “New Page in Sino-Indonesian Comradeshipin Arms,” Jen-min Jih-pao, January 30, 1965, and Peking Review, ibid. pp. 7–9.

³³⁸ For Afro-Asian reluctance to leave the United Nations see Radio Algiers, January 25, 1965, and Radio Accra, January 26, 1965.

³³⁹ Hamilton from theUnited Nations in The New York Times, 02 17–19, 1965Google Scholar, and Zëri i Popullit, February 17–20, 1965.

³⁴⁰ Tse-tung, Mao, “Problems of War and Strategy,” Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 272Google Scholar.

³⁴¹ Baldwin, Hanson W., “Vietnam: New Policy in the Making,” The Reporter, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3 (08 12, 1965), pp. 16–20Google Scholar.

³⁴² Fall, Bernard, “Vietnam Blitz,” The New Republic, 10 9, 1965, pp. 17–21Google Scholar, at p. 20.

³⁴³ Frankel, Max in The New York Times, 08 27, 1965Google Scholar, and Harsch, Joseph C., “Another Round,” The Christian Science Monitor, 10 26, 1965Google Scholar.

³⁴⁴ The above is primarily based on discussions with and publications by two experts on Southeast Asia who were in Vietnam in the summer of 1965: my colleague, ProfessorPye, Lucian W., and his interview in U.S. News and World Report, 10 18, 1965, pp. 76–81Google Scholar, and P. J. Honey and his “Vietnam Argument,” op. cit., and “The New Situation in Vietnam,” op. cit. See also Fall, “Vietnam Blitz,” op. cit., whose analysis of the change in the military situation is similar.

³⁴⁵ Reston, James, “Washington: The Stupidity of Intelligence,” The New York Times, 10 17, 1965Google Scholar.

³⁴⁶ Alsop, Stewart, “What the People Really Think,” The Saturday Evening Post, 10 23, 1965, pp. 27–31Google Scholar (with Oliver Quayle public opinion polls). The Gallup and Harris polls showed the same results.

³⁴⁷ Tokyo Shimbun, June 2, 1965. The Chou En-lai interview inAl-Musawwar (Cairo), 06 3, 1965Google Scholar, declaring that China did not want Soviet aid in a war with the United States, was probably propagandistic.

³⁴⁸ NCNA in English, June 23, 1965 (SCMP 3486, June 28, 1965.) North Vietnamese scientists remained there (Radio Moscow in Vietnamese to Vietnam, September 18, 1965, 1030 GMT).

³⁴⁹ Jen-min Jih-pao, July 13, 1965, andPeking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 29 (07 16, 1965), pp. 6–7Google Scholar.

³⁵⁰ Tokyo Shimbun, June 2, 1965.

³⁵¹ Hsiu-chu, Fan, “The Struggle Between the Two Lines over the Question of Dealing with U.S. Imperialism,” Ta Kung Pao, 07 27, 1965Google Scholar (SCMP 3509, August 3, 1965, pp. 27–33, at p. 32).

³⁵² Piao, Lin, “Long Live the Victory of People's Warl” Jen-min Jih-pao, 09 2, 1965Google Scholar, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 36 (09 3, 1965), pp. 9–30Google Scholar.

³⁵³ Jui-ch'ing, Lo, “The People Defeated Japanese Fascism and They Can Certainly Defeat U.S. Imperialism Too,” Jen-min Jih-pao, 09 2, 1965Google Scholar, quoted from Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 36 (09 3, 1965), pp. 31–39Google Scholar.

³⁵⁴ “U.S. Imperialism Can Be Defeated As Well,” Jen-min Jih-pao, September 2, 1965 (SCMP 3533, September 8, 1965).

³⁵⁵ For other analyses, seeZagoria, Donald S., “China's Strategy—A Critique,” Commentary, Vol. 40, No. 5 (11 1965), pp. 61–68Google Scholar; Leonhard, Wolfgang in Die Zeit, 09 21, 1965Google Scholar; Kx. [Kux, Ernst], “Pekings Kampfansage an die Welt,” Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 10 1, 1965Google Scholar; “A Plea for People's War,” Current Scene, Vol. III, No. 28 (10 1, 1965)Google Scholar; and “Fear of War,” China News Analysis, No. 580 (09 10, 1965)Google Scholar.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., Richard Halloran, “Red China Sets Defenses for U.S. Air Raids,” The Washington Post, September 3, 1965;“Democratic Tradition of Chinese People's Liberation Army,” Hung Ch'i, No. 8, 1965Google Scholar (JPRS 31, 360, August 20, 1965); decree abolishing formal military ranks and insignia (NCNA, May 24, 1965 [SCMP 3466, May 27, 1965]); Lung, Ho, “The Democratic Tradition of the Chinese People's Liberation Army,” Hung Ch'i, 08 1, 1965Google Scholar, and Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 32 (08 6, 1965), po. 6–16Google Scholar.

³⁵⁷ For example, aYi, Ch'en statement in Tokyo Shimbun, 06 2, 1965Google Scholar; a Chou En-lai interview with Al-Musawwar (Cairo) in an APT Cairo dispatch, Le Monde, June 4, 1965; Jen-min Jih-pao, July 13, 1965 (NCNA in English, July 13, 1965, 0300 GMT).

³⁵⁸ Piao, Lin, op. cit., p. 15Google Scholar.

³⁵⁹ Ibid. p. 18.

³⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 19.

³⁶¹ Ibid. p. 22.

³⁶² Ibid. p. 28.

³⁶³ Ibid. p. 24. This was not new; Aidit had said substantially the same in December 1963. SeeAidit, D. N., Set Afire the Bandung Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat l (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964)Google Scholar, and P'eng Ch'en, quoted in his May 25, 1965, Djakarta speech, op. cit. See “A Plea for Peoples' War,” Current Scene. op. cit. See alsoWohl, Paul in The Christian Science Monitor, 11 15, 1965Google Scholar, citing Branko Lazitch of Est & Ouest.

³⁶⁴ Piao, Lin, op. cit., p. 29Google Scholar.

³⁶⁵ That is, the Soviet Union—W.E.G.

³⁶⁶ In his September 29, 1965, Peking press conference; quoted fromPeking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 41 (10 8, 1965), pp. 7–14Google Scholar, at p. 14.

³⁶⁷ Kosygin atRiga, , Pravda, 07 18, 1965Google Scholar.

³⁶⁸ Frankel, Max in The New York Times, 06 20, 1965Google Scholar.

³⁶⁹ Hanson W. Baldwin in ibid., July 4, 1965.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., August 13 and 26, 1965.

³⁷¹ Specifically as to whether prior U.S. troop withdrawal was a precondition for negotiation: For example, a Moscow Viet Cong spokesman reportedly hinted it was not. See Vera Stovickova on Radio Prague, October 21, 1965, 2100 GMT, reporting on a Helsinki press conference by Moscow NLFSV representative Nguyen Van Dong. See also The Economist (London), 10 30, 1965, pp. 474–475Google ScholarPubMed; Wohl, Paul in The Christian Science Monitor, 10 29, 1965Google Scholar; and, for earlier indications, Fall, Bernard, “North Vietnam: A Profile,” Problems of Communism, Vol. XIV, No. 4 (07–08 1965), pp. 13–25Google Scholar, at pp. 24–25. In late November 1965 a report, denied by Washington, indicated that Rumania was attempting to mediate between Washington and Hanoi (The New York Times, November 22 and 23, 1965).

³⁷² Iklé, Fred Charles, “The Real Negotiations on South Vietnam,” The Reporter, 06 3, 1965, pp. 15–16Google Scholar.

³⁷³ Py op. Cit.

³⁷⁴ I have profited greatly from discussions with my colleague Professor Myron Weiner.

³⁷⁵ See“How the Kashmir War Began,” The Times (London), 09 13, 1965Google ScholarPubMed (from their Delhi correspondent).

³⁷⁶ Text inPeking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 39 (09 24, 1965), pp. 8–9Google Scholar.

³⁷⁷ The Chinese declared (ibid.. Vol. VIII, No. 40 [October 1, 1965], pp. 16–17) that the Indians had torn down their own advanced border posts; India (Boston Herald, September 22, 1965) denied it. India did agree, although it had previously refused, to joint inspection; see its note of September 17, to Peking, Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 39 (09 24, 1965), pp. 11–12Google Scholar.

³⁷⁸ This was apparently conveyed at a U.S.-Chinese ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw. See a Warsaw dispatch inThe Observer (London), 09 19, 1965Google ScholarPubMed. That it was not unwelcome to Moscow was indicated by a Prague radio comment: “It appears that a warning delivered to Peking by the U.S. government stated that a large-scale action against India could result in extensive U.S. retaliation.… Damage that theU.S. army and, above all, the U.S. air force could inflict on China would be very considerable and severe.” (Milan Weiner on Radio Prague, September 26, 1965, 1200 GMT.)

³⁷⁹ CPR note of September 19 (text in Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 39 [09 24, 1965], pp. 9–11)Google Scholar.

³⁸⁰ Lukas, J. Anthony from New Delhi in The New York Times, 10 5, 1965Google Scholar.

³⁸¹ Hanson W. Baldwin, “Barrier to a Long War,” ibid., September 9, 1965.

³⁸² The Economist (London), 10 23, 1965, p. 383Google Scholar.

³⁸³ See, for example, a September 7 CPR governmental statement, Peking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 37 (09 10, 1965), pp. 6–7Google Scholar.

³⁸⁴ See MacFarquhar, Roderick, “China and the Cease-Fire,” The New Statesman, 09 24, 1965, pp. 323–324Google Scholar, and “Thanks for Muffing It,” The Economist (London), 09 25, 1965, pp. 1177–1179Google Scholar. For support of the CPR by Pyongyang see a DPRK-Indonesia communiqué (KCNA in English, September 28, 1965, 1720 GMT), and by Hanoi, , Nhan Dan, 09 23, 1965Google Scholar (VNA in English, September 23, 1965, 0555 GMT).

³⁸⁵ “Who Backs the Indian Aggressor?” Jen-min Jih-pao, September 18, 1965, quoted fromPeking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 39 (09 24, 1965), pp. 13–16Google Scholar.

³⁸⁶ For a perceptive analysis of Soviet policy in this context, seeMurarka, Dev from Moscow in The Spectator, 09 24, 1965Google Scholar.

³⁸⁷ For example, a TASS statement, September 7, 1965, 1841 GMT.

³⁸⁸ Pravda, September 20, 1965.

³⁸⁹ For example, a “news review” in ibid., September 22, 1965.

³⁹⁰ Compare the PKI-CCP communiqué (“a complete unanimity of positions and views”) inPeking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 33 (08 13, 1965), p. 5Google Scholar, and Aidit statements against imperialism and modern revisionism (ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 23 [June 4, 1965], pp. 8–12) and in favor of continuing polemics (ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 35 [August 27, 1965], pp. 23–24) with a PKI-CPSU communiqueé (“exchange of opinions”), Pravda, August 1, 1965 (CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 31 [08 25, 1965], P. 19)Google Scholar.

³⁹¹ SeeMcVey, Ruth T., “Indonesia,” Survey, No. 54 (01 1965)Google Scholar, reprinted in Labedz, op. cit., pp. 113–122, and her forthcoming book, to be published by the M.I.T. Press on the PKI and the Sino-Soviet rift; Justus van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Publications Center, 1965)Google Scholar, “Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4 (Winter 1964–1965), pp. 357–383Google Scholar, “The Vocabulary of Indonesian Communism,” Problems of Communism, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (05–06 1965), pp. 1–9Google Scholar, and “The Sino-Indonesian Partnership: Its Origins and Implications,” Orbis, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (Summer 1964), pp. 332–356Google Scholar; Hindley, Donald, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951–1963 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965)Google Scholar and “The Indonesian Communist Party and the Conflict in the International Communist Movement,” The China Quarterly, No. 19 (07–09 1964), pp. 99–119CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Peking and Indonesia,” China News Analysis, No. 551 (02 12, 1965)Google Scholar; Griffith, , The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 23–26Google Scholar, 35–36, 102–103, 122–123 and 207–210; j.c.k. [Kun, Joseph C.], “Will Sukarno Get the Bomb?” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 07 29, 1965Google Scholar; and William McLaughlin, “Mr. Aidit's Holiday,” ibid., August 6, 1965. I am grateful to Dr. McVey for comments on an earlier draft of this section.

³⁹² For the events of September 30 et seqq., only journalistic accounts were available as of November 1965. See particularly the dispatches from Djakarta by John Hughes in The Christian Science Monitor, notably his reconstruction of the coup of October 10, 1965, and byKing, Seth S. in The New York Times, notably two of 10 31, 1965, pp. 1Google Scholar and E3.

³⁹³ Quoted fromPeking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 43 (10 22, 1965), p. 5Google Scholar.

³⁹⁴ ibid. pp. 6–14.

³⁹⁵ Pravda, October 26, 1965.

³⁹⁶ For the WFTU I have drawn primarily on a lecture by Kevin Devlin of the Columbia University Research Institute of Communist Affairs, delivered at the Columbia Faculty Seminar on International Communism on October 26, 1965. See alsoDevlin, Kevin, “Chinese Reject Soviet Overtures at Budapest Meeting,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 10 26, 1964Google Scholar, and “Disunity in the WFTU: Storm Signals for Warsaw Congress,” ibid., July 26, 1965; l.z. [Louis Zanga], “Yugoslav Trade Union Chief Calls for Greater WFTU Autonomy,” ibid., October 5, 1965; and Williams McLaughlin, “WFTU Embarks on Collision Course,” ibid., October 7, 1965. For the October 1965 Warsaw WFTU congress see the running coverage by PAP, NCNA, TASS, L'Unità, and Le Monde; Lama, Luciano, “Fatto nuova alia FSM,” Rinascita, Vol. XXII, No. 43 (10 30, 1965), pp. 3–4Google Scholar; and especially McLaughlin, William, “WFTU: End of the Affair,” Radio Free Europe, Munich, 10 25, 1965Google Scholar. The best sources on WFTU activities are L'Unità and Avanti l

³⁹⁷ Premier Chou En-lai's letter to leaders of Afro-Asian countries, quoted fromPeking Review, Vol. VIII, No. 44 (10 29, 1965), pp. 6–7Google Scholar at p. 7.

³⁹⁸ “Observer,”“The Soviet Union and the Afro-Asian Forum,” New Times, No. 22, 06 2, 1965, pp. 7–8Google Scholar. See Pierre, Henri from Moscow in Le Monde, 06 8, 1965Google Scholar, and, for Chinese opposition in January 1965, PTI (Bombay) Moscow dispatch, February 5, 1965.

³⁹⁹ Herreman, Philippe in Le Monde, 03 31 and 06 4, 1965Google Scholar.

⁴⁰⁰ On the OCAM and Houphouet-Boigney see Du Bois, Victor D., “The Search for Unity in French-Speaking Africa,” American Universities Field Staff Reports, West Africa Series, Vol. VIII, Nos. 3, 4 and 5 (06 and 07 1965)Google Scholar.

⁴⁰¹ For the conference postponement seeJansen, G. H., “Postponement of the ‘Second Bandung,’” The World Today, Vol. XXI, No. 9 (09 1965), pp. 398–406Google Scholar; Pauker, Guy J., “The Rise and Fall of Afro-Asian Solidarity,” Asian Survey, Vol. V, No. 9 (09 1965), pp. 425–432CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and the running coverage in Le Monde.

⁴⁰² AFP fromCairo, , Le Monde, 07 1, 1965Google Scholar.

⁴⁰³ Jeune Afrique (Algiers) September 23, 1965.

⁴⁰⁴ USSR-UAR communiqué, Pravda, 09 2, 1965Google Scholar.

⁴⁰⁵ In an interview with the UAR Middle Eastern News Agency (MENA), published by NCNA in English, September 12, 1965, 0659 GMT, quoted fromPeking Review. Vol. VIII, No. 38 (09 17, 1965), pp. 8–9Google Scholar, at p. 9.