1. See Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, “The Chinese political spectrum,”Problems of Communism, No. 2 (March–April 1987), pp. 1–13; Harding, Harry, “The domestic politics of China's global posture, 1973–1978,” in Fingar, Thomas (ed.), China's Quest for Independence (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980);Google Scholar Kenneth Lieberthal, “The foreign policy debate in Peking as seen through allegorical articles, 1973–76, The China Quarterly (CQ), No. 71 (September 1977); Gottlieb, Thomas M., Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1977);Google ScholarHamrin, Carol, “China reassess the superpowers,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Summer 1983).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. Garver, John W., China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968–1971 (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 134–37;Google Scholar John Garver, “Chinese foreign policy in 1970: the tilt towards the Soviet Union,” CQ, No. 82 (June 1980); Lieberthal, Kenneth, “Domestic politics and foreign policy,” in Harding, Harry (ed.), China's Foreign Policy in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 52.Google Scholar

3. Lieberthal, Kenneth G., Sino–Soviet Conflict in the 1970s: Its Evolution and Implications for the Strategic Triangle (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1978).Google Scholar

4. Carol Hamrin, “China reassesses the superpowers,” pp. 226–27.

5. See, in particular, Michael Ng–Quinn, “The analytical study of Chineseforeign policy,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2 (June 1983). For a critique of Ng–Quinn's work, see Hamrin, Carol Lee, “Domestic components and China's evolving Three Worlds Theory,” in Harris, Lillian Craig and Worden, Robert L. (eds.). Chinaand the Third World: Champion or Challenger (Dover, MA: AuburnHousePublishing, 1986).Google Scholar

6. See Ross, Robert S., “International bargaining and domestic politics: U.S.–China relations since 1972,” World Politics, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2 (January 1986).Google Scholar

7. For a discussion of Mao's interest and initiatives in foreign policy, see Michel Oksenberg, “Mao's policy commitments, 1921–1976,” Problems of Communism, No.6 (November–December 1976), pp. 1–26; Oksenberg, Michel, “The political leader,” in Wilson, Dick (ed.), Mao Tse–tung in the Scales of History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 95–96.Google Scholar

8. On the border hostilities, see Hinton, Harold C., The Bear at the Gate:Chinese Policymaking under Soviet Pressure (Washington, D.C.: AmericanEnterpriseInstitute, 1971).Google ScholarOn China's response to the Czechoslovakia crisis, see Wich, Richard, Sino–Soviet Crisis Politics: A Study of Political Change and Communication (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1980).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9. For the 1960s, see Gottlieb, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism, pp.84–94. Huang Yongsheng's 1971 speech is in Xinhua, 31 July1971,FBIS/PRC,2August 1971, pp. A5–7. Also see, for example, Xinhua,7 March 1970. FBIS/PRC, 9 March 1970, pp. A11–13. The radical position on the United States is clear from even a cursory examination of the media at this time. They argued that as a declining capitalist state, the U.S. was more dangerous than ever and heightened vigilance was the appropriate response.

10. Philip Bridgham, “The fall of Lin Biao,” CQ, No. 55 (July/September 1973), p. 446. Also see the report on an alleged Zhou Enlai speech released by the Taiwan government. Agence France Presse, 23 February 1977, FBIS/PRC, 23 February 1977, p. E26.

11. For a full discussion of Lin's policy package, including its economic aspects, see Harding, Harry, “Political trends in China since the Cultural Revolution,” in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 402 (July 1972), pp. 72–75; Gottlieb, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12. The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, in Peking Review, 30 April 1969, p. 36.

13. The coalition included Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi. The coalitions weakness was underscored by Xie's apparent illness. He was last seen in public in March 1970.

14. The chronology of U.S.–China signalling and diplomacy is well documented in Kissinger, Henry, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).Google Scholar

15. Chang, Parris, Power and Policy in China (second edit.) (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), pp. 198;Google ScholarDomes, Jurgen, China After the Cultural Revolution: Politics Between Two Party Congresses (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 34–37.Google Scholar

16. Bridgham, “The fall of Lin Piao,” pp. 429–32. Domes, China After the Cultural Revolution, Ch. 3. Also see “Chairman Mao on Party building,” Peking Review, 11 April 1969, pp. 3–5; “Triumphantly forge ahead along Chairman Mao's line in Party building,” Red Flag, No. 1 (1970), in FBIS/PRC, 8 January 1978, pp. B1–13.

17. Kao, Michael Y.M. (ed.), The Lin Biao Affair: Power Politics and Military Coup (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press. 1975), p. 91: Domes, China After the Cultural Revolution, p. 100.Google Scholar

18. Mengbi, Hao and Haoran, Duan (principal eds.), Zhongguo gongchandang liushinian(SixtyYears of the Chinese Communist Party) (Nanjing: Liberation Army Press, 1984), p. 613.Google Scholar

19. Kao (ed.), The Lin Piao Affair, pp. 59–61.

20. Hao Mengbi and Duan Haoran, Sixty Years of the Chinese Communist Partv, p. 262.

21. Also see Bridgham, “The fall of Lin Piao,” p. 435, on Mao's need for caution and circumspection after the Lushan Plenum. Cf. Garver, China's Decision for Rapproche– ment, pp. 135–37.

22. For the official reports, see Xinhua, 30 September 1978, FBIS/PRC, 1 October 1970, pp. Bl–2. Edgar Snow's account is in his The Long Revolution (New York, Random House, 1972), pp. 3–4.

23. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 700–701.

24. Ying–Mao Kao and Pierre M. Perrolle, “The politics of Lin Biao's abortive coup,” Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, No. 6 (June 1974), p. 561; Kao (ed.). The Lin Biao Affair, pp. 62, 80.

25. Kao (ed.), The Lin Piao Affair, p.89.

26. Derong, Zheng, et al. (principal eds.), Xin zhongguo jishi, 1949–1984 (Record of New China) (Changchun: North–east Normal University Press, 1986), p. 492; Hao Mengbi and Duan Haoran, Sixty Years of the Chinese Communist Party, p. 620; Zheng Derong and Zhu Yang (principal eds.), Zhongguo gongchandang lishi jiangyi (Teaching Materials on the History on the Chinese Communist Party), Vol. 2, 5th edit. (Jilin People's Press, 1985), p. 199.Google Scholar

27. The most detailed Chinese examination of this event and the role of Mao, Zhou and other foreign ministry officials is Jiang, Qian, “Pingpang waijiao”: shimo (“Ping– pong Diplomacy”: The Beginning and End) (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1987), especially Chs 8, 9, 14, 15. Also see Guan Fengrui “Zhou Enlai tongzhi zai woguo waijiao shijian zhong dui Mao Zedong sixiang de zhuoyue gongxian” (“Comrade Zhou Enlai's outstanding contribution to Mao Zedong thought in our country's foreign events”), Lmoning daxue xuebao (Liaoning University Journal), No. 5 (1986), in Fuyin baokan ziliao: zhongguo waijiao (Duplication of Materials from Newspapers and Periodicals: Chinese Foreign Policy), No. 10 (1986), pp. 23–25;Google Scholar the interview with Enlai, Zhou is in Bulletin of Concerned Asia Scholars, Vol. III, Nos. 3–4 (Summer–Fall, 1971), p. 42. On the date of the conference, see Hao Mengbi and Duan Haoran, Sixty Years of the Chinese Communist Party, p. 620.Google Scholar

28. On the behind the scenes slowdown, see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 694–97. On the Warsaw talks, China clearly signalled her intention to delay only temporarily the progress towards rapprochement, reporting that “the Chinese Government deems it no longer suitable” to meet. “As to when the meeting will be held in the future, it will be decided upon later through consultation....” See Xinhua, 18 May 1970, FBIS/PRC, 19 May 1970, p. Al.

29. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 696.

30. Xinhua, 8 April 1970, FBIS/PRC, 8 April 1970, p. 5–6.

31. Xinhua, 25 June 1970, FBIS/PRC, 25 June 1970, pp. A8–9.

32. Mao Zedong, “People of the world unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs!” Xinhua, 20 May 1970, FBIS/PRC, 20 May 1970, pp. A1–2.

33. For Zhou's remarks, see, e.g., Xinhua, 2 September 1970, FBIS/PRC, 3 September 1970, pp. A23–25; Xinhua, 30 September 1970, FBIS/PRC, 1 October 1970, pp. B4–5. On the July signalling, see Kissinger, White House Years, p. 697.

34. Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 1 March 1972, p. 1.

35. Hao Mengbi and Duan Haoran, Sixty Years of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 631–33.

36. See, e.g., Oksenberg, Michel, “A decade of Sino–American relations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (1982), pp. 182–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37. For an analysis of China's reaction to the fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon, see Ross, Robert S., The Indochina Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy, 1975–1979 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), Ch. 2.Google Scholar

38. See Kissinger's record of his 1973 discussions with Mao and Zhou in Kissinger, Henry, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 55, 67, 690.Google Scholar Also see President Ford's discussion of Deng Xiaoping's opposition to détente in Ford, Gerald R., A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 335. For an extended discussion of this process, see Ross, “International bargaining and domestic politics,” pp. 263–67, passim.Google Scholar

39. On U.S. relations with Taiwan during this period, see Barnett, A. Doak, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 205–207.Google Scholar

40. There is no need here to either establish or detail the respective foreign policy positions.The best description of their preference during this period is Lieberthal, “The foreign policy debate in Peking,” pp. 533–39.

41. Hao Mengbi and Duan Haoran, Sixty Years of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 639–40.

42. The most comprehensive discussion of the Changsha meetings of 18 October meeting between Wang Hongwen and Mao and of 20 October between Mao and Wang Hairong and Tang Wenshen is drawn from the 1980 trial of the “gang of four.” See Ming, Zhou (principal ed.), Lishi zai zheli chensi (History is Pondering Here). Vol. II (Beijing: Huaxia Press, 1986), pp. 196–203. Because much of the testimony cited in this work is from secondary participants in the trial, much of the information is not available in the official record of the trial of the principal defendants.Google Scholar

43. Hao Mengbi and Duan Haoran, Sixty Years of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 638–39; Ming, Zhou, History is Pondering Here, Vol. I (Beijing: Huaxia Press, 1986), pp. 75–76.Google Scholar

44. Dun, Sun, et al. (eds.), Zhongguo gongchandang lishi jiangyi (TeachingMaterials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party), Vol. II (Jinan: Shandong People's Press, 1985), pp. 295–96; Hao Mengbi and Duan Haoran, Sixty Years of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 645–46.Google Scholar

45. “Ye Jianying yuanshuai weida guanghui” (“Marshal Ye Jianying's life of greatness and glory”), Renmin ribao (overseas edit.), 30 October 1986.

46. It is significant that Zhou never directly criticized U.S. policy towards Taiwan. Documents of the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), p. 60. Cf. Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 205.Google Scholar

47. Ford, A Time to Heal, pp. 336–37.

48. U.S. Congress, Ninth Congressional Delegation to the People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976). p. 21.Google Scholar

49. For a discussion of the content and the politics of drafting these documents, see Lieberthal, Kenneth, Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan. Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, No. 33, 1978).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

50. Hao Mengbi and Duan Haoran, Sixty Years of the Chinese Communist Party, p. 647. For Mao's statement, see Peking Review, 12 September 1975, p. 7.

51. Jiang's speech has yet to be released. It is discussed in Hao Mengbi and Duan Haoran, Sixty Years of the Chinese Communist Party, p. 647.

52. Ibid. p. 649; Sun Dun, Teaching Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party, p. 298. For a more extensive discussion of the Water Margin campaign, see Goldman, Merle, Chinese Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

53. Hao Mengbi and Duan Haoran, Sixty Years of the Chinese Communist Party, p. 649.

54. FBIS, Trends in Communist Media, 7 January 1976, p. 9.

55. Xinhua, 21 February 1976, FBIS/PRC, 23 February 1976, p. A5; Xinhua, 22 February 1976, FBIS/PRC, 23 February 1976, p. A9; Xinhua, 23 February 1976, FBIS/PRC, 23 February 1976, p. A3.

56. U.S. Congress, Visit to the People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 3–7. Also note the invitation to former Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger to visit China. See FBIS, Trends in Communist Media, 9 September 1976, p. 25.Google Scholar

57. U.S. Congress, The United States and China (Washington D.C.: U.S. Govern– ment Printing Office, 1976), pp. 2–3, 16, 18.Google Scholar

58. Weizhong, Fang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dashiji (Economic Chrono– logy of the People's Republic of China) (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1984), pp. 559–60.Google Scholar For the trade statistics, see Barnett, A. Doak, China's Economy in Global Perspective (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 507.Google Scholar

59. Barnett, China's Economy in Global Perspective, p. 508.

60. On Sino–Japanese trade during this period, see Lee, Chae–Jin, China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), pp. 17–20.Google Scholar For a fuller discussion of the politics of Chinese foreign economic policy, see Ann Fenwick, “China's foreign trade policy and the campaign against Deng Xiaoping,” in Fingar (ed.), China's Quest for Independence; Whiting, Allen S., Chinese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the 1970s (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1979), pp. 53–76.Google Scholar

61. See Ross, The Indochina Tangle, Chs 2 and 3.

62. See the discussion of President Carter in Xin Wan Bao (Hong Kong), 6 November 1976, FBIS/PRC, 10 November 1976, pp. NN1–2. Also note the discussion of the formation of Committee on the Present Danger in Xinhua, 12 November 1976, FBIS/PRC, 15 November 1976, pp. A4–5.

63. See the discussion of the Carter Administration's initial reluctance to tackle the Taiwan issue in Vance, Cyrus, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 79; Oksenberg, “A decade of Sino–American relations,” p. 182.Google Scholar

64. Zheng Derong, Record of New China, p. 604; Pengwen, Shao (principal ed.), Zhongguo gongchandang lishi jiangyi (Teaching Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Changchun: Jilin University Press, 1984), p. 337;Google Scholar He Qin, et al. (eds.), Zhonggongdang lijiangyi (Teaching Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Beijing: Chinese People's University Press, 1984), p. 199; Zheng Derong and Zhu Yang (principal eds.), Zhongguo gongchandang lishi jiangyi (Teaching Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party), Vol. 2 (5th edit.), pp. 243–44.Google Scholar

65. Zheng Derong, Record of New China, p. 604; Hao Mengbi and Duan Haoran, Sixty Years of the Chinese Communist Party, Vol. 2, p. 671; Shao Pengwen, Teaching Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party, p. 338.

66. Interview with Michel Oksenberg, National Security Council Staff member with responsibility for China in the Carter Administration. Oksenberg accompanied Vance to Beijing.

67. Ross, The Indochina Tangle, Ch. 6.

68. Deng might have assumed responsibility for foreign policy earlier in the year, perhaps even before he returned to work in early May, as some Chinese privately contend. Yet, his leadership was not publicly evident until later in the year. The most that can be said is that his authority had emerged no later than the summer.

69. See the eulogy in Xinhua, 18 September 1976, FBIS, 20 September 1976, pp. A7–11. Also see FBIS, Trends in Communist Media, 22 September 1976, p. 7. For similar formulations during this period, see the 2 November announcement by the CCP Central Committee, the NPC Standing Committee, the State Council, and the CCP Military Affairs Commission in Xinhua, 2 November 1976, FBIS, 2 November 1976, pp. A1–2.

70. U.S. Congress, The United States and China, p. 2; Xinhua, 14 November 1976, FBIS/PRC, 15 November 1976, p. A3.

71. See the report of the delegation's press conference in Agence France Presse, 22 November 1976, FBIS/PRC, 22 November 1976, p. A5. Senator Mike Mansfield, although more concerned with resolving the Taiwan issue, received essentially the same impression in conversations with Chinese leaders in Beijing in early October. See U.S.Congress, China Enters the Post–Mao Era (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 9.Google Scholar

72. Peking Domestic Service, 11 January 1977; FBIS/PRC, 13 January 1977, pp. E9–10.

73. Allen Whiting argues that the Chinese calculus of deterrence includes the propositions that “The worse our domestic situation, the more likely our external situation will worsen” and “A superior power will seek to take advantage of (China's) domestic vulnerability.” See Whiting, Allen S., The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), pp. 201–205.Google Scholar

74. For a Soviet discussion of Moscow's initiatives, see Gromyko, A.A. and Ponomarev, B.N. (eds.), Soviet Foreign Policy: Volume II, 1945–1980 (4th, rev. and enlarged edit.) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981), pp. 565–66.Google Scholar Among various western analyses, see Mills, William de B., Sino–Soviet Interactions, May 1977–June 1980, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1981, pp. 26–30;Google ScholarSegal, Gerald, Sino–Soviet Relations after Mao(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. Adelphi Papers, No. 202, 1985), p. 6. On the negotiations and the brief lull in Chinese polemics, see FBIS, Trends in Communist Media, 22 December 1976, p. 12. Particularly note Beijing's charge that “Moscow even haughtily demanded that we change our policy.” Cited in FBIS, Trends in Communist Media, 5 January 1977, p. 9.Google Scholar

75. The learn from Dazhai speech is in Xinhua, 28 December 1976, FBIS/PRC, 28 December 1976, pp. E2–15. Also see Li Xiannian's many comments in late 1976 and early 1977 criticizing Soviet overtures. On Chinese apprehension over Soviet intentions, see in particular the Renmin ribao article discussing Soviet “nuclear intimidation” of China and the need for vigilance. “Down with nuclear superstition,” Renmin ribao, 13 May 1977; FBIS/PRC, 13 May 1977, pp. E26–27.

76. FBIS/Trends in Communist Media, 2 March 1977, pp. 7–9; Ibid. 7 July 1977, pp. 3–4.

77. I am grateful to Michael Yahuda for this information. For a particularly authoritative and harsh attack on détente, see Ren Guping, “The Munich tragedy and contemporary appeasement,” Renmin ribao, 26 November 1978, in Peking Review, 9 December 1978, pp. 6–11.

78. Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 79–83; Oksenberg, “A decade of Sino–American relations,” pp. 182–83.

79. On the course of the normalization negotiations, see Oksenberg, “A decade on Sino–American relations,” p. 187. Regarding the developments in Indo–China, see Ross, The Indochina Tangle, Ch. 8.

80. See his interview in Time magazine, 5 February 1979, p. 34.

81. Carol Hamrin, “China reassesses the superpowers.”

82. L'Unita, 8 January 1982; FBIS/PRC, 9 January 1982, pp. Gl–2. For addition comments by Li, see, e.g., Xinhua, 24 January 1982, FBIS/PRC, 25 January 1982, pp. K2–4. Also see Lieberthal, “Domestic politics and foreign policy,” p. 65; Hamrin, “China reassesses the superpowers,” p. 218.

83. Hamrin, “China reassess the superpowers.” For a more comprehensive discus– sion of the coalitions and their domestic policy preferences, see Solinger, Dorothy, “The Fifth National People's Congress and the process of policy making: reform, readjust– ment, and the opposition,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXII, No. 12 (December 1982).Google Scholar

84. Compare the U.S. and Chinese speeches during Vice–president Mondale's 1979 visit to China and Secretary of Defence Harold Brown's 1980 visit to China. See, for example, Hamrin, “China reassesses the superpowers”; Ross, “International bargaining and domestic politics”; Sutter, Robert G., Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments After Mao(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), pp. 87–97.Google Scholar

85. For a discussion of these developments, see Ross, “International bargaining and domestic politics,” pp. 271–82.

86. For a discussion of Deng's preeminence in foreign policy, see Barnett, A. Doak, The Making of Foreign Policy in China; Structure and Process (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 9–17.Google Scholar

87. For an extended discussion of this transformation, see Ross. “International bargaining and domestic politics.” Cf. Hamrin, “China reassesses the superpowers.”

88. For an examination of China's evolving Soviet policy during this period, see Mills, “Sino–Soviet interactions, May 1977–June 1980;” William Hyland, “The Sino– Soviet conflict: dilemmas of the strategic triangle” in Solomon, Richard (ed.), The China Factor (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1981).Google Scholar

89. For Hu Yaobang's remarks, see Zhongguo xinwen she, 10 April 1985, FBIS/PRC, 11 April 1985, p. E2.

90. For a general treatment of this dynamic in communist systems, see Rush, Myron, How Communist States Change Their Rulers (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), Ch. 1.Google Scholar

91. For the Chinese case, see, e.g., the discussion of the powerful domestic constituencies which shape domestic reform policy in Susan Shirk, “The politics of industrial reform,” in Perry, Elizabeth and Wong, Christine (eds.). The Political Economy of Reform in Post–Mao China (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University, 1985).CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a discussion of the less developed form of this process during the Maoist era, see Oksenberg, Michel, “Occupational groups in Chinese society and the Cultural Revolution,” in Oksenberg, (ed.), The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, Unversity of Michigan. Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, No. 2, 1968).Google Scholar

92. See Shirk, Susan, “The domestic political dimensions of China's foreign economic relations,” in Kim, Samuel S. (ed.), China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post–Mao Era (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1984).Google Scholar