This article addresses the problems related to the use of the Internet in Canada in an international context. Does international law allow Canada to regulate the Internet and its actors even if they are located abroad? Under the constitution, which level of government has the authority to do so? In which circumstances have the courts in Québec and in the common law provinces personal jurisdiction over persons using the Internet in an international context and which law do these courts apply? When are Canadian courts prepared to recognize and enforce foreign judgments involving the Internet and its actors? The author deals with these questions and is of the opinion that in most situations the federal Parliament has the jurisdiction to prescribe and the Canadian courts have the jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to the Internet and its actors in an international context without violating international law. However, to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, it would be better to adopt an international convention covering the various aspects of the Internet.

Cet article traite du droit international comme un droit de principes (“droit constitutionnel”) bien plus qu’un droit de réglementation détaillée (“droit administratif”). Après un survol de l’origine historique et de la raison d’être de cette caractéristique du droit international, des exemples sont donnés pour illustrer comment le développement de normes autour de grands principes sert parfois les fins de la flexibilité progressive (par exemple à travers le principe du patrimoine commun), parfois en revanche vise à laisser une matière dans l’espace politique, à la discrétion des États (par exemple l’autodétermination). Puis sont abordées les conséquences de cette caractéristique, notamment, la place importante de l’action politique en droit international, la pauvreté normative du droit international, sa codification difficile, la création différée du droit (les principes génèrent la pratique des États), les flottements conceptuels et terminologiques fréquents, l’absence d’une rule of law. Enfin est explorée la tendance récente à préciser le corpus de droit international, à la fois sur le plan normatif et celui des institutions internationales, aptes à formuler en temps et lieu du droit nouveau.

This article discusses four judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada that transformed private international law in Canada and represent a striking episode in the internationalization of law — a form of judicial activism in the name of the international. It is argued that these cases evidence a mode of internationalization by internationalist policy consciousness that is distinct from, although often complementary to, internationalization via the mechanism of international treaties or changes in customary international law. The key features of this approach suggest some resemblances to the vision found in the traditions of liberal internationalism, Canadian internationalism, and public international law. The article cautions against several general dangers in the use of this approach in law reform and adjudication and uses two specific doctrinal issues in private international law to demonstrate what a richer policy discourse concerning internationalism would be.

Les États-Unis ont qualifié les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 ainsi que leur lutte contre le terrorisme de “guerre.” L’auteur analyse l’applicabilité et l’application du droit international humanitaire à ces événements. Il arrive à la conclusion que ce droit ne régit pas les attaques contre New York et Washington, mais la guerre en Afghanistan, indépendamment de la légitimité de celle-ci et des causes soutenues par les parties. En conséquence, tout au moins les membres des forces armées talibanes — et possiblement certains membres d’Al-Qaeda, qui sont tombés, en Afghanistan, au pouvoir des forces américaines, sont en principe et jusqu’à ce qu’une décision individuelle statuant le contraire soit rendue, des prisonniers de guerre protégés par la IIIe Convention de Genève. Les dispositions de celle-ci sont appropriées pour régir le traitement de ces personnes en partie détenues à Guantánamo Bay. Toutes les autres personnes arrêtées par les États-Unis et leurs alliés en Afghanistan sont des civils protégés par la IVe Convention de Genève. En tant que tels, elles ne peuvent pas être détenues à Guantánamo. Pour terminer, l’auteur revoit les différents arguments avancés ces derniers temps selon lesquels les Conventions de Genève ne sont pas adaptées à la “guerre contre le terrorisme.” Selon l’auteur, cette thèse n’est pas justiWée et il serait en tout état de cause impossible d’adopter de nouvelles règles mieux adaptées.

The growth in the use of collective economic sanctions in the post-Cold War epoch calls for a re-examination of the legal basis and constraints on the implementation of sanctions. This article is an attempt to explore, from a legal point of view, the problems and restrictions associated with sanctions, and to suggest the ways in which economic sanctions can be rendered more legitimate in terms of international legal requirements. It is argued that, in addition to the traditional treaty basis of collective sanctions, a breach of an erga omnes obligation is also a legitimate legal basis for economic sanctions. It is also contended that, in addition to traditional economic considerations, sanctions should be subject to other limitations such as respect for principles of international humanitarian law. After determining the restrictions on the implementation of sanctions, the author makes proposals for refining current practices in imposing economic sanctions. In conclusion, it is argued that collective sanctions have the potential of being used in a more humane and institutionally coherent way.

The author considers whether humanitarian intervention can be justified even without express Security Council authorization. Starting with the statement of former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy that Canada intervened in Kosovo knowing that it did not have full legal justification, but feeling that such intervention was nevertheless morally justified, the author explores whether there is an evolving acceptance that explicit Security Council authorization is not necessary. He argues that an evolving reinterpretation of the Charter is appropriate such that, while Security Council authorization remains necessary for humanitarian intervention, there has to be flexibility in determining what constitutes authorization. In this respect, it would be important for a General Assembly declaration on legitimate humanitarian intervention to be in place in order to provide a baseline for interpreting a given Security Council resolution.

In Spraytech v. Hudson, the Supreme Court of Canada made a bold declaration on the status of the precautionary principle in international law. While the methodology of the majority is open to criticism, the judgment is a welcome clarification of the court’s groundbreaking decision in Baker v. Canada and, building on that case, offers the prospect of a truly internationalized Canadian jurisprudence. In a postscript to this comment, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh v. Canada is briefly considered.

The disputes between Canada and Brazil over subsidies to the regional aircraft industry were the first cases under Part II (covering prohibited subsidies) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties (SCM Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The PROEX case, involved the scope of the concept of “special and differential treatment” under Article 27 of the SCM Agreement, and the interpretation of the first paragraph of Item (k) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies as set out in Annex I to the SCM Agreement. The Canada — Aircraft case involved, for the first time, Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, which defines what practices constitute a subsidy, and Article 3, which prohibits subsidies “contingent, in law or in fact, upon export performance.” The case also dealt with important procedural issues relating to WTO dispute settlement. The author reviews critically these decisions with respect to both substantive and procedural issues.

The title of this manuscript might astonish readers, but it will certainly not mislead them, for this is indeed a serious and involved magnum opus of considerable length on a topic of considerable complexity. It was painstakingly researched and carefully written by Gordon W. Smith over a period of about thirty years. Recognizing the value of what was largely this man’s life’s work, his executors have undertaken to realize the dream that was behind the manuscript, namely, to enable its availability for the beneWt of all Canadians, particularly those interested in history and international law as these subjects pertain to the Arctic. The original handwritten manuscript, which numbers several thousand pages of text, has been preserved in accordance with archival standards. The content has been reproduced in electronic format on CD ROM and amounts to over two million words. The executors hope to release this valuable and important piece of work for publication.