American feminism at the point of Ronald Reagan's first election to the White House in 1980 appeared to merge the mobilizational strengths of social movement activism with the institutional professionalism that comes from interest-group experience. Unlike the British women's movement at the time of Margaret Thatcher's first majority in 1979, or organized feminism in Canada at the point of Brian Mulroney's first majority in 1984, the American movement appeared virtually unassailable. Yet observers who documented the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment, the unravelling of reproductive choice provisions and sustained resistance to affirmative action policies during the Reagan/Bush years would tend to question this assumption. The author evaluates the clash between right-of-centre and feminist interests in the United States, providing one of the first empirical assessments of legislative and judicial decision making in the Reagan/Bush years in key policy areas identified by the American women's movement.

In a content analysis realized in 1977 for the purposes of the C.R.T.C, Arthur Siegel noted that the image of Canadian geopolitical reality presented in their news programme by the English and French television networks of the CBC was heavily influenced by the linguistic cleavage. A comparative analysis undertaken in 1987 shows that the coverage of Canadian news has failed to evolve despite the urgings of the C.R.T.C. and the will of CBC management to understand this situation. It is suggested that competition between public and private television networks, as well as the professional norms guiding journalists, are better explanations than the presumed political prejudices of these journalists.

This article analyzes the recent constitutional turmoil in Canada by arguing that disenchantment with political institutions can be traced to confusion and indecision about the kind of democratic regime Canadians want. Using the work of Johan Olsen and James March, the author outlines two models of democratic political institutions, both centred on the concept of popular sovereignty but each offering its own version of how popular rule is to be achieved and legitimated. While the Canadian state was originally established on “integrative” principles and processes, recent years witnessed the rise of “aggregative” ideals. This development has had a profound effect on constitutional politics as well as on “normal” politics. The result is that Canadians now have a different democracy than the one they inherited from their British forebears, one with its own capacity to generate stalemate and disappointment.

Abstract. The primary lesson to be learned from the failed Charlottetown Accord is that substantive constitutional reform in Canada is not possible, and will not be for some time. This claim is structurally grounded—a reflection of inherent limitations to successful constitutional negotiations. Specifically, it contends that the requirement of mass input/legitimization of constitutional bargaining in deeply divided societies is incompatible with successful constitution making. There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, mass legitimization serves to undermine effective elite accommodation. The degree of compromise necessary to forge a constitutional agreement at the elite level among different societal groups alienates too many mass supporters of each group. As a result, elites cannot deliver the support of their constitutional constituents. Second, constitution making, by virtue of providing certain groups with almost perpetual special privileges, provides an incentive for groups to seek constitutional status. Mass input into the constitutional process lowers the costs associated with seeking constitutional status, thereby facilitating the creation of new constitutional orientations. In this article, a theoretical argument about the incompatibility of consociational constitutionalism and mass input/legitimization is developed. This argument applies to the Canadian context, detailing the prevailing “mega-constitutional” orientations (MCOs) in Canada, emphasizing their inherent irreconcilability. Based on evidence from the Charlottetown referendum campaign, empirical support is provided for the argument developed. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings and forecasts failure for constitutional initiatives, in Canada and elsewhere, where consociational constitutionalism occurs in tandem with the requirement of mass input/legitimization.

Résumé. La première leçon à tirer de l'échec de l'Accord de Charlottetown, c'est qu'une réforme constitutionnelle en profondeur n'est pas possible, et ce pour un avenir prévisible. Cette prémisse s'appuie sur des éléments structured, reflétant des limites inhérentes aux négotiations constitutionnelles. Plus précisément, cela présume que l'exigence de légitimation par les masses du marchandage constitutionnel dans des sociétés profondément divisées représente un obstacle majeur pour le succès des négotiations. On invoquera deux motifs pour justifier cette conclusion. D'abord, la légitimation populaire contribue à empêcher les accommodements entre les élites. L'ampleur des compromis nécessaires à l'émergence d'un accord au niveau des élites entre différents groupes sociaux aliène trop de citoyens dans chacun des groupes. Conséquemment, les élites ne peuvent garantir l'appui de leurs mandants. En deuxième lieu, le bricolage constitutionnel, qui procure à certains groupes des privilèges sociaux perpétuels, encourage les groupes à rechercher un statut constitutionnel. La participation des masses au processus diminue les coûts associés à la quête de statut constitutionnel, facilitant ainsi la création de nouvelles orientations constitutionnelles. Cet article propose une argumentation théorique à propos de l'incompatibilité entre le constitutionnalisme consociationnel et la légitimation par la participation populaire. La thèse est appliquée au cas canadien, approfondissant les orientations macro-constitutionnelles dominantes ou pas, et en en faisant ressortir l'irréconciliabilité. En s'appuyant sur l'expérience référendaire d'octobre 1992, l'article étoffe ensuite concrètement l'argumentation. Par-delà le résumé des principaux résultats, la conclusion prédit l'àchec des initiatives constitutionnelles, au Canada et ailleurs, partout où le constitutionnalisme consociationnel sera accompagné par l'exigence d'une légitimation par la participation populaire.

This study is a comparative survey of the political processes through which peaceful secession has taken place. The main focus is upon Singapore-Malaysia, Austria-Hungary and Norway-Sweden, though some attention is paid to other cases, including Czechoslovakia. The object is to derive, inductively, a set of empirical generalizations about the politics of the transition from a union or federation to two or more sovereign states. The article presents 13 such generalizations. Each is discussed and shown to hold in the various cases. Together, they comprise the pattern of politics that characterizes instances of peaceful secession