This article outlines the pattern of women's participation in the Canadian parliamentary system. The question of interest is whether female members of the House of Commons make a difference in politics and, notably, if they substantively represent women. The basic underlying hypothesis is that women in the Canadian House of Commons make a difference, that is to say, they substantively represent women. However, the impact of women in politics is limited: they do indeed make a difference, but not a drastic one. In this sense, women try to shape the legislative agenda and the legislative discourse in order to promote women's issues more than do men, but their activity in favour of women's concerns remains quite limited from a numerical point of view. To achieve effective results in this study, two methods were employed: a survey given to members of the 35th Canadian Parliament, and a content analysis of the Hansard Index of the House of Commons. Overall, the results presented here provide some support for the substantive argument. On the question of whether women members of the House of Commons make a difference in politics, and, significantly, if they substantively represent women, the answer is generally positive, although it is necessary to qualify this response. Both female and male MPs speak and act to support women's issues in the House of Commons, but these activities remain quantitatively marginal. However, on each aspect considered, the group of female MPs were proportionately more involved in women's issues than their male counterparts.

This article connects the conflict in Canada over formal constitutional amendments—patriation (1982), the Meech Lake (1987) and the Charlottetown (1992) Accords—with constitutional litigation and interpretation. The authors posit that governments and organized social interests compete with and among themselves for constitutional advantage in both forums of constitutional modification, and that outcomes in each forum have predictable consequences for behaviour in the other. Specifically, they argue that conflicts over the “distinct society” (1987) and “Canada” (1992) clauses are best understood as predictable government attempts to regain constitutional resources lost to Charter-based interest groups during the framing of the “reasonable limitation” clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1980–1981) and its subsequent judicial operationalization—the “Oakes test” (1986).The conflicts over theses various “interpretative clauses” were not just about “symbolic Status” or “conflicting constitutional visions,” but about winning Charter cases and accumulating legal resources. The authors develop the corollary argument that “advocacy scholarship” has played a complementary role to litigation in “public interest” groups' use of the Charter to challenge government policies.

This article addresses the question of the applicability of John Kingdon's theory of agenda-setting to Canadian political life. It examines the extent to which agenda-setting in Canadian governments is routine or discretionary, predictable or unpredictable, and the extent to which it is influenced by events and activities external to itself. The study uses time series data collected on issue mentions related to Native affairs, the constitution, drug abuse, acid rain, the nuclear industry and capital punishment in parliamentary debates and committees between 1977 and 1992. It compares these series to other time series developed from media mentions, violent crime rates, unemployment rates, budget speeches and speeches from the throne, elections and first ministers' conferences over the same period in order to assess the impact of such events on public policy agenda-setting.

Policy institutes, or think tanks, have become increasingly visible on the political landscape. However, their policy role has varied in different countries. This article seeks to explain why, compared to think tanks in the United States, Canadian institutes have maintained a relatively modest presence in the policy-making community. Although many Canadian think tanks have made concerted efforts to replicate the strategies of their American counterparts, they have had far less success employing them in an effective and meaningful manner. While many American think tanks have both the resources and the opportunities to convey ideas to policy makers, Canadian organizations must overcome institutional, cultural and economic barriers before they can play a decisive role in policy-making circles. This article also makes reference to the experiences of think tanks in some parliamentary systems, notably Great Britain, to demonstrate that although these barriers are formidable and need to be addressed in some detail, they are not insurmountable.

This study deals with the question of economic voting in Canada, notably that the electoral impact of economic perceptions with regard to the performance of the federal government has not been homogeneous among the whole Canadian electorate during the period of Liberal dominance in Quebec. Contrary to our Findings on voters in other provinces, francophone Quebeckers did not vote according to their judgment of the government on economic matters, their fidelity to the Liberal party having inhibited them in this respect. These results suggest that the absence of economic voting in Quebec during the Liberal regime may clarify, at least in part, the puzzling conclusions of previous research, that show a fragile relationship between the economy and the electoral outcomes in Canada. These findings break new ground for a better understanding of the specific electoral rationality used by minorities in long-established democracies.