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Predictable and Unpredictable Policy Windows: Institutional and Exogenous Correlates of Canadian Federal Agenda-Setting*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Michael Howlett
Michael Howlett
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University
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Abstract

This article addresses the question of the applicability of John Kingdon's theory of agenda-setting to Canadian political life. It examines the extent to which agenda-setting in Canadian governments is routine or discretionary, predictable or unpredictable, and the extent to which it is influenced by events and activities external to itself. The study uses time series data collected on issue mentions related to Native affairs, the constitution, drug abuse, acid rain, the nuclear industry and capital punishment in parliamentary debates and committees between 1977 and 1992. It compares these series to other time series developed from media mentions, violent crime rates, unemployment rates, budget speeches and speeches from the throne, elections and first ministers' conferences over the same period in order to assess the impact of such events on public policy agenda-setting.

Résumé

Cet article aborde la question de l'applicabilité de la théorie de John Kingdon portant sur l'établissement des priorités dans la vie politique canadienne. Il examine dans quelle mesure l'établissement des priorités dans les gouvernements canadien est routinié ou discrétionnaire, prévisible ou imprévisible et dans quelle mesure ce processus est influencé par les événements ou les activités qui lui sont extéieurs. Cette étude utilise des données sérielles sur des enjeux reliés aux questions autochtones, à la constitution, à l'usage abusif des drogues, aux pluies acides, à l'industrie nucléaire et aux débats parlementaires et dans les comités portant sur la peine de mort entre 1977 et 1992. Cet article compare ces séries à d'utres développées à partir de mentions dans les média, les niveaux de crimes violents, les niveaux de chômage, les discours sur les budgets et les discours du trône, les élections et les conférences des premiers ministres au cours de la même période dans le but d'évaluer l'impact de ces événements sur l'établissement des priorités dans les politiques publiques.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , September 1998 , pp. 495 - 524
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1998

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References

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25 Coherency “measures the linear correlation between two series at each frequency and is analogous to the square of the ordinary product-moment correlation coefficient.” See Chatfield, The Analysis of Time Series, 147.

26 Beecher et al. have argued that the key effect to watch for is “agenda-density,” or how many issues are on the agenda at one time. See Beecher et al., “Community Power, the Urban Agenda, and Crime Policy,” 630–43.

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