Arend Lijphart has launched a stimulating line of inquiry by calling attention to certain affinities between consociational democracy and federalism (above, pages 499–515), but in my opinion the analysis can become still more interesting if we introduce a third element to the comparison. I refer to the rapidly burgeoning literature of the past five years around the phenomena that have been variously and rather tentatively labelled as “neo-corporatism,” “societal corporatism” or “liberal corporatism.” The purpose of this brief note is not to evaluate nor even to summarize that literature, but to draw attention to certain points of contact between the patterns that it describes and the consociational and federal models discussed above. In making this tripartite comparison we may be led to examine more carefully the significance of alternative sites or arenas for making policy and resolving conflicts, and the different patterns and strategies of bargaining appropriate to different sites.

There is something intrepidly parochial in Patricia Hughes's account of Mill's views. Her very opening statement, with its new vision of society, its “emerging social forces,” its principals “trapped by traditional influences,” sets the tone for the enterprise which follows—an historical melodrama with J. S. Mill, the patron saint of contemporary liberalism, reborn in Canada without his aspergillum, an affable enough character, a sort of Bruno Gerussi of the political thought set, his do-gooder's heart generally in the right place but his head usually muddled: an admirably earnest figure, even, who some how always misses the point but, up to now, has gotten away with it. Our aspiring script-writer intends to set things right, to show how we can redo the storyline (which may require substituting another nineteenth century great in the leading role), so as to combine passion and theory in a really radical vision of a fully liberated society.

The growth of the activities of the state of Quebec from 1867 to 1900 is examined in light of expectations drawn from theoretical and empirical studies pertaining to other states. Contrary to these expectations, the state in Quebec during these years gave a low priority to the police function and was very slow to organize revenue collection on a sound basis. Instead, high priority went to railway construction, to the administration of justice (other than the police) and to education. This pattern of intervention is said to be due to the difficult economic situation which prevailed from 1873 to 1896, to the uncertainties of the new federal system and to the constraints issuing from the laisser-faire ideology and the power of the Church. Given the major objective of economic development and these constraints, the choice of strategies open to governments was limited.

Also examined in this article is the administrative system created to carry out these activities. The governments of these years did little to change the system which they inherited from the United Canadas. Although it was not complex, this system did call on a wide variety of professional talent in the civil service. The civil servants were relatively well off in terms of salary and hours of work but, in political terms, they had little power. Here, as in the case of expanding state activities, progress was far from being continuous.