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To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute, That is the Question: Agency Litigation under the Influence of Appellate Courts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 May 2012

Quan Li
Quan Li*
Affiliation:
University of Central Florida
*
Quan Li, Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida, 4000 Central Florida Blvd., P.O. Box 161356, Orlando FL, 32816, [email protected]
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Abstract

Abstract. This article examines how institutional uncertainty within the US federal circuit courts influences regulatory agencies' enforcement choices of prosecution or non-prosecution. I argue that the circuits' random assignment of judges and cases creates institutional uncertainty in terms of variation in each circuit's possible rulings with respect to the bureaucracy's policy position. This, in turn, affects agencies' probability of prosecution because the high degree of uncertainty will discourage prosecution, given its cost. In other words, agencies reduce their exposure to judicial review by avoiding prosecution. I use ideological variance within the circuits as a proxy for measuring the circuit courts' internal group dynamics. Large ideological variance indicates high institutional uncertainty and consequently leads to fewer numbers of prosecutions by the bureaucracy. The empirical results based on the prosecution record of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice from 1950 to 1994 strongly support the theory.

Résumé. L'article analyse comment l'imprévisibilité des décisions judiciaires au niveau des cours d'appel fédérales de circuit influence les décisions par les agences publiques de poursuivre les contrevenants à la règlementation. Je montre que l'attribution des juges et des causes par loterie crée de l'incertitude quant à l'issue des poursuites. L'incertitude réduit la probabilité que les agences publiques entament des poursuites judiciaires étant donné le coût élevé de celles-ci. En d'autres termes, les agences publiques atténuent l'implémentation de la règlementation par crainte de perdre devant des tribunaux imprévisibles. J'utilise une mesure de variance idéologique pour quantifier la dynamique de groupe à l'intérieur des circuits judiciaires. Une grande variance idéologique signifie un résultat incertain et mène à un nombre réduit de poursuites initiées par les agences publiques. Les données empiriques, provenant des registres de la Division Anti-trust du Ministère de la Justice des États-Unis pour la période s'étendant de 1950 à 1994, soutiennent fortement la théorie.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 45 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 185 - 205
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 2012

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