Legal scholars generally consider the theorisation and constitutionalisation of constitutional interpretation as a matter for the courts. This article first challenges this tendency on conceptual grounds, showing that no institutional commitment follows from the nature of interpretation in law, constitutional law included. It then provides guidance for thinking about institutional perspectives according to two criteria: the nature and normative strength of the sources interpreted and the capacity of the interpreter to include and consider every possibility affected when her interpretation carries collective effects and is authoritatively final. The application of these criteria places the discussion on the grounds of democratic theory. The article thus reviews competing democratic theories and champions deliberative democracy as the alternative whose constitutive features best allow for the development of institutions capable of exercising constitutional interpretation when the imposition of meaning on the constitution is final and carries erga omnes effects.

Contemporary discussions of private law theory often assume that parties in a private law interaction can relate as equals if, and only if, equality is cast in terms of formal equality (sometimes called transactional equality). I devote these pages to refute this conceptual view, showing that it does not draw correctly the map of the logical space in which conceptions of private law equality are located. Negatively, I argue that the formal conception of equality, most comprehensively defended by certain influential corrective justice theories, does not exhaust this space. Affirmatively, I argue that this space provides room for at least one more conception which I call ‘substantive equality’.

The current approach to statutory interpretation in Canada, viz., the ubiquitous “modern principle,” is an empty rhetorical gesture that masks the contingent, subjective nature of language and naturalizes institutionally sanctioned definitions. Since the late-nineties, virtually every relevant decision cites the same passage as methodology, positing the discoverability of objective textual meaning by looking to things like the “ordinary sense” and “intention of Parliament.” This is theoretically incoherent and incompatible with most credible understandings of language and interpretive subjecthood. This paper begins with a critical reading of each directive in the “modern principle” to demonstrate the normative force of its outdated approach. After discussing the legitimizing function of an ostensibly consistent method that elides the difficulties of linguistic meaning, I conclude with a preliminary discussion on the possibility of progress—or the idea of (literally) a postmodern principle of statutory interpretation.

Is a right to democracy compatible with the right to self-determination? According to some, the two rights are incompatible because a right to democracy would prevent a people from choosing not to live in a democracy. As a result, these Incompatibilists argue, there can be no right to democracy. We argue that the Incompatibilists are right in that the two rights can indeed conflict. They are wrong, however, in that such conflicts do not preclude the mutual existence of both rights. To show why, we distinguish between two elements of self-determination and argue that the right to self-determination and the right to democracy each protect a different element. Arguing that both rights are best understood as principles that can be balanced using the proportionality principle, we reveal how, depending on the concrete circumstances, one right can outweigh the other without ceasing to exist, and thereby prove the Incompatibilists wrong.

Judicial formalism is perceived as fully compliant with the requirements of the rule of law. With its reliance on plain meaning and its reluctance to apply historical, purposive and functional interpretative premises, it seems an ideal tool for constraining discretionary judicial powers and securing the predictability of law’s application, which latter is one of the main tenets of the rule of law. In this paper, I argue that judicial formalism is based on a misguided model of language, and as such cannot deliver what it promises. In fact, judicial decisions based on formalistic reasoning are surprising to their addressees and instead of promoting predictability, they undermine it. A judicial strategy fully compliant with the rule of law requires a different vision of language than that proposed by judicial formalism, and as a consequence, a different, moderately non-formalistic conception of legal interpretation.

This article claims that legal time has excluded and submerged an important sense of time inside structured time. Structured time has two forms. Each form of structured time identifies a beginning to a legal order (droit, Recht) as a whole. The one form has focussed upon a critical date. The critical date is exemplified by a basic text, such as the Constitution, or the judicially identified date of settlement, sovereignty or territorial control of a territory by the state. The second form of structured time has begun with the judicial recognition of a value such as the rule of law, the protection of minorities, equal treatment, or due process of law. With the two forms of structured time, jurists have proceeded to identify a binding law. Such a law has been considered a rule, principle, doctrine or other intelligible standard. Once structured legal time has thus begun, events of legal relevance have been represented by jurists in a distinct phase or period of time. Each such a distinct period is parsed through reference to its named, or labelled, starting point and the latter, in turn and ultimately, with reference to the beginning of the very constitutional order as a whole. Legal justification and the conceptual structures of justification are presumed to follow suit. The article argues, however, that another sense of time, excluded and submerged inside structured time, is experienced. An experienced event, manifested as a discrete incident in experiential time, opens to a condition of the possibility of the existence of law.

Among the classic arguments which advocates of open government use to fight government secrecy is the appeal to a “people’s right to know.” I argue that the employment of this idea as a conceptual weapon against state secrecy misfires. I consider two prominent arguments commonly invoked to support the people’s right to know government-held information: an appeal to human rights and an appeal to democratic citizenship. While I concede that both arguments ground the people’s right to access government information, I argue that they also limit this right and in limiting it, they establish a domain of state secrecy. The argument developed in the essay provides a novel interpretation of Dennis Thompson’s claim, who in his seminal work on the place of secrecy in democratic governance, has argued that some of the best reasons for secrecy are the same reasons that argue for openness and against secrecy.

This article juxtaposes a jurisprudential thesis and a practical problem in an attempt to gain critical insight into both. The jurisprudential thesis is Dworkin’s rights thesis. The practical problem revolves around judicial resort to the floodgates argument in civil adjudication (or, more specifically, a version of this argument focused on adjudicative resources, which is dubbed here the FA). The analysis yields three principal observations: (1) Judicial resort to the FA is discordant with the rights thesis. (2) The rights thesis is instructive in one way but mistaken in another. While Dworkin has highlighted some valid and sound reasons against judicial policymaking, his conclusive exclusion of judicial policymaking from civil law adjudication is erroneous. Civil law adjudication, it is argued, is an arena of ineliminable tension between principle and policy. (3) The FA is a type of policy argument particularly vulnerable to objections against judicial policymaking. There should, therefore, be a (rebuttable) presumption against judicial resort to it.

This paper discusses cases in which defendants were coerced to do something they wanted to do anyway. Through these cases a stark divergence between the legal and philosophical discussion of alternative possibilities is highlighted. The paper seeks to vindicate the legal approach to coercion and volition by showing that the legal approach could be accounted for with an epistemic version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, a version which is also immune to Frankfurt-type examples.

In this essay, I argue that the role for exclusionary reasons in a sound account of practical rationality is, at most, much more circumscribed than proponents of exclusionary reasons might suppose. Specifically, I argue that an attractive account of moral motivation is in tension with the idea that moral reasons can be excluded. Limiting ourselves to the tools of first order moral reasons—including such relations as outweighing, and disabling—allows us to preserve a more attractive account of the relationship between what there is strongest reason to do, what one is motivated to do, and that for which one is praiseworthy or blameworthy. In closing, I argue that we can capture the normativity associated with legal decision-making using only the resources of the first-order model.

The justification of the reasonable doubt standard has been hotly debated in recent years. Deontologists—including retributivists—have generally defended the standard, whilst consequentialists have generally argued for a lower standard of proof. Captivating arguments have been produced from both sides. The paper narrates this debate through a dialogue between ideal representatives of these different camps. In doing so, it recasts—and, hopefully, improves—some of the arguments presented thus far. Then, the paper introduces a new participant in the debate, the Intermediary. The Intermediary is under the impression that the debate has reached an impasse, due to fundamental moral disagreements between the parties involved. Therefore, she presents them with a challenge: to find a common ground that allows the parties to justify to each other the choice of a standard of proof, notwithstanding their different basic moral commitments. The Intermediary takes up this challenge, and provides a justification for the reasonable doubt standard based on the value of respecting defendants and on rules of instrumental rationality.

When exploring the relations between the concept and the nature of law, ample philosophical reflection has been dedicated to the relations between the intension of terms (or the content of concepts) and their extension. Much less consideration has been given to the causal relations between concept and thing within socially constructed entities. This paper examines the interactive causal relationship between law and the concept we have of it and reflects on its implications for legal philosophy. First, it explains the causal role played by concepts in processes of social construction and applies this explanation to the analysis of the special case of law. Second, it compares this causal role played by the concept of law to the role assigned to it in the context of externalist theories of meaning and mental content. Lastly, it demonstrates the advantages of seeing law as an interactive kind in answering some contemporary methodological difficulties stemming from conceptual plurality or uncertainty, and in opening new avenues for research in legal philosophy.

This paper considers the connections between the Statehood/recognition debate in international law and social ontology. I aim to show that certain theories of social ontology, which I call Groupjective Internalism, can be used to defend Constitutive Theories of Statehood. Among philosophers whom I consider committed to Groupjective Internalism are major figures in the field: Searle, Gilbert and Tuomela. This is an interesting result as Constitutive Theories are generally looked upon with suspicion in international law.

Kant and Hegel offer two very different accounts of contract as a transfer of rights. In this paper, I argue that Kant’s approach largely corresponds to that taken by the German legal system, in which the transfer of property rights arises separately from the original contractual obligation. Hegel’s account of contract is instead most comfortably associated with the approach taken by the French legal system, in which a contract is sufficient on its own to effect a full transfer of property rights. I conclude that only German law and Kantian transfer theory properly conceive of contract as an obligation, while the Hegelian and French approaches risk erasing the obligational content of contract entirely.

Ideas as to how the law exercises control over its subjects can be formulated as explanations for the concurrence of two facts: A. the law stipulates certain behaviour, and B. a given subject behaves in conformity with that stipulation. Such explanations can be organised into a taxonomy. The exercise forces us to consider what is important in a theory of legal order. The taxonomy developed here suggests that there are three main mechanisms for controlling a particular subject’s behaviour: (1) collateral motivation (coercion and reward); (2) authority; and (3) coordination, or the intervention in the subject’s strategic situation through affecting the behaviour of others. Other accounts have tended either to leave out coordination or to seek to assimilate it to authority. Such treatment overlooks important, ethically distinctive features of coordination as a mechanism of bringing about compliance with the law.

There are a set of wrongs that are normatively distinct as ‘criminal wrongs’, and yet, there is disagreement as to ‘the basic features of criminal liability’ that explain this normative distinctiveness. The only consensus has been that criminal wrongs are ‘public wrongs’. For some, they are public wrongs in the sense that they infringe the values and interests for which the community has a shared and mutual concern. For others, they are public wrongs in the sense that they are the wrongs that public officials are responsible for punishing. A third view is that they are public wrongs in the sense that there are procedural advantages of having public officials empowered to address the wrongdoing. I argue here that the first two views are analytically inseparable: the considerations that explain the wrongs that merit social prohibition are the same considerations that explain the censuring and punitive response of the criminal law. I also argue here that, contrary to the third view, the powers of public officials in criminal law procedures follow from, rather than explain, the concept of a crime being a public wrong. Procedural advantages can explain how criminal wrongs are public wrongs, but they cannot explain why criminal wrongs are public wrongs.

Constitutional democracies unilaterally enact the laws that regulate immigration to their territories. When are would-be migrants to a constitutional democracy morally justified in breaching such laws? Receiving states also typically enact laws that require their existing citizens to participate in the implementation of immigration restrictions. When are the individual citizens of a constitutional democracy morally justified in breaching such laws? In this article, I take up these questions concerning the justifiability of noncompliance with immigration law, focusing on the case of nonviolent—or mere—noncompliance. Dissenting from Javier Hidalgo’s view, I argue that the injustice of an immigration law is insufficient to make mere noncompliance justified. Instead, I contend that only if an immigration law lacks legitimate authority are individuals justified in breaching it, since the subjects of an institution with legitimate authority are under a content-independent moral duty to comply with its rules. I further argue that a constitutional democracy’s regimes of law regulating immigration and requiring its citizens’ participation in implementing these regulations have legitimate authority. Nevertheless, when a particular immigration law is egregiously unjust, its legitimacy is defeated.

This article explores Aquinas’ views on property in the context of the revival of interest in Thomistic property thinking in the ‘human flourishing’ perspective on property. It highlights a broad coherence with the aims of human flourishing property theory, and progressive property theory more generally. At the same time, it argues that where property theorists use Aquinas’ views as direct authority for arguments concerning current property dilemmas, complex interpretative issues arise, which cast into sharp relief foundational questions concerning the balance between voluntary and legally compelled redistribution, and between public and private law measures, for progressive property theory.

This review considers some criticisms made of Arthur Ripstein’s Kantian theory of private law. Authors in this collection are Japa Pallikkathayil, Katrin Flikschuh, Andrea Sangiovanni, AJ Julius, George Pavlakos, Daniel Weinstock, Allen Wood, and Martin J Stone, with reply by Arthur Ripstein. The review itself focuses on the problematic role in Ripstein’s theory of individual choice or purposiveness in the light of the work of the eight critics.