Contemporary discussions of private law theory often assume that parties in a private law interaction can relate as equals if, and only if, equality is cast in terms of formal equality (sometimes called transactional equality). I devote these pages to refute this conceptual view, showing that it does not draw correctly the map of the logical space in which conceptions of private law equality are located. Negatively, I argue that the formal conception of equality, most comprehensively defended by certain influential corrective justice theories, does not exhaust this space. Affirmatively, I argue that this space provides room for at least one more conception which I call ‘substantive equality’.

I employ the principle of fairness to argue that many existing states have a moral duty to obey international law simply in virtue of its status as law. On this voluntarist interpretation of the principle of fairness, agents must accept (in a technical sense) the benefits of a cooperative scheme in order to acquire an obligation to contribute to that scheme’s operation. I contend that states can accept the benefits international law provides, and that only if they do so do states have a fair-play duty to obey international law. In addition, I demonstrate that A. John Simmons’ criticisms of the attempt to use the principle of fairness to establish a duty to obey domestic law – both with respect to understanding the legal order as a cooperative scheme, and to agents’ acceptance of benefits – do not apply in the international context.

In free speech theory ‘speech’ has to be defined as a special term of art. I argue that much free speech discourse comes with a tacit commitment to a ‘Subtractive Approach’ to defining speech. As an initial default, all communicative acts are assumed to qualify as speech, before exceptions are made to ‘subtract’ those acts that don’t warrant the special legal protections owed to ‘speech’. I examine how different versions of the Subtractive Approach operate, and criticize them in terms of their ability to yield a substantive definition of speech which covers all and only those forms of communicative action that—so our arguments for free speech indicate—really do merit special legal protection. In exploring alternative definitional approaches, I argue that what ultimately compromises definitional adequacy in this arena is a theoretical commitment to the significance of a single unified class of privileged communicative acts. I then propose an approach to free speech theory that eschews this theoretical commitment.

Legal scholars have been inspired by the dialogic approach and rallied around it as the solution to constitutional conflict in domestic constitutional orders and the transnational legal landscape. This paper aims to show that the gravitation towards judicial dialogue in contemporary constitutional theory misses the point, given the ambiguities surrounding it. My investigation reveals that the dialogic approach does not succeed in guiding the inter-departmental or inter-regime interactions in a way that no single power would exert unilateral domination. The emergence of judicial supremacy in both national and transnational constitutional orders further suggests that underlying those ostensible examples of judicial dialogue is a transfigured conception of sovereignty. As it is the rise of judicial sovereignty that drives the move towards judicial dialogue in contemporary constitutional developments, I suggest that legal scholars shift focus of attention from the idea of dialogue to the enhanced judicial role in the new constitutional era.

Can rights constitutionalism operate as a social democratic restraint on private power? How should we assess this? Following renewed interest in social democratic legal theory, some propose developing more egalitarian forms of rights constitutionalism as a counterweight to overweening private power in the global economy. Such strategies follow a normative methodology, associated with liberal accounts of legality which emphasize the autonomy of law as an external means of social change. This can be contrasted with traditional social democratic accounts of law as an artifact produced through and in political struggle. This shift of focus to normative argument is at the expense of contextual diagnosis, which remains valuable in questioning whether constitutional strategies can restrain private power in the name of substantive equality. Rights constitutionalism, reflecting its classical liberal roots, continues to protect private power in important ways.; Two strategies, based in innovations in North American and European constitutionalism respectively, have been proposed to overcome this default. First, the Application to State Institutions (ASI) model seeks to extend the reach of constitutional application to include private actors, and; second the Application to Law (LAW) model seeks to extend the scope of rights by requiring all law to conform to constitutional guarantees, including equality. A sociologically grounded analysis of the comparative jurisprudence shows these models retain key elements of the classical liberal framework, such as the state-civil society distinction, and which have in practice militated against any significant democratization of private power.

Legal positivism is often described as the view that there is no necessary relationship between law and moral values. Such an understanding of positivism, this essay argues, is both unfruitful and far removed from the concerns of the figure most often associated with the origins of the positivist tradition, Thomas Hobbes. For Hobbes, legal positivism represented a decisive break with the intellectual tradition of common law scholarship which could no longer provide a satisfactory account of political authority. Positivism began, therefore, as an explanation of the basis of law’s authority within wider theories of social order: legal rules came to be seen as possessing authority not as the specific outcomes of broader moral precepts, but because they represent definitive, posited solutions to the problems of collective living. Analytical positivism, by contrast, centres upon the possibility of descriptive neutrality: an essential property of law, it is felt, is that ascertainment of its content does not necessarily depend upon moral assessments of the purpose of value of legal rules. Such an understanding, it is contended, is only very indirectly related to the traditional concerns of the legal philosopher, and hence marginal to a rich and detailed view of law’s nature. This essay traces the developments which led to the narrowly analytical view of legal positivism, and argues that positivism is much better understood as a series of peculiarly potent reflections on the rule of law: Hobbes’s answers to the questions of social order and the authority of law are often highly unsatisfactory; but it is his questions, rather than those of the modern positivists, which are most worth asking, and which should drive the legal philosopher.

This Article responds to one challenge to the aspiration to incorporate distributive-egalitarian sensitivity into tort law. Arguably, any attempt to effect redistribution by means of tort law is bound to be random and, hence, unjust. There are two facets to the randomness charge: partiality of the participants and crudeness of the distributive result. I argue that the randomness charge, in both its aspects, does not provide a convincing reason to oppose infusing tort law with distributive-egalitarian sensitivity. The charge of randomness is based on two factual assumptions and one normative claim: namely, that existing tort law has no significant redistributive effect; that redistribution through tort law is especially susceptible to the charge of randomness; and that random progressive redistribution is less fair than the status quo distribution. In this Article, I challenge all three claims. I first argue that existing tort law has inevitable distributive consequences and that these consequences are predominantly regressive. I then raise four challenges to the assumption that distribution through tort law is partial, arguing that either such distribution is not partial at all or that it is no more partial than the distribution produced by alternative mechanisms: “localized distributive justice”; “participation through insurance”; “the complement thesis”; and “no comparative randomness.” Next, I develop a methodology for comparing the fairness of the post-tort litigation redistribution with that of the status quo distribution. This methodology is based on the respective proximity of these distributions to the reference point of society’s ideal distributive scheme. Applying this methodology, I argue that partial progressive redistribution is fairer than the status quo distribution. Regarding the problem of partiality of participants, I maintain that any injustice that arises from treating differently members of the same group is overridden by the more egalitarian distribution achieved between the different groups, namely, that the inter-group justice outweighs the intra-group injustice. With respect to the problem of the crudeness of the distributive result, I posit that adopting a guideline for redistribution that is “pro-disadvantaged” rather than “anti-well-to-do” ensures the superiority of the partial progressive redistribution relative to the status quo. Furthermore, even under a more radical “anti-well-to-do” benchmark for redistribution, that superiority might still be maintained. Finally, I apply my three claims to the context of gender inequality and lost earnings. I argue that the theoretical framework developed in this Article provides support for gender-neutral damages awards for lost earnings.

IzhakEnglard argues that Ernest Weinrib's idea of coherence in private law, based solely on corrective justice, must be modified to include distributive justice in order to better fit legal practice. Englard proposes complementarity, a framework accommodating mutually exclusive scientific concepts, as a basis for private law’s coherence, based on an analogy between the concepts of light and justice. This analogy is insufficient as an epistemological basis common to science and law upon which complementarity can be applied as Englard suggests. Despite Englard's failure complementarity may yet be applicable to law, based on an epistemological 'problem of observation' that science and law share.

The classical concept of protection of human rights is generally perceived as appertaining to the public sphere. It is concerned with the protection of the individual against the power of the State. However, current voices are heard asserting that human rights are not confined to that sphere. It is claimed that individuals are entitled to respect for their human rights not only as against the power of the state but also in their dealings with one another. Introducing human rights jurisprudence to the disciplines of private law would limit the autonomy of an individual where exercise of that autonomy would infringe the human rights of another person. Under this proposal, the rules of such fields as contract law, company law, torts law and family law, would be subject to human rights principles.

The privatising of human rights is taken by this author to infer the attribution of a review jurisdiction to the courts to override provisions of private law the application of which would bring about infringement of the human rights of individuals. It is in the nature of constitutional human rights protection to transfer the power to determine the limits of rights and powers away from the legislature and bestow it on the courts. By this conception of privatising human rights, obviously, not every protection offered by a state to individuals against interference or injury by private persons or bodies can be classified as an application of human rights in the private sphere. The protections provided by the criminal law or by torts, contract and labour law are not privatised human rights in this sense. The clarification is especially important in order to distinguish the provisions of international human rights law from a concept of constitutional privatisation. The international human rights provisions are in essence directives to governments and may be implemented by legislation. Only where they become directly applicable against private persons in the courts of the state party to the Convention can they be regarded as instances of privatising human rights. The perception of a right as a privatised human right rather than a mere application of the norms of the legal system is hence based on the source of the right in the constitutional hierarchy. In the analysis which ensues, the assumption will be made that there is a privatised human right only where that right derives directly from a constitutional power bestowed on courts. In this article, I shall employ the phrase ‘privatising human rights’ to denote this concept. As it will emerge, the use of this term is appropriate not only to denote the process but also to raise policy analogies to a more commonly known form of “privatising”—the privatising of economic activities of the state.

In this essay, I seek to provide an account of the scope and justification of gain-based damages for civil wrongs. My starting point is that the main accounts of restitution for wrongs are inconsistent with the structure of the law of damages. My alternative explanation provides a framework which is coherent with the law of obligations and allows a reading of restitution for wrongs in terms of corrective justice. When a wrong affects a proprietary or proprietary-like interest, I argue that the normal response is compensation, not restitution. In this context, I introduce the expression ‘pseudo-restitutionary damages’ to identify those awards in which the claimant’s loss is measured by the defendant’s gain. The true nature of pseudo-restitutionary damages is revealed by their close link to the loss. When the loss disappears, the benefit disappears with it. Unlike pseudo-restitution, proper restitution for wrongs requires a benefit which is independent of the loss and is only connected to the wrong. The benefit cannot be dissociated from the claimant’s loss if it is the consequence of a wrongful direct transfer of wealth from the claimant to the defendant. Corrective justice can account for proper restitutionary damages. It provides a normative ground for the victim to seize the defendant’s gain independently of any loss suffered by the victim. It isolates the wrongdoer and the victim as the parties to a restitutionary claim. The award is granted because it would be unjust if the wrongdoer would go scot-free with his wrongful gains; and it is granted to the victim because any wrongful behaviour is detrimental to the sufferer of the injustice. Although quite distinct, compensation and restitution for wrongs show certain structural similarities. The former aims to place the victim in the same position in which the victim was before the damaging event took place; the latter seeks to place the wrongdoer in the same position in which the wrongdoer was before he performed the wrongful act. Both legal responses aim at neutrality as between the pre- and post-wrong position but in respect of different parties.

It is not untypical for arguments about the justice of taxation to be framed in the rhetoric of property, for example by equating taxation with the taking of property by the state, a form of expropriation. An important recent example is found in Murphy and Nagel’s book, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice. In this paper the author argues that the equation of taxation with expropriation is conceptually awry, and that, properly understood, justifications for property rights bear only tangentially on the justice of taxation. The author elaborates this view by discussing Murphy and Nagel’s general strategy when they attempt to justify taxation in the face of libertarian ‘pro-property’ arguments, in the particular case of the ‘saver’s argument’, i.e., the argument that taxation on the income from investments amounts to an unfair burden on savers.

In this paper, I will discuss the question of the response of the law to the social phenomenon of violation of the law from moral motives. This phenomenon is characterised by the fact that the motivation behind the violation of the law is the desire of the actor to act according to his moral beliefs. In the case of “normal” criminality, on the other hand, a person violates the law for non-moral reasons, e.g., to obtain an advantage, to release anger, etc. Within the category of morally-motivated violation, too, there are different types of breach. First, a distinction exists between “revolutionary disobedience” and other acts. “Revolutionary disobedience” might also be motivated by moral considerations, but it is differentiated in that it involves violations of the law which are intended to bring about a change in the existing regime. As opposed to this, there are violations of the law which are motivated by moral considerations, but which are perpetrated by people who are interested in the continuation of the existing regime and social structure in its entirety. I shall not deal with “revolutionary disobedience” in this paper.

Secondly, even within the group of violations from moral motives which do not constitute “revolutionary disobedience”, the present practice is to identify two types of breach: civil disobedience and conscientious objection. The main thrust of the distinction is this: in essence, civil disobedience is a political act, an appeal to the public, and its aim is to bring about a change in the law or in policy which seem to the violator to be wrong or immoral. Conscientious objection is a personal act. The violator feels that should he submit to the law, in the circumstances, he will be committing a moral wrong. The objector’s act is not motivated by a desire to influence the whole polity, but rather, by a desire to stay clean, and not to perpetrate, with his own hands, a moral wrong. In effect this is an act of the individual defending himself against coercive pressures to perform what he regards as a moral wrong.

Despite the neglect by political liberals in the distant and recent past to take collective rights seriously, the problem of collective rights is beginning to capture the attention of an increasing number of philosophers. This new concern for collective rights seems to be “the result of a recent interest in the value of communities.” I shall clarify and assess some of the chief categories of collective moral rights talk and proffer some criteria of adequacy for a philosophical analysis of collective moral rights. Finally, I set forth and defend an analysis of justified collective moral rights.

This paper seeks to counter a currently popular account of criminal defences which holds that both excuses and justifications are characterised by the fact that the conduct of the actor is consistent with the standards to be expected of good citizens in the role inhabited by the actor. Its object is to restore due prominence to the role played by human frailty in core defences. The position will be advanced that a significant reason for this loss of prominence is that insufficient attention has been paid to the filtering role played by crisis. For both excuses and justifications crisis marks the moral limits within which a workable system of norm enforcement can be achieved. In each case it ensures defences are socially validated, although the nature of the validation differs according to the nature of the defence. With defences of reasonable reaction crisis helps mark the parameters of reasonableness and ensures respect for the rule of law. Crisis may also deprive individuals of their susceptibility to conform their behaviour to rules. Its major constitutive role in this regard is to ensure that this susceptibility is rooted in the characteristics of human beings generally rather the specific characteristics of the actor. In this way it gives moral focus to the way excuses may intrude simply because the state cannot reasonably demand any better, at the same time providing a mechanism for distinguishing true excuses from exemptions or defences of impaired capacity.

A critical review of Jules Coleman’s The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory. Coleman’s book has two principal objectives: (1) to defend both Inclusive Legal Positivism and Coleman’s influential views on the role of corrective justice in explaining tort law; and (2) to show how philosophical pragmatism can usefully be employed in defending such views. In this article I both outline and critique the main elements of Coleman's book. I also explore ways in which some of its central arguments could usefully be modified or extended to solve related jurisprudential puzzles.

It is widely believed that voting rights confer power to individual voters as well as to the collective body of the electorate. This paper evaluates this notion on the basis of two conceptions of political power: the causal view, according to which power equals the ability to exert causal effect, and the legal view, according to which power equals the legal ability to produce legal effect. The proposition defended is that causal conceptions of power are unable to account for the view that voting rights confer power to either individuals or collectives. In particular, the theory according to which the powers conferred by the vote equal the probability of being decisive or “pivotal” in elections does not justify the ascription of power to voters. It does not because the probability of being influential is not a valid interpretation of power as the capacity to mobilize sufficient causal effect to determine an outcome. In addition, causal conceptions of power are unable to recognize the people as the unique owner of political power. The powers exercised by the members of the electorate appear to be just one among several causes that contribute to determine electoral outcomes. In the end, the legal analysis of power proves superior. Power in a democracy is placed with the people as a legal category vested with the legal capacity to revise the legal relationship between individuals and the state.

The encounter between Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss remains a source of fascination and polemics for the friends and enemies of both thinkers. According to Stephen Holmes, both Schmitt and Strauss belong to a single tradition of anti-liberalism, whose ultimate practical implication is suggested by Schmitt's fate as a Nazi apologist. Indeed, Holmes places much emphasis on Strauss's criticism of Schmitt for failing to develop a critique of liberalism that goes beyond the horizon of liberalism itself, and interprets this criticism of Schmitt as a call for a form of anti-liberalism more extreme and virulent than that propounded by Schmitt on the very eve of his membership in the Nazi party.

Freedom of expression has been often described as a necessary precondition for democracy and for the implementation of an effective system of human rights. A deliberative democracy cannot function if citizens are not granted the fundamental right to express their views and to criticize the government without being censored.1 The rule of law becomes an empty notion if legal orders do not protect the impartial, autonomous judgments of the judiciary.2

Despite the tremendous literature that has sprung up concerning Hart’s The Concept of Law, one very important feature of the work has been somewhat overlooked: its methodological underpinnings. While Hart himself says The Concept of Law may “be regarded as an essay in descriptive sociology”, this claim has not received adequate philosophical examination. Though a dedicated philosophical positivist, the distinctive feature of Hart’s legal philosophy – the internal aspect of rules – requires a social science methodology that moves him in the direction of hermeneutics. In defending the importance of the internal aspect of rules against the predictive theory of Scandinavian Legal Realist Alf Ross, Hart argues that without the internal aspect, one

Sparked by books by Saul Kripke and Crispin Wright, the last several years have seen a renewal of interest in Wittgenstein’s remarks on rules. A large part of the contemporary discussion centers on what it is to follow a rule, how it is that human beings come to follow them, and what facts, mental or otherwise, determine or explain why some but not other logically equivalent extensions of a rule are deemed to constitute a following of the rule.