1. Two caveats about the focus of this article are in order. First, I will not address problems unrelated to the relationships between the notion of interpretation, institutions and democracy when that meaning has effects over the whole society. For instance, I do not address here the likely objection that giving the final word in constitutional interpretation to the same agents who should be limited by the constitution raises a rule of law problem. This is a legitimate objection, but this is not the place to tackle it. Second, it is also necessary to reflect on the specific institutional mechanisms that would make my argument empirically feasible. This essay, however, is centred on theoretical consideration and does not offer concrete institutional proposals. This endeavour deserves separate examination.

2. E.g., Richard Fallon Jr, “A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation” (1987) 100:6 Harv L Rev 1189; Joel Bakan, “Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and Legitimacy in Canadian Constitutional Thought” (1989) 27:1 Osgoode LJ 123; Robert Post, “Theories of Constitutional Interpretation” (1990) 209 Faculty Scholarship Series 13; Frederick Schauer, “Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution” (2004) 92:34 Cal L Rev 1045; Comella, Victor Ferreres, The Constitution of Spain. A Contextual Analysis (Hart, 2013) at 210.Google Scholar For a full treatment of this sort of accounts, see Donald Bello Hutt, “Against Judicial Supremacy in Constitutional Interpretation” (2017) 31 Revus 7.

3. Dworkin, Ronald, “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 9:1 Critical Inquiry 179 at 179;Google Scholar Dworkin, Ronald, Law’s Empire (Fontana, 1986) at 50, 87.Google Scholar See also, Christie, George C, “Dworkin’s Empire” (1987) 157 at 159;Google Scholar Raz, Joseph, Between Authority and Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 47–48;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Simmonds, Nigel, Central Issues in Jurisprudence (Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) at 209.Google Scholar

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6. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1978) at 22.

7. Ibid at 22, 44-47; Genaro Carrió, “Professor Dworkin’s Views on Legal Positivism” (1979) 55:2 Ind LJ 209 at 235.

8. Simmonds, supra note 3 at 210.

9. Mandel, Michael, “Dworkin, Hart, and the Problem of Theoretical Perspective” (1979) 14:1 JL & Soc’y 57 at 61;Google Scholar Dworkin, supra note 3 (1986) at 14-15, 64; Levin, Avner, “The Participant Perspective” (2002) 21 Law & Phil 567 at 569.Google Scholar

10. Dworkin, supra note 3 (1986) at 90.

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12. Marmor, supra note 4 at 44.

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17. Lawrence Solum, “The Unity of Interpretation” (2010) 92 Boston L Rev 551 at 568.

18. Ibid at 572.

19. Ibid at 568-69.

20. Fallon, Richard Jr, “The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation” (2015) 82 U Chicago L Rev 1235 at 1272.Google Scholar

21. Ibid at 1255.

22. Ibid at 1307.

23. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, 4th ed, translated by Anscombe, G, Hacker, P & Schulte, J (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) at §139 [emphasis in original].Google Scholar

24. Ibid at §140.

25. Ibid at 2009, §28, §32, §85.

26. Hereinafter, I use ‘decisional’ in a Schmittian sense, i.e., as unconstrained by rules/norms.

27. Marmor, supra note 4 at 44.

28. Marmor, supra note 16 at 149.

29. Ibid at 149.

30. Ibid.

31. Sunstein, Cass & Vermeule, Adrian, “Interpretation and Institutions” (2002) John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper 1 at 2.Google Scholar

32. My use of the term pragmatic does not refer to the philosophical construct pragmatism, understood as an alternative to realism, idealism, transcendentalism, utilitarianism, positivism, etc. Here I use the term in the way Posner does when discussing what he calls “applied pragmatism”. See Richard Posner, “Pragmatic Adjudication” (1996) 18:1 Cardozo L Rev 1 at 1. I express this caveat to anticipate the likely objection that pragmatism, understood in the first of these two senses, is also a principled alternative.

33. Ibid at 5.

34. I put aside the question of who determines which social facts count as legal sources. Judges are traditionally seen as members of what Adler calls ‘recognitional community’. See Matthew Adler, “Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?” (2006) 100 Nw UL Rev 719 at 726. That is, a certain group of people whose patterns of thought and behaviour ground the ultimate criteria of validity of a legal system. Hence, judges’ mental states and patterns of behaviour also count to determine which sources bind them and which do not. This problem needs more attention, however, than the one I can offer here.

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37. Schor, Miguel, “Mapping Comparative Judicial Review” (2008) 7:2 Wash U Global Stud L Rev 257 at 263.Google Scholar See, e.g., Article 138 Peruvian Constitution, Article 133 Mexican Constitution, Article 266 Guatemalan Constitution, Article 185 Salvadoran Constitution, Article 4 Colombian Constitution, Article 20 Chilean Constitution. The case is similar in Canada, Australia, Ireland and South Africa. See Pegoraro, Luigi, La justicia constitucional. Una perspectiva comparada, translated by León Alonso, M, Salvador Crespo, M & Zamora Crespo, M (Dyckinson, 2004) at 69–75.Google Scholar

38. For example, the following countries’ constitutional courts: Bolivia (Article 58 of the Ley del Tribunal Constitucional), Colombia (Article 47 of the Ley Estatutaria de Administración de Justicia 1996, and article 21 of the Decreto 2067/1991), Ecuador (Article 22 of the Ley de control constitucional 1997), Peru (Article 204 of the Peruvian Constitution), Venezuela (Article 336 of the Venezuelan Constitution), Germany, Spain, among others. Rodríguez, José Fernández, La justicia constitucional europea ante el siglo XXI (Tecnos, 2007) at 110–11.Google Scholar

39. See Nogueira, Humberto, “Consideraciones sobre las sentencias de los Tribunales Constitutionales y sus efectos en América del Sur” (2004) 10:1 Ius et Praxis 113.Google Scholar In principle, this is why the US Supreme Court was given the faculty to grant writs of certiorari. See Taft, William H, “Three Needed Steps of Progress” (1922) 8:1 ABA J34 at 35;Google Scholar Sternberg, Jonathan, “Deciding Not to Decide: The Judiciary Act of 1925 and the Discretionary Court” (2008) 33:1 JSCH 1 at 9.Google Scholar Litigants before the Spanish Constitutional Court also have to prove that their claims (amparos) may “involve a legal issue of social and economic repercussion” before the court hears the complaint (Article 49 of the Ley del Tribunal Constitucional). In practice, however, these mechanisms were introduced to reduce the courts’ dockets.

40. Waldron, Jeremy, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1346 at 1375, 1376–86.Google Scholar

41. For example, in the United States (US Supreme Court Rule 37), Argentine (Autoacordada 28/2004), Colombia (Article 13, Decree number 2067/1991; Constitutional Court C-513/1992), Brazil (Article 2.2., Act number 9868/1999; Article 103-A Federal Constitution and Article 3.2, Act number 11417/ 2006), South-Africa (Article 10 South-African Constitution; Rule 10 South-African Constitutional Court, Promulgated under Government Notice R1675 in Government Gazette 25726 of 31 October 2003), Canada (Subrule 61(4) of the Rules of the Supreme Court).

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43. I thank Jeff King for his suggestion to address this point.

44. Finck, supra note 36 at 126-27.

45. Ibid at 125-26; Cappelletti, supra note 36 at 137.

46. This, pace, Robert Alexy, “Balancing, constitutional review, and representation” (2005) 3:4 Int’l J Const L 572 at 579, and Pierre Rosanvallon, Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity (Princeton University Press, 2011) at 121-68. Similarly, Ely justified judicial review as a safeguard of the representative process. His view has been criticised, however, on grounds similar to the ones I here defend. Judith Koffler, “Constitutional Catarrh: Democracy and Distrust, by John Hart Ely” (1981) 1:2 Pace L Rev 403; Tribe, supra note 15 at 28; Gargarella, Roberto, La justicia frente al gobierno. Sobre el carácter contramayoritario del poder judicial (Ariel, 1996) at 154–57;Google Scholar Posner, Richard, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy (Harvard University Press, 2005) at 233.Google Scholar

47. See, e.g., the constitutions of Chile (Articles 93.1 and 93.4), France (Articles 61, paragraph 1 and 2, and 62 final paragraph), Bolivia (Articles 196 and 202.1), Colombia (Article 241.8 second paragraph).

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64. Martí, supra note 48 at 65.

65. Ibid at 71.

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80. Young, supra note 76 at 155.

81. Manin, supra note 50 at 358; Schumpeter, supra note 54 at 269; Richard Posner, “Smooth Sailing. Democracy doesn’t need Deliberation Day” (January-February 2004) Legal Affairs; Fishkin, supra note 42 at 246.

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