¹ A cobalt occurrence had been located in the area in 1900. See Convey, J., “The Development of the Uranium and Atomic Energy Industry in Canada,” Can. Min. & Metall. Bull., 09, 1954.Google Scholar

² From the inception of the raw materials programme close co-operation was accomplished through the Combined Development Agency, a tripartite committee of representatives from Canada, Britain, and the United States, whose function was to allocate all uranium supplies and procure additional quantities in areas outside Canada and the United States. These arrangements were necessary because of the extreme shortage of uranium in those early days.

³ When operations at the mine were suspended in 1940, a two years' stock of ore was on hand for the refinery. The reopening is referred to in Canada, House of Commons, Debates (hereafter cited as Debates), 06 3, 1946, p. 2106.Google Scholar The only other developed source of uranium was the Shinkolobwe mine in the Belgian Congo. Shinkolobwe continued in operation without a break and hence filled most of the requirements at the beginning of the Manhattan Project.

⁴ PC 7167 and PC 7168. They were extended under the Continuation of Transitional Measures Act, 1947, largely because UN policy respecting uranium and atomic energy was still under discussion.

⁵ All shares were taken over by the Crown under PC 535 of Jan. 27, 1944. The directors agreed that $1.35 was a fair price to pay. Debates, 01 28, 1944, 6.Google Scholar PC 8256 of October 27, 1944, gave authority to incorporate a new company, under the Companies Act, 1934, and transfer to it all the assets of the old. Dec. 10, 1945, p. 3203.

⁶ The Orders were revoked on Dec. 30, 1947. Debates, 03 16, 1948, p. 2285.Google Scholar

⁷ Ibid., 2284–5.

⁸ The end of the guarantee period was originally set at March 31, 1953; towards the end of 1948 this was changed to 1955. By extensions introduced in 1950, 1951, and 1952, the terminal date became successively 1958, 1960, and finally March 31, 1962.

⁹ W. J. Bennett, Eldorado, Address at the Annual Convention of the Prospectors and Developers Association, and the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Geological Association of Canada, Toronto, March 6, 1951 (hereafter cited as Address).

¹⁰ This formula was brought in on April 18, 1950. Assume an ore grading 0.25 per cent or 5 pounds to the ton, then:–

¹¹ Bennett, Address. See also R. E. Barrett, Eldorado, The Canadian Programme in Atomic Energy, presentation to the American Mining Congress, Los Angeles, Oct., 1956.

¹² Bennett, Address.

¹³ R. J. Henry, Eldorado, The Uranium Industry of Canada; presentation to the Provincial Ministers of Mines, Winnipeg, Sept. 20, 1954.

¹⁴ 1410 George 6; ch. 37. By 10 (1) of this statute the AECB was given power to procure the incorporation of companies under the Companies Act, 1934 (24–25 George 5, ch. 33). A new Crown corporation, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, was thus constituted in 1952 to provide the more flexible type of administration needed for the Chalk River reactor station, begun in 1944 under the direction of the National Research Council.

¹⁵ No special permission was ever required to prospect, but the Board issued exploration and mining permits giving leave to drill, remove samples, and dispose of ores and concentrates. Until the end of 1956, information on production and ore reserves was classified.

¹⁶ It received and compiled data from prospectors and companies in compliance with the regulations of the AECB, and performed free testing of six samples from any one discovery. Properties were examined only for its own studies and never for imparting “commercial intelligence.”

¹⁷ Although the mine ore at Port Radium was high-grade, the mill tailings were low-grade but still contained enough uranium in fine particles to pay for chemical processing. The acid leach technique was developed to treat these tailings, and a basic leach process was developed for the entire ore-body at Beaverlodge, where the considerable carbonate content of the ore would cause abnormal acid consumption. See Henry, The Uranium Industry of Canada. Most uranium minerals in Canada will dissolve readily under oxidizing conditions in dilute sulphuric acid or sodium carbonate solutions. The extraction of uranium from its ores involves crushing and grinding to a size which will liberate the minerals, dissolving in a solution best suited to the ore, removing the pregnant solution from the pulp, and precipitating the uranium as a high-grade chemical concentrate. The Eldorado Beaverlodge mill is the only one in Canada to use sodium carbonate-bicarbonate as a leach reagent. Can., H. of C. Special Comm. on Research, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (hereafter Minutes), 1956, 349.Google Scholar Many US mills have used the Beaverlodge process as a base for processing. Minutes, 1961, 52.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Eldorado was instrumental in having roads and an airstrip constructed at Beaverlodge. It is a major operator of transport facilities in the Northwest Territories: a subsidiary, Northern Transportation Company, serves as a public carrier for all types of freight in the Mackenzie River watershed; air transport is provided by another subsidiary, Eldorado Aviation Limited.

¹⁹ For some years after the initiation of the buying programme it was the official view to discount the possibility of finding commercial uranium in the provinces.

²⁰ See Debates, 03 2, 1956, p. 1739.Google Scholar

²¹ Ibid. Some mines in the Blind River did not actually begin shipments till early in 1958.

²² A11 the uranium oxide which the Canadian government had contracted to buy from private mines, plus all Eldorado's output, was earmarked for the American market, with shipments to be completed by 1962. Eldorado's purchases were offset, at no profit to itself, by matching sales to AEC. Options to take additional amounts of concentrates were granted to both buyers. Retrospectively, it may be significant that, in 1956, an extension of AEC's buying plan in the US to the end of 1966 failed to bring a corresponding change in Canada. The Canadian government pointed out that the US was anxious to promote the discovery of new deposits in face of a deteriorating domestic reserve position. Debates, 05 25, 1956, pp. 4325–6.Google Scholar By 1956 more than nine hundred mines were in production in the US. Since none of these had large ore reserves, it was necessary continually to stimulate prospecting. In practice this difference in the duration of the Commissions programme did not deter the development of the industry in Canada; it even tended to generate optimism in mining and financial circles.

²³ Minutes, 1961, 25–8.Google Scholar When Britain in 1956 raised the question of securing Canadian uranium it also expressed the desire to obtain 24 million pounds from March 31, 1963 to December 31, 1966. On March 29, 1957, through an exchange of letters, Eldorado undertook to make this quantity available in the period specified, and the Atomic Energy Authority agreed to buy it. No formal contract was signed. This agreement has figured prominently in recent discussions and controversies, and is considered in Part III of this paper. The original CDA orders covering South African production ran from 1951 to 1961 and provided for full write-off. Canadian producers did not want to be tied to such long contracts but wished to recover all outlays and realize a profit in five years. The accelerated amortization allowed for in the prices (averaging $10.30 a 1b.) paid by Eldorado represented a government subsidy to the industry. See Minutes, 1961, 117.Google Scholar

²⁴ Debates, 02 18, 1957, pp. 1365–6.Google Scholar

²⁵ Financial Post, 05 10, 1958 Google Scholar; DBS, Canada Year Book, 1959 (Ottawa, 1959), 498.Google Scholar Permits may be issued for individual sales of up to 250 pounds for use in testing and research, with a maximum for any one country of 2,500 pounds, unless a co-operation agreement exists between Canada and that country, in which case sales of larger amounts are allowed.

²⁶ It is anticipated that US output will be held around 18,000 tons of oxide per year under contracts running to 1966. Bank of Nova Scotia, “Uranium and Atomic Energy,” Monthly Review, 03, 1960.Google Scholar

²⁷ The decision was made public on November 6, 1959, by both Eldorado and AEC. Northern Miner, 11 12, 1959.Google Scholar For some time prior to this AEC had been urged by Eldorado to make an early declaration of its intentions. When options were first granted it was understood, under a gentleman's agreement, that at least part of them would be taken up. Debates, 03 12, 1959, p. 1865 Google Scholar; Feb. 11, 1960, pp. 984, 989; Feb. 16, 1960, p. 1142. Having reached the position of the world's largest producer, the United States no longer depended on Canadian supplies; the options granted first refusal. The United States exported to Canada the adverse effects of over-supply, thereby protecting its own uranium industry and satisfying the demands of the mining “lobby” in Washington.

²⁸ W. J. Bennett, The Raw Material for Atomic Energy, address to the Canadian Club of Montreal, January 26, 1953.

²⁹ Bennett, Address.

³⁰ Zeemal, Albert, “How we Discovered and Staked the Gunnar Uranium Mine,” Precambrian, 05, 1956.Google Scholar

³¹ Henry, The Uranium Industry of Canada.

³² Using personnel and equipment supplied by Preston East Dome, and following the course of a large Z-shaped formation indicated in a Geological Survey map of 1922, the drive was extended from May 7 to July 9, and resulted in the staking of about 1,600 claims. When the news leaked out a rush of major proportions followed. Joubin, F. R. and James, D. H., “Canada's Uranium Future,” Precambrian, 05, 1956 Google Scholar; Joubin, F. R., “Uranium Deposits of Algoma,” Can. Min. & Metall. Bull., 10, 1954.Google Scholar

³³ Bateman, I. D., “Recent Uranium Developments in Ontario,” Economic Geology, 1955, 361–72Google Scholar; “Faraday Uranium Mine,” Western Miner and Oil Review, 05, 1957.Google Scholar

³⁴ Announcement amplified in Debates, 03 2, 1956, p. 1739.Google Scholar

₃₅ Ibid.

³⁶ Canada's reserves were estimated to be 225 million tons of ore with a U₃O₈ content of 237,000 tons. United States reserves were estimated at 60 million tons with a uranium content of 150,000 tons; and South African at 1.1 billion tons of ore containing 370,000 tons of uranium. Ore grades for the three countries were therefore 0.105, 0.25, and 0.033 respectively. At the beginning of 1960 reserves were:

United States 86.1 million tons ore grading 0.28% = 241,000 tons of oxide

Canada 308.5 million tons ore grading 0.12% = 370,000 tons of oxide

South Africa 1050.0 million tons ore grading 0.025% = 263,000 tons of oxide. Of the Canadian total for 1960, the Algoma region accounted for 96 per cent. Denison alone had 133 million tons grading 0.125 per cent. Griffith, J. W., A Survey of the Canadian Uranium Industry, 1959 (Dept. of Mines and Tech. Surveys, Ottawa, 1960), 5, 46 Google Scholar; idem, “Uranium,” A Preliminary Survey of the Canadian Mineral Industry in 1960 (Dept. of Mines and Tech. Surveys, Ottawa, 1961), 14.

³⁷ The Port Radium mine with 0.58 per cent and Rayrock (Marian River) with 0.367 per cent had the best grades. Beaverlodge has around 0.2 per cent; Blind River over 0.1 per cent; Bancroft about 0.1 per cent.

³⁸ As a partial offset to the low content of its ore, the Bancroft area has all the advantages of location: paved highways, railways, and power lines traverse the region, which is one of settled communities. The typical commercial uranium deposit at Bancroft comprises several parallel fine-grained pegmatite dykes, with uranium minerals enriching the dykes to form ore lenses of varying lengths and widths. Ore distribution is highly irregular. A unique and valuable feature of the mineralization of the Algoma district is its uniform distribution throughout very large masses; generally, ore bodies are long and consistent in thickness. Uranium content is remarkably similar from one mine to the next.

³⁹ At Beaverlodge, the ore bodies are of a disseminated pitchblende type and exhibit a greater degree of variability than at Blind River. As a consequence, several firms were unable to confirm highly promising drill findings when they passed to the underground development phase, could not prove up ore-bodies capable of sustaining individual treatment plants, and had to pool their ore to provide feed for the Lorado custom mill.

⁴⁰ Rayrock was the exception, having no funded debt.

⁴¹ Bonds to the value of $19 million and $61 million were sold in the United States by Stanrock and Northspan respectively. Financial Post, Survey of Mines, 1962, 174, 178.Google Scholar By contrast, most of the money required to build up uranium production in the Rand was provided by the United States government, with Britain supplying the balance.

⁴² Financial Post, Dec. 15, 1956.

⁴³ The Easson Index of uraniums (January 1, 1953 = 100) stood at about 450 in August, 1955, but below 200 in the autumn of 1956 as against 400, 105, and 140 in the spring of 1957, 1960, and 1961 respectively.

⁴⁴ Northspan built three and Algom two.

⁴⁵ Several senior companies, e.g., Ventures and Noranda, had claims at one time, but did not retain them.

⁴⁶ “The Rio Tinto Story,” Precambrian, 10, 1957 Google Scholar; Hart, R. C., “The Algom Mines: History,” Western Miner and Oil Review, 07, 1956.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Greyhawk was originally awarded a contract requiring it to erect a small mill, but this was cancelled when Faraday agreed to treat Greyhawk ore on a custom basis, its contract being increased accordingly. In the spring of 1959, Greyhawk's mine was closed. The company was uncertain about maintaining an acceptable grade of ore and could not raise additional funds for development. Almost immediately it arranged a voluntary assignment in bankruptcy. Financial Post, Survey of Mines, 1961, 229.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ At the same time Eldorado bought the Radiore claims adjoining its mine at Beaverlodge for $1 million. It had been working this property, on a royalty basis, under a lease agreement of 1951.

⁴⁹ In May, 1959 Stanrock was placed in receivership, having defaulted on its bonds. During 1960 several bids were made for the company's contract, but no sale resulted. To formalize the position of the unsecured creditors the firm was placed in bankruptcy in January, 1960, the receivers–Montreal Trust Co.–continuing to operate and manage the plant. Survey of Mines, 1961, 195.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 193.

⁵¹ Ibid., 311–12.

⁵² Ibid., 188.

⁵³ Most of them have taken steps to diversify their activities, and perpetuate their existence, by undertaking exploration programmes, financing and developing other properties, and acquiring investments in other sectors of the economy. Pressure from the mining industry forced Eldorado out of the prospecting field early in 1961. No privately owned mining company of comparable size would be without an exploration arm. See Minutes, 1961, 158, 179–81Google Scholar; Survey of Mines, 1962, 298.

⁵⁴ DBS, Canada Year Book, 1960, 570 Google Scholar; Canada Year Book, 1961, 506, 545. Uranium shipments in 1961 decreased by $65 million to $204 million. DBS, Preliminary Estimate of Canada's Mineral Production, 1961 (Ottawa, 1962), 3–4.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Canada Year Book, 1960, 1034. Exports of uranium ores and concentrates for 1961 will probably run under $200 million, a decline from 1960 of more than a quarter. See DBS, Canadian Statistical Review, 02, 1962, 57.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Successive discoveries of important deposits in the US had increased doubts about AEC using its options. Canada failed to persuade the US to exercise part of the options in return for stretching out deliveries. Offers to supply at lower prices were also of no avail. Minutes, 1961, 80–1.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ This over-all estimate may be broken down thus: $350 million for mines and mills, $100 million for social capital (new towns, transportation, etc.), and $50 million for exploration. Excluded from the estimate is an undetermined amount covering the outlays of all those companies whose activities ended at the pre-production stage.

⁵⁸ This might suggest that the execution of government policy by Eldorado could have been improved. It should be noted, however, that the financial troubles of these (mostly small) undertakings were caused by their faulty estimating of costs and reserves prior to going underground, to adverse conditions encountered when ore-bodies were reached, and in some cases, to poor management generally.

⁵⁹ By arrangement with the Combined Development Agency, South African contracts in the period 1961–66 have been extended to 1970 with provision to transfer production from high-cost to low-cost mines. International Monetary Fund, International Financial News Survey, 03 10, 1961.Google Scholar With this modification, CDA has dispensed with its function in South Africa, and is now responsible for only three small contracts, one in Portugal and two in Australia. When these are completed in 1962, it will go out of existence. Minutes, 1961, 23.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Ibid., 28–30.

⁶¹ Late in 1961 Bicroft and Macassa Mines merged in Macassa Gold Mines Ltd. The new company's financial position will be strengthened by an infusion of liquid resources and by the use of Bicroft's undepreciated assets and pre-production write-offs to obtain income tax savings. Bicroft's shareholders acquired an interest in a profitable Kirkland Lake gold mine. Sale of Bicroft's plant, inevitable if no further contracts are obtained, might realize enough to repay a $1 million loan for miners' houses, owed to the federal government.

⁶² At mid-1961 Rio Algom had three mills operating. One was then closed; plans are to close another in 1965, and the last in 1966. Survey of Mines, 1962, 173.

⁶³ In 1960 output dropped by a fifth. On the basis of present contracts, it is estimated that deliveries of oxide (in tons) from year to year between 1961 and 1966, will fall thus: 9,691, 8,373, 6,548, 3,434, 1,464, 1,100. Griffith, , “Uranium,” 14.Google Scholar At August 31, 1959, uranium mining employed 13,626 people. Griffith, , A Survey, 3–4.Google Scholar At January 15, 1960, employment stood at 11,792, but it had fallen to about 6,000 by the end of 1960. Distribution among the camps at the earlier date, with year-end figures bracketed, was as follows: Elliot Lake 8,537 (4,000); Beaverlodge 1,632 (1,000); Bancroft 1,400 (1,000); Port Radium 223 (nil). Griffith, , “Uranium,” 14.Google Scholar Elliot Lake, Blind River, has been very hard hit as a result of the cut-back in uranium production. Planned as a model town to serve a population of 30,000, it has seen the number of inhabitants fall from 25,000 in 1959 to 15,000 at the end of 1960. In the absence of new industries, the population will continue to fall, particularly after 1963, the year Denison is due to close. Total investment in the town for houses, schools, churches, stores, hospital, banks, utilities, and the like has been estimated as high as $70 million. Elliot Lake will continue to receive loans from the government of Ontario to cover operating costs. The crisis in the industry and the social implications of the stretch-out are debated in Debates, 02 23, 1960, pp. 1373–85Google Scholar; Aug. 10, 1960, pp. 7905–9.

⁶⁴ There had actually been several previous references to an arrangement to supply Britain with uranium up to 1966, but no details were divulged and no conferences held with producers respecting the order. See Debates, 02 1, 1958, p. 4147 Google Scholar; Minutes, 1961, 303–4.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Several factors have combined to cause a decided slowing-down of plans for nuclear power development: the greater length of time than anticipated to overcome technical problems and make power reactors competitive with conventional plants; technological advances which have improved the efficiency of conventional plants and prevented expected rises in the cost of power produced by them; increases in the supplies of other fuels.

⁶⁶ Minutes, 1961, 95.Google Scholar It is not known whether the government will seek to keep alive the mines now operating, by distributing the order through a quota system based on capacity, or will concentrate production in those undertakings whose costs are lowest. In the former case profitable operation would be impossible for several companies; in the latter, additional social costs would be incurred in those communities deprived of their main source of livelihood. A further important question raised by the British contract concerns Eldorado's future as a producer. There is already considerable opposition to its continued existence as a competitor with the private sector in a buyer's market. (A revised agreement between Canada and Britain has now been worked out. No details are available, and a formal contract has yet to be signed. See The Globe and Mail, 05 23, 1962.Google Scholar)

⁶⁷ World production in 1959 was perhaps 50,000 tons, of which the US produced 16,400, Canada 15,900, South Africa 6,400, the USSR and East Germany 6,000 (estimated), and the Belgian Congo 2,300. Griffith, , A Survey, 46.Google Scholar Consumption (outside the Soviet bloc) was approximately 30,000 tons in 1959. Detailed studies made in the past two years have forecast requirements of between 33,000 and 36,000 tons for 1965. It would seem that the mining of uranium ores in the Congo has ceased. Minutes, 1961, 15.

⁶⁸ Eldorado began the sales campaign in 1959, with the uranium producers' committee of the Canadian Metal Mining Association helping to meet the cost of advertising, exhibiting at trade fairs, and so on. Until 1958–59 the company's research was oriented towards perfecting the technical extracting process and aiding the industry generally. In continuing this work, it is recognized that while the scope for increasing efficiency and lowering costs may not be so great as formerly, even modest improvements are important in the current competitive situation. In the summer of 1959, Eldorado and the Mines Branch embarked on serious research into possible alternative uses for uranium, out of which has come promise of developing uranium steel. Up to February, 1961, Eldorado had spent $105,000 and the Mines Branch $150,000 on this line of research. From 1949 to 1960 Eldorado's total research expenditures amounted to $5.3 million. Besides this, it gave grants of $343,000 to universities. Eldorado played a leading role in the formation, late in 1960, of the Canadian Uranium Research Foundation, with an annual income for a five-year period of $250,000 contributed by all producers, except Stanrock, in proportion to output. Minutes, 1961, 128, 133,151, 168.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ The factors entering into the long-run growth of demand for uranium are briefly discussed in Hunter, W. D. G., “Canada's Uranium Industry: A Crisis of Survival,” Business Quarterly, 26, no. 4, Winter, 1961, 226–32.Google Scholar