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The Role of Private Enforcement within EU Competition Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2017

Niamh Dunne
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Abstract

Private enforcement is an increasingly prominent element of EU competition law. The forthcoming Directive on damages actions aims to strengthen and, to a degree, harmonise procedures for private competition litigation, while recent case law of the Court of Justice reaffirms the centrality of the right to claim compensation for losses stemming from breach of the competition rules. Moreover, this right has been presented as an essentially unitary one, whereby any victim of any type of competition infringement has, in principle, the right to claim damages. This chapter reviews the evolving framework, and considers, specifically, the role for private enforcement within the overall system of EU competition law. Taking into account the Commission’s efforts to facilitate and increase private enforcement, the emerging EU public enforcement framework, as well as the substantive EU competition rules more generally, this chapter argues that, contrary to the rhetoric, private enforcement is a mechanism best adapted, and arguably most appropriate, for use only in the context of hard-core cartels. It is further suggested that the gap between rhetoric and reality is not problematic as such, yet difficulties may arise insofar as these divergences conflict with the principle of effectiveness.

Type
Research Article
Information
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies , Volume 16 , 2014 , pp. 143 - 187
Copyright
Copyright © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 2014

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References

1 Joined Cases C-295 to 297/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA etc, EU:C:2006:461, para 31.

2 For example, the recent fine of €1.7 billion imposed on banks participating in cartels to fix the LIBOR and EURIBOR benchmark interest rates: see European Commission Press Release IP/13/1208, ‘Antitrust: Commission fines banks €1.71 billion for participating in cartels in the interest rate derivatives industry’, published 4 December 2013 (no decision yet published).

3 Including cases against technology giants Microsoft (confirmed in T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Commission, EU:T:2007:289) and Intel (confirmed in T-286/09 Intel Corp v European Commission, EU:T:2014:547).

4 European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules (COM(2008) 165 final), published 2 April 2008 (‘White Paper’) p 3.

5 Namely, Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, EU:C:2011:389; Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others, EU:C:2012:2390; Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and Others, EU:C:2013:366; and Case C-557/12 Kone AG and Others v BB Infrastruktur AG, EU:C:2014:1317.

6 See also European Commission, Staff Working Paper. Annex to the Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules (SEC(2005) 1732), published 19 December 2005 (‘Staff Working Paper (Green Paper)’) para 2.

7 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings ([2004] OJ L24/1, 29.1.2004).

8 See Articles 107–109 TFEU.

9 Confirmed by, inter alia, the Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (COM(2013) 404 final), published 11 June 2013 (‘Proposal for Damages Directive’) p 2.

10 Proposal for Damages Directive, p 3.

11 See eg European Commission, Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ([2013] OJ C167/19, 13.6.2013) (‘Communication on quantifying harm’), paras 1–2.

12 Proposal for Damages Directive, n 9 above, pp 2–3.

13 See n 1 above.

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16 Although, of course, certain producers may see an increase in their individual welfare: see Motta, Competition Policy, ibid, 43.

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18 See Neelie Kroes, Taking Competition Seriously—Antitrust Reform in Europe SPEECH/05/157, Speech to the International Bar Association/European Commission Conference ‘Antitrust Reform in Europe: A Year in Practice’, Brussels, 10 March 2005.

19 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty ([2003] OJ L1/1, 4.1.2003) (‘Regulation 1/2003’).

20 See, on this point, Otis, n 5 above, paras 56–64.

21 Structural remedies can be imposed only where only be imposed where there is no ‘equally effective’ behavioural remedies or where the behavioural remedy would be ‘more burdensome’ for the defendant undertaking.

22 See also the Commission’s current Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 1/2003 ([2006] OJ C210/2, 1.09.2006).

23 Article 23(5), Regulation 1/2003.

24 See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-272/09 P KME Germany AG, KME France SAS and KME Italy SpA v European Commission, EU:C:2011:63, paras 63–67.

25 See eg the UK’s Enterprise Act 2002, s 188, and Ireland’s Competition Act 2002, ss 6–7. For a thoughtful consideration of the potential for criminalisation at the EU level, see Wils, WPJ, ‘Is Criminalisation of EU Competition Law the Answer?’ (2005) 28 World Competition 117 Google Scholar.

26 See Werden, ‘Sanctioning Cartel Activity’, n 17 above, 19–22.

27 See eg Wils, ‘Is Criminalisation the Answer?’, n 25 above; Beaton-Wells, C and Ezrachi, A (eds), Criminalising Cartels (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011)Google Scholar; and Furse, M, The Criminal Law of Competition in the UK and in the US: Failure and Success (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 Article 3(1), Regulation 1/2003.

29 See eg Office of Fair Trading, Director Disqualification Orders in Competition Cases: An OFT Guidance Document (2010), and Stephan, A, ‘Disqualification Orders for Directors Involved in Cartels’ (2011) 6 Journal for European Competition Law & Practice 529 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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32 See eg Communication on quantifying harm, n 11 above.

33 See Lande, ‘Benefits of Private Enforcement’, n 31 above, 4; and Crane, Institutional Structure (2011), n 14 above, 163.

34 15 USC §15.

35 European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on Damages for breach of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)) (‘EP Resolution on White Paper’), at Recital (I).

36 White Paper, p 3.

37 See generally Komninos, AP, ‘The Road to the Commission’s White Paper for Damages Actions: Where We Came From’ (2008) 4 Competition Policy International 81 Google Scholar.

38 Proposal for Directive on Damages, n 9 above, p 2.

39 Staff Working Paper (Green Paper), n 6 above, para 3.

40 See eg White Paper, n 4 above, p 3.

41 Communication on quantifying harm, n 11 above, para 1.

42 Communication on quantifying harm, n 11 above, para 2; contrast the more expansive range of objectives canvassed by Nazzini, R and Nikpay, A, ‘Private Actions in EC Competition Law’ (2008) 4 Competition Policy International 107 Google Scholar.

43 Communication on quantifying harm, n 11 above, para 2. See also Donau Chemie and others, n 5 above, para 23.

44 Lande, ‘Benefits of Private Enforcement’, n 31 above.

45 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie and others, EU:C:2013:67, para 48.

46 Bator, FM, ‘The Anatomy of Market Failure’ (1958) 72 Quarterly Journal of Economics 351, 351CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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48 See eg Gerber, DJ, ‘Private enforcement of competition law: a comparative perspective’ in Möllers, TMJ and Heinemann, A, The Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 446 Google Scholar.

49 In particular, under the original enforcement framework of Regulation 17 of 1962 ([1962] OJ 13/204, 21.2.1962), any agreement that might breach (the precursor to) Article 101(1) TFEU yet which could be exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU had to be notified to the Commission for pre-approval.

50 See, most notably, the decision in C-501/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services and others v Commission, EU:C:2009:610.

51 See European Commission, White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, COM(99) 101 final, published 28 April 1999; and Schaub, A, ‘Modernization of EC Competition Law: Reform of Regulation No. 17’ (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 752 Google Scholar.

52 See European Commission, A proactive Competition Policy for a Competitive Europe, published 20 April 2004 (COM(2004) 293) 7; also Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty ([2004] OJ C101/97, 27.4.2004), and European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings ([2009] OJ C 45/7, 24.2.2009) (‘Enforcement Priorities for Article 82 EC’).

53 See, generally, Dunne, N, ‘Commitment Decisions in EU Competition Law’ (2014) 10 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 399 Google Scholar.

54 Pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003, NCAs are also empowered to accept commitments to conclude investigations; see also Schweitzer, H, ‘Commitment Decisions: An Overview of EU and National Case Law’ (2012) 48150 e-Competition Bulletin: www.concurrences.com/english/bulletin/special-issues/commitments-decisions/ Google Scholar.

55 Recital (13) of Regulation 1/2003.

56 See European Commission, Notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU ([2001] OJ C 308/6, 20.10.2001) para 116.

57 See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council: Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 (SEC(2009) 574 final), published 29 April 2009 (‘Report on Regulation 1/2003’) para 94.

58 See Case C-441/07 P European Commission v Alrosa, EU:C:2010:377, especially paras 35 and 48; also T-342/11 Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio (CEEES) v Commission, EU:T:2014:60, especially paras 54–55.

59 See, eg, divestiture of business units in several energy commitments decisions, including Commission Decision of 18 March 2009 in Case COMP/39.402—RWE Gas Foreclosure ([2009] OJ (C 133) 10); Commission Decision of 29 September 2010 in Case COMP/39.315—ENI ([2010] OJ (C 352) 8); and Commission Decision of 26 November 2008 in Case COMP/39.388—Germany Electricity Wholesale Market and Case COMP/39.389—German Electricity Balancing Market ([2009] OJ (C 36) 8).

60 See, eg Canenbley, C and Steinvorth, T, ‘Effective Enforcement of Competition Law: Is there a Solution to the Conflict between Leniency Programmes and Private Damages Actions?’ (2011) 2 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 315, 324–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ezrachi, A and Ioannidou, M, ‘Public Compensation as a Complementary Mechanism to Damages Actions: From Policy Justifications to Formal Implementation’ (2012) 3 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 536 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. An example of this approach in practice, albeit in somewhat unusual circumstances, is the infringement decision of the UK’s Office of Fair Trading in Case CE/2890–03 Exchange of information on future fees by certain independent fee-paying schools, of 20 November 2006. Here, the defendant schools agreed, inter alia, to make ex gratia payments to support an educational trust fund for the benefit of pupils who attended the schools during academic years in respect of which fee information had been exchanged in breach of the Competition Act 1998.

61 See Wagner-Von Papp, F, ‘Best and Even Better Practices in Commitment Procedures after Alrosa: The Dangers of Abandoning the “Struggle for Competition Law”‘ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 929, 931 and 965Google Scholar.

62 See Wils, ‘Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages’, n 14 above, 6 and 9.

63 Case 127/73 Belgische Radio en Televisie v SV SABAM and NV Fonior (BRT (I)), EU:C:1974:6, para 16. Regulation 1/2003 rendered Article 101 TFEU directly effective in its entirety.

64 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd v Others, EU:C:2001:465.

65 Courage, ibid, para 26.

66 Manfredi, n 1 above, at para 63.

67 Courage, n 64 above, para 27.

68 See eg Manfredi, n 1 above, para 91; Pfleiderer, para 29; Otis, para 42; Donau Chemie, para 23; and Kone, para 23 (all n 5 above).

69 Manfredi, para 61.

70 Manfredi, para 97, citing Case C-271/91 Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority, EU:C:1993:335, para 31. See also Donau Chemie, para 24.

71 Kone, paras 33–34.

72 Pfleiderer, para 28.

73 Courage, n 64 above, para 29; reiterated more recently in Pfleiderer, para 30, and Donau Chemie, para 25.

74 Joined Cases C-6/90 and 9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci and Others v Italian Republic, EU:C:1991:428.

75 Compare eg Albors-Llorens, A, ‘ Courage v Crehan: Judicial Activism or Consistent Approach?’ (2002) 61 Cambridge Law Journal 38, 41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Möllers and Heinemann, Enforcement, n 48 above, 424–25; van Gerven, W, ‘Private Enforcement of EC Competition Rules in the ECJ—Courage v Crehan and the Way Ahead’ in Basedow, J (ed), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2007) 28 Google Scholar; Havu, K, ‘Horizontal Liability for Damages in EU Law—the Changing Relationship of EU and National Law’ (2012) 18 European Law Journal 407 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and C Cauffman, ‘The European Commission Proposal for a Directive on Antitrust Damages: A First Assessment’ (2013) Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper No 2013/13, para 3.1. For a more general discussion of the spillover effects between EU law and national private law, see Johnston, A, ‘Instances and Analysis of Feedback in the Loop-flow between EC Law and National Private law: Some Tentative Insights for Comparative and European Community Lawyers’ in Remien, O (ed), Schuldrechtsmodernisierung und Europäisches Vertragsrecht (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2007)Google Scholar.

76 See eg Case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v Justitiekanslern, EU:C:2007:163, paras 40–41.

77 Courage, n 64 above, para 19.

78 Donau Chemie, n 5 above, para 20.

79 See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-557/12 Kone AG and Others, EU:C:2014:45, para 24.

80 See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Kone, para 23.

81 Opinion of Advocate General Mazák in Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, EU:C:2010:782, para 17.

82 Pfleiderer, ibid, paras 30–31.

83 Donau Chemie, paras 43–49.

84 Donau Chemie, paras 33 and 42.

85 Donau Chemie, para 32.

86 Case C-365/12 P European Commission v EnNW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG, EU:C:2014:112.

87 EnBW, paras 106–108.

88 EnBW, para 132.

89 See eg Opinion of Advocate General Mazák in Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer, EU:C:2010:782; Otis, n 5 above, paras 45–48; and Donau Chemie, para 24.

90 Donau Chemie, para 24.

91 See eg Forrester, IS, ‘Due Process in EC Competition Cases: A Distinguished Institution with Flawed Procedures’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 817 Google Scholar.

92 Otis, n 5 above, paras 50–54.

93 Commission Decision of 21 February 2007 in Case COMP/E-1/38.823—Elevators and Escalators (summary at [2008] OJ C 75/19, 26.3.2008).

94 Otis, n 5 above, para 63.

95 Compare eg Nazzini, R, ‘Administrative Enforcement, Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Law: A Comparative Contextual-Functionalist Perspective’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 971 Google Scholar; and Wils, WPJ, ‘The Compatibility With Fundamental Rights of the EU Antitrust Enforcement System in which the European Commission acts both as Investigator and as First-Instance Decision Maker’ (2014) 37 World Competition 5 Google Scholar.

96 European Commission, Green paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2005) 672 final (‘Green Paper’) p 4.

97 Staff Working Paper (Green Paper), n 6 above, para 29.

98 Staff Working Paper (Green Paper), n 6 above, paras 16–17.

99 Discussed in European Commission, Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules (COM(2008) 165 final), published 2 April 2008.

100 White Paper, n 4 above, p 3.

101 White Paper, n 4 above, p 3.

102 European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2007 on the Green Paper on Damages for breach of the EC antitrust rules (2006/2207(INI)). Note Recital 32, however, stating that the European Parliament: ‘[e]mphasises that Parliament should play a co-legislative role in the field of competition law’.

103 European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on Damages for breach of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)) (‘EP Resolution on White Paper’).

104 See P Boylan, ‘Draft Damages Directive: Off the Agenda for Now’, Practical Law, published on 28 October 2009, available at: uk.practicallaw.com/8-500-5687?service=competition; Sittenreich, MA, ‘The Rocky Path for Private Directors General: Procedure, Politics, and the Uncertain Future of EU Antitrust Damages Actions’ (2012) 78 Fordham Law Review 2701, 2723Google Scholar; and Barling, G, ‘Collective Redress for Breach of Competition Law—A Case for Reform?’ (2011) 10 Competition Law Journal 5, 15Google Scholar.

105 See EP Resolution on White Paper, n 103 above, Recitals 3–6. On this issue, see generally Pinotti, V and Stepina, D, ‘Antitrust Class Actions in the European Union: Latest Developments and the Need for a Uniform Regime’ (2011) 2 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 24 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

106 See eg European Commission, Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress: Next Steps. Joint information note by Vice-President Reding, Vice-President Almunia and Commissioner Dalli (SEC(2010) 1192), published 5 October 2010.

107 European Commission, Staff Working Document Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress (SEC(2011) 173 final), published 4 February 2011.

108 European Commission, Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law ([2013] OJ L201/60, 26.7. 2013), in particular paras 1–2.

109 Ibid, Recital (7).

110 See eg Green Paper, n 96 above, p 7; White Paper, n 4 above, p 7; EP Resolution on White Paper, n 103 above, Recital (17).

111 European Commission, Staff Working Document. Practical Guide Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 TFEU of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (SWD(2013) 205), published 11 June 2013 (‘Staff Working Document on Quantifying Harm’); see also Communication on quantifying harm, n 11 above, para 10.

112 Communication on quantifying harm, n 11 above, para 6.

113 Staff Working Document on Quantifying Harm, n 111 above, paras 7 and 10.

114 Staff Working Document on Quantifying Harm, para 17.

115 Proposal for Damages Directive, n 9 above.

116 See eg the views of Pohlmann, P, ‘Private Losses in European Competition Law: Public or Private Enforcement’ in Schulze, R (ed), Compensation of Private Loses: The Evolution of Torts in European Business Law (Munich, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2011) 161–62Google Scholar; and Stürmer, R, ‘Duties of Discolsure and Burden of Proof in the Private Enforcement of European Competition Law’ in Basedow, J (ed), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law (The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 2007) 170 Google Scholar, both pre-dating the current proposal.

117 See J Kortmann and R Wesseling, ‘Two Concerns Regarding the European Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions’ (August 2013) CPI Antitrust Chronicle 3–5. Other practitioners point to a ‘spontaneous harmonization’ occurring as a result: see A Komninos, ‘Private Enforcement: An Overview of EU and National Case Law’ (March 2012) e-Competitions Special Issue No 44442, www.concurrences.com.

118 Proposal for Damages Directive, n 9 above, in particular draft Article 1, p 30.

119 Proposal for a Directive, Explanatory Memorandum, p 8.

120 Proposal for a Directive, Explanatory Memorandum, p 10.

121 In this regard, see the comments (and veiled warnings to the European Parliament) of Vice-President Almunia in his speech to the College of Europe GCLC annual conference, ‘Antitrust damages in EU law and policy’, SPEECH/13/887, delivered 7 November 2013.

122 The proposed Directive has thus been criticised as comprising, at first glance, ‘a random selection of minimum procedural requirements that lack coherence or structure’: see Howard, A, ‘Too little, too late? The European Commission’s Legislative Proposals on Anti Trust Damages Actions’ (2013) 4 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 455, 456CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

123 Recital 11, Revised Draft Directive.

124 Recital 15, Revised Draft Directive.

125 Recital 21, Revised Draft Directive.

126 See eg Recitals 19–21, Revised Draft Directive.

127 See Kersting, C, ‘Removing the Tension between Public and Private Enforcement: Disclosure and Privileges for Successful Leniency Applicants’ (2014) 5 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Cauffman, ‘The European Commission Proposal’, n 75 above, at section 4.

128 See Pfleiderer, paras 23–24, and Donau Chemie, paras 25–27.

129 See Council of the European Union Document 2013/0185(COD)—03.12.2013 Debate in Council.

130 Hanover Shoe, Inc v United Shoe Machinery Corp, 392 US 481 (1968), and Illinois Brick Co v Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977); see also F Richmond, ‘Pursuing Effective Remedies in Private Competition Actions’ [2013] Competition Law Journal 192, 197–98.

131 See text accompanying n 104 above.

132 See n 108 above.

133 In defence of class actions in this context, see Barling, ‘Collective Redress’, n 104 above, and Iacobucci, EM, ‘Cartel Class Actions and Immunity Programmes’ (2013) 1 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 272 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

134 Kortmann and Wesseling, ‘Two Concerns Regarding the European Draft Directive, n 117 above, 3. The authors nonetheless approve of the horizontal approach to collective redress (ibid). In favour of a sector-specific approach to collective action in the antitrust field, see Buccirossi, P and Carpagnano, M, ‘Is it Time for the European Union to Legislate in the Field of Collective Redress in Antitrust (and how)?’ (2012) 4 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 3, 9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

135 See Howard, ‘Too Little, Too Late?’, n 122 above, 459.

136 See eg Maier-Rigaud, FP, ‘Toward a European Directive on Damages Actions’ (2014) 10 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 341 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Kersting, ‘Removing the Tension between Public and Private Enforcement’, 127 above.

137 See Kortmann and Wesseling, ‘Two Concerns Regarding the European Draft Directive’, n 117 above, 2.

138 Indeed, in a number of instances the Commission and EU Courts have drawn express parallels between the substantive content and application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU: see eg Commission Decision of 21 December 1988 in Cases IV/30.979 and 31.394—Decca Navigator System ([1989] OJ L43/27, 15.2.89); Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission, EU:T:1999:41; and Joined Cases C-395 and 396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge v Commission, EU:C:2000:132.

139 See n 56 above.

140 See eg Commission Decision of 12 April 2006 in Case COMP/B-1/38.348—Repsol CPP (summary at [2006] OJ L176/104, 30.6.2006).

141 See eg Commission Decision of 8 December 2010 in Case COMP/39.398—VISA MIF (summary at [2011] OJ C79/8, 12.3.2011).

142 Commission Decision of 22 June 2011 in Case COMP/39.525—Telekomunikacja Polska, at 12 (summary at [2011] OJ C324/7, 9.11.2011).

143 Alrosa, n 58 above, para 35.

144 Alrosa, para 48.

145 See eg European Commission, Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 ([2006] OJ C210/2, 1.9.2006) paras 19–26.

146 See also Havu, ‘Horizontal Liability for Damages’, n 75 above, 416–17.

147 Courage, n 64 above, para 26.

148 Pfleiderer, paras 28–29; Otis, para 41; Donau Chemie, para 21 (all n 5 above).

149 Pfleiderer, paras 19 and 25.

150 Otis, para 42.

151 Manfredi, n 1 above, para 31.

152 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV, EU:C:1999:269, paras 36–39.

153 The original draft Article 1(1) began: ‘This Directive sets out certain rules necessary to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty or national competition law, can effectively exercise the right to full compensation’.

154 Supporting the argument that the passing-on defence arises primarily or exclusively in the context of cartel cases, see eg Hellwig, M, ‘Private Damage Claims and the Passing-On Defence in Horizontal Price-Fixing Cases—An Economist’s Perspective’ in Basedow, J (ed), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law (The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 2007)Google Scholar; van Boom, WH, ‘The Law of Damages and Competition Law: Bien étonnés de se trouver ensemble?’ in Schulze, R (ed), Compensation of Private Loses: The Evolution of Torts in European Business Law (Munich, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2011) 166 Google Scholar; and van Gerven, ‘Private Enforcement of EU Competition Rules’, n 75 above, at fn 33.

155 See n 165 below.

156 See n 111 above and accompanying text.

157 Practical Guide, n 111 above, para 203. See also the fuller explication of this restrictive approach at para 192.

158 ibid, para 192.

159 See eg Case C-68/12 Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky v Slovenská sporitel’ňa as, EU:C:2013:71.

160 See eg Enforcement Priorities for Article 82 EC, in which the Commission describes its priorities for application of Article 102 TFEU solely in terms of exclusionary conduct resulting in ‘anticompetitive foreclosure’ (see eg paras 19 and 23). While the possibility that exploitative conduct may also breach Article 102 TFEU is acknowledged (para 7), the Commission provides no guidance on the potential application of Article 102 in such circumstances, suggesting, at the very least, that such forms of abuse are a lesser priority, if not entirely discounted.

161 See eg European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints ([2010] OJ C130/1, 19.5.2010) (‘Guidelines on Vertical Restraints’), and European Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements ([2011] OJ C11/1, 14.1.2011).

162 European Commission, Impact Assessment: Damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules (SWD(2013) 203 final), published 11 June 2013 (‘Impact Assessment’) paras 64–65.

163 See Report for the European Commission, ‘Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios’, Final Report (Contract DG COMP/2006/A3/012), published 21 December 2007.

164 See n 56 above.

165 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as regarding the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases ([2008] OJ C171/3, 1.7.2008) and European Commission, Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases ([2008] OJ C167/1, 2.7.2008).

166 Regulation (EC) No 622/2008, Recital (2).

167 See eg Speech of Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy, Cartels: the priority in competition enforcement, delivered at the 15th International Conference on Competition: A Spotlight on Cartel Prosecution, Berlin on 14 April 2011 (SPEECH/11/268).

168 Indeed, two recent cases before the Union courts—EnBW and Otis —also had their origins in efforts to bring follow-on actions premised upon Commission infringement decisions.

169 See eg Commission Decision of 6 March 2013 on non-compliance with commitments in Case COMP/39.530—Microsoft (Tying) (summary at [2013] OJ C120/15, 26.4.2013).

170 See, to similar effect on the question of whether NCAs can subsequently adopt findings of breach, the approach of the General Court in Case T-342/11 CEEES, n 58 above, para 66, and Report on Regulation 1/2003, para 107.

171 For example, ‘patent ambush,’ applied in Commission Decision of 9 December 2009 in Case COMP/38.636—RAMBUS (summary at [2010] OJ C30/17, 6.2.2010), or strategic under-investment resulting in a constructive refusal to supply, as in Commission Decision of 29 September 2010 in Case COMP/39.315—ENI ([2010] OJ C352/8).

172 Report on Regulation 1/2003, para 109.

173 Impact Assessment, para 66.

174 See van Gerven, ‘Private Enforcement of EU Competition Rules’, n 75 above, 24–25; and Wils, ‘Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages’, n 14 above, 15.

175 Although Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 does at least require that NCAs should have the power to both impose fines and accept commitments to conclude cases when applying Article 101 and 102 TFEU.

176 See eg Schweitzer, ‘Commitment Decisions: An Overview’ n 54 above.

177 See eg WE Kovacic, ‘The Intellectual DNA of Modern US Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix’ [2007] Columbia Business Law Review 1; Odudu, O, ‘Developing Private Enforcement in the EU: Lessons from the Roberts Court’ (2008) 53 Antitrust Bulletin 873 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Baker, DI, ‘Private and Public Enforcement: Complements, Substitutes and Conflicts—A Global Perspective’ in Ezrachi, A (ed), Research Handbook on International Competition Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishers, 2012) 245 Google Scholar, and DA Crane, ‘Antitrust and the Judicial Virtues’ [2013] Columbia Business Law Review 1, especially 8–14.

178 Pacific Bell Telephone Co, d/b/a AT&T California et al v linkLine Communications, Inc, et al, 129 S Ct 1109 (2009).

179 See eg Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574 (1986); Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209 (1993); Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC, et al v Billing et al, 127 S Ct 2383 (2007); and linkLine Communications, n 178 above.

180 Gerber, n 48 above, 452.

181 See also, in this regard, Odudu, n 177 above.

182 See eg US v Trenton Potteries Co, 273 US 392 (1927) and US v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US 150 (1940).

183 See European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty ([2004] OJ C101/97, 27.4.2004), para 46, and the approach in eg Joined Cases C-204/00 P etc, Aalborg Portland A/S and others v Commission, EU:C:2004:6.

184 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877 (2007).

185 See Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practice ([2010] OJ L102/1, 23.4.2010), Article 4(a), and Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, paras 223–29. The status of maximum RPM as an object restriction was established in Case 161/84 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis, EU:C:1986:41.

186 linkLine Communications, n 178 above.

187 Berkey Photo, Inc v Eastman Kodak Co, 603 F 2d 263 (2d Cir 1979), 297; and Trinko, n 193 above, 407.

188 On margin squeeze, see Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v European Commission, EU:C:2010:603, and Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Scerige AB, EU:C:2011:83; on excessive pricing, see Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission, EU:C:1978:22, and a recent application of this theory by the Commission, in the context of commitment proceedings, in its Decision of 15 November 2011 in Case COMP 39.592—Standard & Poor’s ([2012] OJ C31/8, 4.2.2012).

189 Brooke Group; confirmed and applied to monopsony purchasing in Weyerhaeuser Company v Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, 549 US 312 (2007).

190 Case C-202/07 P France Télécom SA v Commission, EU:C:2009:214; contrast the approach urged by Advocate General Mazák in his Opinion, EU:C:2008:520, particularly paras 68–78, who argued that recoupment should be required as a matter of both law and policy.

191 Contrast the approaches of the Federal Trade Commission in In the Matter of Intel Corporation, Docket No 9341, Decision and Order of 29 October 2010 and the European Commission in its infringement Decision of 13 May 2009 in Case COMP/C-3/37.990—Intel ([2009] OJ C227/13, 22.9.2009).

192 See Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH v Mediaprint Zeitungs, EU:C:1998:569, and Enforcement Priorities for Article 82 EC, paras 75–90.

193 Verizon Communications, Inc v Law Office of Curtis V Trinko, 540 US 398 (2004).

194 See European Commission Press Releases IP/13/563 ‘Antitrust: Commission fines Lundbeck and other pharma companies for delaying market entry of generic medicines’, published 19 June 2013 (decision not yet published), and the US Supreme Court decision in FTC v Activis, Inc, Docket No 12-416, judgment of 7 June 2013.

195 See n 52 above.

196 XXXVIIth Report on Competition Policy (1997), 77.

197 See eg Rejection Decision of 23 July 2004 in Case COMP/A.36.568/D3—Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg; cf Commission Decision of 15 November 2011 in Case COMP/39.592—Standard & Poor’s summary at [2012] OJ C31/8, 4.2.2012).

198 See Brief of Amici Curiae Professor and Scholars in Law and Economics in Support of the Petitioners in Pacific Bell Telephone Co, d/b/a AT&T California et al v linkLine Communications, Inc, et al, subsequently published as Sidak, JG, ‘Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability’ (2008) 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 279, 295CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This frequent criticism is explored, and to an extent debunked, by Wagner-von Papp, F, ‘Rhetoric and Reality: You Protect Competitors, We Protect Competition—Except When We Protect Competitors’ in Petit, N and Ramundo, E (eds), William E Kovacic: An Antitrust Tribute Liber Amicorum, vol II (New York, Institute of Competition Law, 2014)Google Scholar.

199 Contrast the approach of Sidak, ‘Abolishing the Price Squeeze’ with eg Heimler, A, ‘Is Margin Squeeze and Antitrust or a Regulatory Violation?’ (2010) 6 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 879 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

200 Now 15 USC §45.

201 See eg FTC v Cement Institute et al, 333 US 683 (1948); FTC v Brown Show Co, 384 US 316 (1966) and FTC v Sperry & Hutchinson Co, 405 US 233 (1972).

202 See eg Hovenkamp, H, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice (St Paul, West Publishing, 2011), 647 Google Scholar; Elhauge, E, United States Antitrust Law and Economics (New York, Foundation Press, 2008) 549 Google Scholar; Lande, RH, ‘Revitalizing Section 5 of the FTC Act Using “Consumer Choice” Analysis’ (2009) 8(3) Antitrust Source, February 2009 Google Scholar; Kovacic, WE and Winerman, M, ‘Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act’ (2012) 76 Antitrust Law Journal 929 Google Scholar; and Ohlhausen, M, ‘Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: Principles of Navigation’ (2014) 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

203 Kovacic and Winerman, ‘Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5’, n 202 above, 947.

204 See also Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, n 202 above, 200.

205 See eg Kovacic and Winerman, ‘Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5’, n 202 above, 930; and Foer, AA, ‘Section 5 as a Bridge towards Convergence’ (February 2009) 8(3) Antitrust Source, 2–3 Google Scholar.

206 Foer, ‘Section 5 as a Bridge’, 7.

207 Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, n 202 above, 488.

208 Compare the views of eg Kovacic and Winerman, ‘Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5’; Ohlhausen, ‘Principles of Navigation’, both n 202 above; J Sims, ‘Section 5 Guidelines: Josh Wright as the New King of Corinth?’ CPI Antitrust Chronicle, September 2013, with the particularly trenchant criticisms of current Federal Trade Commissioner Joshua Wright: see Statement of Commissioner Joshua D Wright, Proposed Policy Statement Regarding Unfair Methods of Competition Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, published 19 June 2013.

209 Even Robert Bork, famous scourge of antitrust over-expansiveness, accepted that pricefixing and market-sharing cartels ought to be per se illegal under antitrust: see Bork, RH, The Antitrust Paradox (New York, Free Press, 1973), particularly ch 13Google Scholar.

210 See Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, EU:C:2001:458, para 31; reaffirmed in Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), EU:C:2011:124, para 41.

211 See n 98 above.

212 In relation to payment card interchange fees, for example, the Commission proposes to supplement its antitrust enforcement efforts—see eg Commission Decision of 19 December 2007 in Case COMP/34.579—MasterCard (summary at [2009] OJ C264/8, 6.11.2009) and Commission Decision of 8 December 2010 in Case COMP/39.398—VISA MIF (summary at [2011] OJ C79/8, 12.3.2011)—with a sector-specific regulation: see European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament and of the Council on interchange fees for card-based payment systems (COM(2013) 550 final), published 24 July 2013.

213 Unibet, n 76 above, para 43.

214 Unibet, n 76 above, paras 42–43.

215 Article 47(1), Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

216 Opinion of AG Kokott in Kone, n 79 above, para 69.

217 Donau Chemie, para 47.

218 Proposal for Damages Directive, n 9 above, p 11.

219 Ibid.

220 Ibid.

221 Opinion of AG Kokott in Kone, n 79 above, para 70.

222 Case C-46/93 Brasserie du pêcheur v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EU:C:1996:79, para 51.

223 Ibid, para 55.

224 Courage, n 64 above, para 32.

225 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty ([1998] OJ C9/3, 14.1.98), Section 1A.

226 See n 22 above.

227 See nn 157–161 and accompanying text above.

228 Maier-Rigaud, ‘Toward a European Directive’, n 136 above.

229 See n 17 above.