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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 October 2017
This essay is continuing the path between the disciplines of law and political science that I have been following for a couple of years now. This is a somewhat delicate exercise. In addressing my own discipline, law, I argue that it should renew its perceptions of reality and open up its normative and dogmatic conceptual structure. To political scientists engaged in integration research, I suggest that they ought to take the law’s normative structure seriously and open up their analytical and empirical models to this peculiar reality. ‘Two goals?! No wonder he never gets anywhere!’ By no means, I would object, we are only looking at the two sides of the same coin. And there are good reasons to undertake such efforts: Europe’s constitution is too important to be left up to the lawyers; but it is also something that cannot be grasped by empirical and analytical approaches which are unable to address the normative dimension of the ‘real’ world.
Translated by Iain L Fraser. The original German version is forthcoming in Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch (eds), Europäische Integration (2nd edn Leske und Budrich 2003). The English version of the contribution to the first edition is ‘Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and the Role of Law in the Process of European Integration’ (1996) 2 European Law Journal 105–135. The fact that the paper was written for political scientists which is visible from its style of citation, implies that the legal materials referred to will all be quite familiar to students of European law. But this should not be true for the approach as a whole. I would like to thank Jo Eric Murkens for his thoughtful help with the editing of this text.
1 Commission of the European Communities, European Governance. A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final of 25.07.01.
2 OJ C 80, 10 March 2001.
3 Accessible at http://www.europa.eu.int./comm/laeken/_council/.
4 An interpretation paid little attention to abroad: on this, cfGerber, David J ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the “New” Europe’ (1994) 42 American Journal of Comparative Law 25 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sauter, W, Competition Law and Industrial Policy in the EU (Oxford UP 1997) 26 ffGoogle Scholar.
5 Stein, E, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75 American Journal of International Law 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 For striking similarities in this respect see Ipsen, HP, ‘Über Supranationalität’ in: idem, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht in Einzelstudien (Nomos 1984) 97; Weiler, J, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403 at 2413 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar, and, more recently, von Bogdandy, A, ‘Beobachtungen zur Wissenschaft vom Europarecht. Strukturen, Debatten und Entwicklungsperspektiven der Grundlagenforschung zum Recht der Europäischen Union’ (2001) 39 Der Staat 3 at 11ff Google Scholar (English version in 2000 European Law Journal 208–238).
7 ’The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between contracting states. This view is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but also to peoples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member States and also their citizens … In addition, the task assigned to the Court of Justice under Article 177, the object of which is to secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by national courts and tribunals, confirms that states have acknowledged that Community law has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before those courts and tribunals. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which not only comprise Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community,’ (Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 at 24 f).
8 ’The integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which derive from the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, make it impossible for the States, as a corollary, to accord precedent to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent with that legal system … . The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to subsequent domestic laws without jeopardising the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty set out in Article 5(2) and giving rise to the discrimination prohibited by Article 7’ (Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 1251, 1269 f).
9 Stein above n 5; Weiler above n 3 at 2413; Pernice, I, ‘Maastricht, Staat und Demokratie’ (1993) 26 Die Verwaltung 449 Google Scholar, and especially the Court’s own Opinion 1/91, [1991] I ECR 6079.
10 Stein above n 5 at 25.
11 Weiler, J, ‘Journey to an Unknown Destination, A Retrospective and Prospective of the European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration’ (1993) 31 Journal of Common Market Studies 417 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 cfHöland, A, ‘Die Rechtssoziologie und der unbekannte Kontinent Europa’ (1993) 14 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 17 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schepel, H and Wesseling, R, The Legal Community Judges, Lawyers, Officials (Blackwell, Oxford 1997)Google Scholar.
13 The Baron of Münchhausen is famous for his preposterous/tall stories.
14 Börzel, T, ‘Private Actors on the Rise? The Role of Non-State Actors in Compliance with International Institutions’ (manuscript Florence/Bonn; 2000).
15 Wiener, A, ‘The Embedded Acquis Communautaire. Transmission Belt and Prism of New Governance’ (1998) 4 European Law Journal 294 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
16 Burley, A-M and Mattli, W, ‘Europe before the Court A Political Theory of Legal Integration’ (1993) 47 International Organization, 41 at 72 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
17 Joerges, C, ‘Rechtswissenschaftliche Integrationstheorien’, in Kohler-Koch, B, and Woyke, W, (eds), Lexikon der Politik, Band 5. Die Europäische Union (Beck 1996), 229 Google Scholar.
18 Both terms have no real equivalence in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and law. The pertinent Working Group VI of the European Convention has been called ‘Economic Governance’. That may be the best possible ‘translation’. It does, however, only very imperfectly convey the connotations of Ordnungtheory (cf Gerber and Sauter above n 4; Manow, Ph, ‘Modell Deutschland as an interdenominational compromise. Program for the Study of Germany and Europe’, (2000) Working Paper No 00.3. Center for European Studies, Harvard University).
19 Nörr, KW, Die Republik der Wirtschaft. Teil I Von der Besatzungszeit bis zur Großen Koalition (Mohr 1999) 5–18Google Scholar; Wiethölter, R, ‘Franz Böhm, F (1895–1977)’, in Diestelkamp, B, and Stolleis, M, (eds), Juristen an der Universität Frankfurt aM (Nomos 1989) 208 at 225 ffGoogle Scholar.
20 Abelshauser, W Die Langen Fünfziger Jahre. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1949–1966 (R Oldenburg 1987)Google Scholar; Haselbach, D, Autoritärer Liberalismus und Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Gesellschaft und Politik im Ordoliberalismus (Baden-Baden 1991) 117 ffGoogle Scholar; Nörr above n 19 at 58 ff and 81 ff.
21 Hallstein, W, ‘Wiederherstellung des Privatrechts’ [1946] Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 1; ibid, Der unvollendete Bundesstaat (Econ Verlag 1969); Böhm, F, ‘Die Bedeutung der Wirtschaftsordnung für die politische Verfassung’ [1946] Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 141; Müller-Armack, A, Wirtschaftslenkung und Marktwirtschaft 2edn (Hamburg 19471) Google Scholar.
22 Müller-Armack, A, Die Wirtschaftsordnung des Gemeinsamen Marktes, in idem, Wirtschaftsordnung und Wirtschaftspolitik (Kohlhammer 1966), 401 Google Scholar.
23 For details, see Mussler, W, Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft im Wandel. Von Rom nach Maastricht (Nomos 1998) 58 ff, 91 ff, 125 ffGoogle Scholar.
24 For an ordo-liberal critique of the Maastricht Treaty cfStreit, ME and Mussler, W, ‘The Economic Constitution of the European Community From “Rome” to “Maastricht”’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 5 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for a critique of ordo-liberal claims after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty cf, Sauter above n 8 at 31 ff and 34 ff).
25 Petersmann, E.U, ‘Constitutionalism, Constitutional Law and European Integration’, (1991) 46 Außenwirtschaft 247 Google Scholar; ibid, ‘Grundprobleme der Wirtschaftsverfassung der EG’ (1994) 48 Außenwirtschaft 389.
26 Ipsen, H P, ‘Der deutsche Jurist und das Europäische Gemeinschaftsrecht’ (1964) 43rd Deutscher Juristentag, Vol II L 14 (Beck 1964)Google Scholar; ibid, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (Mohr 1972).
27 Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 176 ff.
28 Kaufmann, M, Europäische Integration und Demokratieprinzip (Nomos 1997) 312 ff; Bach, M, Die Bürokratisierung Europas. Verwaltungseliten, Experten und politische Legitimation in Europa (Westdeutcher Verlag 1999) 38 ff; on this background see Zumbansen, P, Ordnungsmuster im modernen Wohlfahrtsstaat, (Nomos 2000) 93 ffGoogle Scholar; Joerges, ch, ‘On the Legitimacy of Europeanising Europe’s Private Law’, Global Jurist Topics Vol 2 No 2 Google Scholar, Article 1, http//www.bepress.com/gj/topics/vol2/iss2/art1. 65 ff).
29 Majone, G, ‘The European Community. An ‘Independent Fourth Branch of Government”?’, in Brüggemeier, G (ed), Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa (Nomos 1994), 23 Google Scholar.
30 Majone, G, ‘“Democracy Deficit” The Question of Standards’ (1996) 4 European Law Journal, 5 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
31 See 1.a above.
32 These alleged paradoxes—the perfecting of supranational law on the one hand, and insistence on political inter-governmentalism with veto possibilities on the other—were resolved by JHH Weiler in his theory of the legal and political dual structure of the Community as a balance between law and politics (Weiler above n 3 at 2423).
33 On the following, see Moravcisk, A. The Choice for Europe (Cornell UP 1998) 314 ffGoogle Scholar; Joerges, C (1991)’Markt ohne Staat? Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Gemeinschaft und die regulative Politik’, in Wildenmann, R, (ed), Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen für eine politische Union (Nomos 1991), 225 Google Scholar (translated as ‘The Market without a State? States without Markets? Two Essays on the Law of the European Economy’, EUI Working Paper Law 1/96, San Domenico di Fiesole 1996); ibid, ‘Legitimationsprobleme des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts und der Vertrag von Maastricht’, in Brüggemeier, G (ed), Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa (Nomos 1994), 91; ibid, ‘Rationalisierungsprozesse im Recht der Produktsicherheit Öffentliches Recht und Haftungsrecht unter dem Einfluß der Europäischen Integration’, in (1994) 14 Jahrbuch für Umwelt- und Technikrecht 141.
34 Reich, N, ‘Competition Between Legal Orders A New Paradigm of EC Law?’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 861 Google Scholar.
35 Sandholtz, W and Zysman, J, ‘1992: Recasting the European Bargain’ (1989) 42 World Politics 95 at 96 ffGoogle Scholar.
36 Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649.
37 ‘Commission Communication on the effects of the ECJ judgment of 20 February 1979 in 120/78 (“Cassis de Dijon”)’, OJ C 256, 3 October 1980, 2–3; Commission of the EC (1985) Commission White Paper to the European Council on Completion of the Internal Market, COM (85) 310 final, 14.06.85.
38 Mestmäcker, EJ, ‘Auf dem Wege zu einer Ordnungspolitik für Europa’ in Mestmäcker, EJ, Möller, H, Schwartz, H (eds), Eine Ordnungspolitik für Europa. Festschrift für Hans vond. Groeben (Nomos 1987), 9–49Google Scholar.
39 Joerges, ‘Rationalisierungsprozesse’ above n 33 at 154 ff; Bücker, A, Von der Gefahrenabwehr zu Risikovorsorge und Risikomanagement im Arbeitsschutzrecht. Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel der rechtlichen Regulierung der Sicherheit von Maschinen unter dem Einfluß der europäischen Rechtsangleichung, (Duncker and Humbolt 1997)Google Scholar; Eichener, V, Das Entscheidungssystem der Europäischen Union. Institutionelle Analyse und demokratietheoretische Bewertung (Leske und Budrich 1997)Google Scholar.
40 According to a much quoted, but now rather hoary, statement by Jacques Delors (speech to the European Parliament on 4.7.1988, EC Bulletin 1988, 7/8, 124), the economic law in force in EC Member States is, to a large degree (80%), enacted or brought into being by the Community. Delors rejected complaints about the regulating mania of his bureaucracy [‘Europa im Umbruch. Vom Binnenmarkt zur Europäischen Union’, in Kommission der EG (ed), Europäische Gespräche, Heft 9, 1992]: of 100 Community law-making initiatives, only 8 were truly to be attributed to the Commission: in 92% of cases, his officials were taking up the concerns of the Member States—and 70% of cases saw the Community taking up the law-making concerns of the Federal Republic (ibid at 12).
41 Jachtenfuchs, M, ‘The Governance Approach to European Integration’ (2001) Journal of Common Market Studies 245.
42 Majone above n 29 at 23.
43 On these continuities and discontinuities, see Joerges, C, ‘Europe a Großraum? Shifting Legal Conceptualisations of the Integration Project. Wurde Europa ein Großraum?’, in Joerges, C and Ghaleigh, N, Darker Legacies of Law in Europe The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its Legal Traditions, (Hart 2003) 168 Google Scholar.
44 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Urteil von 12 October 1993–2 BvR 2134/92 u 2 BvR 2159/92, BVerfGE 89, 155 at 181, cf 188 ff. The term ‘Staatenverbund’ (association of states) was used by the Second Senate’s rapporteur, Paul Kirchhof, as a term for a form of organisation ‘between an alliance of states and the de-statization of the Member States’, without combining this with any claim to a definitive legal substantive description ( Kirchhof, P, ‘Der deutsche Staat im Prozeß der europäischen Integration’ in Isensee, J and Kirchhof, P (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Bd. VII (Müller Verlag 1994), 855 at 859 ffGoogle Scholar). There has been much puzzlement over its meaning both in Germany, since this is indeed, once again, merely a Gestalt term ( Möllers, C, Staat als Argument (Beck 2000) 378 ffGoogle Scholar), and elsewhere, since it was hard to know how exactly to translate ‘Verbund’.
45 BVerfGE 89 at 184.
46 See Weiler above n 3.
47 BVerfGE 89 at 182.
48 Ibid at 206.
49 Ibid at 186.
50 Ibid at 185.
51 Ibid at 186.
52 Heller, H, ‘Politische Demokratie und soziale Homogenität’ (1928), in ibid, Gesammelte Schriften, vol 2 (Sijthoff 1971) 421 at 427 f.
53 Böckenförde, E-W, ‘Demokratie als Verfassungsprinzip’, in ibid, Staat, Verfassung und Demokratie (Suhrkamp1991), 289 at 348 ff; von Bogdandy, A and Bast, J, ‘Die vertikale Kompetenzordnung der Europäiaschen Union/ Rechtsdogmatischer Bestand und Verfassungspolitische Reformperspektiven.’ (2001) 28 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 441 Google Scholar; Bryde, B-O, ‘Die bundesrepublikanische Volksdemokratie als Irrweg der Demokratietheorie’ (1994) 5 Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 305 at 311 fGoogle Scholar; Pernice, I, ‘Die Dritte Gewalt im Europäischen Verfassungsverbund’ [1996] Europarecht 27; also La Torre, M ‘Un giurista nel crepuscolo di Weimar. Politica e diritto nell’opera di Hermann Heller’, (2001) Ratio Juris.
54 Möllers above n 44 at 407.
55 Lepsius, O, Die gegensatzaufhebende Begriffsbildung. Methodenentwicklungen in der Weimarer Republik und ihr Verhältnis zur Ideologisierung der Rechtswissenschaft unter dem Nationalsozialismus (Beck 1994), 13 ffGoogle Scholar.
56 The Court again proved to be subsequently conciliatory; it has explicitly confirmed the constitutionality of the monetary union (Bundesverfassungsgericht (1998) Beschluß von 31 March 1998, 2 BvR 1877/97, 2 BvR 50/98, BVerfGE 97, 350).
57 For this concept, see Everling, U, ‘Zur Stellung der Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union als ‘Herren der Verträge’, in Beyerlein, U et al (eds), Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung. Festschrift für Rudolf Bernhardt (Duncker & Humbolt 1995) 1161 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
58 European law is a field for public lawyers. This may explain why even comprehensive analyses barely mention the ironic consequence of defending nation-state democracy brought out in the text, while the echoes of Schmitt have very much been taken seriously: cf, Bryde above n 53 and Weiler, J, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 219 CrossRefGoogle Scholar on the one hand, Ladeur, K-H, ‘Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality The Viability of the Network Concept’ (1997) 3 European Law Journal 33 at 35 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar and von Bogdandy, A, ‘Das Leitbild der dualistischen Legitimation für die europäische Verfassungsentwicklung’, (2000) 83 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 284 Google Scholar, on the other.
59 Commission of the EC, A White Paper on European Governance—’Enhancing Democracy in the European Union’ (Work programme, SEC (2000) 1547/7 final, 11.10.00) 4.
60 OJ C 34, 18 December 2000.
61 The language setting it up is kept instructively vague: ‘The question ultimately arises as to whether this simplification and reorganisation might not, in the long run, lead to the adoption of a constitutional text in the Union … In order to pave the way for the next Intergovernmental Conference …, the European Council has decided to convene a Convention … . [I]t will be the task of this Convention to consider the key issues arising for the Union’s future and try to identify the various possible responses,’ (SN 300/01 ADD 1, 7).
62 Cf, 1.1.1 above.
63 In my understanding of Europe’s constitutionalisation, the efforts to Europeanise private law, which are gaining ever more momentum, should be mentioned here; for a very brief sceptical comment cf Joerges above n 28.
64 Commission above n 59.
65 Steinberg, P, ‘Governance-Modelle in der Politikwissenschaft und Möglichkeiten Ihrer verfassungsrechtlichen Umsetzung’, WHI Working Paper 6/99 (1999) – www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/ WHI; Schmitter, PC, ‘What is there to Legitimise in the EU … and how might this be Accomplished’ (Typescript EUI Florence 2001).
66 Kohler-Koch, B, ‘The Evolution and Transformation of European Governance’, in KohlerKoch, B, and Eising, R, (eds), The Transformation of Governance in the European Union, (Routledge 1999), 14 Google Scholar.
67 Commission above n 59; also Joerges, C, ‘“Economic order”—”technical realization”—”the hour of the executive” some legal historical observations on the Commission White Paper on European governance’ (2001) http//www.iue.it/RSC/Governance/ and ibid, ‘The Commission’s White Paper on Governance in the EU A Symptom of Crisis?, Guest Editorial’ (2002) Common Market Law Review 441.
68 The definition by the Commission is extraordinarily vague: (‘“Governance” means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence’): see Commission of the European Communities above n 1 and n 59.
69 See, for instance, Jachtenfuchs above n 41 at 246.
70 Above n 1 at 10 f.
71 Note the series published by the Forward Studies Unit (http://europa.eu.int/comm/gover-nance/index_de.htm) and especially De Schutter, O, and Lebessis, N and Paterson, J (eds), Governance in the European Union (ECJ, Luxembourg 1999), 3–42001Google Scholar.
72 Above n 1 at 8.
73 Ibid at 24 ff and 40.
74 Ibid at 14.
75 Commission of the EC, above n 59.
76 Scharpf, FW, ‘European Governance Common Concerns vs. The Challenge of Diversity, Symposium Responses to the European Commission’s White Paper’ (RSC Symposium 2001), 86 (http://www.iue.it/RSC/symposium).
77 Ashiagbor, D ‘Soft Harmonisation Labour Law, Economic Theory and the European Employment Strategy’ (PhD Thesis, EUI Florence 2002).
78 (Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 1996; Scharpf, F W, Regieren in Europa. Effektiv und demokratisch? (Campus Verlag 1999)Google Scholar.
79 Scharpf, FW, ‘Die Politikverflechtungs-Falle Europäische Integration und deutscher Föderalismus’ (1985) 26 Politische Vierteljahresschrift 323 Google Scholar; Benz, A, ‘Politische Steuerung in lose gekoppelten Mehrebenensystemen’, In Wehrle, R and Schimank, U (ed), Gesellschaftliche Komplexität und kollektive Handlungsfähigkeit (Campus Verlag 2000), 99 Google Scholar.
80 For details, see Mayer, FC, ‘Die drei Dimensionen der Europäischen Kompetenzdebatte’ (2001) 61 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 577 Google Scholar; von Bogdandy and Bast above n 53.
81 Furrer, A, Die Sperrwirkung des sekundären Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die nationalen Rechtsordnungen (Nomos 1994)Google Scholar.
82 Scharpf, FW, ‘Autonomieschonend und Gemeinschaftsverträglich. Zur Logik der europäischen Mehrebenenpolitik’, MPIFG Discussion Paper 9/93 (Bonn 1993).
83 Eriksen, EO, and Fossum, JE, ‘The European Union and Post-national Integration’ (ARENA Working Paper No 9/99, Oslo 1999); Joerges, ch, ‘The Law’s Problems with the Governance of the European Market’, in Joerges, C and Dehousse, R (eds), Good Governance in Europe’s ‘Integrated’ Market (Hart 2002) 3 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. All this is very largely in line with the concept developed by Pernice (above n 53 and ibid, ‘Multi-level Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam European Constitution-Making Revisited’ (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 703; and (2002) European Law Review 511) of a ‘constitutional association’, to the extent that it starts from both the de jure and the de facto inter-dependency in the European multi-level system, and seeks to overcome the dichotomies between national and European law. ‘Deliberative’ supranationalism, however, seeks to set out these functions more precisely.