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The Shifting Geometry of Union Citizenship: A Supranational Status from Transnational Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 January 2020

Stephen COUTTS
Stephen COUTTS*
Affiliation:
University College Cork
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Abstract

This Article analyses recent developments in Union citizenship, in particular the relationship between Articles 20 and 21 TFEU. In doing so, it divides Union citizenship into a transnational and a supranational dimension with the transnational dimension having two sub-dimensions: social integration and autonomy. It is argued that we are seeing an increased emphasis on the responsibility of the individual citizen in the context of the transnational dimension and a clear linkage between the transnational and supranational dimensions. The result of these two moves is a status which continues to emphasise the relationship between the Union citizen and the communities represented by Member States, while framing this with a more prominent supranational dimension.

Keywords

Union citizenshipArticle 21 TFEUArticle 20 TFEUright to territoryterritory of the Uniontransnationalsupranational
Type
Articles
Information
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies , Volume 21 , December 2019 , pp. 318 - 341
Copyright
Copyright © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge

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Footnotes

*

I would like to thank Niamh Níc Shuibhne for extremely useful comments on an earlier draft and for subsequent exchanges. I would also like to thank the EU Law Working Group meeting in Dublin and participants at a panel at the Conference of Europeanists 2019 in Madrid, in particular Dimity Kochenov, for comments on previous versions of this Article. Thanks are also due the anonymous reviewers, whose useful comments contributed significantly to the final version of this Article. The usual disclaimer applies.

References

1 The development has been noted in the literature. See, for example, Shuibhne, N Níc, ‘Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of Union Citizenship’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 889Google Scholar; Spaventa, E, ‘Earned Citizenship: Understanding Union Citizenship through Its Scope’ in Kochenov, D (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2017)Google Scholar; and the various contributions in Thym, Daniel (ed), Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU (Hart Publishing, 2017)Google Scholar.

2 This framework is based on chapters 2 and 3 in Coutts, S, Crime, Citizenship and Community in the European Union (Hart Publishing, 2019)Google Scholar.

3 Such a presentation thus fits within the transnational school of thinking about the European Union as described by Lacroix and Nicolaïdis. See the description of this transnational school in Lacroix, J, ‘Is Transnational Citizenship (Still) Enough?’ in Kochenov, D, de Búrca, G, and Williams, A (eds), The EU's Justice Deficit? (Hart Publishing, 2015), pp 177–80Google Scholar, citing Lacroix, J and Nicolaïdis, K, ‘European Stories: An Introduction’ in Lacroix, J and Nicolaïdis, K (eds), European Stories. Intellectual Debates about Europe in National Contexts (Oxford University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Penot, A Iliopoulou, ‘The Transnational Character of Union Citizenship’ in Dougan, M, Shuibhne, N Níc, and Spaventa, E (eds), The Empowerment and Disempowerment of the European Citizen (Hart Publishing, 2012)Google Scholar. This corresponds to what Magnette terms the horizontal dimension of Union citizenship. See Magnette, P, La Citoyennéte Européenne (Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1999), pp 158 ffGoogle Scholar.

4 See Azoulai, L, ‘La Citoyenneté Européenne, un Statut d'Intégration Sociale’ in Cohen-Jonathan, G et al. (eds), Chemins d'Europe: Mélanges en l'honneur de Jean Paul Jacqué (Dalloz, 2010)Google Scholar. See also Barbou des Places, S, ‘The Integrated Person in EU Law’ in Azoulai, L, Barbou des Places, S, and Pataut, E (eds), Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles, Identities (Hart Publishing, 2016)Google Scholar.

5 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77, Rec 18 (‘Citizenship Directive’).

6 For an overview of the role of the concept of social integration in the development of Union citizenship see Azoulai, note 4 above, and Barbou des Places, note 4 above.

7 See, for example, Martinez Sala, C-85/96, EU:C:1998:217, Grzelczyk, C-184/99, EU:C:2001:458, and Bidar v Sec. of State for Education and Skills, C-209/03, EU:C:2005:169.

8 See the classic cases of Garcia Avello v Belgian State, C-148/02, EU:C:2003:539 and Grunkin Paul, C-353/06, EU:C:2008:559.

9 Most emblematic being perhaps Metock v Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform, C-127/08, EU:C:2008:449.

10 See in particular ibid.

11 See especially Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v Eind, C-291/05, EU:C:2007:771.

12 Opinion of AG Sharpston in O & B and S & G, C-456/12 and C-457/12, EU:C:2013:837, para 95. See also the use of the concept of vested rights to explain the ‘name’ case of Grunkin-Paul, EU:C:2008:559 in Kuipers, JJ, ‘Cartesio and Grunkin Paul: Mutual Recognition as a Vested Rights Theory Based on Party Autonomy in Private Law’ (2009) 2(1) European Journal of Legal Studies 66Google Scholar.

13 Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L166/1.

14 Preuß, U, ‘Problems of a Concept of European Citizenship’ (1995) 1(3) European Law Journal 267, 280Google Scholar.

15 Although as noted by Azoulai, it is a rather fragmented concept of integration, referring to specific sites of social or civil integration rather than a coherent national whole. See Azoulai, L, ‘The European Individual as Part of Collective Entities (Market, Family, Society)’ in Azoulai, L, Barbou des Places, S, and Pataut, E (eds), Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles, Identities (Hart Publishing, 2016)Google Scholar.

16 See for example the desire by Belgium to secure integration through a uniform application of naming rules in Garcia Avello, note 8 above, para 40.

17 See generally Coutts, note 2 above, Conclusion.

18 Rottmann v Bayern, EU:C:2010:104, C-135/08.

19 Ruiz Zambrano v ONEm, C-34/09, EU:C:2011:124.

20 In Rottmann, the individual concerned had previously moved from Austria to Germany, a fact which for AG Maduro ensured Mr Rottmann's case was not a purely internal situation (see Opinion of AG Maduro, Rottmann, note 18 above, para 11). In its judgment, the Court of Justice, without referring to prior movement, found simply that Mr Rottmann's status as a Union citizen was sufficient to bring the matter within the scope of Union law (see Rottmann, note 18 above, para 42). This revolutionary aspect of the judgment, while noted (see in particular D Kochenov, ‘Case C-135/08, Rottmann v Friestaat Bayern’ (2010) 47(6) Common Market Law Review 1831), was overshadowed by the more immediately relevant finding that the Court of Justice was imposing constraints on the operation of nationality law.

21 Rottmann v Bayern, note 18 above, paras 55 ff.

22 Zambrano v ONEm, note 19 above, para 44.

23 Ibid, para 42.

24 Something advocated for in for example Kochenov, D, ‘On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship as a Federal Denominator’ in Kochenov, D (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 For an account of this federal bargain in the context of Union citizenship see Shuibhne, N Níc, ‘Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship: What Are the Implications for the Citizen When the Polity Bargain Is Privileged?’ in Kochenov, D (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Presss, 2017)Google Scholar.

26 For a critique of the reasoning of the Court, or absence thereof, see Shuibhne, N Níc, ‘Seven Questions for Seven Paragraphs’ (2011) 36(2) European Law Review 161Google Scholar. For an exploration of what this might entail see Kochenov, D, ‘The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification’ (2013) 19(4) European Law Journal 502CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 Iida v Stadt Ulm, C-40/11, EU:C:2012:691, para 71, speaking of ‘very specific situations’.

28 Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, C-256/11, EU:C:2011:734, para 71.

29 Ymeraga v Minstre du Travail, de l'Emploi et de l'Immigration, C-87/12, EU:C:2013:291, para 37; Iida v Stadt Ulm, note 27 above, para 72.

30 Kramer, D, ‘Earning Social Citizenship in the European Union: Free Movement and Access to Social Assistance Benefits Reconstructed’ (2016) 18 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 270, p 292CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 See in particular Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Brey, C-140/12, EU:C:2013:565.

32 Although some contend that developments do not represent such a radical change and merely reflect a natural development and application of the underlying secondary legislation. See for example Davies, G, ‘Has the Court Changed, or Have the Cases? The Deservingness of Litigants as an Element in Court of Justice Citizenship Adjudication’ (2018) 25(10) Journal of European Public Policy 1442CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 The scholarly treatment has been extensive. For a selection see the contributions in Thym, D (ed), Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU (Hart Publishing, 2017)Google Scholar. See also Shuibhne, note 1 above; Spaventa, note 1 above; Ferrera, M, ‘The Contentious Politics of Hospitality: Intra-EU Mobility and Social Rights’ (2016) 22(6) European Law Journal 791CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 Citizenship Directive, note 5 above, Art 24.

35 Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, C-333/13, EU:C:2014:2358.

36 For an assessment of this case law in terms of interpretation technique and the balance between the legislature and the Court, see van den Brink, M, ‘Justice, Legitimacy and the Authority of Legislation within the European Union’ (2019) 82(2) Modern Law Review 293Google Scholar.

37 Contrary to most interpretations, Davies argues for a certain degree of continuity in the jurisprudence of the Court on these matters. See Davies, note 32 above.

38 For a critique of this and a call for a (return to) more holistic and less economically focused assessment of the degree of an individual integration, see O'Brien, C, Unity in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale of the UK (Hart Publishing, 2017), ch 9Google Scholar. Similarly, Neuvonen argues for a greater focus on inter-subjective dimension of integration, ie between individual Union citizens rather than between Union citizens and (host) Member States. See Neuvonen, P, Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU Law: We the Burden? (Hart Publishing, 2016)Google Scholar.

39 See in particular Alimanovic and Others, C-67/14, EU:C:2015:597, para 60.

40 See Kramer, note 30 above, pp 289–90.

41 Ibid, p 280.

42 See Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, note 35 above, para 39.

43 Gusa v Minister for Social Protection et al, C-442/16, EU:C:2017:1004.

44 Tarola v Minister for Social Protection, C-483/17, EU:C:2019:309.

45 Ibid, paras 46–49.

46 Of course, this does rely on a not unproblematic view of what it means to be in control or otherwise of one's situation where individual choices interact with environmental factors and personal capabilities in a complex manner. I am grateful to Dimity Kochenov for this point.

47 See Gusa v Minister for Social Protection et al, note 43 above, para 44.

48 This does lead us back to the old exclusionary tendencies in market citizenship, where those not conforming to current ideas of productivity and contribution fall outside the scope and protection of this status they supposedly enjoy as fundamental. See especially O'Brien, note 38 above, on this point.

49 See van den Brink, note 36 above.

50 See Kochenov, D and Pirker, B, ‘Deporting the Citizens within the European Union: A Counter-intuitive Trend in Case C-348/09 PI v Obergurgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid’ (2013) 19(2) Columbia Journal of European Law 369Google Scholar; Mancano, L, ‘Criminal Conduct and Lack of Integration into the Society under EU Citizenship: This Marriage is not to be Performed’ (2015) 6(1) New Journal of European Criminal Law 53CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Coutts, S, ‘The Absence of Integration and the Responsibilisation of Union Citizenship’ (2018) 3 European Papers 761Google Scholar.

51 Citizenship Directive, note 5 above, Art 28(3).

52 For this reading of Tsakouridis, C-145/09, EU:C:2010:708 and PI, C-348/09, EU:C:2012:300, see Coutts, S, ‘Union Citizenship, Social Integration and Crime: Duties through Crime’ in Azoulai, L, Barbou des Places, S, and Pataut, E (eds), Constructing the Person in EU Law (Hart Publishing, 2016)Google Scholar, and Coutts, note 2 above, ch 4.

53 K and HF v Belgische Staat, C-331/16 and C-366/16, EU:C:2018:296. For a comment, see S Coutts, ‘The Expressive Dimension of the Union Citizenship Expulsion Regime: Joined Cases C-331/16 and C-366/16, K and HF’ (2018) 3 European Papers 833.

54 K and HF v Belgische Staat, note 53 above, para 60. It should be noted that the Court did mention ‘conduct [presumably current] of the individual concerned that shows the persistence’ of such a disposition. Nonetheless, in preceding paragraphs the Court left no doubt that ‘past conduct alone may constitute [a present threat]’ (para 56) and concluded that the ‘exceptional gravity’ of the initial crimes may lead to the conclusion that the threat to the interests of society is persistent (para 58).

55 Ibid, para 42.

56 Onuekwere v Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-378/12, EU:C:2014:13.

57 Secretary of State for the Home Department v CS, C-304/14, EU:C:2016:674.

58 B and Vomero, C-316/16 and C-424/16, EU:C:2018:256.

59 Citizenship Directive, note 5 above, Art 28(2). See B and Vomero, note 58 above, para 49.

60 Acquisition of permanent residence is premised on the individual having fulfilled the conditions of economic activity or self-sufficiency found in Article 7 of the Directive. See O'Brien, note 38 above, for the difficulties encountered by individuals, even those resident for many years, in fulfilling the conditions of continuous economic activity necessary to secure permanent residence under Article 16 of the Directive.

61 B and Vomero, note 58 above, para 38.

62 Ibid, para 44.

63 Ibid, paras 70–75.

64 See for example Ofanopoulos and Oliveri v Land Baden-Würtemberg, Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01, EU:C:2004:262.

65 Lounes v Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-165/16, EU:C:2017:862.

66 See G Davies, ‘Lounes, Naturalisation and Brexit’ (European Law Blog, 5 March 2018), https://europeanlawblog.eu/2018/03/05/lounes-naturalisation-and-brexit.

67 On this, see Réveillère, V, ‘Family Rights for Naturalised EU Citizens: Lounes’ (2018) 55(6) Common Market Law Review 1855Google Scholar.

68 Lounes v Secretary of State for the Home Department, note 65 above, para 58.

69 See Opinion of AG Bot in Lounes v Secretary of State for the Home Department, note 65 above, para 84.

70 Coman, C-673/16, EU:C:2018:385, in particular stands out as example of the older cases of family reunification based on mutual recognition and the passporting of status, here the status of spouse.

71 O and B, C-456/12, EU:C:2014:135.

72 Coman, note 70 above.

73 With Metock v Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform, note 9 above, being the high-water mark of such an approach.

74 For the original case, see The Queen v Surinder Singh, C-370/90, EU:C:1992:296, and more recently, Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v Eind, note 11 above. Opinion of AG Sharpston in O & B and S & G, note 12 above, who speaks of how rights are ‘passported’ at paragraph 95.

75 Indeed, in Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-60/00, EU:C:2002:434, only temporary service provision abroad was involved.

76 O and B, note 71 above, paras 51–53.

77 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Dias, C-325/09, EU:C:2011:498, para 64.

78 Coman, note 70 above.

79 O and B, note 71 above.

80 Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v Eind, note 11 above.

81 Coman, note 70 above, para 40.

82 Preuß, note 14 above, p 280.

83 Garcia Avello, note 8 above.

84 Grunkin-Paul, note 8 above.

85 See von Wolffersdorff, C-438/14, EU:C:2016:401, and Freitag, C-541/15, EU:C:2017:432, in particular.

86 Coman, note 70 above, paras 43–44.

87 Gusa v Minister for Social Protection et al, note 43 above.

88 Tarola v Minister for Social Protection, C-483/17, EU:C:2019:309.

89 B and Vomero, note 58 above.

90 Onuekwere v Secretary of State for the Home Department, note 56 above.

91 Secretary of State for the Home Department v CS, note 57 above.

92 Coman, note 70 above.

93 Citizenship Directive, note 5 above, Art 3(2).

94 See Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rahman and Ors, C-83/11, EU:C:2012:519; Secretary of State for the Home Department v Banger, C-89/17, EU:C:2018:570; SM v Entry Clearance Officer, UK Visa Section, C-129/18, EU:C:2019:248.

95 Rendón Marín v Administración del Estado, C-165/14, EU:C:2016:675.

96 Secretary of State for the Home Department v CS, note 57 above.

97 Chavez-Vilchez and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank and Others, C-133/15, EU:C:2017:354.

98 Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, note 28 above.

99 Tjebbes v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, C-221/17, EU:C:2019:189.

100 Zambrano v ONEm, note 19 above, para 43.

101 Rendón Marín v Administración del Estado, note 95 above; Secretary of State for the Home Department v CS, note 57 above. For a comment on both judgments, see Neuvonen, P, ‘EU Citizenship and Its “Very Specific” Essence: Rendón Marín and CS’ (2017) 54(3) Common Market Law Review 1201Google Scholar.

102 Rendón Marín v Administración del Estado, note 95 above, paras 82–86; Secretary of State for the Home Department v CS, note 57 above, para 36–48.

103 Rendón Marín v Administración del Estado, note 95 above, para 79.

104 Chavez-Vilchez and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank and Others, note 97 above, para 70.

105 Called for immediately after Zambrano itself by Níc Shuibhne, note 26 above, p 162, and Kochenov, note 26 above.

106 Iida v Stadt Ulm, note 27 above, paras 67–68.

107 Ymeraga v Minstre du Travail, de l'Emploi et de l'Immigration, note 29 above, para 37.

108 Rendón Marín v Administración del Estado, note 95 above.

109 Chavez-Vilchez and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank and Others, note 97 above.

110 Iida v Stadt Ulm, note 27 above, para 72; Ymeraga v Minstre du Travail, de l'Emploi et de l'Immigration, note 29 above, para 37.

111 Rendón Marín v Administración del Estado, note 95 above, para 75. See also the comment in paragraph 77 that ‘as Union citizens, Mr Rendon Marin's children have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the European Union, and any limitation of that right falls within the scope of Union law’.

112 Chavez-Vilchez and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank and Others, note 97 above, para 65.

113 Ibid, para 62. See also Rendón Marín v Administración del Estado, note 95 above, para 73.

114 This is an argument to be made based on a close reading of Chavez-Vilchez that the Court has detached movement from residence, creating a stand-alone right of residence as advocated by AG Sharpston in Opinion of AG Sharpston in Zambrano v ONEm, EU:C:2010:560.

115 Tjebbes v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, note 99 above, para 46.

116 Preuß, note 14 above, p 280.

117 Zambrano v ONEm, note 19 above, para 44. Also explored in detail in N Níc Shuibhne, ‘The ‘Territory of the Union’ in ‘EU Citizenship Law: Charting a Route from Parallel to Integrated Narratives’ Yearbook of European Law (forthcoming, 2019).

118 Rendón Marín v Administración del Estado, note 95 above, para 77; Chavez-Vilchez and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank and Others, note 97 above, para 33. The notion has been addressed somewhat in the literature on this case law. See Azoulai, L, ‘“Euro-Bonds”: The Ruiz Zambrano Judgment or the Real Invention of EU Citizenship’ (2011) 3(2) Perspectives on Federalism 31Google Scholar; Raucea, C, ‘European Citizenship and the Right to Reside: “No One on the Outside Has a Right to Be Inside?”’ (2016) 22(40) European Law Journal 470CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Neuvonen, note 101 above, p 1212.

119 I am grateful to Imelda Maher for pointing out the legal connotations of the concept of territory.

120 Azoulai, note 118 above.

121 See Lindahl, H, ‘Finding a Place for Freedom, Security and Justice: The European Union's Claim to Territorial Unity’ (2004) 29(4) European Law Review 461Google Scholar, for a discussion of territory and in particular the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice precisely in these terms.

122 Art 21 TFEU.

123 Tjebbes v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, note 99 above.

124 As perhaps implied in Kochenov, note 26 above, p 513.

125 With the important exception of limited family reunification rights for non-mobile Union citizens.

126 Neuvonen, note 101 above, pp 1213–14.

127 For the constructive and dynamic nature of Union citizenship, see Kostakopoulou, D, ‘Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change’ (2005) 68(2) Modern Law Review 233CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

128 Arendt, H, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Schoken Books, 2004), p 293Google Scholar. See also Moore, M, A Political Theory of Territory (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp 38 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

129 See also Níc Shuibhne, note 117 above.

130 Everson, M, ‘A Very Cosmopolitan Citizenship: But Who Pays the Price?’ in Dougan, M, Shuibhne, N Níc, and Spaventa, E (eds), Empowerment and Disempowerment of the European Citizen (Hart Publishing, 2012), p 149Google Scholar, quoting Lindahl, note 121 above, in turn quoting Hannah Arendt.

131 Echoes of this can sentiment be found in the Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Rottmann v Bayern, EU:C:2009:588, para 23. There is also an important normative implication in the representation of the territory of the Union whereby certain values are attributed to the Union, informing the protection of Union citizens. See Azoulai, L, ‘Transfiguring European Citizenship: From Member State Territory to Union Territory’ in Kochenov, D (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2017)Google Scholar, and Níc Shuibhne, note 117 above, on this point. In this sense the concept of the territory of the Union as a protective reference is closely connected to developments in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. See generally Coutts, note 2 above.

132 Níc Shuibhne, note 117 above.

133 See Anderson, B, Gibney, M J, and Paoletti, E, ‘Boundaries of Belonging: Deportation and the Constitution and Contestation of Citizenship’ (2011) 15(5) Citizenship Studies 543Google Scholar.

134 Azoulai, note 131 above.

135 In a similar and critical vein, see Everson, note 12 above.

136 Rendón Marín v Administración del Estado, note 95 above, paras 81 ff; Secretary of State for the Home Department v CS, note 57 above, paras 36 ff.

137 For a similar dynamic in the context of voting rights to the European Parliament see Coutts, S, ‘Delvigne: A Multi-Levelled Political Citizenship’ (2017) 42(6) European Law Review 867Google Scholar.

138 And also in the slightly different context of Thierry Delvigne v Commune de Lesparre Médoc and Préfet de la Gironde, C-650/13, EU:C:2015:648.

139 As discussed in Coutts, note 137 above.