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⁷ This belief was enshrined in ‘Say’s Law’, as to which see Galbraith, John K, A History of Economics (London, Penguin, 1991) 74-81 and 116Google Scholar.

⁸ Ibid 193–209, 221–36.

⁹ Hobsbawm (n 5) 102–08.

¹⁰ Hobsbawm (n 5) 94–95 concludes that ‘the Great Slump destroyed economic liberalism for half a century’.

¹¹ Keynes, John M, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (New York, Harcourt, 1936)Google Scholar; Galbraith (n 7) 76. See also Heilbron, Robert, The Worldly Philosophers, revised 7th edn (London, Penguin, 2000) 248-87Google Scholar.

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¹⁵ von Hayek, Friedrich A, The Road to Serfdom (London, George Routledge, 1944)Google Scholar.

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¹⁷ Peck (n 2) 82–133; Steger and Roy (n 2) 17–20.

¹⁸ Hobsbawm (n 5) 271.

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²⁴ See US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. CPI—All Items, updated 1-27-12.U.S. (all urban consumers).

²⁵ Galbraith (n 7) 267.

²⁶ Harvey (n 2) 43–44.

²⁷ Ibid 42–45.

²⁸ Hobsbawm (n 5) 409.

²⁹ As to monetarism, see Boyer (n 6) 511–12; Friedman, Milton, A Program for Monetary Stability (New York, Fordham University Press, 1959)Google Scholar; Hirsch, Abraham and Marchi, Neil de, Milton Friedman’s Economics in Theory and Practice (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gordon, Robert J (ed), Milton Friedman’s Monetary Framework: A Debate with His Critics (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1974)Google Scholar; and Steger and Roy (n 2) 17–18.

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³¹ Galbraith (n 7) 266–82.

³² Hobsbawm (n 5) 409–410.

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³⁹ Hobsbawm (n 5) 431.

⁴⁰ Stiglitz, Joseph, Globalization and its Discontents (London, Allen Lane, 2002) 13 Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Den Bosche, Peter Van, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004) 76-85Google Scholar.

⁴³ Trebilcock et al (n 37) 14.

⁴⁴ Hayek, (n 15) and The Constitution of Liberty (London, Routledge, 1976)Google Scholar; Muller, Jerry Z, The Mind and the Market: Capitalism in Modern European Thought (New York, Albert A Knopf, 2002) 347–87Google Scholar.

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⁴⁷ See Petsoulas (n 45).

⁴⁸ Harvey (n 2) 7.

⁴⁹ Hobsbawm (n 5) 271.

⁵⁰ Hayek, Friedrich A, quoted by Dierckxsens, Wim, The Limits of Capitalism: An Approach to Globalization without Neoliberalism (London, Zed Books, 2000)Google Scholar, emphasis added.

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⁵³ Public choice theory ostensibly de-legitimates government policies by portraying them not as the legitimate outcome of democratic processes, but as representing the capture or co-option of government power by concentrated special interest groups to advance their own selfish interests rather than ‘the public good’. Such theory is then deployed to justify the imposition of constraints upon national regulatory autonomy by means of international trade regimes to ensure free trade and free international capital flows, which are believed by neoliberals to represent the true ‘public good’. See McGinnis, ‘Decline’ (n 51) 916–18. See also McGinnis, ‘Structure of Liberty’ (n 51) 82–83; Stigler, George, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell Journal of Economics & Management Science 3 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Olson, Mancur Jr, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Good and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1965)Google Scholar; Lowenstein, Daniel H, ‘Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics’ (1985) 32 University of California at Los Angeles Law Review 826–28Google Scholar; Mueller, Dennis C, Public Choice II (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; McGinnis, John O and Movesian, Mark L, ‘The World Trade Constitution’ (2000) 114 Harvard Law Review 511, 523–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stephan, Paul B III, ‘Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and International Economic Law’ (1995) 10 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 748, 754Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ McGinnis, ‘Decline’ (n 51) 904; McGinnis, ‘Structure of Liberty’ (n 51) 81.

⁵⁵ McGinnis, ‘Decline’ (n 51) 915, citing Gifford, Daniel J, ‘Federalism, Efficiency, The Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy’ (1995) 44 Emory Law Journal 1227 Google Scholar; McGinnis, ‘Structure of Liberty’ (n 51) 85–86.

⁵⁶ McGinnis, ‘Decline’ (n 51) 914; Epstein, Richard A, ‘Exit Rights under Federalism’ (1992) 55 Law and Contemporary Problems 147, 149CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁷ McGinnis, ‘Decline’ (n 51) 915.

⁵⁸ McGinnis, ‘Structure of Liberty’ (n 51) 81.

⁵⁹ Weingast, Barry, ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’ (1995) 11 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1, 24–28Google Scholar; and Hayek, Friedrich A, ‘The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism’ in Hayek, Freidrich A, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969) 255 Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ McGinnis, ‘Decline’ (n 51) 915.

⁶¹ Ibid 904, 915.

⁶² Ibid 916.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid 917.

⁶⁵ See, eg, Trebilcock et al (n 37) 3–4; Van Den Bosche (n 42) 16–19; Lester, Simon and Mercurio, Bryan with Davies, Arwel and Leitner, Kara, World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008) 46–59Google Scholar; Quereshi and Ziegler (n 37) 11–12; Jackson, John H, Davey, William J and Sykes, Alan O Jr, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text, 4th edn (St Paul, West, 2002) 7–15Google Scholar; Jackson, John H, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1997) 14–19Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ McGinnis, ‘Decline’ (n 51) 914. Thus, Gray, John, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism (London, Granta, 2009) 35 Google Scholar notes that: ‘Neo-liberal economic policies stripped the nation-state of most of its leverage over national economic life.’

⁶⁷ McGinnis, ‘Structure of Liberty’ (n 51) 81, 82.

⁶⁸ McGinnis, ‘Decline’ (n 51) 919–20; McGinnis ‘Structure of Liberty’ (n 51) 87.

⁶⁹ Bork, Robert H, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York, Basic Books, 1978)Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ Ibid 104–05, emphasis added.

⁷¹ Bork (n 69) 105, emphasis added.

⁷² In this respect, neoliberal conceptions of ‘competition’ serve the same purpose as did ‘competition’ under classical liberalism, namely to provide a rationale for preventing the state from interfering in the market. As Hovenkamp, Herbert, ‘The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition’ (1988–89) 74 Iowa Law Review 1019 Google Scholar, 1021 has put it: ‘The law of competition was classicism’s mechanism for keeping politics out of state decision-making about the allocation of resources.’ See also Millon, David, ‘The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power’ (1988) 61 Southern California Law Review 1219 Google Scholar.

⁷³ See, eg, Graells, Albert Sánchez, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) 104 and 227–359 Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ Harvey (n 2) 67. Thus, as Harvey observes, the virtues of ‘competition’ have been used to justify creating markets in rights to pollute and to justify the privatisation or outsourcing of state functions.

⁷⁵ Ibid 79.

⁷⁶ Ibid 92; see also 87.

⁷⁷ Ibid 69–70.

⁷⁸ As satirised by the words of the anti-hero Gordon Gecko in the film Wall Street (1987): ‘Greed … is good.’

⁷⁹ See Bork (n 69) 119–21; and Posner, Richard A, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (1979) 8 Journal of Legal Studies 103 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Economic Theory of the Common Law’ (1981) 9 Hofstra Law Review 775, 786–94; ‘The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman’ (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 243; and ‘Wealth Maximization Revisited’ (1985–87) 2 Notre Dame Journal of Legal Ethics & Public Policy 85. Neoliberals reject the learning of the 1930s (such as Berle, Adolph A and Means, Gardiner, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York, Macmillan, 1933)Google Scholar) that suggested that under managerial capitalism, the motives of those directing firms may be dis associated from profit-maximisation for the firm. For criticisms of profit-maximisation as a legal norm, see Coleman, Jules L, ‘Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization’ (1979–80) 8 Hofstra Law Review 509 Google Scholar; Dworkin, Ronald, ‘Is Wealth a Value?’ (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 191 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kronman, Anthony T, ‘Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle’ (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 227 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Weinrib, Ernest J, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (1980) 30 University of Toronto Law Journal 307 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁰ Harvey (n 2) 79.

⁸¹ Ibid 64.

⁸² Ibid 15–17, 26, 54; Steger and Roy (n 2) 23–29, 38–39, 59–60; Peck (n 2) 159–60. In the US under President Reagan, the neoliberal attachment to low taxes was said to be justified by a ‘supply-side’ approach to economics based on the ‘Laffer curve’, essentially a theory that tax revenues are zero whether charged at either a 0 per cent or a 100 per cent rate and that, whilst the maximum tax revenue arises somewhere between those two extremes, the revenue maximisation point was lower than had hitherto been assumed; in other words, lower taxes than hitherto would, it was believed, yield more tax revenue. See Steger and Roy (n 2) 24; Canto, Victor A, Joines, Douglas H and Laffer, Arthur B, Foundations of Supply-side Economics: Theory and Evidence (New York, Academic Press, 1983)Google Scholar. See also Mundell, Robert A, Monetary Theory: Interest, Inflation and Growth in the World Economy (Pacific Palisades, Goodyear, 1971)Google Scholar; and Mundell, Robert A and Kemp, Jack, A Monetary Agenda for World Growth (Boston, Quantum, 1983)Google Scholar.

⁸³ See Plante, Raymond, The Neoliberal State (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009)Google Scholar; Prasad, Monica, The Politics of Free Markets: The Rise of Neoliberal Economic Policies in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006)Google Scholar; Steger and Roy (n 2) 15–17.

⁸⁴ Harvey (n 2) 11–19, 65–66.

⁸⁵ Harvey (n 2) 64 notes that ‘the freedom of businesses … to operate within [an] … institutional framework of free markets and free trade is regarded as a fundamental good’. See also Harvey (n 2) 66, 72 and 93; and Steger and Roy (n 2) 35–38, 51–58 referring to President Clinton’s ‘market globalism’.

⁸⁶ Harvey (n 2) 166.

⁸⁷ As to public sector outsourcing, see Knight, Louise and Holland, Christine, ‘Outsourcing: A National and Sector Level Perspective on Policy and Practice’ in Erridge, Andrew, Fee, Ruth and Mclloy, John (eds), Best Practice Procurement: Public and Private Sector Perspectives (Aldershot, Gower, 2012) 55 Google Scholar; Kakabadse, Andrew and Kakabadse, Nada, ‘Outsourcing in the Public Sector: A Comparative Analysis of Practice, Capability and Impact’ (2001) 21(5) Public Administration and Development 401 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Grimshaw, Damian, Vincent, Steve and Willmott, Hugh, ‘Going Privately: Partnership and Outsourcing in UK Public Services’ (2002) 80(3) Public Administration 475 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁸ Harvey (n 2) 76–77. As to public-private partnerships, see Christina D Tvarnø (ed), PublicPrivate Partnerships: An International Analysis—From a Legal and Economic Perspective, available at www.cbs.dk/files/cbs.dk/public-private_partnerships_an_international_analysis_-_from_a_legal_and_economic_perspective_0.pdf.

⁸⁹ Ibid 67.

⁹⁰ See, eg, Graells (n 73) 76–77.

⁹¹ Harvey (n 2) 67–68.

⁹² As to ‘market-based instruments’, see Glen Hepburn, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Report, ‘Alternatives to Traditional Regulation’ available at www.oecd.org/regreform/regulatory-policy/42245468.pdf; Stavins, Robert N, ‘MarketBased Environmental Policies’ in Portney, Paul R and Stavins, Robert N, Public Policies for Environmental Protection (Washington DC, Resources for Nature, 2000)Google Scholar; Bailey, Ian, ‘Market Environmentalism, New Environmental Policy Instruments, and Climate Change in the United Kingdom and Germany’ (2007) 97(3) Annals of the Association of American Geographers 530 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bakker, Karen, ‘Neoliberalising Nature? Market Environmentalism in Water Supply in England and Wales’ (2005) 97(3) Annals of the Association of American Geographers 542 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and McCarthy, James and Prudham, W Scott, ‘Neoliberal Natures and the Nature of Neoliberalism’ (2004) 35 Geoforum 275 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹³ Harvey (n 2) 67.

⁹⁴ Harvey (n 2) 64.

⁹⁵ Thus: ‘Private finance projects are contractual arrangements between the public and private sectors, which use at least some funding raised through the private sector, to deliver public authorities’ objectives. The costs, including the finance costs, are eventually paid by the public authority through annual payments, or by users through charges. In this context, public authorities are public sector bodies that commission the project. In doing this, the public authorities manage the tendering, governance and contractual relationships for the public sector’; National Audit Office, Private Finance Projects, A Paper for the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, October 2009 (hereinafter ‘NAO Report’) para 1.1. In a similar vein: ‘The PFI is a form of public private partnership … that marries a public procurement programme, where the public sector purchases capital items from the private sector, to an extension of contracting-out, where public services are contracted from the private sector’; Grahame Allen, The Private Finance Initiative (PFI), House of Commons Library, Research Paper RP01/117, 18 December 2001, available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP0111710, also stating that the ‘PFI differs from privatisation in that the public sector retains a substantial role in PFI projects, either as the main purchaser of services or as an essential enabler of the project. It differs from contracting out in that the private sector provides the capital asset as well as the services. The PFI differs from other public-private partnerships in that the private sector also arranges finance for the project; and that [u]nder the most common form of PFI, the private sector designs, builds, finances and operates (DBFO) facilities based on “output” specifications decided by public sector managers and their departments.’

⁹⁶ NAO Report (n 95) para 1.1.

⁹⁷ See the Executive Office of the President of the United States, ‘Fiscal Year 2013 Historical Tables’, Budget Office of the US Government, Table 1.1, third column.

⁹⁸ See Eurostat, ‘Government Deficit/Surplus, Debt and Associated Data, 2012’, available at http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=gov_dd_edpt1&lang=en.

⁹⁹ To this list might be added protection from economic meltdown when banks are pushed to the brink of failure by their own reckless lending policies and the very de-regulation of the banking sector which neoliberal policies have mandated, as happened in the 2008 financial crisis.

¹⁰⁰ Even this strategy may be disciplined by the market because, as the international federalists have predicted, globalised capital markets will, as we have seen in the years since the financial collapse in 2008 and the ensuing Eurozone crisis, punish countries whose debt is considered too high by demanding higher bond yields (interest payments) for lending to them by purchasing government bonds.

¹⁰¹ See Allen (n 95) 20–25; NAO Report (n 95) paras 3.1–3.34; House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, First Report of Session 2009–10, Private Finance Projects and Off-Balance Sheet Debt, HL Paper No 63-I, 17 March 2010, vol 1 (hereinafter ‘HL Paper 63-I’) para 56; House of Common Treasury Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session 2010–12, ‘Private Finance Initiative’, August 2011, HC 1146, vol 1 (hereinafter ‘Treasury Committee Report’) paras 10–25.

¹⁰² HL Paper 63-I (n 101) para 56. The government has recently undertaken to publish Whole of Government Accounts showing the present value of PFI liabilities (£144.6 billion as at 2010–11), but PFIs are still generally not shown as part of the national debt: HM Treasury, A New Approach to Public-Private Partnerships, December 2012, paras 1.22, 1.29 and Box 1.E.

¹⁰³ See, eg, HL Paper 63-I (n 101) paras 51–53.

¹⁰⁴ NAO Report (n 95) 35–44; HL Paper 63-I (n 101) para 53.

¹⁰⁵ See National Audit Office evidence, quoted by HL Paper 63-I (n 101) para 53.

¹⁰⁶ NAO Report (n 95) paras 3.1–3.9 (as regards incentives to use PFI generally) and paras 3.10–3.12 (as regards ‘PFI credits’).

¹⁰⁷ A comprehensive range of assumptions built into the PFI–PSC comparison which would have the effect of tilting the balance in favour of PFI are listed in Treasury Committee Report (n 101) paras 62–65 and Box 2. Such assumptions include those as to the discount rate, ‘optimism bias’ and those about the tax yield from PFIs as compared to conventional procure ments. See also HL Paper No 63-I (n 101) paras 31–39 (discount rates) and 34–37 (optimism bias); House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, Forty-Fourth Report, ‘Lessons from PFI and Other Projects’, 1 September 2011, HC 1201, para 2 (as regards PFI partners going offshore); House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, ‘Delivering Better Value for Money from the Private Finance Initiative’, Twenty-Eighth Report of Session 2002–03, published 19 June 2003, 9 June 2003, HC 764, para 6: ‘We have seen many cases where the public sector comparator has been incorrectly used as a pass or fail test. In these cases the desire to show that the PFI deal is “cheaper” than the public sector comparator has led to manipulation of the underlying calculations and erroneous interpretation of the results.’

¹⁰⁸ Andreas Kappeler and Mathieu Nemoz, European Investment Bank Economic and Financial Report 2010/04, Public-Private Partnerships in Europe: Before and During the Recent Financial Crisis, July 2010, available at www.eib.org/attachments/efs/efr_2010_v04_en.pdf 7, Table 1.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid 8, Table 2.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid 7, Table 1.

¹¹⁴ European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC), Market Update: Review of the European PPP Market in 2012, available at www.eib.org/epec/resources/epec-market-update-2012-en.pdf Figure 1.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ There were 26 UK public-private partnership transactions in 2012 having an aggregate value a little below €6 billion and accounting for 48 per cent of the aggregate value of all EU public-private partnerships in the period. France was the next most active with 22 transactions worth a little below €4 billion. Only seven other Member States transacted public-private partnerships that year, each country’s transactions being worth on aggregate less than €1 billion; EPEC (n 114) 2 and Figure 2.

¹¹⁷ See the OECD Recommendations on Principles for Public Governance of Public-Private Partnerships (OECD, Paris, May 2012, available at www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/PPPnoSG. pdf; and the proceedings of the OECD Senior Budget Officials Network on Public-private Partnerships, available at www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/seniorbudgetofficialsnetworkonpublicprivatepartnershipsppps.htm.

¹¹⁸ Among the many resources dedicated to public-private partnerships (including PFI-type public-private partnerships) on the IMF website (www.imf.org/external/index.htm), see International Monetary Fund, Public-Private Partnerships, 12 March 2004, available at www. imf.org/external/np/fad/2004/pifp/eng/031204.htm.

¹¹⁹ The World Bank has financed many projects involving public-private partnerships, including, as recent examples, the Donsin Transport Infrastructure Project for Burkina Faso (P120960, approved 16 May 2013); the Second Kerala State Transport Project for India (P130339, approved 14 May 2013); and the Energy Sector Capacity Building Project for Tanzania (P126875, approved 26 March 2013); EPEC (n 114). It has funded training on publicprivate partnerships, for example, for the State Bank of Pakistan (see World Bank, Training on Infrastructure Finance in Public Private Partnership Projects, 2010 (available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/12392 ) and its ‘Open Knowledge Repository’ (at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org) holds hundreds of papers on the subject.

¹²⁰ The EIB has been a major funder of debt finance to European public-private partnerships. See PriceWaterhouseCooper, ‘Delivering the PPP Promise: A Review of PPP Issues and Activity’, available at www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/government-infrastructure/pdf/promisereport. pdf, Annex B, showing that up to 8 June 2005, the EIB had funded public-private partnership projects to the value of €19,489 million. See also EIB, ‘The EIB’s Role in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)’, 15 July 2004, available at www.eib.org/attachments/thematic/eib_ppp_en.pdf.

¹²¹ European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Mobilising Private and Public Investment for Recovery and Long-Term Structural Change: Developing Public Private Partnerships’ COM(2009) 615 final, para 1.

¹²² PriceWaterhouseCooper (n 122) Appendix C, showing that by October 2005, the EU’s Cohesion Fund, European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) had together co-financed PPPs to the extent of €952 million.

¹²³ European Commission (n 121) para 3.4.

¹²⁴ Ibid para 3.

¹²⁵ Ibid para 3.2. As to the Joint Technology Initiative, see the Joint Sherpas Group, Final Report, ‘Designing Together the “Ideal House” for Public-Private Partnerships in European Research’, January 2010, available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/jti/index_en.cfm; European Commission, ‘Report to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Brussels—First Interim Evaluation of the ARTEMIS and ENIAC Joint Technology Initiatives’ COM(2010) 752 final.

¹²⁶ European Commission, ‘Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions’ COM/2004/0327 final; ‘Staff Working Paper— Report on the Public Consultation on the Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and Community law on Public Contracts and Concessions’ SEC(2005) 629; ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions’ COM(2011) 897 final; and ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Award of Concession Contracts’ COM(2011) 897 final.

¹²⁷ Thus, for example, public-private partnerships brought to a financial close in Europe in 2012 included Phase 1 of the Intercity Express Programme in the UK (€3.2 billion), the NimesMontpellier high-speed rail bypass in France (€1.8 billion), the Rotterdam World Gateway port expansion in the Netherlands (€720 million) and the Tribunal de Grand Instance de Paris in France (€563 million): EPEC (n 114). For the capital value of PFI contracts in the UK, see HM Treasury, ‘PFI Signed Projects List: March 2012’ and ‘PFI Projects in Procurement: March 2012’, both available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/pfi-projects-data.

¹²⁸ Daintith, Terence, ‘Legal Analysis of Economic Policy’ (1982) 9 Journal of Law and Society 191 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Daintith, Terence, ‘Regulation by Contract: The New Prerogative’ (1979) Current Legal Problems 41 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹²⁹ Graells (n 73) 5 takes an ultra-neoliberal position on the matter, arguing that: ‘It can hardly be overemphasised that public procurement is a mechanism of government intervention.’

¹³⁰ Graells (n 73) 36.

¹³¹ Council Directive 71/305/EC of 26 July 1971 concerning the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts [1971] OJ L185/5.

¹³² Directive 2004/18 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L134/114.

¹³³ Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors [2004] OJ L134/1.

¹³⁴ Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC.

¹³⁵ Directive 2004/17, art 16; Directive 2004/18, art 7; Directive 2009/4, art 8. The current thresholds are all helpfully stated at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/rules/current/index_en.htm#maincontentSec2.

¹³⁶ Council Directive of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (89/665/EEC) [1989] OJ L395/33, as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts [2007] OJ L335/31.

¹³⁷ Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors [1992] OJ L76/14, as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts [2007] OJ L335/31.

¹³⁸ Directive 89/665, art 1(3) and Directive 92/13, art 1(3) (each as amended by Directive 2007/66) require that national review procedures be available to ‘at least to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement’.

¹³⁹ Arrowsmith (n 1) 12–138; Arrowsmith, Sue, ‘The Purpose of the EU Procurement Directives: Ends, Means and the Implications for National Regulatory Space for Commercial and Horizontal Procurement Policies’ in Barnard, Catherine, Gehring, Markus with Solane, Iyiola (eds), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol 14 (2011–2012) (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) 1 Google Scholar; Poulsen, Sune T, Jakobsen, Peter S and KalsmoseHjelmborg, Simon E, EU Public Procurement Law: The Public Sector Directive, the Utilities Directive, 2nd edn (Copenhagen, Djøf Publishing, 2012) 29–30Google Scholar; Sohrab, A, ‘The Single European Market and Public Procurement’ (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 522, 524CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bovis, Christopher H, EU Public Procurement Law (Cheltenham, Elgar European Law, 2007) 1–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and see Graells (n 73)108.

¹⁴⁰ Directive 2004/18, arts 23–24; Directive 2004/17, arts 34–35; Directive 2009/81, arts 18–19.

¹⁴¹ Directive 2004/18, arts 28–34; Directive 2004/17, art 40; Directive 2009/81, arts 25–29, 50.

¹⁴² Directive 2004/18, arts 44, 46–52; Directive 2004/17, arts 40, 56; Directive 2009/81, arts 38, 40–46.

¹⁴³ Directive 2004/18, art 45; Directive 2004/17, arts 51–54; Directive 2009/81, art 39.

¹⁴⁴ Directive 2004/18, art 53; Directive 2004/17, art 55; Directive 2009/81, art 47.

¹⁴⁵ Arrowsmith (n 139) 17–20.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid 6–8.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid 8–13, 15.

¹⁴⁹ For the corresponding provisions of Directive 2004/17, see art 10.

¹⁵⁰ See, eg, Directive 2004/18, art 23(1)–(2) (as regard technical specifications, art 53(1)–(2) (contract award criteria) and arts 35–55 (advertising and transparency).

¹⁵¹ Arrowsmith (n 139) 20–22. As to the distinction between public purchaser decisions that hinder access to contracts and the purchaser’s decision as to ‘what to buy’, see Kunzlik, Peter, ‘Green Public Procurement: European Law, Environmental Standards and “What to Buy” Decisions’ (2013) 25(2) Journal of Environmental Law 173 CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

¹⁵² For a concise explanation of the evolution of the public procurement regime through four ‘generations’ of directives, see Bovis (n 139) 17–62.

¹⁵³ See, eg, Directive 2004/18, recital 1, indicating that the directive ‘is based on Court of Justice case-law’.

¹⁵⁴ The most important new procedure, intended to facilitate public-private partnerships, was ‘competitive dialogue, as to which see Directive 2004/18, art 29.

¹⁵⁵ See Arrowsmith (n 1) 126–61; Arrowsmith, Sue, ‘The Past and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From Framework to Common Code?’ (2005–06) 35 Public Contracts Law Journal 337 Google Scholar; Bovis (n 139) 17–62; Trepte, Peter, Public Procurement in the EU: A Practitioner’s Guide (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 27–38 Google Scholar and xxvii–xxviii.

¹⁵⁶ Each directive excludes certain specified types of contract from their scope: see Directive 2004/17, arts 19–26; Directive 2004/18, arts 10, 12–18; Directive 2009/81, arts 11–13.

¹⁵⁷ As to the application of the TFEU to public procurement decisions see Drijber, Berend Jan and Stergiou, Hélène, ‘Public Procurement Law and Internal Market Law’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 805 Google Scholar; Arrowsmith (n 1) 182–247; Trepte (n 155) 3–27; Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik, ‘EC Regulation of Public Procurement’ and Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Application of the EC Treaty and Directives to Horizontal Policies: A Critical Review’ both in Arrowsmith and Kunzlik (eds) (n 3) at 56–87 and 247–48 respectively. As to the application of general principles derived from the TFEU to public procurement decisions see, eg, Case C-275/98 Unitron Scandinavia and 3-S [1999] ECR I-8291 [31]; Case C-324/98 Telaustria Verlags GmbH & and Telefonadress GmbH v Telecom Austria AG [2000] ECR I-10745 [60]–[62]; Case C-231/03 Conzorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v Comune di Cingia de’ Botti [2005] ECR I-7287 [16]–[17]; C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH v Gemeinde Brixen & Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-8585 [46]–[52]; Case C-507/03 Commission v Ireland [2007] ECR I-9777 [29]–[32]; Case C-260/04 Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I-7083 [22]– [26]; Case C-324/07 Coditel Brabant SA v Commune d’Uccle & Région de Bruxelles-Capitale [2008] ECR I-8457 [25], [26]; Case C-91/08 Wall AG v La ville de Francfort-sur-le-Main & Franfurter Entsorgungsund Service (FES) GmbH [2010] ECR I-2815 [33]–[38]; and Case C-203/08 Sporting Exchange Ltd v Minister van Justitie [2010] ECR I-4695 [39]–[41].

¹⁵⁸ Joined Cases C-147/06 and 148/06 SECAP SpA and Santorsi Soc coop arl v Comune di Torino [2008] ECR I-3565 [31].

¹⁵⁹ Case C-6/05 Medipac-Kazantzidis AE v Venizelio-Pananio (PESY KRITIS) [2007] ECR I-4557 [33]; Case T-258/06 Germany v Commission [2010] ECR II-2027 [80]–[84].

¹⁶⁰ Priority services are those listed in Annex IIA of Directive 2004/18. Their award is subject to all of the relevant rules of the directive: see arts 20, 23–55 and Annex IIA. Nonpriority services are those listed in Annex IIB of Directive 2004/18. They are subject only to the Directive’s rules governing technical specifications and to a duty to publish notice of the award of such a contract: see arts 20, 23, 35(4) and Annex IIB. The corresponding provisions of Directive 2004/17 are arts 31 and 32 and Annex XVII A and B, and of 2009/81 are arts 15 and 16 and Annexes I and II.

¹⁶¹ Directive 2004/18, art 17. Service concessions are contracts whereby the concessionaire contracts with a contracting authority to provide services, but is remunerated not by the contracting authority, but by charging fees to users.

¹⁶² Directive 2004/18, arts 56–61. Works concessions are contracts whereby the concessionaire contracts with a contracting authority to construct an asset (such as a road or bridge), but is remunerated not by the contracting authority, but by charging fees to users. Both works concessions and services concessions are wholly excluded from Directive 2004/17, art 18.

¹⁶³ Treumer, Steen and Werlauff, Erik, ‘The Leverage Principle: Secondary Community Law as a Lever for the Development of Primary Community Law’ (2003) 28 European Law Review 124 Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁴ European Commission, ‘Interpretative communication on the Community Law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives’ [2006] OJ C179/2; and Commission, ‘Interpretative communication on concessions under Community Law’ [2000] OJ C121/2, noted by M Krugner (2003) Public Procurement Law Review 181.

¹⁶⁵ European Commission (n 126).

¹⁶⁶ Arrowsmith and Kunzlik (n 157) 59–72; and Kunzlik (n 151).

¹⁶⁷ Directive 2004/18, art 53 and Annex VI.

¹⁶⁸ Case C-243/89 Commission v Denmark (‘Storebælt’) [1993] ECR I-3353.

¹⁶⁹ Directive 2004/18, art 44.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid art 53(1)(b).

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid art 53(1)(a).

¹⁷³ Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin kaupunki & HKLBussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213.

¹⁷⁴ Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635.

¹⁷⁵ Case C-225/98 Commission v France (‘Nord Pas-de-Calais’) [2000] ECR I-7445.

¹⁷⁶ Concordia (n 173) [55].

¹⁷⁷ Ibid [60]–[69]. The requirement for a ‘link to the subject matter of the contract’ was reiterated in Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-14527 [66].

¹⁷⁸ Concordia (n 173) [55].

¹⁷⁹ Ibid [59].

¹⁸⁰ See EVN (n 177), where the Court held (at [67]–[71]) that use of a MEAT contract award criterion giving credit at the bid evaluation stage to tenderers who could supply an amount of electricity from renewable energy sources that exceeded the amount to be purchased by the contracting authority was not ‘linked to the subject matter of the contract’, since it related to the tenderer’s capacity to supply such electricity to others and so was incompatible with EU law. The purpose of the requirement was to encourage the development of renewable energy capacity, but, since it was not linked to the subject matter of the contract, it was unlawful. It discriminated against small producers of green electricity who, although having sufficient capacity to meet the contracting authority’s needs, did not have greater capacity.

¹⁸¹ Directive 2004/17, recital 1 and art 55(1)(a); Directive 2004/18, recital 1 and art 53(1) (a); and Directive 2009/81, art 47 all require that MEAT award criteria must be ‘linked to the subject matter of the contract’. Recital 71 of Directive 2009/81, however, formulates this principle in rather different terms, stating that: ‘The determination of [MEAT award criteria] … depends on the object of the contract, since they must allow the level of performance offered by each tender to be assessed in the light of the object of the contract as defined in the technical specifications, and the value for money of each tender to be measured.’

¹⁸² See, eg, European Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication on the Community Law Applicable to Public Contracts and the Possibilities for Integrating Environmental Considerations into Public Contracts’ COM(2001) 274, final, paras 1.1 and 1.2.

¹⁸³ Peter Kunzlik, ‘The Procurement of “Green” Energy’ in Arrowsmith and Kunzlik (n 3) 391–401; Kunzlik, Peter ‘“Green Procurement” under the New Regime’ in Neilsen, Ruth and Treumer, Steen (eds), The New EU Public Procurement Directives (Copenhagen, Djøf, 2005) 126–31Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁴ EVN (n 177) [72]. As to the importance of green electricity, see also Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099 [72]–[81].

¹⁸⁵ European Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication on the Community Law Applicable to Public Contracts and the Possibilities for Integrating Environmental Considerations into Public Contracts’ COM(2001) 274, final, paras 1.2; and European Commission, Buying Green! A Handbook on Environmental Public Procurement (Luxembourg, Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004, section 3.4.2Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁶ See Kunzlik, ‘Green Procurement’ (n 183); and Kunzlik, ‘The Procurement of “Green” Energy’ (n 183). See also Trepte, Peter, ‘The Contracting Authority as Purchaser and Regulator: Should the Procurement Rules Regulate What We Buy?’ in Ølykke, Griff S, Hansen, Carina R Risvig and Tvarnø, Christina D (eds), EU Procurement Directives: Modernisation, Growth and Innovation (Copenhagen, Djøf, 2012) 95 Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁷ Case C-368/10 Commission v The Netherlands [2012] 3 CMLR 234 as to which see Kunzlik, Peter, ‘From Suspect Practice to Market-Based Instrument: Policy Alignment and the Evolution of EU Law’s Approach to “Green” Public Procurement’ (2013) 22(3) Public Procurement Law Review 97, 102–04Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁸ Concordia (n 173) [62].

¹⁸⁹ Ibid [63].

¹⁹⁰ Ibid [61].

¹⁹¹ Commission v The Netherlands (n 187) [62] (precision as regards technical specifications); [88] (precision as regards award criteria), as to which see Kunzlik (n 187) 97.

¹⁹² Concordia (n 173).

¹⁹³ Case C-44/96 Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria AG and others v Strohal Rotationsdruck GesmbH [1998] ECR I-73.

¹⁹⁴ Case C-360/96 Gemeente Arnhem & Gemeente Rheden v BFI Holding BV [1998] ECR I-6821.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid [42].

¹⁹⁶ Ibid [43].

¹⁹⁷ Arrowsmith (n 139) 14, 27.

¹⁹⁸ Case C-380/98 The Queen v HM Treasury, ex parte The University of Cambridge [2000] ECR I-8035.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid [17] emphasis added.

²⁰⁰ Concordia (n 173) [55].

²⁰¹ Case C-213/07 Michaniki AE v Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ipourgos Epikratias [2008] ECR I-9999.

²⁰² Ibid [54] emphasis added.

²⁰³ Thus, for example, Graells (n 73) 111 argues that revisiting this question is ‘a must’ in order to ensure ‘more competition-oriented procurement’.

²⁰⁴ Graells (n 73).

²⁰⁵ Arrowsmith (n 139).

²⁰⁶ Graells (n 73) 41, 49, 58–60, 100, 101 and 111.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Graells, Albert Sánchez, ‘More Competition-Oriented Public Procurement to Foster Social Welfare’ in Thai, KV (ed), Towards New Horizons in Public Procurement (Boca Raton, PrAcademics Press, 2010) 81, 105Google Scholar.

²⁰⁹ Graells (n 73) 23.

²¹⁰ Ibid 19–20.

²¹¹ Ibid 12.

²¹² Ibid 5.

²¹³ Ibid 14. Nor does Graells consider that the relationship between competition policy and public procurement policy is one of equals. His analysis is ‘grounded on two starting assumptions: that competition goes first, and that there is room for more competition in public procurement’: ibid 12.

²¹⁴ Ibid 19 emphasis added.

²¹⁵ Ibid 19–20.

²¹⁶ From amongst the extensive legal literature on modernisation of EU competition enforcement policy, see Gerber, DavidJ, ‘Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law’ (2007–08) 31 Fordham International Law Journal 1265 Google Scholar. As regards the nature of modernisation as a neoliberal coup, see Buch-Hansen, Hubert and Wigger, Angela, The Politics of Competition Regulation: A Critical Political Economy Perspective (Abingdon, Routledge, 2011)Google Scholar.

²¹⁷ Buch-Hansen and Wigger (n 218). Robert Bork, a Chicago neoliberal and one of the prophets of the antitrust revolution in the US, himself saw his work as part of an ideological struggle to entrench free markets with minimum government interference: see Bork (n 69) 418–25. His revolution triumphed when, in Reiter v Sonotone Corp 442 US 330 (1979), the Supreme Court asserted, citing only Bork (n 69), that the ‘floor debates’ during the passage of the Act ‘suggest that Congress designed the Sherman Act as a consumer welfare prescription’. This coup was confirmed by the Supreme Court in NCAA v Board of Regents 468 US 85 (1984) 107, which cited Reiter as authority for its unqualified assertion (made without consideration of the Court’s own long-standing jurisprudence) that ‘Congress designed the Sherman Act as a consumer welfare prescription’. As Bork and his fellow Chicago neoliberals would have wished, their revolution, if not always producing antitrust doctrine that conforms absolutely to their preferred model, has produced a ‘market-freeing’ approach under which firms operating in the ‘free market’ are less extensively controlled by antitrust intervention. Indeed, belief in the free market underlies the new jurisprudence: see Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc 433 US 36 (1977) 57, where the Court referred to ‘our free market economy’; Business Electronics Corporation v Sharp Electronics Corporation, 485 US 717 (1988) 726, where the Court referred to the need ‘to assure the market-freeing effect’ of Sylvania; FTC v Superior Court Trial Lawyers’ Association 493 US 411 (1990) 434, where it condemned a ‘strike’ by trial lawyers (who had collectively refused to undertake publicly funded work unless the rate of remuneration was improved) as being equivalent to an unlawful price-fixing conspiracy and stated that, like all such conspiracies, it ‘posed some threat to the free market’; NCAA v Board of Regents, 113, where it described a price-fixing and output-limiting arrangement as ‘a restraint upon the operation of a free market’; and Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP 540 US 398 (2004) 407, where it referred to monopoly as ‘an important element of the free market system’ (emphasis added in all cases). Fox, Eleanor M, ‘Consumer Beware Chicago’ (1985–86) 84(8) Michigan Law Review 1714 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 1715–16 describes the neoliberal nature of Chicago antitrust as follows: ‘The dominant thread is this: The heart of Chicago School is not its model for finding a violation. The heart is everything else. Chicagoans state what the law reprehends in terms as narrow as possible. Chicago is not fighting a war against inefficiency. Chicago is fighting a war for private freedom of action. Chicago’s critical contention and presumption that firms act efficiently is not a descriptive observation that produces the conclusion that almost everything is legal. It is simply [an] argument supporting the normative claim that people (including firms) should be left free to act and that there is almost never a higher social interest’.

²¹⁸ Graells (n 73) 5.

²¹⁹ Ibid 6.

²²⁰ Ibid 10 and see ibid 101–05.

²²¹ Ibid 85.

²²² Ibid 86–87.

²²³ Ibid 15.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid

²²⁶ Ibid 10.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ See, eg, Graells (n 73) 109, who observes that developments in EU public procurement policy (presumably the ruling in Concordia (n 173) and the legislative provisions of subsequent directives which codified it) had been guilty of ‘“reintroducing” secondary policies’ into the procurement system and that, from his perspective, this made it necessary to ‘redefine EU public procurement policy… in order to maintain or develop competition-oriented rules’.

²²⁹ Graells (n 73) 60.

²³⁰ Ibid 98–99.

²³¹ Ibid 100.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid 24.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ As to the ‘negative and deregulatory’ nature of the non-discrimination aspect of internal market law, see Craig, P and Búrca, G de, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 606 Google Scholar.

²³⁸ Some see EU internal market law as serving the very purpose of facilitating regulatory arbitrage and thereby allowing the market to impose its de-regulatory pressure on Member States, reflecting the international federalist thinking that we have already explored. For accounts of such ‘competitive federalism’, see Poiares, Miguel, We, the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998) 107–08, 131–36Google Scholar; and Barnard, Catherine, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) 25–27 Google Scholar.

²³⁹ See Apeldoorn, Bastiaan van, ‘The Contradictions of “Embedded Neoliberalism” and Europe’s Multi-level Legitimacy Crisis: The European Project and its Limits’ in Apeldoorn, Bastiaan van, Drahokoupil, Jan and Horn, Laura (eds), Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European Governance: From Lisbon to Lisbon (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 24 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁴⁰ Arrowsmith (n 139).

²⁴¹ Ibid 2.

²⁴² Ibid 26.

²⁴³ Ibid 26.

²⁴⁴ Ibid 1, 25.

²⁴⁵ Ibid 36–40.

²⁴⁶ Directive 71/305/EEC, recital 9; Council Directive 77/62/EEC of 21 December 1976 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts [1977] OJ L13/1, recital 12; Council Directive 88/295/EEC of 22 March 1988 amending Directive 77/62/EEC relating to the coordination of procedures on the award of public supply contracts and repealing certain provisions of Directive 80/767/EEC [1988] OJ L127/1, recital 6: Council Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts [1993] OJ L199/1, recital 14; and Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts [1993] OJ L199/54, recital 10.

²⁴⁷ Directive 77/62/EEC, recital 2; Directive 80/767/EEC, recital 3; Directive 98/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 amending Directive 93/38/EEC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors [1998] OJ L101/1, recital 2.

²⁴⁸ Council Directive 89/440/EEC of 18 July 1989 amending Directive 71/305/EEC concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts [1989] OJ L210/1, recital 6.

²⁴⁹ Directive 89/440/EEC, recital 14; Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts [1992] OJ L209/1, recital 20.

²⁵⁰ Directive 89/440/EEC, recital 19.

²⁵¹ Directive 89/665/EEC, recital 3; and Directive 92/13/EEC, recital 5.

²⁵² Council Directive 93/38/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors [1993] OJ L199/84, recital 9; and Directive 98/4/EC, recital 8.

²⁵³ Directive 2004/18, recitals 2, 29, 46, 41, 46 and arts 23(2), 44(3), 44(4), 72.

²⁵⁴ Ibid recitals 4, 8, 31 and arts 29(6), 29(7), 32(2), 33(7), 54(8).

²⁵⁵ Ibid arts 35, 41(3), 69.

²⁵⁶ Ibid recitals 12, 13, 15, 31, 36.

²⁵⁷ Ibid recital 21.

²⁵⁸ Ibid recital 28.

²⁵⁹ See, eg, Directive 2004/17, recitals 4, 5, 7–9, 11, 15, 20–23, 27, 28, 32, 38–42, 44, 55 and arts 14(4), 15(7), 27, 28, 30, 34(2), 49(2), 54(3), 56(9), 65(2). See also Directive 2009/81, recitals 15, 18, 23, 35, 38, 40, 48, 49, 55, 56, 58, 63, 69, 72, 73 and arts 18(2), 21(4), 27(6)–(7), 29(2), 30(3), 35(3), 38(3)–(5), 48(8) and 52(6)–(7).

²⁶⁰ Storebælt (n 168) [33], applied, eg, in Concordia (n 173) [81]; and Joined Cases C-21/03 and C-34/03 Fabricom SA v État belge [2005] ECR I-1559 [26].

²⁶¹ Beentjes (n 174) [21]; Case C-27/98 Metalmeccanica Fracasso SpA & Leitschutz Handels-und Montage GmbH v Amt der Salzburger Landesregierung für den Bundesminister für wirtschaftlicheAngelegenheiten [1999] ECR I-5697 [26]–[27]; Case C-399/98 Ordine degli Architetti delle Province di Milano e Lodi, Piero De Amicis, Consiglio Nazionale degli Architetti, Leopoldo Freyrie & Comune di Milano v Pirelli SpA, Milano Centrale Servizi Spa & Fondazione Teatro all Scala [2001] ECR I-5409 [52]; Case C-247/02 Sintesi SpA v Autorità per la Vigilanza sui Lavori Pubblici [2004] ECR I-9215 [35]–[40]; Case C-220/05 Jean Auroux and others v Commune de Roanne [2007] ECR I-385 [52].

²⁶² Telaustria (n 157) [62].

²⁶³ Case C-470/99 Universale-Bau AG [2002] ECR I-11617 [51]–[53]; Case C-214/00 Commission v Kingdom of Spain [2003] ECR I-4667 [50]–[53].

²⁶⁴ Ordine degli Architetti (n 261) [52].

²⁶⁵ Case C-107/98 Teckal Srl v Comune di Viano and Azienda Gas-Acqua Consorziale (AGAC) di Reggio Emilia [1999] ECR I-8121, Opinion of AG Cosmas, 1 July 1999 [48].

²⁶⁶ Metalmeccanica Fracasso (n 261) [31]–[33].

²⁶⁷ Metalmeccanica (n 261) [31]; Sintesi (n 261) [37].

²⁶⁸ Ordine degli Architetti (n 261) [52]; Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99 Impresa Lombardini SpA & Impresa Generale di Costruzioni v ANAS—Ente nazionale per le strade and Società Italiana per Condotte d’Acqua SpA; and Impresa Ing. Mantovani Spa v ANAS— Ente nazionale per le strade & Ditta Paolo Bregoli [2001] ECR I-9233 [34]; Universale-Bau (n 263) [89]; Michaniki (n 201) [39]; Case C-480/06 Commission v Germany [2009] ECR I-4747 [47]; Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle & RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall—und Energieverwetungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-26 [44] (and see [23]); Case C-340/04 Carbotermo SpA & Consorzio Alisei v Comune di Busto Arzizio & AGESP SpA [2006] ECR I-4137 [58]; and Case C-337/06 Bayerischer Rundfunk and others v GEWA—Gesellschaft f ür Gebäudereinigung und Wartung mbH [2007] ECR I-11173 [39].

²⁶⁹ Case C-411/00 Felix Swoboda GmbH v Österreichische Nationalbank [2002] ECR I-10567 [33].

²⁷⁰ Joined Cases C-226/04 and C-228/04 La Cascina Soc coop arl & Zilch Srl v Ministero della Difesa, & Others, and Consorzio GfM v Ministero della Difesa & La Cascina Soc coop arl [2006] ECR I-1347 [3].

²⁷¹ Ibid [4]. Cf Commission v Spain (n 263) [53], which refers to the ‘dual objectives of opening up competition and transparency’ pursued by the directives.

²⁷² Case C-412/04 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-619 [2]; Case C-454/06 Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v Republic Österreich (Bund), APA-OTYS Originaltext—Service GmbH & APA Austria Presse Agentur registrierte Genossenschaft mit beschränkter Haftung [2008] ECR I-4401 [31].

²⁷³ See, eg, Case 240/83 Procureur de la République v Association de défense des brûleurs d’huiles usagées [1985] ECR 531 [9]; Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV [1999] ECR I-3055 [36] and [37]; Telaustria (n 157) [62]; and SECAP (n 158).

²⁷⁴ TFEU arts 101, 102, 103(2), 106, 108, 109.

²⁷⁵ [2007] OJ C306/1.

²⁷⁶ Originally art 3(f) EEC, renumbered as art 3(g) EEC, and again renumbered as art 3(1)(g) EC.

²⁷⁷ [2007] OJ C 306/156.

²⁷⁸ Piris, Jean-Claude, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010) 309 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁷⁹ As to Europe’s ordoliberal heritage, see Gerber, David J, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998)Google Scholar; and Fox, Eleanor M ‘The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium’ (1981) 66 Cornell Law Review 1140 Google Scholar.

²⁸⁰ Emphasis added. As to ordoliberalism’s economic freedom rationale, see Monti, Giorgio, EC Competition Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 23–25 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Möschel, W, ‘Competition Policy from an Ordo Point of View’ in Peacock, A and Willgerodt, H (eds), German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy (London, Macmillan, 1989)Google Scholar; W Möschel, ‘The Proper Scope of Government Viewed from an Ordo Point of View: The Example of Competition Policy’ (2001) Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics 3; Gormsen, Liza Lovdahl, A Principled Approach to Abuse of Dominance in European Competition Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rose, Ian and Ngwe, Cynthia, ‘The Ordoliberal Tradition in the European Union, its Influence on Article 82 EC and the IBA’s comments on the Article 82 EC Discussion Paper’ (2007) 3 Competition Law International 8 Google Scholar; Bloch, Robert E et al, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Article 82 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act’ (2006) 7 Business Law International 136, 141Google Scholar; Monti, Georgio, ‘The Concept of Dominance in Article 82’ (2006) 2 European Competition Journal 31, 42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁸¹ Monti, EC Competition Law (n 280) 23–24. The concept of economic efficiency which underlies Graells’ argument is incompatible with neoliberal precepts (ibid 24).

²⁸² United States v Topco Associates Inc 405 US 596 (1972) 610, emphasis added. See also Northern Pacific R Co v United States 356 US 1 (1958) 3; and Times-Picayune Pub Co v United States 345 US 594 (1953) 605.

²⁸³ Wils, Wouter PJ, ‘The Modernization of the Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Commission’s Proposal for a New Council Regulation replacing Regulation No 17’ (2001) 24 Fordham International Law Journal 1655 Google Scholar has noted that: ‘The insertion of the prohibition of restrictive agreements in European law, as well as around the same time in German national law, was due to American influence, if not pressure.’ See also Freyer, Tony A, Antitrust and Global Capitalism, 1930–2004 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006) 245–314 Google Scholar; Wells, Wyatt, Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World (New York, Columbia University Press, 2002) 163–74Google Scholar; and Spierenburg, Dirk (with Poidevin, Raymond), The History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation (London, Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1994)Google Scholar.

²⁸⁴ Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461 [125].

²⁸⁵ Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV & Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel NV v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I-4529 [38]; Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited and others v Commission and others [2009] ECR I-9291 [63]; Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corporation v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601 [664]; and Case C-95/04 P British Airways plc v Commission [2007] ECR I-2331 [106] (and [68] of AG Kokott’s Opinion). See also Jones, Alison and Sufrin, Brenda, EU Competition Law Text, Cases and Material 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 51 Google Scholar.

²⁸⁶ See n 282 above and its associated text.

²⁸⁷ Karel Van Miert, ‘A Pragmatic Approach to Europe’s Competition Policy’, in FrontierFree Europe, Monthly Newsletter (5 April 1993), emphasis added.

²⁸⁸ This was originally stated by recital 2 of the second coordinating directive, Directive 77/62/EEC. Similar statements were also to be found in Directive 80/767/EEC, recital 3; Directive 98/4/EC, recital 3.

²⁸⁹ Storebælt (n 168) [33].

²⁹⁰ Concordia (n 173) [81].

²⁹¹ Lombardini and Mantovani (n 268) [34]; Ordine degli Architetti (n 261) [52].

²⁹² Mannesmann (n 193) [323]; Ordine degli Architetti (n 261) [75], where the Court held, as regards Directive 93/38, that: ‘Exposure to Community competition in accordance with the procedures provided for by the Directive ensures that the public authorities cannot indulge in favouritism.’ See also Lombardini and Mantovani (n 268) [35], which states as regards Directive 93/37 that: ‘The primary aim of the Directive is thus to open up public works contracts to competition. It is exposure to Community competition in accordance with the procedures provided for by the Directive which avoids the risk of the public authorities indulging in favouritism’ (emphasis added); ex parte The University of Cambridge (n 198) [17].

²⁹³ BFI Holding BV (n 194) [4]; ex parte The University of Cambridge (n 198) [16]; Case C-237/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-939 [41]; Lombardini and Mantovani (n 268) [36]; Universale-Bau (n 263) [51]; Case C-19/00 SIAC Construction Ltd v County Council of the County of Mayo [2001] ECR I-7725 [32]; Case C-92/00 Hospital Ingenieure Krankenhaustechnik PlanungsmbH (HI) v Stadt Wien [2002] ECR I-5553 [43]; and Bayerischer Rundfunk (n 268) [38] (as regards Directive 92/50).

²⁹⁴ See, eg, Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc 429 US 477 (1977) 488.

²⁹⁵ European Commission, ‘Green Paper on the Modernisation of EU Public Procurement Policy: Towards a More Efficient European Procurement Market’ COM(2011) 15 final, 39.

²⁹⁶ Concordia (n 173).

²⁹⁷ Directive 2004/18, recital 5. See also Directive 2004/17, recital 12.

²⁹⁸ See also Directive 2004/17, recital 55; and Directive 2009/81, recital 5.

²⁹⁹ Directive 2004/18, recital 1.

³⁰⁰ See also European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement’ COM(2011) 896 final (the Proposed New Public Contracts Directive); and European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors’ COM(2011) 895 final.

³⁰¹ Arrowsmith, Sue, ‘National and International Perspectives on the Regulation of Public Procurement: Harmony or Conflict?’ in Arrowsmith, Sue and Davies, Arwel (eds), Public Procurement: Global Revolution (London, Kluwer Law International, 1998) 7 Google Scholar; Arrowsmith, Sue, Linarelli, John and Wallace, Don Jr, Regulating Public Procurement (The Hague, Kluwer Law, 2000) 29 Google Scholar.

³⁰² Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, Jr (n 301) 29.

³⁰³ See, eg, Allen (n 95) 28 29, 39-42; HL Paper 63-I (n 101) paras 76–114; House of Commons Treasury Committee (n 101) 15–36; House of Commons Public Accounts Committee Twenty-Second Report of Session 2002-03, ‘PFI refinancing update’, 13 June 2003, HC 203, 3; House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, Twenty-Fifth Report of Session 2006–07, ‘Update on PFI debt refinancing and the PFI equity market’, 15 May 2007, HC 158.

³⁰⁴ Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, Jr (n 301) 29.

³⁰⁵ Arrowsmith (n 303) 7; Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace (n 301) 29.

³⁰⁶ Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace (n 301) 30.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace (ibid 31–32) consider that there is inevitably a tradeoff between achieving value for money and the need to ensure that the procurement process is itself efficient. However, value for money itself may be compromised if an overly elaborate and expensive procurement procedure is used relative to the value of the contract.

³⁰⁹ Concordia (n 173) [55]. See also Beentjes (n 174); and Case C-324/93 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Evans Medical and Macfarlan Smith [1995] ECR I-563 which held that a contracting entity may ‘choose the criteria it regards as relevant when it assesses the tenders submitted’; Concordia (n 173) [45].

³¹⁰ Graells (n 73) 25.

³¹¹ Indeed, the only sense in which one might conceivably regard the regulation of public procurement by the EU as ‘domestic’ would be to the extent that it applies to the procurement activities of the institutions of the EU itself, but that is clearly not the situation at which Graells’ argument is directed.

³¹² Graells (n 73) 52–53.

³¹³ Emphasis added.

³¹⁴ TFEU, art 10.

³¹⁵ Ibid art 11.

³¹⁶ Ibid art 12.

³¹⁷ Ibid art 8.

³¹⁸ Ibid art 9.

³¹⁹ Ibid art 7.

³²⁰ The Lisbon Strategy of 2000 (Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000) relaunched in 2006 (Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (23/24 March 2006) 7775/1/06, Brussels, 18 May 2006), aimed to make Europe ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (23/24 March 2006) 7775/1/06, Brussels, 18 May 2006, para. 5).

³²¹ European Commission, ‘Communication, Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ COM(2010) 2020 final 5, 12, 15, 16, 17, as to which see Kunzlik (n 187).

³²² Kunzlik (n 187) analyses the relevant initiatives, which include, in particular, European Commission ‘A Lead Market Initiative for Europe’ COM(2007) 860 final; ‘Public Procurement for a Better Environment’ COM(2008) 400 final; ‘A Resource-efficient Europe’ COM(2011) 21 final; ‘Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative Innovation Union’ COM(2010) 546 final; Commission Communication, ‘An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage’ COM(2010) 614 final; ‘Energy 2020—A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy’ COM(2010) 639 final; ‘Towards a Single Market Act For a highly competitive social market economy—Fifty proposals for improving our work, business and exchanges with one another’ COM(2010) 608 final; Presidency Conclusions, Gothenburg European Council (15 and 16 June 2001) paras 19–32, available in European Commission, A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development (Luxembourg, Office of Official Publications of the EC, 2002) 7–15 Google ScholarPubMed (endorsing European Commission, ‘A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development’ COM(2001)264 final); Renewed EU Sustainable Development Strategy, adopted by the European Council on 15–16 June 2006, 10917/06, Brussels, 26 June 2006; and European Commission ‘The Sustainable Consumption and Production and Sustainable Industrial Policy (‘SCP/SIP’) Action Plan’ COM(2008) 397 final.

³²³ Kunzlik (n 187).

³²⁴ Ibid; Kunzlik (n 151).

³²⁵ Kunzlik (n 187).

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement’ COM(2011) 896 final (the ‘Proposed New Public Contracts Directive’); and European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors’ COM(2011)895 final. See also European Commission, ‘Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy—Toward a more efficient European procurement market’ COM(2011) 15 final.

³²⁸ See Kunzlik (n 187).

³²⁹ The Proposed New Public Contracts Directive COM(2011) 896 final, recital 41, art 40(1) and Annex VIII (1)(a) and (b).

³³⁰ Ibid arts 66(1)(b), 67(1). See also recital 40.

³³¹ Ibid art 66(2)(d).

³³² Ibid.

³³³ European Commission, ‘Sustainable Consumption and Production and Sustainable Industrial Policy’ COM(2008) 397 final 7, 8.

³³⁴ Since 2008, EU GPP criteria have been developed for 19 categories of product, including, eg, copying paper, office IT equipment, construction, transport and furniture. See www.ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/index_en.htm and its links.

³³⁵ See, eg, European Commission, ‘Public Procurement for a Better Environment’ COM(2008) 400 final 5–6.

³³⁶ See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/toolkit_en.htm.

³³⁷ See Kunzlik (n 187).

³³⁸ The first such legislation was Regulation (EC) 106/2008 [2008] OJ L39/1 on a Community energy-efficiency labelling programme for office equipment. See also Directive 2009/33 [2009] OJ L120/5 on the promotion of clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles.