¹ In the framework of this article “implementing legislation” and “secondary legislation” will be used synonymously.

² In this case, the basic Directive is not based on Art. 174 of the EC Treaty, the legal basis for environmental legislation, but on Art. 95. When it is so, the main objective of the Directive in question is the internal market, though the protection of the environment might represent an ancillary aim. An example of this kind of legislation is Directive 94/62 on packaging and packaging waste Directive, OJ 1994 L 365/10 (hereafter referred to as “the packaging Directive”). See Part IV F below.

³ Jans, J.H. European Environmental Law (Groningen, European law Publishing, 2000) 132 Google Scholar.

⁴ The text of the Community measure will also specify whether the committee operates according to the Advisory, the Management or the Regulatory procedures. Until the adoption of the new comitology Decision 468/1999, OJ 1999 L 184/23, the Community act also identified the variant of the Management or Regulatory procedures which were to be followed in the process of adoption of implementing legislation. The new comitology decision has simplified the two procedures, by abolishing the variants. The standard rules of procedures of committees operating under the new comitology decision are published in OJ 2001 C 38/3.

⁵ We will see further to what extent it is true that the comitology procedures are democratically accountable. For a more detailed analysis of this issue see Toeller, A.E. and Hofmann, C.H. “Democracy and the Reform of Comitology” in Andenas, M. and Türk, A. (eds.) Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000) 25 Google Scholar.

⁶ Flynn, B. “Postcards from the Edge of Integration? The Role of Committees in EU Environment Policy-Making”, in Christiansen, T. and Kirchner, E.J. (eds.) Committee Governance in the European Union (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000) 79 Google Scholar.

⁷ This organism was created to fill the communication gaps between the Commission and the Member States. It consists of the Directors-General of the member’s states environmental administrations. The Group provides for a forum of information exchange and unconstrained discussion. Bursens, P. Beyers, J. Kerremans, B. “The Environment Policy Review Group and the General Consultative Forum”, in Van Schendelen, M.P.C/M. (ed.) EU Committees as Influential Policy Makers (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998) 30 Google Scholar.

⁸ The Forum was originally called “General Consultative Forum on the environment” and it was set up through Commission Decision 93/701, OJ 1993 L 328/53, to advise the Commission on aspects of both sustainable development and environmental policy. In 1997, the Forum slightly changed its name and widened its mandate. See Commission Decision, OJ 1997 L 58/48. The Forum is composed of 32 members and it brings together representatives from the sectors of production, the business world, regional and local authorities, professional associations, unions and environmental and consumer organisations. The Forum is a “depen dent creature” of the Commission both in terms of practical organisation of its meetings and activities. The opinions of the Forum are not legally binding; as a result, the Commission is totally free either to neglect or to incorporate the Forum’s views in future legislation. Bursens, P. Beyers, J., Kerremans, B. “The Environment Policy Review Group and the General Consultative Forum”, in Van Schendelen, M.P.C/M. (ed.) EU Committees as Influential Policy Makers (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998) 32 Google Scholar.

⁹ The waste management committee is a permanent advisory committee, set up by the Commission in 1976, OJ 1976 L 115/73. It operates in the field of DG XI by providing the Commission with legal advice. It does not have a direct formal influence on decision making process, as comitology committees do. Four committees are supervised by the WMC: the packaging committee, the technical adaptation committee on waste (TAC), the shipment of waste committee and the landfill of waste committee. Van Kippersluis, R. “The Waste Management Committee”, in Christiansen, T. and Kirchner, E.J. (ed.) “Committee Governance in the European Union” (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000) 50 Google Scholar.

¹⁰ These committees are mostly concerned with consumer health and food safety rather than with environmental risks. In 1997 the Commission replaced the existing scientific committees with new ones in order to improve coherence and avoid overlaps. See Commission’s decision 97/579 in OJ 1997 L 237/18. For a more detailed account of the operation of these committees see Falke, J. “Comitology: from Small Council to Complex Network” in Andenas, M. and Türk, A. ( ed.) Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000) 359 Google Scholar.

¹¹ Türk, A. “The Role of the Court of Justice” in Andenas, M. and Türk, A. (ed.) Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000) 240 Google Scholar.

¹² This committee replaces the scientific advisory committee to examine the toxicity and ecotoxicity of chemical compounds (see Commission Decision 78/618, OJ 1978 L 198/17). As a side comment, it has to be underlined that this committee is mostly composed of scientists who are toxicologists rather than eco-toxicologists. This implies that the members of the committee are well placed to assess the impact of certain substances on human beings whereas they are inevitably less suited to appreciate the consequences of spreading the same substances into the environment. This is due to the fact that the study of environmental consequences of spe cific human activities is still a relatively new domain of scientific knowledge.

¹³ OJ 2000 C 225/2.

¹⁴ Commonly known as “Horizontal environmental Directives” are those on environmental impact assessment, industrial risks, access to environmental information.

¹⁵ See Art. 19 of Directive 96/61, OJ 1996 L257/26.

¹⁶ For the list of committees operating in environmental policy, see the budget 2000, OJ 2000 L 40, 491.

¹⁷ Joerges, C. Neyer, J. “Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-Solving: European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector” 4 (1997) Journal of European Public Policy 620 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ Weiler affirms: “Committees do exercise considerable political and policy discretion without adequate political accountability”, see “Prologue: Amsterdam and the Quest for Constitutional Democracy”, in O’Keeffe, D. and Twomey, P.M. (eds.) Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999) 15 Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Early studies on committees operating in the field of environmental policies were carried out by Demmke, C. (ed.), “Managing European Environmental Policy”—The Role of the Member States in the Policy Process”, EIPA, (Maastricht 1997)Google Scholar.

²⁰ This is especially true for the EPRG. It is here that the Commission gathers political information on national realities which allows it to take initiatives or to refrain from doing it.

With the sole use of national experts and technocrats within the comitology procedures the Commission would be unable to do this. See Bursens, Beyers, Kerremans above n 7 at 36.

²¹ They come from the national environmental ministries and from the economic affairs or industry ministries.

²² Töller, A. E. “The ‘Article 19 Committee’: the Regulation of the Environmental Management and Audit Scheme”, in Van Schendelen, M.P.C/M. (ed.), EU Committees as Influential Policy Makers, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998) 182 Google Scholar.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ The importance of the integration principle has progressively increased since 1997 when it was singled out in Art. 6 the Amsterdam EC Treaty. In March 2000 the Council asked the Commission to report on “the progress in relation to the integration of the environment in Commission’s work” by June 2001. See Council Conclusions on the Commission’s global assessment of the fifth action programme, Council document 6775, 30 March 2000, point 16. See on this principle Wasmeier, M. “The Integration of Environmental Protection as a General Rule for Interpreting Community Law” 38 (2001) CMLRev 159 Google Scholar.

²⁵ Interview with Commission’s officials of DG ENT.

²⁶ See Art. 202 para. 3 of the Amsterdam EC Treaty.

²⁷ See for description of the case law on the distinction between “legislation” and “implementation”, Lenaerts, K. Verhoeven, A. “Towards a Legal Framework for Executive Rule-Making in the EU? The Contribution of the New Comitology Decision” 37 (2000) CMLRev 650 Google Scholar. For a detail account of the Court of Justice’s contribution in shaping the implementing system see Türk, above n 11 at 217.

²⁸ Lanz, K. and Scheuer, S. “EEB Handbook on EU Water Policy under the Water Framework Directive”, (2001) 47 Google Scholar published on EEB website: http://www.eeb.org.

²⁹ See the tasks of the committee, set up by Art. 20 of the Council Directive 92/43 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ 1992 L 206/7.

³⁰ See Art. 16 of Directive 1999/31 on landfill of waste, OJ 1999 L 182/1.

³¹ An exhaustive list of comitology executive measures in the field of the environment is provided by Demmke, C. “Comitology in the Environmental sector” in Andenas, M. and Türk, A. (eds.) Delegated Legislation and the Kole of Committees in the EC (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000) 283 Google Scholar.

³² Gehring, T. “Bargaining, Arguing and Functional Differentiation of Decision-Making: the Role of Committees in European Environmental Process Regulation”, in Joerges, C. and Vos, E. (eds.), EU committees: social regulation, law and politics (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999) 208 Google Scholar.

³³ In the ESC opinion on the “Proposal for a Council Directive relating to limit values for sulphur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter and lead in ambient air”, it is stated: “Under Article 7(6) of the draft in conjunction with Article 12 of the framework Directive, the technical details concerning measurement and sampling are to be adapted to progress by the Commission using the so-called comitology procedure. But according to the second sentence of Article 12(1) of the framework Directive, amendments which result in a direct or indirect modification of limit values or alarm thresholds must be dealt with under the normal legislative procedure [. . .]” See OJ 1998 C 214/1.

³⁴ “Some of the Annexes of the proposed Directive being of political nature (e.g. Annexes II, IV, V), the Council is of the opinion that their future possible adaptation should be done according to the co-decision procedure.” See Art. 16 of Common position on incineration of waste n. 7/2000, OJ 2000 C 25/43.

³⁵ “Given the political nature of most of the Annexes (which to a certain extent also replace some of the former Articles), not all of the Annexes mentioned in amendment 91 should be adapted through a Committee procedure [. . .].” See amendments 91 and 92 of the Common Position n. 41/1999 of 22 October 1999 adopted by the Council in the field of a framework water policy, OJ 1999 C 343/1.

³⁶ See COM (2000) 347. Art. 13 of the Commission’s proposal states that adaptation to technical progress of Annexes II, III, IV will be carried out through the comitology procedures. This implies that the remaining Annexes of the future Directive will be changed according to the standard decision-making process.

³⁷ OJ 1975 L 194/39.

³⁸ OJ 1991 L 78/32.

³⁹ It is worth emphasising that the change of the definition of waste would have to pass through the codecision procedure.

⁴⁰ The Court of Justice distinguished between the “essential elements” to be adopted on the basis of the standard decision-making procedures and the non-essential elements to be decided through comitology procedure in Case C-25/70 Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und FuttermittellKöster, [1970] ECR 1151.

⁴¹ Above texts nn 27 to 32.

⁴² See the cases of the eco-label, the eco-audit and GMO committees described in the following section.

⁴³ This is the case of biotechnology Directives, (90/219 and 90/220), as it is described in C., Landfried “Beyond Technocratic Governance the Case of Biotechnology”, 3 (1997) ELJ 255 Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ On the contrary, one author argues that the nitrate committee is “very powerful in terms of its formal powers”, as it has the possibility to adapt, without further express constraints or guidelines, all annexes to scientific and technical progress. Gehring above n 32 at 209.

⁴⁵ See articles 8–9 of Directive 91/676, OJ 1976 L 375/1.

⁴⁶ Gehring, above n 32.

⁴⁷ This conclusion can be found in reports of the European Environmental Agency which state: “Nitrate concentrations in major EU rivers are largely unchanged since 1980.” See EP Resolution of 6 December 2000 (A5–O386/20OO) on the implementation of the nitrate Directive 91/676, p. 5.

⁴⁸ This conclusion does not necessarily justify the idea that the Commission should no longer resort to comitology procedures and that the annexes should be exclusively agreed among the Community Institutions. Indeed, one cannot deny the need for comitology to provide a rapid updating mechanism in response to technical and scientific progress. The pitfall of leaving such a task in the hands of the political decision-making bodies (apart from the fact that they lack expertise) is that they might take many years before getting an agreement on technical thresholds to be incorporated into the Directives. Meanwhile, the quality of the environment deteriorates.

⁴⁹ The Eco-label regime is regulated by Regulation 1980/2000, OJ 2000 L 237/1.

⁵⁰ The eco-audit procedure was set up by Regulation n. 1836/93, OJ 1993 L 168/1. Art. 19 of the Regulation lays down the powers of the comitology committee.

⁵¹ See Art. 21 of Directive 90/220, OJ 1990 L 117/15.

⁵² See on this Committee the study of Butt Philip, A. “The Eco-label Regulatory Committee” in Van Schendelen, M. (ed.), “EU Committees as Influential Policy Makers” (Aldershot, 1998) 164 Google Scholar.

⁵³ See on this Committee the study of Töller, above n 22.

⁵⁴ OJ 1992 L 99/1.

⁵⁵ See Art. 7.

⁵⁶ Further minor tasks of the Committee were the adoption of a decision on the costs of processing the application for eco-label and the drawing up of the standard contract for the use of eco-label.

⁵⁷ It is worth remarking that nothing in the Committee’s organisation assures that the final choice—technical in character, but with political implications—will be made taking environ mental protection as a priority.

⁵⁸ Above n 49.

⁵⁹ Now the tasks of the Committee consist of: establishing the working plan in co-operation with the Commission (Art. 5); laying down the specific ecological criteria for each product group and their respective periods of validity in co-operation with the EUEB (Art. 6.2); in adapting the Annexes of the Regulation to technical progress including progress in the relevant international standardisation activities (Art. 16). Further tasks are mentioned in Arts. 9.2, 11, 12 and 13.

⁶⁰ See Commission’s decision 2000/730 establishing the European Union Eco-labelling board and its rules of procedure, OJ 2000 L 293/24, para. 3.

⁶¹ See above n 50.

⁶² The main tasks may be defined as follows: the adoption of guidelines concerning the frequency of audits (Art. 4 (2)); the recognition of national, European or international standards for auditing systems and certification procedures that meet the requirements of the regulation (Art. 12); the adaptation of the Annexes of the Regulation (Art. 17). Furthermore, the Committee is to promote collaboration between Member States concerning the accreditation of environmental verifiers (Art. 6(6)).

⁶³ On one occasion, the Committee agreed to recognise that three national standards on environmental management systems partly satisfied the requirements of EMAS. On the second occasion, the Committee expressed its opinion on a Commission decision to recognise that international standards ISO/EN-standards 14001:1996 partly meet the requirements of EMAS. See Töller, above n 22 at 183.

⁶⁴ Landfried, C. “The European Regulation of Biotechonology by Polycratic Governance Governance” in Joerge, C. and Vos, E. (eds.) EU committees: social regulation, law and politics (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999) 179 Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ See on this point Weiler who underlines how the Court feels uneasy to take technical decisions in the field of motor car or food safety, above n 18 at 16.

⁶⁶ Above n 51.

⁶⁷ Bradley, K. “The GMO-Committee on Transgenic Maize; Alien Corn, or the Transgenic Procedural Maze”, in Van Schendelen above n 52, 207.

⁶⁸ Commission Decision 97/98, OJ 1997 L 031/69.

⁶⁹ Resolution on biosafety and food security, OJ 1996 C 362/277.

⁷⁰ Bradley, above n 67 at 212.

⁷¹ Written question, n. 388/97 by Ilona Graenitz to the Council, OJ C 1997 319/64.

⁷² Resolution on genetically modified maize, OJ 1997 C 123/29.

⁷³ National bans are possible under Art. 16 of Directive 90/220.

⁷⁴ See European Parliament R5-0075/2001 adopted the 14 February 2001, not yet published in the OJ. Due to space constraints, it is not possible in this context to analyse the text of the new GMO Directive.

⁷⁵ “Ban on GMOs widens biotech industry divide” European Voice (15-21 March 2001).

⁷⁶ Gaja, G. “Note to the case C-6/99 Association Greenpeace France and others v. Ministère de l’agriculture et de la Pêche and others , [2000] ECR 1651, 37 (2000) CML Rev 1428 Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ See Declarations on Council decision 1999/468, OJ C 1999 203/1.

⁷⁸ Ibid. para. 3.

⁷⁹ Töller, above n 22 at 191.

⁸⁰ Commission Decision 2001/119, OJ 2001 L 47/32.

⁸¹ On the relationship between comitology committees and the European Parliament see, C., Blumann “Le Parlement Européen et la Comitologie: une Complication pour la Conférence Intergouvernementale de 1996”, 1 (1996) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europeen 1 Google Scholar; Hix, S. “Parliamentary Oversight of Executive Power: What Role for the European Parliament in Comitology”, in Christiansen, T. and Kirchner, E.J. (eds.) Committee Governance in the European Union, (Manchester University Press, 2000) 62 Google Scholar; Reich, C. “Le Parlement Européen et la ‘Comitologie’”, 336 (1990) RMC 319 Google Scholar.

⁸² See case C-230/78, Eridania [1979] ECR 2749; C-46/86, Romkes I [1987] ECR 2671. These cases are quoted by K., Bradley “Comitology and the Law: Through a glass, darkly”, 29 (1992) CMLRev 701 Google Scholar.

⁸³ Case 156/93, European Parliament v. Commission [1995] ECR 1–2019 and Case C–303/94, European Parliament v. Council [1996] ECR-1393.

⁸⁴ See Türk, above n 11.

⁸⁵ Above n 83.

⁸⁶ Above n 83.

⁸⁷ Council Regulation n. 2092/91, OJ 1991 L198/1.

⁸⁸ The implementing Regulation is Commission Regulation 207/93, OJ 1991 L 25/5 which defines the content of Annex VI to the basic regulation.

⁸⁹ Council Directive 91/414, OJ 1991 L230/1.

⁹⁰ Council Directive 94/43, OJ 1994 L 227/31.

⁹¹ The Parliament is one of the legislators in the European Community together with the Council. However, it does not enjoy implementing powers which are exercised by the Commission, the Council and the committees. This is why the Parliament is concerned with the way the Council uses its implementing powers. Should the Council make an abusive use of its implementing powers the Parliament’s legislative powers would be consequently eroded.

⁹² The proposal of clearly defining the tasks of the implementation committee is advocated by Toeller and Hofmann above n 5 at 45.

⁹³ Directive 2000/59, OJ 2000 L 332/81.

⁹⁴ Directive 96/62, OJ 1996 L 296/55.

⁹⁵ Art. 12.

⁹⁶ Bradley, K. “Institutional Aspects of Comitology: Scenes from the Cutting Room”, in Joerges, C. and Vos, E. (eds.) EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999) 92 Google Scholar.

⁹⁷ See Part B. v).

⁹⁸ Interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament and the Commission on procedures for implementing Council decision 1999/468 of June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, OJ 2000 L 256/19.

⁹⁹ Art. 7(3) of the 1999 comitology decision.

¹⁰⁰ Art. 8, ibid.

¹⁰¹ See paragraph C of the European Parliament’s Resolution on the 1999 interinstitutional agreement, OJ 2000 C 339/269.

¹⁰² Ibid. para. 3.

¹⁰³ The Parliament needs to re-organise itself in the following respects: it has to set up a system which guarantees, in a short space of time, the collection of all draft implementing measures sent by the Commission, the distribution of such measures to the competent committees for discussion and the holding of a debate in the plenary for controversial implementing measures.

¹⁰⁴ Interviews with civil servants of the European Parliament. During these interviews, it emerged that the European Parliament is internally divided as to whether it makes sense for the Parliament to systematically monitor comitology committees decisions.

¹⁰⁵ Bignami F.E. “The Administrative State in a Separation of Powers Constitution: Lessons for European Community Rulemaking from the United States” in Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/99, in http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/99/990701.html.

¹⁰⁶ An accurate description with concrete examples drawn from the environmental area is provided for in Bignami’s article above n 105 at 34.

¹⁰⁷ Bignami, above n 105 at 26.

¹⁰⁸ Bignami, above n 105 at 73.

¹⁰⁹ It would not be necessary to publish the draft implementing measures in all the languages of the EC. English and French would be enough.

¹¹⁰ This proposal was made by EEB on its Comments on the Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on Waste from Electrical and Electronic Equipment (hereinafter ‘WEEE’) and the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment (hereinafter ‘EEE’), see EEB website: http://www.eeb.org, May 2000 2.

¹¹¹ See the website http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/governance.

¹¹² The title of the white paper is “Enhancing Democracy in the European Union”, and it is due to be published by summer 2001.

¹¹³ OJ 1985 C 136/1.

¹¹⁴ ‘The technique of referring to standards was pioneered by the Low Voltage Directive of 1973”. See Joerges C. Schepel H. Vos E. “The Law’s Problems with the Involvement of Non-Governmental Actors in Europe’s Legislative Processes: the Case of Standardisation under the ‘New Approach’” (1999) EUI working papers, 7.

¹¹⁵ Vos, E. Institutional Framework of Community Health & Safety Regulation: Committees, Agencies and Private Bodies (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999) at 306 Google Scholar.

¹¹⁶ See for these exceptions Vos ibid at 286.

¹¹⁷ Case 10/56, Meroni v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, [1958] ECR 157.

¹¹⁸ Joerges, Schepel, Vos, above n 114 at 14.

¹¹⁹ “It was in 1995 that the Commission issued its Communication on the broader use of standardisation in Community policy announcing its plans to extend the use of standardisation to other areas, including biotechonology, environmental policy and telecommunication services”. See Joerges, Schepel, Vos, above n 114 at 21.

¹²⁰ See above n 2.

¹²¹ Art. 12 of the Eco-audit Regulation establishes that “companies implementing national, European or international standards for environmental management systems and audits and certified, according to appropriate certification procedures, as complying with those standards shall be considered as meeting the corresponding requirements of Regulation 1836/93 provided that, in particular, the standards and procedures are recognised by the Commission acting in accordance with the procedures laid down in Art. 19 of the same Regulation.” In fact, the Commission has officially recognised that the international standard ISO 14001:1996 and the European standard EN ISO 14001:1996, establishing specification for environmental management systems, contain requirements corresponding to those of the audit Regulation. See Commission Decision 97/265, OJ 1997 L 104/37.

¹²² Directive 2000/53, OJ 2000 269/34. Para. 25 of the Directive states: “The preparation of European standards, where appropriate, should be promoted. Vehicle manufacturers and material producers should use component and material coding standards, to be established by the Commission assisted by the relevant committee. In the preparation of these standards the Commission will take account, as appropriate, of the work going on in this area in the rele vant international forums.” The preparation of these standards might require the involvement of standardisation bodies.

¹²³ COM (2000) 347. See Part IV.G.

¹²⁴ See Taschner K., “European environmental technical Bureau in the scaffold”, in the EEB Newsletter Metamorphosis, 18 July 2000, 2.

¹²⁵ See mandate M/200 Rev. 3 of 8 March 1996. This document is unpublished. Access to it and to other documents related to packaging and packaging waste Directive was possible thanks to the collaboration of a kind civil servant of DG ENV.

¹²⁶ Art. 21.

¹²⁷ These factors are: prevention of packaging and packaging waste, reuse, material recycling, energy recovery, organic recovery. See Commission’s mandate above n 125.

¹²⁸ A detailed description of the legal grounds which led to the conclusion that CEN failed to fulfil the Commission’s mandate is provided in the EEB’s on-line publication, “CEN at Work: How the Requirements of the European Packaging Waste Directive (94/62) Are Bypassed by CEN Standards”, see EEB website: http://www.eeb.org, September 2000.

¹²⁹ Interview with Commission officials of DG ENV.

¹³⁰ See “Bid to Reach Compromise on Packaging” in European Voice (22–28 March 2001) 23. See also “Commission Rejects CEN Packaging Standards” ENDs report 314 March 2001.

¹³¹ See the two proposals adopted by the Commission in COM 347 (2000) final: proposal for a Directive on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and elec tronic equipment and proposal for a Directive on waste from electrical and electronic equipment.

¹³² R., Hunter and Molyneux, C.G. “The Draft EC Directive on Electronic Equipment: an Imprudent and Illegal Proposal”, 23 n 24 (2000) International Environment Report 924 Google Scholar.

¹³³ “Commission Proposes EMAS Role in Electronics Eco-Design Directive” EN DS report 3 14 March 2001.

¹³⁴ The Commission’s proposal states: “It is necessary to draw up as quickly as possible provisions concerning the design and manufacture of electrical and electronic equipment to minimise their impact on the environment during their life cycle. In the interest of overall consistency between the Directives relevant to electrical and electronic equipment, those provisions should be drawn up in accordance with the principles set out in the Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a “New approach” to technical harmonisation and standards.” See Paragraph 11 COM (2000) 347.

¹³⁵ Hunter and Molyneux above n 132 at 925.

¹³⁶ This is hinted at by EEB in its study of packaging waste where it is stated that EEB “prefers another institutional framework for implementing the mandate of the Commission.” Another confirmation of the preference of environmental organisations (EEB) for committees of experts can be found in the position paper of EEB on the draft proposal for a Directive on EEE. Here, EEB states: “In case standards need to be developed at EU level, the EEB would rather see one of the proposed committee schemes or another effective mechanism to guarantee Environmental NGO participation and political control.” See EEB’s Comments on the Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on Waste from Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) above n 110 at 2.

¹³⁷ Above n 2.

¹³⁸ Above n 2.

¹³⁹ Interview with EEB member.