¹ Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1, 12 (emphasis added).

² Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, 593 (emphasis added).

³ Pescatore, P ‘International Law and Community Law—A Comparative Analysis’ (1970) 7 CML Rev 167 Google Scholar.

⁴ Timmermans, C ‘The EU and Public International Law’ (1999) 4 European Foreign Affairs Review 181 Google Scholar.

⁵ Meessen, KM ‘The Application of Rules of Public International Law within Community Law’ (1976) 13 CML Rev 485 Google Scholar.

⁶ Puissochet, J-P ‘La Place du Droit international dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes’ in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Federico Mancini (Milan, Giuffrè, 1998) 779, 780 Google Scholar.

⁷ The other dimensions of this ambivalent relationship, such as the international capacity and responsibility of the EC, will not be discussed in this article. For a discussion of these issues for international organisations see generally Klabbers, J An Introduction to International Institutional Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2002) chs 3 and 14 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Krück, H ‘Die auswärtige Gewalt der Mitgliedstaaten und die auswärtigen Befugnisse der Europäischen Gemeinschaften als Problem des Souveränitätsverständnisses’ in Bleckmann, A and Ress, G (eds) Souveränitätsverständnis in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Baden Baden, Nomos, 1980) 155, 163Google Scholar. The inverse problem can be found in many a federal state, where the external sovereignty of the federation has been interpreted to give it wider powers than in the domestic sphere. For a discussion of this ‘foreign affairs exceptionalism’ in the context of the United States see Levitan, DM ‘The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory’ (1946) 55 Yale Law Journal 467 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ Peters A ‘The Position of International Law within the European Community Legal Order’ (1997) 40 German Yearbook of International Law 9, 11. For the view that considers Community law as part of traditional international law see Wyatt D ‘New Legal Order, or Old?’ (1982) 7 EL Rev 147, arguing that the Community legal order is ‘quite explicable in terms of traditional international legal theory and practice’ (ibid, 148).

¹⁰ Art 5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) clarified that the Convention would also apply to ‘Treaties constituting international organisations and treaties adopted within an international organisation‘. The provision states: ‘[t]he present Convention applies to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organisation and to any treaty adopted within an international organisation without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organisation’. For a fuller discussion of Art 30 of the Vienna Convention, see sects II and III below.

¹¹ Kelsen, H Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (Tübingen, Mohr, 1920)Google Scholar.

¹² Timmermans, C, above n 4, 183.

¹³ The first infant disease being the question of direct effect of Community law in the national legal orders: see Pescatore, P ‘The Doctrine of ‘Direct Effect’: an Infant Disease of Community Law’ (1983) 8 EL Rev 155 Google Scholar.

¹⁴ The article will not specifically deal with the Social Policy Agreement or the Schengen Convention. For an analysis of the ambivalent relationships between EC law and the former see Curtin, D ‘The Constitutional Structure of the Union: a Europe of Bits and Pieces’ (1993) 30 EL Rev 17, 52-60Google Scholar. The Schengen Convention and its connections with the Community legal order are discussed in O’Keeffe, D ‘The Schengen Convention: A Suitable Model for European Integration?’ (1991) 11 Yearbook of European Law 183 Google Scholar.

¹⁵ The principle has been codified in Art 30(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969): ‘[w]hen all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under Article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty’.

¹⁶ See also the discussion on the Vienna Convention in sect III below.

¹⁷ Lenaerts, K and van Nuffel, P Constitutional Law of the European Union (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) 751 Google Scholar. The concept of ‘precedence’ is perhaps not the best concept to capture the relationship, for international agreements of the Member States do not form part of the Community legal order.

¹⁸ Case C–466/98, Commission v United Kingdom [2002] ECR I–9427 para 23.

¹⁹ What happens when a former ‘third’ state becomes a Member of the Community? This situation is illustrated in Case C–3/91, Exportur SA v LOR SA and Confiserie du Tech SA [1992] ECR I–5529, where the ECJ had to deal with a bilateral convention between France and Spain. The Court emphasised, as a preliminary point, that the accession of Spain to the EC had changed its perspective: ‘it should be observed that the national court rightly considered that the provisions of a convention concluded after 1 January 1958 by a Member State with another State could not, from the accession of the latter State to the Community, apply in the relations between those States if they were found to be contrary to the rules of the Treaty. It is therefore necessary to determine whether the provisions of the Franco-Spanish Convention are compatible with the rules of the Treaty on the free movement of goods’: ibid, para 8 (emphasis added). The bilateral convention had become an inter se agreement and was, consequently, fully assimilated to the regime applicable to national unilateral measures: ibid, para 39.

²⁰ Case 10/61, Commission v Italy [1962] ECR 1, 10–11.

²¹ Case 812/79, Attorney General v Juan C. Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, para 9 (emphasis added). This was confirmed in Case C–158/91, Criminal Proceedings against Jean-Claude Levy [1993] ECR I–4287, para 22 (emphasis added): ‘[i]n view of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question submitted for a preliminary ruling must be that the national court is under an obligation to ensure [that the relevant Community legislation] … is fully complied with by refraining from applying any conflicting provision of national legislation, unless the application of such a provision is necessary in order to ensure the performance by the Member State concerned of obligations arising under an agreement concluded with nonmember countries prior to the entry into force of the E. . . C Treaty.’

²² Case C–324/93, The Queen v Secretary of State for Home Department, ex parte Evans Medical Ltd and Macfarlan Smith Ltd [1995] ECR I–563, para 32.

²³ Cremona, M ‘Defending the Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and Compliance’, Paper delivered to the EUI Workshop ‘EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals’, Florence, 11 Nov 2006.

²⁴ Case C–84/98, Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR I–5215.

²⁵ Ibid, para 30 (emphasis added).

²⁶ Ibid, para 33.

²⁷ Ibid, para 59.

²⁸ Ibid, para 58. For an elaborate discussion of the question of when denunciation may be necessary see: Koutrakos, P EV International Relations Law (Oxford, Hart, 2006) 313-16Google Scholar.

²⁹ Klabbers, J ‘Moribund on the Fourth of July? The Court of Justice on Prior Agreements of the Member States’ (2001) 26 EL Rev 187, 197Google Scholar.

³⁰ For the question when an amendment transforms an ‘old’ into a ‘new’ agreement see: Case C–476/98, Commission v Germany (Open Skies) [2002] ECR I–9855, para 64, where the Court ruled that an amendment that ‘entails new and significant international commitments’ will turn a prior into a subsequent agreement.

³¹ Case 812/79, Attorney General v Juan C Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, para 9 (emphasis added).

³² Art 106 Euratom reads: ‘Member States which, before the entry into force of this Treaty, have concluded agreements with third States providing for cooperation in the field of nuclear energy shall be required to undertake jointly with the Commission the necessary negotiations with these third States in order to ensure that the rights and obligations arising out of such agreements shall as far as possible be assumed by the Community. Any new agreement ensuing from such negotiations shall require the consent of the Member State or States signatory to the agreements referred to above and the approval of the Council, which shall act by a qualified majority.’

³³ Meessen thus concluded: ‘[t]he provision that treaty commitments of the Member States vis-à-vis third states ‘shall not be affected’ excluded any attempt on the part of the Community to have the rules of state succession concerning unions of states applied to its own formation. The non-application of these rules must be regarded as operating in two directions: the treaty commitments of the Member States are neither cancelled nor are they automatically transferred to the Community’: see Meessen, KM, above n 5, 489.

³⁴ Pescatore, P L’ordre juridique des Communautés Européennes (Liège, Presse univer sitaire de Liège, 1975) 147-8Google Scholar: ‘un effet de substitution ou de succession au sens du droit international: en assumant, en vertu des traités, certaines compétences et certains pouvoirs précédemment exercés par les Etats membres, la Communauté a dû reprendre, également, les obligations internationales qui réglaient l’exercice de ces compétences et pouvoir’ (translation by the author).

³⁵ Schermers, HG ‘The European Communities Bound by Fundamental Rights’ (1990) 27 CML Rev 249, 251Google Scholar.

³⁶ Hilf, M ‘Europäische Union und Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention’ in Beyerlin, U (ed) Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung (Berlin, Springer, 1995) 1193, 1197CrossRefGoogle Scholar:’[e]igentlich sollte die materielle Bindung aller Organe der EU bzw. der drei Gemeinschaften an die EMRK unbestritten sein: Der Gedanke der Rechtsnachfolge drängt die Annahme förmlich auf, daß die Mitgliedstaaten Hoheitsgewalt nur unter gleichzeitiger Weitergabe der an diese geknüpften Rechtsbindungen übertragen konnten’.

³⁷ Uerpmann-Wittzack, R ‘The Constitutional Role of Multilateral Treaty Systems’ in von Bogdandy, A and Bast, J (eds) Principles of European Constitutional Law (Oxford, Hart, 2006) 145, 168Google Scholar: ‘[i]t is difficult to explain this in legal theory. First of all, the idea referred to contradicts the general view that the EC exercises original jurisdiction and not a bundle of Member State jurisdictions’. C Tomuschat even claims that the ‘mortgage theory’ is rejected by the majority of Community commentators considering ‘that the establishment of the Community had led to the emergence of a new governmental power centre which could not be conceptualised as being made up of fragments or splinters of national sovereign authority’: Tomuschat, C ‘Case Note on Yusuf and Kadi ’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 537, 543 Google Scholar.

³⁸ Pescatore, P ‘La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes et la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme’ in Matscher, F and Petzold, H (eds) Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension (Cologne, Heymann, 1988) 441, 450Google Scholar: ‘une manifestation de l’effet de succession reconnue en droit international, sauf que nous avons affaire ici à une succession ni territoriale, ni générale, mais à une succession fonctionnelle et limitée’ (translation by the author).

³⁹ On the application of the idea of ‘succession’ see Petersmann, EU ‘ Artikel 234 EEC’ in von der Groeben, H, von Boeckh, H and Thiesing, J (eds) Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1974) 736, 745-6Google Scholar (rn 8): ‘[i]n Übereinstimmung mit dem Rechtsgutachten des IGH betr . ‘Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Services of the U.N.’ (ICJ Rep.1949, S.174 ff.) kann die (analoge) Anwendbarkeit allgemeinen Völkerrechts auf eine mit eigener Vö lkerrechtspersönlichkeit ausgestattete Internationale Organisation wie die EWG (vgl. Art.210 EWGV) nur funktionell vom Gründungsvertrag der Organisation sowie von den Erfordernissen der völkerrechtlichen Grundsätze des Vertrauensschutzes und der Rechtssicherheit her ermittelt werden ... [Es] liegt eine analoge Anwendung der erwähnten Staatensukzessionsregeln dahingehend nahe, da gemeinschaftsrechtlich bewirkte Kompetenzverschiebungen innerhalb präföderaler Wirtschaftsgemeinschaften ähnlich wie bundesstaatliche Zuständigkeitsverschi ebungen vom internationalen Vertragspartner hinzunehmen sind und den völkerrechtlichen Erfüllungsanspruch des internationalen Vertragspartners ändern können’.

⁴⁰ In the succinct words of Pescatore, ‘[o]n n’adhère pas à ce qui est déjà en vigueur’: Pescatore, P, above n 38, 441.

⁴¹ Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Company NV v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 1219.

⁴² Art 18 EEC read: ‘[t]he Member States declare their readiness to contribute to the development of international trade and the lowering of barriers to trade by entering into agreements designed, on a basis of reciprocity and mutual advantage, to reduce customs duties below the general level of which they could avail themselves as a result of the establishment of a customs union between them’.

⁴³ Art 111 EEC read: ‘[t]he following provisions shall, without prejudice to Articles 115 and 116, apply during the transitional period: (1) Member States shall coordinate their trade relations with third countries so as to bring about, by the end of the transitional period, the conditions needed for implementing a common policy in the field of external trade. The Commission shall submit to the Council proposals regarding the procedure for common action to be followed during the transitional period and regarding the achievement of uniformity in their commercial policies. (2) The Commission shall submit to the Council recommendations for tariff negotiations with third countries in respect of the common customs tariff. The Council shall authorise the Commission to open such negotiations. The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. (3) In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act unanimously during the first two stages and by a qualified majority there after. (4) Member States shall, in consultation with the Commission, take all necessary measures, particularly those designed to bring about an adjustment of tariff agreements in force with third countries, in order that the entry into force of the common customs tariff shall not be delayed. (5) Member States shall aim at securing as high a level of uniformity as possible between themselves as regards their liberalisation lists in relation to third countries or groups of third countries. To this end, the Commission shall make all appropriate recommendations to Member States. If Member States abolish or reduce quantitative restrictions in relation to third countries, they shall inform the Commission beforehand and shall accord the same treatment to other Member States.’

⁴⁴ International Fruit, above n 41, 1236–7 (emphasis added).

⁴⁵ Ibid, paras 10–13. The Court’s choice was wise, for the Art 307 EC route might have been more dangerous. This is well illustrated by the decision of the German Federal Finance Court of 9 Jan 1996, discussed by Reich, N ‘Judge-made ‘Europe à la carte’: Some Remarks on Recent Conflicts between European and German Constitutional Law Provoked by the Banana Litigation’ (1996) 7 European Journal of International Law 103, 111Google Scholar, where the Federal Court insisted on the ‘supremacy’ of the German international law obligations under GATT. Art 307 EC would entitle Germany to set aside Community law that was incompatible with the international agreement.

⁴⁶ International Fruit, above n 41, para 7.

⁴⁷ Ibid, paras 14–16 and 18 (emphasis added). In Joined Cases 267, 268 and 269/81, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Societa Petrolifera Italiana SpA (SPI) and SpA Michelin Italiana (SAMI) [1983] ECR 801, para 17, the ECJ clarified that following the introduction of the common customs tariff on 1 July 1968 the Community had ‘assumed its full powers in relation to the sphere covered by GATT’.

⁴⁸ Kapteyn, PJG ‘The Domestic Law Effect of Rules of International Law within the European Community System of Law and the Question of the Self-Executing Character of GATT Rules’ (1974) 8 International Lawyer 74 Google Scholar (emphasis added). For a critical evaluation of the succession theory in the context of GATT see Uerpmann-Wittzack, R, above n 37, 166: ‘[t]he EC was actually integrated into GATT 1947 as a Member State under international law. However, consent to this existed amongst all of the participants. Consequently the position of the EC within GATT 1947 could be explained by the concept of implied accession’.

⁴⁹ The Court of Justice had not yet ‘officially’ declared the CCP to be an exclusive com petence of the Community. However, the doctrine of succession was a precursor to that development: see Schütze, R ‘Dual Federalism Constitutionalised: the Emergence of Exclusive Competences in the EC Legal Order’ (2007) 32 EL Rev 3, 6–10Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ This article will not deal with the systemically opposite question of how the European Convention system has defined its relationship to the Community legal order. Suffice it to make three brief points: first, the obligations under the European Convention have been held to be of an ‘integral’ kind, for ‘[u]nlike international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words of the Preamble, benefit from a “collective enforcement”‘: Ireland v United Kingdom Series A No 25 (1978) 1 EHRR 90, para 239. Inter se modifications among the parties of the Convention will, consequently, conflict with its purpose. Secondly, the Convention legal order has not considered the Community materially bound by the ECHR, but has allowed an indirect review of Community acts via its Member States. Thirdly, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a similar stance to the Community legal order as the German Constitutional Court had vis-à-vis the Community legal order in Solange I . These principles have recently been summarised in App No 45036/98 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim irketi v Ireland, (2006) 42 EHRR 1.

⁵¹ Jacobs, FG ‘European Community Law and the European Convention on Human Rights’ in Curtin, D and Heukels, T (eds) Institutional Dynamics of European Integration, Vol. II (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) 561 Google Scholar.

⁵² Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419, para 7.

⁵³ Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1979] ECR 1125 para 4 (emphasis added).

⁵⁴ Case 4/73, Nold, Kohlen und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission [1947] ECR 491, para 13 (emphasis added).

⁵⁵ Lawson, R ‘Confusion and Conflict? Diverging Interpretations of the European Conventions on Human Rights in Strasbourg and Luxembourg’ in Lawson, R and de Blois, M (eds) The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe, Vol. III (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhofff, 1994) 219, 223Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ An early commentator—seeing in the last sentence of Nold a direct reference to the ECHR that had just been ratified by France—thus argued: ‘[t]he Court could have followed the precedent of the Third International Fruit Case in which it decided that the E … C was bound by the GATT. It should then have held that the Communities were bound by the European Convention on Human Rights now that all its Member States were parties to it’: Schermers, HG ‘Community Law and International Law’ (1975) 12 CML Rev 77, 83Google Scholar. The Court confirmed its position against succession in Case 36/75, Rutili v Ministre de l’Intérieur [1975] ECR 1219.

⁵⁷ See in particular: Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst AG v Commission [1989] ECR 2859. For an excellent analysis see: Lawson, R, above n 55, esp. 234–50.

⁵⁸ Krogsgaard, LB ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Community after Maastricht’ (1993) 19 LIEI 99, 108 (emphasis added)Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Jacobs, FG, above n 51, 563: ‘[a]s a result of the development of the case-law, now confirmed by the Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union, the Community can be said to be subject in effect to, if not bound formally by, the European Convention on Human rights’. In a similar vein M Hilf, above n 36, 1207, argued that: ‘[f]ür das künftige Verhältnis der EU zur EMRK ist davon auszugehen, daß mit [Artikel 6(2) EUV] die materielle Bindung jeglicher im Rahmen der EU ausgeübten Hoheitsgewalt an die EMRK sichergestellt sein dürfte.’

⁶⁰ Contra, Uerpmann-Wittzack, R, above n 37, 172–4.

⁶¹ Neuwahl, NA ‘The Treaty on European Union: A Step Forward in the Protection of Human Rights?’ in Neuwahl, NA and Rosas, A (eds) The European Union and Human Rights (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 1, 14 Google Scholar. This position has been confirmed by the ECJ in Case C–112/00, Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Austria [2003] ECR I–5659, paras 71–72 (emphasis added): ‘[a]ccording to settled case-law, fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of which the Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. The ECHR has special significance in that respect … The principles established by that case-law were reaffirmed in the preamble to the Single European Act and subsequently in [Article 6(2)] of the Treaty on European Union’.

⁶² Even an (eventually) legally binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will entertain an ‘ambivalent’ relationship with the ECHR: see Polakiewicz, J ‘The Relationship between the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ in Kronenberger, V (ed) The European Union and the International Legal Order (The Hague, TMC Asser, 2001) 69 Google Scholar.

⁶³ Mendelson, MH ‘The European Court of Justice and Human Rights’ (1981) 1 Yearbook of European Law 125, 160CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁴ Opinion 2/94, (ECHR Accession) [1996] ECR 1759.

⁶⁵ According to Art 4 UN Charter, only states can become full members. Before formal amendment of the UN Charter, the Community must ‘settle for a more modest participation in the work of the world organisation’: Brückner, P ‘The European Community and the United Nations’ (1990) 1 EJIL 174, 176CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁶ Art 48(2) UN Charter.

⁶⁷ Puissochet, JP ‘The Court of Justice and International Action by the European Community: The Example of the Embargo against the Former Yugoslavia’ (1996-7) 20 Fordham International Law Journal 1557, 1568 Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ Case C–84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications and others [1996] ECR I–3953.

⁶⁹ For a more elaborate discussion of the Community’s traditional approach towards UN Security Council Resolutions see: Koutrakos, P Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law: the Legal Regulation of Sanctions, Exports of Dual-use Goods and Armaments (Oxford, Hart, 2001) 58-91Google Scholar as well as Schütze, R ‘On Middle Ground: The European Community and Public International Law’, EUI Working Paper 2007/13, 16–19.

⁷⁰ Case T–306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, [2005] ECR II–3533.

⁷¹ In particular: UN Security Council Resolution 1390/2002, laying down the measures to be directed against Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban and other associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities.

⁷² Common Position 2002/402/CFSP led to the adoption of Council Regulation (EC) 881/2002, imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban, and repealing Regulation 467/2001, OJ 2002 L 139/9. Art 2 of the Regulation reads: ‘[a]ll funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned or held by, a natural or legal person, group or entity designated by the Sanctions Committee and listed in Annex I shall be frozen. No funds shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, a natural or legal person, group or entity designated by the Sanctions Committee and listed in Annex I. No economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, a natural or legal person, group or entity designated by the Sanctions Committee and listed in Annex I, so as to enable that person, group or entity to obtain funds, goods or services.’

⁷³ Yusuf, above n 70, para 227.

⁷⁴ Ibid, para 243 (emphasis added).

⁷⁵ Ibid, para 239.

⁷⁶ Ibid, paras 245–253 (references omitted). Significantly, the Court did not refer to the exclusive nature of the Community competence to adopt economic sanctions (under Art 133 EC).

⁷⁷ Analysing the European Court’s relationship to GATT in International Fruit before the CFI had decided Yusuf, Eeckhout, P External Relations of the European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2004) 438 Google Scholar claimed that ‘[m]uch of that reasoning can be transposed to the relationship between the UN Charter and the EC, in so far as Security Council resolutions are concerned’. Therefore, ‘the Court might well, if the question were ever to come before it, be inclined to recognise the binding character of UN Charter and of Security Council resolutions, and find support for such recognition in its own case law’. However, there are heavy arguments against such a position: first, as Eeckhout himself admits, the Community has not replaced the Member States in the UN or in the Security Council. Secondly, the idea that the Member States ‘could not transfer to the Community more powers than they possessed’ (‘nemo dat quod non habet’ ) has been rejected by the majority of Community commentators, considering ‘that the establishment of the Community had led to the emergence of a new governmental power centre which could not be conceptualised as being made up of fragments or splinters of national sovereign authority’: Tomuschat, C ‘Case Note on Yusuf and Kadi’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 537, 543Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ ‘Un tel effet contraignant ne peut pas non plus être formellement déduit des stipulations du traité CE (notamment ses [Articles 10, 297 ou 307]). La singularité et l’autonomie de l’ordre juridique communautaire, soulignées, dès l’origine, par la jurisprudence de la Cour, plaideraient même plutôt en sens contraire’: Puissochet, JP ‘La Place du Droit international dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes’ in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Federico Mancini (Milan, Giuffrè, 1998) 779, 790 Google Scholar. For the opposite view see: Tomuschat, C (above n 77, 542) arguing that in relation to Arts 307 and 297 ‘the exposition of the Court does not show any weakness’. Tomuschat suggests a teleological reduction of the scope of Art 307 EC: ‘[o]bviously, the membership status within the United Nations does not belong to the category of elements which adversely affect the desirable Community harmony and which, therefore, should be eliminated (Article 307(2))’. The author justifies this result by reference to his belief that ‘the United Nations constitutes the overarching structure of a world order system of governance in which the Community forms a regional sub-system, hierarchically inferior to the fundamental principles and rules enshrined in the Charter’: ibid, 541–2.

⁷⁹ Art 297 EC allows a Member State, inter alia, ‘to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security’ and, therefore, represents a specification of Art 307 EC: ‘[w]hereas [Article 307] of the Treaty of Rome regulates the solution of possible conflicts between two legal orders, [Article 297] confers in a special situation, wide derogative powers to the Member States concerned which can affect all Treaty provisions within the limits set by [Article 298] … Under the strict terms of [Article 297] Member States therefore were empowered to adopt measures in order to implement Security Council resolutions as on economic sanctions against, for example, Southern Rhodesia. Measures were taken by Member States in this regard which were designated by the Council and Commission as legal. The derogation clause of [Article 297] of the Treaty of Rome itself provides, however, for consultation among all Member States … When these discussions occur they may lead to the adoption of a Community act’: Bohr, S ‘Sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and the European Community’ (1993) 4 EJIL 256, 265-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁰ ‘But if the Court were to strike down those regulations, why would that impede the performance by the Member States of their UN obligations? Those obligations would remain intact, and surely every Member State could itself decide to take the action (freezing of assets) which is required by the relevant resolutions … Surely there might be some Member States where it would be possible to have review of the domestic measures on human-rights grounds in domestic constitutional law. But that cannot be of concern to the CFI’: Eeckhout, P ‘Does Europe’s Constitution Stop at the Water’s Edge?: Law and Policy in the EU’s External Relations’, Fifth Walter van Gerven Lecture, 22.

⁸¹ Art 30(3) VC.

⁸² De Witte, B ‘Rules of Change in International Law: How Special is the European Community?’ (1994) 25 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 299, 303CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a more cautious tone see: Schermers, HG and Blokker, N International Institutional Law (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) 734 Google Scholar: ‘[m]any authors take the view that the members may overrule an amendment clause by unanimous decision. It does however seem doubtful whether the general law of treaties always prevails over express constitutional provisions.’

⁸³ Karl, W ‘Treaties, Conflicts between’ in Bernhardt, R (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1995) 935, 939Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ The distinction is nowhere codified in the Vienna Convention, on the Law of Treaties, but is said to underlie a number of its provisions. The distinction has also entered the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (see Pauwelyn, J Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2003) 55 CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

⁸⁵ Fois, P Gli Accordi Degli Stati Membri Delle Communità Europee (Milan, Giuffrè, 1968) 168 Google Scholar (translation by the author): ‘[l]e indubbie particolarità dei Trattati non autorizzano infatti, alla luce anche della prassi finora formatasi, a parlare di “rottura” “avec la technique traditionnelle du traité multilatéral”‘ (quoting Cartou, L Le Marché commun et le droit public (Paris, Sirey, 1959) 8)Google Scholar.

⁸⁶ They would remain effective to the extent that they were compatible with EC law—the solution suggested by Art 30 VC. See sect II A above.

⁸⁷ Pescatore, P L’ordre juridique des Communautés Européennes (Liège, Presse universitaire de Liège, 1975) 143-4Google Scholar (translation by the author).

⁸⁸ Art 306 reads: ‘The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude the existence or completion of regional unions between Belgium and Luxembourg, or between Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, to the extent that the objectives of these regional unions are not attained by application of this Treaty.’

⁸⁹ In an affirmative sense see van Panhuys, JHF ‘Conflicts between the Law of the European Communities and Other Rules of International Law’ (1965-6) 3 CML Rev 420, 440 Google Scholar.

⁹⁰ Pescatore, P, above n 87, 140: ‘[i]l s’agit, somme toute, d’accords internationaux “en forme simplifiée”, conclus dans le cadre offert par le Conseil des Communautés .’ A (slightly) different chracterisation is given by Ipsen, HP Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (Tübingen, Mohr, 1972), 468 Google Scholar, considering these decisions as unilateral acts of an international organ set up by the collectivity of the Member States: ‘[i]nsgesamt handelt es sich um Beschlüsse eines vertraglich nicht instituierten Kollegialorgans, dessen Mitglieder mit dem kollegialen Rat der Gemeinschaften identisch sind. Deshalb ist weniger seine Erscheinung als Institution, als vielmehr seine Funktion der Beschlussfassung von rechtlicher Bedeutung’.

⁹¹ In favour of a classification as Community law: Hartley, TC The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford, Clarendon, 1988) 92 Google Scholar: ‘[i]n addition to the constitutive Treaties, there are certain other international agreements between the Member States. Where these deal with matters within the scope of the Community and were drawn up within the Community context, they may be regarded as part of Community law’. See also Wuermeling, J Kooperatives Gemeinschaftsrecht (Kehl, Engel, 1988) 199 Google Scholar.

⁹² In favour of the international law status: Constantinesco, L-J Das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1977) 543 Google Scholar: ‘[d]ie Rechtsangleichung durch völkerrechtliche Abkommen ist ein klassisches Instrument ... Die Abkommen sind Ausdruck einer rein intergouvernementalen Prozedur, auch wenn sie der EWG dienen’. The ECJ now sides with this position: see Joined Cases C–181 and 248/91, Parliament v Council (Emergency Aid) [1993] ECR I–3685.

⁹³ Limpens-Meinertzhagen, A ‘La Coordination ou l’Unification du Droit par voie de Convention entre les Etats Membres’ in de Ripainsel-Landy, D, et al . (eds) Les instruments du rapprochement des législations dans la communauté économique européenne (Brussels, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1976) 153, 158Google Scholar: ‘[l]a convention CEE se situe à mi-chemin entre la convention internationale classique et le droit communautaire stricto sensu’.

⁹⁴ The position was taken by Wagner, H Grundbegriffe des Beschlussrechts der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Cologne, Heymann, 1965) 242 Google Scholar: ‘[d]er “uneigentliche Ratsbeschluß” ist nahezu omnipotent. Er unterliegt keinen Bindungen des Gemeinschaftsrechts’. See also Deliege-Sequaris, M ‘Révision des Traités Européens En Dehors des Procédures Prévus’ (1980) 16 Cahiers de Droit Européen 538 Google Scholar.

⁹⁵ This view was expressed by Hartley, T, above n 91, 94–5 (emphasis added) in the context of Community Conventions: ‘[i]f a convention is adopted after the Treaty, it could be argued that the convention impliedly amends the Treaty and should therefore prevail. This, however, fails to take account of the fact that both Treaty and convention are part of the Community legal system and in that system the constitutive Treaties are by their very nature of superior status: they create the legal system of which the conventions are a part. Moreover, the Treaties contain provisions laying down specific procedures for their amendment … [T]here can be little doubt that the existence of these procedures creates a presumption: if the Member States adopt subsequent agreements without going through the procedures, they may be presumed, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, not to have intended to amend the constitutive Treaties … If the subsidiary convention does not override the Treaties, it cannot affect the legislative powers conferred by them; consequently, acts adopted under those powers also cannot be affected. It follows from this that, in the absence of an express provision in the convention, the Community act will prevail.’ (However, did this mean that an inter se agreement could make provision that it wished to prevail over the EC Treaty or secondary Community law?)

⁹⁶ Ibsen, HP, above n 90, 469 and 471.

⁹⁷ The ‘decisions of the Member States meeting in the Council’ were therefore classified as ‘complementary law’ by P Pescatore, for ‘il s’agit d’actes à caractère diplomatique (ou international), complémentaires à la fois des traités eux-mêmes et du système d’actes institutionnels que ceux-ci ont mis en place’: Pescatore, P ‘Remarques sur la Nature Juridique des “Décisions des Représentants des Etats Membres Réunis au sein du Conseil’” (1966) 14 Sociaal-econo mische Wetgeving (SEW) 579, 579Google Scholar.

⁹⁸ Case 22/70, Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263.

⁹⁹ Ibid, para 46.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, para 4.

¹⁰¹ ERTA, above n 98, showed that the concept of ‘Community legislation’ had not yet been clearly defined. For a fuller discussion of the Court’s Byzantine reasoning as regards the Community authorship of the ‘proceedings’ see Schütze, R ‘The Morphology of Legislative Power in the European Community: Legal Instruments and the Federal Division of Powers’ (2006) 25 Yearbook of European Law 91, 101-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰² ERTA, above n 98, para 70. Let us pause for a second here. Can the Council—a Community institution—act through inter-governmental channels and would this act still be part of the Community legal order?

¹⁰³ The Court structured ERTA into three parts. The ERTA doctrine has traditionally been identified with the first part of the judgment (ibid, paras 6–32) dealing with the scope and nature of the Community’s implied external powers: cf Schütze, R ‘Parallel External Powers in the European Community: From “Cubist” Perspectives Towards “Naturalist” Constitutional Principles?’ (2004) 23Yearbook of European Law 225. The second part of the ruling (paras 33–67) dealt with the legal nature of the proceedings (cf Schütze, R, above n 101), while the third part (paras 68–96) concerned the horizontal division of powers between the ‘Council’ and the Commission. In this third part, paras 70–77 could be seen indirectly to support the thesis of the constitutional exclusivity of the Community channels for erga omnes cooperation, whereas paras 81–84 appear informed by a legislative pre-emption rationale. According to the latter view, the Member States would be prevented to undertake, acting individually or even collectively, obligations with third countries which affect existing Community legislation.

¹⁰⁴ The constitutional solution proposed in ERTA was soon translated into the language of exclusive competences: ‘[d]ie Frage lautet: ist es rechtlich zulässig, nicht im EWG-Vertrag vorgesehene Übereinkommen unter den Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten auszuhandeln und abzuschließen, wenn die Organe der Gemeinschaft eine Befugnis zur Rechtsetzung nach dem EWG-Vertrag besitzen, insbesondere nach Artikel 100 oder 235? Meine These ist: sobald hinsichtlich einer bestimmten Frage die Merkmale einer im EWG-Vertrag enthal tenen Ermächtigung der Organe der Gemeinschaft zur Rechtsetzung vorliegen, fehlt den Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten die Befugnis, die betreffende Frage im Wege der völkerrechtlichen Vereinbarung untereinander zu regeln . Die Organe der Gemeinschaft besitzen von da an die ausschließliche Zuständigkeit, über den fraglichen Gegenstand zu legiferieren. Es besteht daher keine Wahl zwischen dem gemeinschaftlichen und dem zwischenstaatlichen Verfahren, und zwar auch nicht so lange, als die Organe von der Rechtsetzungsbefugnis noch nicht Gebrauch gemacht haben’: Schwartz, IE ‘EG-Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse, insbesondere nach Artikel 235—ausschließlich oder konkurrierend?’ (1976) 11 Europarecht (Sonderheft) 27, 28 (emphasis added))Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁵ Art 48 TEU reads: ‘[t]he government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties on which the Union is founded. If the Council, after consulting the European Parliament and, where appropriate, the Commission, delivers an opinion in favour of calling a conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States, the conference shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining by common accord the amendments to be made to those Treaties. The European Central Bank shall also be consulted in the case of institutional changes in the monetary area. The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’.

¹⁰⁶ De Witte, B, above n 82, 307 and 309. However, the author ultimately attributes a facilitating function to these procedural conditions (ibid, 313): ‘[y]et, what is facilitated is not the adoption of the amendments itself (the ‘common accord’ of all States is required as well as ratification by them all), but only the initiative for an amendment: the Council of the European Communities can decide to convene a revision conference’.

¹⁰⁷ These resulted from the constitutional practice under the ECSC Treaty. The ECSC Treaty had been amended twice during the transitional period (although this was prohibited) under the Treaty. These amendments were nonetheless regarded as legal, and the Council, the ECSC High Authority and the European Parliament accepted them, ‘allowing the conclusion to be drawn that the Community itself agreed to set aside the provisions prohibiting amendment of its constitution’: Schermers, HG and Blokker, N International Institutional Law (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) 736 Google Scholar. See also Carstens, K ‘Die kleine Revision des Vertrages über die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl’ (1961) 21 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1 Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁸ Case 43/75, Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976] ECR 455.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, para 58 (emphasis added).

¹¹⁰ De Witte, B, above n 82, 315–6. On the possible substantive limits to the competence of the Member States with regard to Treaty amendment see also the author’s excellent discussion at ibid, 318–22 and Everling, U ‘Sind die Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft noch Herren der Verträge?’ in Bernhardt, R (ed), Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte (Berlin, Springer, 1993) 173.

¹¹¹ Joined Cases C–181 and 248/91, Parliament v Council (Emergency Aid) [1993] ECR I–3685.

¹¹² Ibid, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 2.

¹¹³ Ibid, para 15 (emphasis added).

¹¹⁴ Parliament v Council (Emergency Aid), above n 111, paras 12, 16.

¹¹⁵ A beautiful image by de Witte, B: ‘[t]he EU Member States cannot freely decide to switch from the “European law track” to the parallel “international law track” … If EU states were freely allowed to ‘switch to the international law track’ jointly, this would constitute a constant threat to the integrity of the EU legal order … The careful institutional balance established by the EC and EU Treaties, and the categorical distinction between international law and European law made by the ECJ, would then become very fragile. Thus, the question arises as to whether such “chameleonic” behaviour is compatible with the obligations of the Member States under EU law’: de Witte, B ‘Chameleonic Member States: Differentiation by Means of Partial and Parallel International Agreements’, in de Witte, B, Hanf, D and Vos, E (eds) The Many Faces of Differentiation on EU Law (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2001) 231, 232-3Google Scholar.

¹¹⁶ The relationship between inter se cooperation erga omnes and Art 308 EC had already been addressed in ERTA, above n 98, where the Court simply held that ‘[a]lthough [Article 308] empowers the Council to take any “appropriate measures” equally within the sphere of external relations, it does not create an obligation, but confers on the Council an option, failure to exercise which cannot affect the validity of proceedings’: ibid para 95. Arguably, this passage did already betray a judicial preference against the thesis of the exclusivity of the Community channels for inter se agreements erga omnes. For a recent discussion of the scope of Art 308 EC and its position in the Community legal order see Schütze, R ‘Organised Change towards an “ever closer Union’” (2003) 22 Yearbook of European Law 79 Google Scholar.

¹¹⁷ Wuermeling, J Kooperatives Gemeinschaftsrecht (Kehl, Engel, 1988) 267 Google Scholar.

¹¹⁸ Pescatore, P ‘International Law and Community Law—A Comparative Analysis’ (1970) 7 CML Rev 167, 180Google Scholar.

¹¹⁹ Eg Convention on Mutual Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate of 29 Feb 1968 [1969] Bull Supp 2/7; Convention on the Law applicable to contractual Obligations (80/934/EEC), OJ 1980 L 266/1; Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (CONV/INSOL/X1); Convention 90/436/EEC on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjust ment of profits of associated enterprises, OJ 1990 L 225/10.

¹²⁰ Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (consolidated version), OJ 1998 C 27/1.

¹²¹ Schlosser, P ‘Neues Primärrecht der EG’ (1975) 28 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2132, 2133Google Scholar refers to the Brussels Convention as an extension of primary Community law.

¹²² Hartley, TC, above n 91, 93–4: ‘Conventions under [Article 293] form part of the Community legal system’ and as such form ‘part of Community law.’ In this sense see also Wuermeling, J, above n 117, 92: ‘[d]ie Gemeinschaftskonventionen sind Gemeinschaftsrecht’.

¹²³ Rasmussen, H ‘A New Generation of Community Law? Reflections on the Handling by the Court of Justice of the Protocol of 1971 relating to the Interpretation of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments’ (1978) 15 CML Rev 249 Google Scholar.

¹²⁴ Wuermeling views Art 293 EC as a Community competence to be exercised by the collectivity of Member States: ‘[d]ie Mitgliedstaaten handeln im Falle des Art. [293] E...GV also ausschließlich kraft gemeinschaftlicher Kompetenz und Zuständigkeitsverteilung, nicht in Ausübung verbliebener völkerrechtlich-nationaler Außenkompetenz ... Damit übernimmt die Gesamtheit der Mitgliedstaaten organschaftliche Funktionen innerhalb der Gemeinschaft, ohne selbst Organ zu sein. Vereinbarungen, die in diesem Zusammenhang geschlossen werden, stellen ein Integrationsinstrument des EWGV neben anderen dar’: Wuermeling, J, above n 117, 68.

¹²⁵ Ibid, 90–2: ‘[d]eshalb sollte sich eine Charakterisierung des Gemeinschaftsrechts allein an der Gemeinschaftsbezogenheit eines Rechtsaktes orientieren’. For an analysis of the complex principles underpinning the idea of Community authorship see Schütze, R, above n 101, esp. 98–106.

¹²⁶ Capotorti, F ‘The Task of the Court of Justice and the System of the Brussels Convention’ in Court of Justice of the European Communities (ed) Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe (London, Butterworths, 1992) 13, 15Google Scholar.

¹²⁷ Schwartz, IE ‘Übereinkommen zwischen den EG-Staaten: Völkerrecht oder Gemeinschaftsrecht?’ in Kroneck, FJ and Oppermann, T (eds) Im Dienste Deutschlands und des Rechtes (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1981) 551, 606Google Scholar: ‘Rechtsquelle der Übereinkommen und Protokolle ist nicht die Gemeinschaft, sondern die Gesamtheit der Mitgliedstaaten. Sie haben ihren rechtlichen Ursprung in einem multilateralen Vertrag zwischen Staaten, nicht im einseitigen Rechtsetzungsakt eines Organs der Gemeinschaft. Die Übereinkommen und Protokolle stammen von einer anderen Rechtsetzungsgewalt als die Verordnungen und Richtlinien der Gemeinschaft. Grund für die Geltung von Übereinkommen und Protokollen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten ist nicht wie bei Verordnungen und Richtlinien ein Befehl des EWG-Vertrages, sondern der Abschluß eines Vertrages zwischen Staaten ... Die Übereinkommen und Protokolle sind nicht vom EWG-Vertrag abgeleitetes Organrecht, sondern autonomes Vertragsrecht’.

¹²⁸ Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 Sept 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.

¹²⁹ Case 288/82, Ferdinand MJJ Duijnstee v Lodewijk Goderbauer [1983] ECR 3663.

¹³⁰ Ibid, paras 12–14 (emphasis added). The Court had already dealt with the issue of supremacy in Case 25/79, Sanicentral GmbH v Rene Collin [1979] ECR 3423.

¹³¹ Joined Cases 9 and 10/77, Bavaria Fluggesellschaft Schwabe & Co KG and Germanair Bedarfsluftfahrt GmbH & Co KG v Eurocontrol [1977] ECR 1517, para 4: ‘[t]he principle of legal certainty in the Community legal system and the objectives of the Brussels Convention in accordance with [Article 293] of the E … C Treaty, which is at its origin, require in all Member States a uniform application of the legal concepts and legal classifications developed by the Court in the context of the Brussels Convention’.

¹³² Case 150/77, Bertrand v Paul Ott KG [1978] ECR 1431, para 16.

¹³³ Case 181/73, Haegeman v Belgium [1974] ECR 449.

¹³⁴ Art 57(3) Brussels Convention (emphasis added). For matters outside the scope of this provision, academic controversy about the normative relationship of the Convention with EC law continued. In line with his open conception of Community law, Wuermeling argued in favour of the lex posterior rule (Wuermeling, J, above n 117, 132); others preferred an analogous application of Art 307 EC (see Meng, W ‘Artikel 236’ in Von der Groeben, H, Thiesing, J and Ehlermann, C-D Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1991) 5834, 5857 (rn 78))Google Scholar.

¹³⁵ Case 80/83, Habourdin International SA and Banque Nationale de Paris v SpA Italocremona (Order of the Court) [1983] ECR 3639.

¹³⁶ Eg EC Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings (OJ 2000 L 160/1) replaced ‘its’ Convention based on Art 293 which had been opened for signature in 1995, but had not entered into force. On 14 Jan 2003 the Commission issued a Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention (Law applicable to Contractual relations) into a Community instrument, COM(2005)650 final. The draft Rome II Convention has been channelled into Regulation 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ 2007 L 199/49.

¹³⁷ Art 65 EC gives the Community competence to adopt measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications. Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12/1) was adopted on this legal base.

¹³⁸ For a first assessment of this change see Stadler, A ‘From the Brussels Convention to Regulation 44/2001: Cornerstones of a European Law of Civil Procedure’ (2005) 42 CML Rev 1637 Google Scholar.

¹³⁹ Basedow, J ‘The Communitarisation of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam’ (2000) 37 CML Rev 687, 701Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁰ De Witte, B ‘Old-Fashioned Flexibility: International Agreements between Member States of the European Union’ in de Búrca, G and Scott, J (eds) Constitutional Change in the EU: From Uniformity to Flexibility (Oxford, Hart, 2000) 31, 40Google Scholar: ‘[i]nter-se agreements are allowed, for the simple reason that to hold otherwise would be a drastic curtailment of the Member States’ treaty-making competences that cannot be assumed to have taken place in the absence of any clear indication in the founding treaties’.

¹⁴¹ Contra, Schwartz, IE ‘Artikel 220’ in Von der Groeben, H, Thiesing, J and Ehlermann, C-D, above n 134, 5517, 5525 (rn 5).

¹⁴² Case C–336/96, Gilly v Directeur des services fiscaux du Bas-Rhin [1998] ECR I–2793. The Court acknowledged that in the absence of a Community Convention under Art 293 EC, the Member States had remained competent to conclude international agreements to eliminate double taxation (and indeed had concluded many bilateral conventions). However, in the exercise of their retained powers, the Member States would have to respect Community law. See Case 270/83, Commission v France (avoir fiscal) [1986] ECR 273, where the Court clarified that the fundamental freedoms did not ‘permit those rights to be made subject to condition of reciprocity imposed for the purpose of obtaining corresponding advantages in other Member States’: ibid, para 26.

¹⁴³ The rights conferred under Community legislation ‘are unconditional and a Member State cannot make their observance subject to an agreement concluded with another Member State’: Case C–294/99, Athinaiki Zythopoiia AE v Elliniko Dimosio [2001] ECR I–6797, para 32. The Community legislation at issue was Council Directive 90/435/EEC on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (OJ 1990 L 225/6). The bilateral agreement at stake was the double taxation agreement concluded by the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

¹⁴⁴ This would even be uncontroversial under the ‘ordinary’ international solution of Art 41 VC and has been applied to the ECHR legal system: see above n 50.

¹⁴⁵ Art 12 EC.

¹⁴⁶ Tietje, C ‘Die Meistbegünstigungsverpflichtung im Gemeinschaftsrecht’ (1995) 30 Europarecht 398, 399Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 406, 412–3: ‘[i]m folgenden wird sich unter systematischen und teleologischen Gesichtspunkten zeigen, daß es sich bei einer Meistbegünstigungsverpflichtung eben doch um eine Form der Nichtdiskriminierung handelt und die Verpflichtung zur Meistbegünstigung im Falle bestehender inter-se Abkommen im Gemeinschaftsrecht daher nach Art.6 EGV zu beurteilen ist ... Diesem Ergebnis zufolge können sich Unionsbürger auf Art.6 EGV berufen, um sich einer Ungleichbehandlung aufgrund unterschiedlicher Regelungen in Doppelbesteu erungsabkommen oder auf sie bezogener Personenkontrollen nach dem zweiten Schengener Übereinkommen zu erwehren.’

¹⁴⁸ In this sense see Kemmeren, E ‘The Termination of the “Most Favoured Nation Clause” Dispute in Tax Treaty Law and the Necessity of a Euro Model Tax Convention’ (1997) 6 EC Tax Review 146, 147-8Google Scholar: ‘[t]he basis for this point of view is found in the special nature of a bilateral tax treaty between a Member State and another State, whether this State is a Member State or not. Such an agreement is the result of a negotiating process between both states by which the rights and obligations are laid down on the basis of the reciprocity principle. Such a treaty underlies a (well-)provided balance, also with respect to the financial consequences’; and Vogel, K, Gutmann, D and Paula Dourado, A ‘Tax Treaties between Member States and Third States: “Reciprocity” in Bilateral Tax Treaties and Non-discrimination in EC Law’ (2006) 15 EC Tax Review 83, 87Google Scholar: ‘[s]uch a way of reasoning relies on the aforementioned idea that a tax treaty is a coherent set of rules established by two contracting parties with conflicting interest. It assumes that those Contracting Parties have reached an economic balance through negotiation. The consequence of this approach to tax treaties is that their structure should not be jeopardised on the basis of hazardous comparisons with the situation of third State residents’.

¹⁴⁹ Case 235/87, Matteucci v Communauté française of Belgium and Commissariat general aux relations internationales of the Communauté française of Belgium [1988] ECR 5589.

¹⁵⁰ Case C–204/90, Bachmann v Belgium [1992] ECR I–249.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, para 27.

¹⁵² Ibid, para 26 (emphasis added).

¹⁵³ Case C–376/03, D v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingen buitenland te Heerlen [2005] ECR I–5821.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, para 55 (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, paras 59–62.

¹⁵⁶ D Thym has proposed ‘five commandments’ that would establish the constitu tional frame for inter se cooperation by means of international agreements: see Thym, D Ungleichzeitigkeit und europäisches Verfassungsrecht (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2004) 308-18Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁷ Art 11 EC reads: ‘(1) Member States which intend to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves in one of the areas referred to in this Treaty shall address a request to the Commission, which may submit a proposal to the Council to that effect. In the event of the Commission not submitting a proposal, it shall inform the Member States concerned of the reasons for not doing so. (2) Authorisation to establish enhanced cooperation as referred to in paragraph 1 shall be granted, in compliance with Articles 43 to 45 of the Treaty on European Union, by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament. When enhanced cooperation relates to an area covered by the procedure referred to in Article 251 of this Treaty, the assent of the European Parliament shall be required. A member of the Council may request that the matter be referred to the European Council. After that matter has been raised before the European Council, the Council may act in accordance with the first subparagraph of this paragraph. (3) The acts and decisions necessary for the implementation of enhanced cooperation activities shall be subject to all the relevant provisions of this Treaty, save as otherwise provided in this Article and in Articles 43 to 45 of the Treaty on European Union.’

¹⁵⁸ Case C–307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt [1999] ECR I–6161.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, para 57.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, para 59 (emphasis added).

¹⁶¹ Case C–476/98, Commission v Germany (Open Skies) [2002] ECR I–9855.

¹⁶² ‘It follows that Community airlines may always be excluded from the benefit of the air transport agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America, while that benefit is assured to German airlines. Consequently, Community airlines suffer discrimination which prevents them from benefiting from the treatment which the host Member State, namely the Federal Republic of Germany, accords to its own nationals. Contrary to what the Federal Republic of Germany maintains, the direct source of that discrimination is not the possible conduct of the United States of America but the clause on the ownership and control of airlines, which specifically acknowledges the right of the United States of America to act in that way’: ibid, paras 153–154.

¹⁶³ Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community, OJ 1971 L 149/2.

¹⁶⁴ Art 8 of the Regulation, ibid, entitled ‘Conclusion of conventions between Member States’, states: ‘(1) Two or more Member States may, as need arises, conclude conventions with each other based on the principles and in the spirit of this Regulation. (2) Each Member State shall notify, in accordance with Article 96 (1), any convention concluded with another Member State pursuant to paragraph 1.’

¹⁶⁵ The scope of the Regulation was limited by Art 1(k) of the Regulation. It defines the concept of social security convention as ‘any bilateral or multilateral instrument which binds or will bind two or more Member States exclusively, and any other multilateral instrument which binds or will bind at least two Member States and one or more other States in the field of social security, for all or part of the branches and schemes set out in Article 4 (1) and (2), together with agreements, of whatever kind, concluded pursuant to the said instruments’.

¹⁶⁶ Case C–23/92, Grana-Novoa v Landesversicherungsanstalt Hessen [1993] ECR I–4505, para 24.

¹⁶⁷ Jésus-Gimeno, B ‘International and Community Obligations of the Member States in the Field of Social Security Schemes: Which Impact for Migrant Workers?’ in Kronenberger, V (ed) The European Union and the International Legal Order (The Hague, TMC. Asser, 2001) 297, 311Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁸ Case 21/87, Borowitz v Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte [1988] ECR 3715, para 26.

¹⁶⁹ Case C–55/00, Elide Gottardo v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) [2002] ECR I–413.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, paras 33–34, 36 (emphasis added).

¹⁷¹ Ibid, para 37.

¹⁷² Ibid, para 36.

¹⁷³ The question is: could an international agreement with a third state be justified under the free movement rules, while the equivalent unilateral national measure could not?

¹⁷⁴ Koskenniemi, M From Apology to Utopia (Cambridge, CUP, 2005) esp. ch 4 Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁵ Brölmann, C ‘The Legal Nature of International Organisations and the Law of Treaties’ (1999) 4 Austrian Review of International & European Law 85, 111Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁶ This has traditionally been the position in the US: see Art I, sect 10, cl 1 US Constitution: ‘No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation’.

¹⁷⁷ This has been the solution adopted in Germany. Dealing with foreign relations, Art 32(3) German Constitution states: ‘Insofar as the Länder have power to legislate, they may, with the consent of the Federal Government, conclude treaties with foreign states’.

¹⁷⁸ The technique of ‘Community clauses’ will not be discussed here. These clauses were developed in the context of the Common Commercial Policy and would approximately read as follows: ‘[l]orsque les obligations découlant du traité instituant la Communauté économique européenne et relatives à l’instauration progressive d’une politique commerciale commune de rendront nécessaire, des négociations seront ouvertes dans le plus bref délai possible afin d’apporter au présent accord toutes modifications utiles’: Council Decision of 20 July 1060, quoted in Pescatore, P ‘Les Relations extérieures des Communautés européennes’ (1961) 103 Recueil des Cours d’Académie de Droit International de La Haye 7,168 Google Scholar. The Community could only require its Member States to negotiate the inclusion of such a clause. Where the third state refused to add such a clause into the international agreement, this ex ante mechanism would fail.

¹⁷⁹ Art 75(2) ECSC.

¹⁸⁰ Article 103 Euratom (emphasis added).

¹⁸¹ Gaja, G, Hay, P and Rotunda, RD ‘Instruments for Legal Integration in the European Community—A Review’ in Cappelletti, M, Seccombe, M and Weiler, J (eds) Integration through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience Vol.1 Methods, Tools and Institutions (Berlin, de Gruyter, 1986) 113, 148Google Scholar.

¹⁸² Eg Regulation 847/2007 on the Negotiation and Implementation of Air Service Agreements between Member States and Third Countries, OJ 2004 L 157/7. Art 1 lays down a notification requirement for Member States’ air service agreements, while Art 4 deals with the conclusion of Member States’ agreements. The provision reads: ‘(1) Upon signature of an agreement, the Member State concerned shall notify the Commission of the outcome of the negotiations together with any relevant documentation. (2) Where the negotiations have resulted in an agreement which incorporates the relevant standard clauses referred to in Article 1(1), the Member State shall be authorised to conclude the agreement. (3) Where the negotiations have resulted in an agreement which does not incorporate the relevant standard clauses referred to in Article 1(1), the Member State shall be authorised, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 7(2), to conclude the agreement, provided that this does not harm the object and purpose of the Community common transport policy. The Member State may provisionally apply the agreement pending the outcome of this procedure.’

¹⁸³ However, this solution has been suggested by CWA Timmermans. See his intervention in Bleckmann, A and Ress, G (eds) Souveränitätsverständnis in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1980) 210 Google Scholar: ‘[i]ch glaube, das ist eine richtige Interpretation, die es ermöglicht, [Artikel 300 (6)] für eine Lösung solcher Kompetenzkonflikte heranzuziehen’.

¹⁸⁴ The perhaps most explicit exponent of this technique has been Vedder, CW Die auswär tige Gewalt des Europa der Neun (Göttingen, Schwartz & Co, 1980) 123 Google Scholar (emphasis added): ‘[d]a jeder Vertragsschluß durch die Mitgliedstaaten auf Gebieten innergemeinschaftlicher Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse der EWG den Bestand des Gemeinschaftsrechts gefährden bzw. des sen weitere Entwicklung behindern würde, führt eine konsequente Anwendung des Art. 5 Abs. 2 EWGV dazu, daß Mitgliedstaaten verpflichtet sind, solche Verträge nicht mehr zu schließen.’ To fill the gap created by the total loss of all treaty-making powers of the Member States for matters within the legislative competence of the Community, the Community’s implied exter nal powers should be correspondingly extended: ibid, 125.

¹⁸⁵ Schütze, R From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of the Legislative Function in the European Union (Florence, EUI Thesis, 2005) chs 5 and 6 Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁶ This hierarchical position in between primary and secondary Community law follows from the fact that the European Court uses (directly effective) international agreements as a standard of review for the legality of Community legislation. In Case C–61/94, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany [1996] ECR I–3989, para 52, the Court spoke expressly of the ‘primacy of international agreements concluded by the Community over provisions of secondary Community legislation’.

¹⁸⁷ ‘[A] Member State bound by an agreement with a third State will reasonably refrain from voting in favour of a Council act which may lead to an infringement of any obligation under the agreement and will also insist on a vote being taken only unanimously’: Gaja, G, Hay, P and Rotunda, RD, above n 181, 147.

¹⁸⁸ Schütze, R, above n 185

¹⁸⁹ Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Cornelis Kramer and others [1976] ECR 1279.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, para 39.

¹⁹¹ Ibid, paras 44–45.

¹⁹² Case 181/80, Procureur général près la Cour d’Appel de Pau and others v ArbelaizEmazabel [1981] ECR 2961.

¹⁹³ General Agreement on Fishing concluded between France and Spain by exchange of Notes on 20 Mar 1967 [1967] JORF 7807.

¹⁹⁴ See, in particular: Regulation 2160/77 laying down interim measures for the conservation and management of fishery resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of Spain, OJ 1997 L 250/17.

¹⁹⁵ Arbelaiz-Emazabel, above n 192, para 13.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, paras 29–31 (emphasis added).

¹⁹⁷ Churchill, RR and Foster, NG ‘European Community Law and Prior Treaty Obligations of Member States: The Spanish Fishermen’s Cases’ (1987) 36 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 504, 519CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹⁸ Joined Cases C–176 and 177/97, Commission v Kingdom of Belgium and Grand Duchy of Luxembourg [1998] ECR I–3557.

¹⁹⁹ Regulation 4055/86 of 22 Dec 1986 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport between Member States and between Member States and third countries, OJ 1986 L 378/1.

²⁰⁰ Joined Cases C–176 and 177/97, above n 198, para 37.

²⁰¹ Churchill, RR and Foster, NG, above n 197, 519 and 523 (emphasis added).

²⁰² Van Panhuys, JHF ‘Conflicts between the Law of the European Communities and Other Rules of International Law’ (1965-6) 3 CML Rev 420, 434 Google Scholar. The same solution has been proposed by P Daillier advocating ‘comme date critique pour “l’antériorité” de l’établissement de la politique commune des pêches, soit 1979. Deux arguments peuvent être invoqués au bénéfice de la deuxième solution: le principe de bonne foi exige que les tiers aient été alertés par une affirmation concrète de la compétence communautaire; et la jurisprudence Kramer, 1976, admet la compétence des Etats membres pour négocier des accords de pêche avec les Etats tiers au moins jusqu’à cette date, et même jusqu’en 1976’: Daillier, P ‘Le régime de la pêche maritime des ressortissants espagnols sous juridiction des états membres de la C.E.E. (1977–1980)’ (1982) 256 Revue du Marché commun 187, 190Google Scholar.

²⁰³ Pache, E and Bielitz, J ‘Das Verhältnis der EG zu den völkerrechtlichen Verträgen ihrer Mitgliedstaaten’ (2006) 41 Europarecht 316, 327Google Scholar (translation by the author).

²⁰⁴ Bülow, E ‘Die Anwendung des Gemeinschaftsrechts im Verhältnis zu Drittländern’ in Clauder, A (ed) Einführung in die Rechtsfragen der europäischen Integration (Bonn, Europea Union Verlag, 1972), 52, 54 Google Scholar.

²⁰⁵ Petersmann, E-U ‘Artikel 234’ in Von der Groeben, H, Thiesing, J and Ehlermann, C-D (eds) Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag (Baden-Baden, Normos, 1991) 5725, 5731 (rn 6)Google Scholar.

²⁰⁶ This solution has been tentatively suggested by P Daillier in the form of the follow ing question: ‘[c]omment concilier les obligations internationals des Etats members et leurs obligations en vertu du droit communautaire? Dans la mesure où l’incompatibilité des textes successifs résulte d’initiatives tant communautaires que nationales, faut-il envisager un partage de responsabilités internationales entre le CEE et les Etats membres, et si oui, sur la base de quels critères?’: Daillier, P, above n 202, 191.

²⁰⁷ OJ 2007 L 199/40.

²⁰⁸ This had long been obvious from its ‘ambivalent’ relationship to the external relations of federal states: see Wildhaber, L Treaty-making Power and Constitution: An International and Comparative Study (Basel, Lichtenhahn, 1971)Google Scholar, Pt II. For an analysis of the constitutional problems within federal states see also Weiler, JHH ‘The External Legal Relations of Non-uni tary Actors: Mixity and the Federal Principle’ in Weiler, JHH (ed) The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge, CUP, 1999) ch 4 Google Scholar.

²⁰⁹ Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, 593.

²¹⁰ Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1, 12.

²¹¹ Joined Cases C–181 and 248/91, Parliament v Council (Emergency Aid) [1993] ECR I–3685, para 16.

²¹² De Witte, B, above n 140, 31, 47.

²¹³ This is equally true for the first infant disease: the doctrine of direct effect. For a recent overview of that doctrine across the legal instruments of the Community see Schütze, R ‘The Morphology of Legislative Power in the European Community: Legal Instruments and the Federal Division of Powers’ (2006) 25 Yearbook of European Law 91 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.