¹ The ideas of an EU Charter and the EU acceding to the ECHR have featured on the EU agenda since the late 1970s; in 1977 the joint declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on fundamental rights ([1977] OJ C103/1) was adopted and in 1979 an unsuccessful proposal for the EU to accede to the ECHR was tabled by the Commission (COM (79) 2010 final).

² Final report of Working Group II ‘Incorporation of the Charter/Accession to the ECHR’, which was established by European Convention on the Future of Europe, CONV 354/02, 22 October 2002, pp 4–7 and 11–13 in particular; Recital 4 of the Charter; ‘Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ [2007] OJ C303/17, concerning Article 52(3) EUCFR; Recital 1 of the Draft Explanatory Report to the Draft Agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 5 April 2013, annexed as appendix V to Council of Europe document 47+1(2013)2008rev2; and Joint Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, 27 January 2011, available at: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf [last accessed on 14 May 2015].

³ Villalón, P Cruz, Rights in Europe, The Crowded House, King’s College London Working Paper 01/2012 Google Scholar, available at: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/law/research/centres/european/research/CELWPEL012012FINAL.pdf [last accessed 15 May 2015] p 3.

⁴ On this, see Polakiewicz, J, ‘EU Law and the ECHR: Will EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights Square the Circle?’ (26 September 2013), pp 3–4 Google Scholar. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2331497.

⁵ Although the functioning of the pre-Lisbon relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR was not perfect, it was largely harmonious and the inter-systemic tensions that did arise were resolved by way of a high degree of mutual accommodation on both parts, cf Section II below.

⁶ It is widely cited that President Skouris at the 2014 FIDE Conference in Copenhagen stated that the CJEU ‘is not a human rights court. It is the Supreme Court of the Union’, cf S Douglas-Scott, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR: A Christmas Bombshell from the European Court of Justice’, (24 December 2014) Verfassungsblog available at: http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/opinion-213-eu-accession-echr-christmas-bombshell-european-court-justice/#.VJ8TXP8CRA [last accessed on 15 May 2015].

⁷ Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), EU:C:2014:2454 2014, para 169.

⁸ Douglas-Scott, S, ‘The Relationship Between the EU and the ECHR Five Years on From the Treaty of Lisbon’ in S de Vries et al (eds), Five Years Legally Binding Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart Publishing, forthcoming)Google Scholar, Oxford Legal Research Paper (January 2015), pp 16–20 available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2533207&download=yes [last accessed 15 May 2015]; J Callewaert, The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 2014) pp 9–11 and 20–21; and De Búrca, G, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator’ (2013) 11 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 168 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ Vedsted-Hansen, J, ‘Reception Conditions as Human Rights: Pan-European Human Rights or Systemic Deficiencies’ in V Chetail, P De Bruycker and F Maiani (eds), Reforming the Common European Asylum System: The New European Refugee Law (Martinus Nijhoff, forthcoming)Google Scholar; and C Costello and M Mouzourakis, Reflections on Reading Tarakhel: Is ‘How Bad is Bad Enough’ Good Enough?, Working Paper of 12 December 2014, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2548542 [last accessed 3 February 2015].

¹⁰ Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454 concerning the Treaty compatibility of Draft revised agreement (DAA) on the accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 5 April 2013, annexed as Appendix I to Council of Europe document 47+1(2013)2008rev2.

¹¹ J Polakiewicz, ‘The Future of Fundamental Rights Protection Without Accession’, speech given on 26 June 2015 at Maastrict University, available at: http://www.coe.int/fr/web/dlapil/speeches-of-the-director/-/asset_publisher/ja71RsfCQTP7/content/the-future-of-fundamental-rights-protection-without-accession?inheritRedirect=false [last accessed 3 July 2015].

¹² Storgaard, L Halleskov, ‘EU Law Autonomy v European Fundamental Rights Protection’ forthcoming (2015) Human Rights Law Review CrossRefGoogle Scholar doi:10.1093/hrlr/ngv012 [first published online: 20 July 2015]; BH Pirker and S Reitemeyer, ‘Between Discursive and Exclusive Autonomy – Opinion 2/13, the Protection of Fundamental Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law’ Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies doi:10.1017/cel.2015.7 [first published online: August 2015]; T Lock, ‘Autonomy Now?! A Brief Response to Daniel Halberstam’, (12 March 2015) Verfassungsblog available at: http://www.verfassungsblog.de/autonomy-now-a-brief-response-to-daniel-halberstam/#.VS-7xpONhIY [last accessed on 15 April 2015]; and J Komárek, ‘It’s a Stupid Autonomy…’ (14 March 2015) Verfassungsblog available at: http://www.verfassungsblog.de/its-a-stupid-autonomy/#.VTESGZONhIY [last accessed on 17 April 2015].

¹³ On Opinion 2/13, see ibid; and S Peers, ‘The CJEU and the EU’s Accession to the ECHR: A Clear and Present Danger to Human Rights Protection’ (19 December 2014) EU Law Analysis available at: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/12/the-cjeu-and-eus-accession-to-echr.html [last accessed on 15 May 2015]; and C Barnard, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR: Looking for the Silver Lining’ (16 February 2015) EU Law Analysis available at: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.dk/2015/02/opinion-213-on-eu-accession-to-echr.html [last accessed 15 May 2015].

¹⁴ European Court of Human Rights, 2014 Annual Report, foreword by President Spielmann p 6; and speech by President Spielmann at the opening of the judicial year of the European Court of Human Rights, 20 January 2015, pp 4–6 where it is noted, for example, that ‘the important thing is to ensure that there is no legal vacuum in human rights protection on the Convention’s territory, whether the violation can be imputed to a State or to a supranational institution’.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Since the late 1970s, representatives from both courts have met on a regular basis, and since the establishment of the ‘new’ ECtHR in 1998 these meetings have been held annually, Scheeck, cf L, Intrusions, ‘Diplomatic, Dialogues, and Fragile Equilibria: The European Court as a Constitutional Actor of the European Union’ in J Christoffersen and M Rask Madsen (eds), The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2013) ch 9, pp 168–171 Google Scholar; and Douglas-Scott, S, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 629, p 655 Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Juncker, J, Council of Europe/European Union, ‘A Sole Ambition for the European Continent’, Report to the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Council of Europe, 4 April 2006 Google Scholar; and S Douglas-Scott, see note 6 above, p 19.

¹⁸ Larsen L Bay, ‘Dialogue Between the ECJ and the ECHR’; and Lorenzen, P, ‘Dialogue Between the ECJ And the ECHR and the WTO Judiciary’ in C Baudenbacher C (ed), International Dispute Resolution Vol 2: Dialogue Between Courts in Times of Globalization and Regionalization (German Law Publishers, 2010) 33 and 41 Google Scholar. This typology resembles, to some extent, the seminal one of A Slaughter, , ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ (1994) 29 University of Richmond Law Review 99 Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ This section only delivers a compressed overview of the evolution of the CJEU–ECtHR relationship. For a more thorough account, see, in addition to those already cited, de Witte, B, ‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights’ in P Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1999) 839 Google Scholar; Jacobs, FG, ‘Human Rights in the European Union: The Role of the Court of Justice’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 331 Google Scholar; Rosas, A, ‘Fundamental Rights in the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts’ in C Baudenbacher et al (eds), The EFTA Court: Ten Years On (Hart Publishing, 2005)Google Scholar; Douglas-Scott, S, see note 16 above; and NA Lorenz et al, The European Human Rights Culture – A Paradox of Human Rights Protection in Europe? (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) pp 125–157 Google Scholar.

²² For ease of understanding, the article applies the current EU institutional terminology and Treaty numbering also when past events are examined.

²³ Nold v Commission, 4/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51, para 13.

²⁴ Rutili, 36/75, ECLI:EU:C:1975:137, para 32.

²⁵ Hauer, 44/79, ECLI:EU:C:1979:290, paras 17-–19 (Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR).

²⁶ Hoechst, 46/87 and 227/88, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337, para 13. See also ERT, C-260/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254, para 41; and Kremzow, C-299/95 ECLI:EU:C:1997:254, para 14.

²⁷ Joint Declaration of 5 April 1977 of the European Parliament, The Council and the Commission on fundamental rights, [1977] OJ C103/1.

²⁸ See, Rosas, A, ‘The EU and International Human Rights Instruments’ in C Kronenberger (ed) The EU and the International Legal Order (TMC Asser Press, 2001)Google Scholar ch 3.

²⁹ S Douglas-Scott, see note 16 above, pp 644–652 with further references.

³⁰ Ibid; and Douglas-Scott, S, ‘The ECJ and the ECtHR After Lisbon’ in S de Vries et al (eds), The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU After Lisbon (Hart Publishing, 2013) ch 7, p 158 Google Scholar. This jurisprudential pattern is also reflected in the surveys of the of the Luxembourg Court’s reliance on the ECHR, Guild, cf E and Lesieur, G, 2007)Google Scholar, available at: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/garnet/workingpapers/2307.pdf [last accessed on 14 May 2015].

³¹ Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, C-465/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:294, paras 68–94.

³² Spector Photo Group, C-45/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:806, paras 39–43 in particular.

³³ Parliament v Council, C-540/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:429, paras 52 and 57–74 in particular.

³⁴ Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, C-402/05, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461.

³⁵ Ibid, paras 285, 334–335, 356, 360 and 368 in particular.

³⁶ On this issue, see L Halleskov Storgaard, see note 12 above, pp 32–35 with further references.

³⁷ Skouris, V in ‘Dialogue Between Judges: Fifty Years of the European Court of Human Rights Viewed by its Fellow International Courts’ (Strasbourg, 2009)Google Scholar, available at: http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2009_ENG.pdf [last accessed on 15 May 2015], p 43.

³⁸ Cf note 21 above; Callewaert, J, ‘Unionisation and Conventionisation of Fundamental Rights in Europe: The Interplay Between Union and Convention Law and its Impact on the Domestic Legal Systems of the Member States’, in J Wouters et al (eds), The Europeanisation of International Law (Asser Press, 2008) ch 7, pp 110–115 Google Scholar; and Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Bosphorus, C-84/95, ECLI:EU:C:1996:312, para 53.

³⁹ S Douglas-Scott, see note 16 above, p 651 argues that the CJEU deliberately chose not to clarify the precise EU law position of the ECHR and the ECtHR.

⁴⁰ Cf S Douglas-Scott, see note 8 above, p 14 where it is explained how the often quoted examples of conflicts – Hoechst v Commission, C-46/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337 and Orkem v Commission, C-374/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:387 – in fact are the products of either no, or no clear, Strasbourg jurisprudence. Cf also Craig, P and de Búrca, G, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp 404–405 CrossRefGoogle Scholar regarding the so-called Emesa Sugar saga.

⁴¹ Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Siketi v Ireland (Application no. 45036/98) (2006) 42 EHRR 1.

⁴² Ibid paras 159–165.

⁴³ Ibid para 166 cf para 156.

⁴⁴ Cf eg LFM Besselink, The European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights After the Lisbon Treaty: From ‘Bosphorus’ Sovereign Immunity to Full Scrutiny?, Working Paper of 12 January 2008, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf.m?abstract_id=1132788 [last accessed on 15 May 2015]; Costello, C, ‘The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 87 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Parga, A Hinarejos, ‘Bosphorus v Ireland and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe’ (2006) 31 European Law Review 250 Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Illustrative hereof are Connolly v 15 EU Member States (Application no. 73274/01), decision 9 December 2008; and Kokkelvisserij v the Netherlands (Application no. 13645/05), decision of 20 January 2009. The ECtHR has, however, in a number of cases concerning the application of the presumption of equivalence conducted a surprisingly intense scrutiny of decisions by national and the EU judiciary under the Article 267 TFEU, cf. Michaud v France (Application no. 12321/11), 6 December 2012; and Povse v Austria (Application no. 3890/11), decision of 18 June 2013.

⁴⁶ On the tension between the principle of mutual trust and fundamental rights, see Meijers Committee (Standing Committee of Experts on International Immigration, Refugee and Criminal Law), The Principle of Mutual Trust in European Asylum, Migration and Criminal Law (2012); and J Polakiewicz, see note 11 above.

⁴⁷ MSS v Belgium and Greece (Application no. 30696/09) (2011) 53 EHRR 2; and Tarakhel v Switzerland (Application no. 29217/12) (2015) 60 EHRR 28. On these cases, see the literature referred to note 9 above; S Peers, ‘Tarakhel v Switzerland: Another Nail in the Coffin of the Dublin System?’ (5 November 2014) EU Law Analysis, available at: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/tarakhel-v-switzerland-another-nail-in.html [last accessed on 15 May 2015]: and below sections III.B and V.B.

⁴⁸ S Douglas-Scott, see note 16 above, pp 640–644; and A Rosas, see note 21 above, pp 168–171.

⁴⁹ See eg Eskelinen v Finland (Application no. 63235/00) (2007) 45 EHRR 43, para 60.

⁵⁰ See eg Maslov v Austria (Application no. 1638/03) (2008) 47 EHRR 20; Christine Goodwin v UK (Application no, 28957/95), (2002) 35 EHRR 18; and Zolotukhin v Russia (Application no. 14939/03) (2012) 54 EHRR 16.

⁵¹ See eg Neulinger v Switzerland (Application no. 41615/07) (2012) 54 EHRR 31, para 135.

⁵² See eg Stec and Others v UK (Application no. 65731/01) (2006) 43 EHRR 47, para 58; and Ramaer and Van Willigen (Application no 34880/12) (2013) 57 EHRR 3.

⁵³ Avotin v Latvia (Application no. 17500/07), judgment of 25 February 2014.

⁵⁴ Cases such as Hornsby v Greece (Application no. 18357/91) (1997) 24 EHRR 250; and Mendizabal v France (Application no. 51431/99) (2010) 50 EHRR 50.

⁵⁵ Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v Belgium (Application no. 3989/07), judgment of 20 September 2011, paras 55–67. with reference to CILFIT v Ministero della Sanità, C-283/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335.

⁵⁶ On this issue, see W Weiss ‘Human Rights in the EU: Rethinking the Role of the European Convention on Human Rights After Lisbon’ (2011) 7 EU Constitutional Law Review 64.

⁵⁷ Article 216(2) TFEU; and Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, para 180.

⁵⁸ These are identified in the explanations to the Charter, see note 2 above. Different paragraphs of the same Charter provisions are in this respect counted as one insofar as they correspond to the same ECHR provision.

⁵⁹ Opinion of AG Kolkott in Solvay, C-110/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:257, para 95, and Bonda, C-489/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:845, para 44.

⁶⁰ Explanations relating to Article 52(3) EUCFR.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Joint Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, see note 2 above.

⁶³ On the argument made by CJEU in Opinion 2/13 as regards Article 53 EUCFR, see L Halleskov Storgaard, note 12 above, pp 8–9 and 21–23 with further references.

⁶⁴ Åklageren v Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para 44; Schindler v Commission, C-501/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:522, para 32; and Dirextra Alta Formazione, C-523/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:831, para 20.

⁶⁵ L Halleskov Storgaard, see note 12 above, pp 29–30; NA Lorenz et al, see note 21 above, pp 162–217; Lenaerts, K, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review 375 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Lock, T, ‘The CJEU and the ECtHR: The Future Relationship Between the Two European Courts’ (2009) 8 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunal 375, pp 383–385 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Section V.A below on the CJEU’s inconsistent approach to Article 52(3) EUCFR.

⁶⁶ This is the rationale underpinning the prior-involvement mechanism in the Draft Accession Agreement. On the issue of the ECtHR’s competence over the CFSP, see Section V.C below.

⁶⁷ Tuori, K, ‘Transnational Law’ in M Maduro et al (eds), Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (Cambridge University Press, 2014) ch 1, pp 32–33 Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ This expression is borrowed from NA Lorenz et al, see note 21 above, p 200.

⁶⁹ Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 11/79, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114, para 4; and Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, para 170.

⁷⁰ Cf Section IV.D.3 below as regards the principle of ‘substantive awareness’.

⁷¹ Such balancing is inherent in the ECHR’s limitation regime and is also conducted by the ECtHR when determining the extent of the Contracting Parties’ positive obligations under the Convention.

⁷² Kadi I, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461.

⁷³ Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paras 158, 167–168 and 191–195 in particular; and L Halleskov Storgaard, see note 12 above, pp 9 and 23–26 with further references. This argument is addressed in Section V.B below.

⁷⁴ Articles 19 and 32 ECHR.

⁷⁵ L Halleskov Storgaard, see note 12 above, pp 34–35; NA Lorenz et al, see note 21 above.

⁷⁶ Van Gend en Loos, 26/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; Costa v. E.N.E.L, 6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; and Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454.

⁷⁷ Loizidou v Turkey (Application no. 15318/89) (1997) 23 EHRR 513; Bosphorus v Ireland, see note 41 above, para 156; and Behrami & Behrami v France (Application no. 71412/01) and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (Application no. 78166/01), decision of 2 May 2007, para 145.

⁷⁸ See Section IV.D.2 below.

⁷⁹ S Douglas-Scott, see note 16 above, pp 652–660.

⁸⁰ NA Lorenz et al, see note 21 above.

⁸¹ Kadi I, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461; and Section II.A above.

⁸² L Halleskov Storgaard, see note 12 above, pp 32–35.

⁸³ V Skouris, see note 37 above, p 43; and Section II.A above.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ See Section V.A below.

⁸⁶ L Halleskov Storgaard, see note 12 above, pp 34–35 and Section V.B below. Cf S Iglesias Sánchez, ‘The Court and the Charter: The Impact of the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty on the ECJ’s Approach to Fundamental Rights’, (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 1565 who notes (p 1601) that the CJEU today determines the value of Strasbourg case law ‘through the prism of the autonomy of the EU system’.

⁸⁷ This expression is borrowed from K Tuori, see note 67 above, who (pp 13 and 35) refers to ‘the black box’ model as encapsulating a state-sovereigntist view of modern law.

⁸⁸ See, for example, Weiler, JHH, ‘Prologue: Global and Pluralist Constitutionalism – Some Doubts’ in G de Búrca and JHH Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2012) p 9 Google Scholar; and Avbelj, M and Komárek, J, ‘Introduction’ in M Avbelj and J Komárek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing, 2012) ch 1, p 4 Google Scholar.

⁸⁹ Maduro, MP, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in N Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing, 2003)Google Scholar ch 2; ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 1; and ‘Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism’ in Dunoff, JL and JP, Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ch 12.

⁹⁰ Walker, N, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.

⁹¹ D Halberstam, ‘Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Constitutional Law: National, Supranational and Global Governance’, in M Avbelj and J Komárek (eds), see note 88 above, ch 5; and ‘Local, Global and Plural Constitutionalism: Europe Meets the World’ in G de Búrca and JHH Weiler (eds), see note 88 above, ch 4.

⁹² M Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship Between Constitutionalism In and Beyond the State’, in JL Dunoff and JP Trachtman (eds), see note 89 above, ch 10.

⁹³ G de Búrca, ‘The ECJ and the International Legal Order: A Re-evaluation’ in G de Búrca and JHH Weiler (eds), see note 88 above, ch 3.

⁹⁴ K Tuori, see note 67 above.

⁹⁵ Kelsen, H, General Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press, 1945), pp 393–395 Google Scholar.

⁹⁶ On classic constitutionalism and the EU, see, eg, Stein, E, ‘Toward Supremacy of Treaty-Constitution by Judicial Fiat: On the Margin of the Costa Case’ (1965) Michigan Law Review 63 Google Scholar; Kumm, M, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2003), pp 503–505.

⁹⁷ Cf eg J Habermas, Divided West (Polity, 2006); Fassbender, B, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Tomuschat, C, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, General Course on Public International Law’ (1999) 281 Recueil des Cours 9 Google Scholar. de Wet, E, ‘The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 611 CrossRefGoogle Scholar argues that the ECHR constitutes the core value system of the emerging international constitutional order.

⁹⁸ The pertinence of adding ‘constitutionalism’ to ‘pluralism’ is discussed in Section IV.D.2 below.

⁹⁹ N Krisch,‘The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law’ in G de Búrca and JHH Weiler, see note 88 above ch 5.

¹⁰⁰ Teubner, G, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (Oxford University Press, 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?’ in C Joerges et al. (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2004).

¹⁰¹ Fischer-Lescano, A and Teubner, G, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’, (2004) 25(4) Michigan Journal of International Law 999 Google Scholar. For an overview and discussion of ‘radical’ pluralist theories, see K Tuori (2014), see note 67 above, pp 34–37; and G de Búrca, see note 93 above, pp 126–131.

¹⁰² N Walker, see note 90 above, p 338; and M Avbelk and J Komárek, see note 88 above, pp 5–6.

¹⁰³ G de Búrca, see note 93 above, pp 138–148 and 278–284 in particular. De Búrca (p 137) compares her theoretical perspective with that of Bogdandy, Burke-White, Kumm and Halberstam.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, pp 281–282.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, pp 135–148 and 281–283.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. pp 122 and 138–145 in particular.

¹⁰⁷ K Tuori, see note 67 above, p 11.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, pp 41–49 with further references to the work of B de Sousa Santos.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, pp 17–23 where ‘transnational law’ is defined as legal orders or legal systems which have an international law rooting but have eluded the control of nation states. Both EU law and the ECHR system are identified as being transnational legal systems.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p 44 in particular.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p 46 and K Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Ashgate Publishing, 2002), pp 147–197.

¹¹² Ibid, p 47.

¹¹³ Ibid, pp 47–49.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p 54.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, pp 44–45.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, pp 40 and 54.

¹¹⁷ MP Maduro ‘Three Claims for Constitutional Pluralism’ in M Avbelj and J Komárek, see note 88 above, ch 4, pp 70–71.

¹¹⁸ Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Elgafaji and Noor Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, C-465/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:479, para 22.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. Cf similar, Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Kadi I, C-402/05, ECLI:EU:C:2008:11, para 44.

¹²⁰ MP Maduro, see notes 89 and 117 above.

¹²¹ Tuori, K, Critical Legal Positivism (Ashgate Publishing, 2002)Google Scholar.

¹²² MP Maduro, see note 117 above, p 70; and note 89 above (2003), p 534.

¹²³ MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2003), p 523 where he explains that the title of his theory is inspired by the musical method of harmonising different melodies that are not subject to hierarchical relations per se.

¹²⁴ Ibid, p 534. Although the contrapunctual principles were introduced already in Maduro’s earlier writings, cf MP Maduro, note 89 above (2003), pp 524–531, they are in this later works redesigned as modelled specifically to apply to EU and national court, cf MP Maduro, note 89 above (2007), pp 17–21; and (2009), pp 374–379.

¹²⁵ MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2007) p 17.

¹²⁶ Ibid p 2.

¹²⁷ Maduro, MP, ‘In Search of a Meaning and Not in Search of the Meaning: Judicial Review and the Constitution in Times of Pluralism’ (2013) Wisconsin Law Review 54, pp 542–544 Google Scholar and 559–563.

¹²⁸ MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2003) pp 524–525.

¹²⁹ MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2007) p 17; and (2009) p 378.

¹³⁰ Ibid; and MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2003), pp 531–534.

¹³¹ D Halberstam, see note 91 above, pp 152, 160–175 and 200–202.

¹³² MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2003) p 526.

¹³³ MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2007), p 18; (2009), pp 378–379; and (2003) pp 530–533.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2007), p 18; and (2009), pp 374–375.

¹³⁷ Ibid; and MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2003), pp 526–530.

¹³⁸ MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2003), p 523. Jaklic, K, Constitutional Pluralism in the EU (Oxford University Press, 2014), p 6 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, characterises constitutional pluralism as the ‘dominant branch’ of constitutional thought in EU law today, cf similarly, J Weiler, note 88 above, p 12 who, nevertheless, remains hesitant towards the suitability of the ‘constitutional’ label. On this, see Section IV.D.2 below.

¹³⁹ MacCormick, N, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and ‘The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 259.

¹⁴⁰ In concreto, one of the queried questions in the Elgafaji case concerned the relationship between the conditions for granting of subsidiary protection to third country nationals under the EU Qualification Directive and Article 3 ECHR.

¹⁴¹ See, eg N Walker, note 90 above; D Halberstam, note 91 above; and M Avbelj and J Komárek, note 88 above, pp 3–4 with further references.

¹⁴² MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2007), pp 17–21; and (2009), pp 374–339. Cf also P van Elsuwege, ‘New Challenges for Pluralist Adjudication after Lisbon: The Protection of Fundamental Rights in a Ius Commune Europaeum’ (2012) 30(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 195, pp 196–197 who suggests, with reference to Maduro’s work, that a constitutional pluralistic perspective can be applied to the Union’s external relations with the ECHR regime.

¹⁴³ D Halberstam, see note 91 above.

¹⁴⁴ M Kumm, see note 92 above.

¹⁴⁵ MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2003), observes that the contrapunctual principles aim to promote agreement on particular legal outcomes without an agreement on the fundamental values that may justify those outcomes. Cf also, M Avbelj and J Komárek, note 88 above, p 6.

¹⁴⁶ Cf Section IV.B above.

¹⁴⁷ MP Maduro, see note 89 above (2007) pp 17–18; and (2009) pp 378–379. See along the same vein, Huomo-Kettunen, ‘Heterarchical Constitutional Structures in the European Legal Space’, (2013) 6(1) European Journal of Legal Studies 47.

¹⁴⁸ Bosphorus v Ireland, see note 41 above, paras 149–158.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, paras 159–65.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, para 159 with further references.

¹⁵¹ See Section II.B above.

¹⁵² See Section II.A above.

¹⁵³ Cf discussion document of the Court of Justices of the European Union on certain aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 5 May 2010, available at: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-05/convention_en.pdf [last accessed on 15 May 2015], para 3, where it is noted eg that the CJEU supervises ‘that human rights as guaranteed by the Convention are observed, even in the absence of an express obligation to that effect’ and that it refers ‘more and more precisely in recent years, to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’.

¹⁵⁴ See Section III.A above.

¹⁵⁵ JHH Weiler, ‘Dialogical Epilogue’ in JHH Weiler and G de Búrca, see note 88 above, pp 281 and 284–287.

¹⁵⁶ Krisch, N, ‘The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law’, LSE Legal Studies Working Papers 12/2009 Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁷ See eg Dunoff, L and Trachtmand, JP, note 89 above; and J Klabbers et al (eds), The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009)Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁸ N Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context’ in M Avbelj and J Komárek, note 88 above, pp 17–18 observes that: ‘the constitutional pluralist seeks to retain from constitutionalism the idea of a single authorising register for the political domain as a whole while at the same time retaining from pluralism a sense of the rich and irreducible diversity of that political domain’. Cf similarly, MP Maduro in ‘Four Visions of Constitutional Pluralism – Symposium Transcript’, M Avbelj and J Komárek (eds), (2008) 2(1) European Journal of Legal Studies 325, p 363.

¹⁵⁹ On the constitutional nature of the Union, see eg Craig, P, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union’ (2001) 7(2) European Law Review 125 Google Scholar with further references; and Arnull, A et al (eds), A Constitutional Order of States? (Hart Publishing, 2011)Google Scholar. On the constitutional nature of the ECHR system, see eg Greer, S and Wildhaber, L, ‘Revisiting the Debate About “constitutionalizing” the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 12(4) Human Rights Law Review 655 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Keller, H and Sweet, A Stone, ‘Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems’ in Keller H and Stone Sweet A (eds), A Europe of Rights – The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (Oxford University Press, 2008)Google Scholar ch 10.

¹⁶⁰ Cf notes 76 and 77 above.

¹⁶¹ K Tuori, see note 67 above, pp 39–41, in fact develops his normative standpoint on the ideas of Walker.

¹⁶² D Halberstam, ‘“It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward’, Michigan Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No 432, February 2015.

¹⁶³ See Section III.B above.

¹⁶⁴ Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114, para 4; and Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, para 170.

¹⁶⁵ Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, para 169.

¹⁶⁶ Cf NA Lorenz et al, note 21 above, p 200; and P Lorenzen, note 17 above, p 47. See also Storgaard, L Halleskov in T Gammeltoft-Hansen et al (eds), Protecting the Rights of Others (DJØF Publishing, 2013) 443 Google Scholar, pp 447–449 where this argument is demonstrated through an analysis of the CJEU’s judgement in Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-60/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:434.

¹⁶⁷ Cf J Polakiewicz, note 11 above, p 2 who argues that ‘the aim and purpose of fundamental rights is not to foster harmonisation or uniformity’.

¹⁶⁸ J Polakiewicz, see note 4 above, p 28.

¹⁶⁹ See Section II.B above.

¹⁷⁰ Cf the literature referred to in note 8 above; and B De Witte, ‘The Use of the ECHR and Convention Case Law by the European Court of Justice’ in P Popelier et al (eds), Human Rights Protection in the European Legal Order: The Interaction Between the European and National Courts (Intersentia, 2011), ch 1 p 25. On the Charter’s status as the prime EU fundamental rights norm, see CJEU President Skouris in the 2011 Joint Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, note 2 above; N Lorenz et al, see note 21 above p 200; and Otis and Others, C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684, paras 46–47.

¹⁷¹ J McB v LE, C-400/10, ECLI:EU:C:2010:582; para 53; Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, C-92/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662; Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-279/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:811.

¹⁷² Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 concerning Directive (EC) No 2006/24 [2006] OJ L105/43.

¹⁷³ Ibid, paras 47 and 54–55 in particular.

¹⁷⁴ Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105; and Google v Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (article 7 EUCFR). Cf S Iglesias Sánchez, see note 86 above, pp 1601–1604.

¹⁷⁵ Article 1(2) TEU. Cf R Baratta, ‘Accession of the EU to the ECHR: The Rationale for the ECJ’s Prior Involvement Mechanism’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 1305, who notes (p 15) that the Charter ‘not only exercises a protective function of individual rights, but […] also expresses the set of common values around which to build this social identity’.

¹⁷⁶ See Section IV.A above.

¹⁷⁷ G de Búrca, see note 8 above, p 174.

¹⁷⁸ L Halleskov Storgaard, see note 12 above, pp 30–32, where it is demonstrated that the CJEU’s substantive reasoning in Fransson relies closely on Strasbourg case law on the ne bis in idem principle.

¹⁷⁹ A Slaughter, see note 18 above, p 113.

¹⁸⁰ Cf G de Búrca, see note 8 above, p 180.

¹⁸¹ D Halberstam, see note 162 above, p 143.

¹⁸² Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, C-399/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107.

¹⁸³ See Section III.B above.

¹⁸⁴ Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paras 168 and 191.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, paras 191–192.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, para 194.

¹⁸⁷ L Halleskov Storgaard, see note 6 above, pp 23–26; and J Polakiewicz, see note 11 above, p 3.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid; and Tarakhel v Switzerland, see note 47 above.

¹⁸⁹ R (on the application of EM (Eritrea)) v Secretary of State of the Home Department [2014] UKSC 12.

¹⁹⁰ Costello, C, ‘Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored’ (2012) Human Rights Law Review 287, p 339 Google Scholar, notes that there is a ‘chasm’ between EU legal standards and the reality for asylum seekers.

¹⁹¹ Kadi I, C-402/05, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461.

¹⁹² L Halleskov Storgaard, see note 12 above, pp 15–19; and D Halberstam, see note 162 above, pp 12–14.

¹⁹³ R Baratta, see note 175 above, p 8.

¹⁹⁴ Declaration 2 to Article 6(2) TEU.

¹⁹⁵ Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Opinion 2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2475 who recommended an approval of the DAA conditioned upon minor modifications or additions to the procedural mechanisms.

¹⁹⁶ L Halleskov Storgaard, see note 12 above, pp 27–28 and 35–37.

¹⁹⁷ Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paras 249–257.

¹⁹⁸ Kadi I, C-402/05, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461; and Section II.B above.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, para 285.

²⁰⁰ Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Opinion 2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2475, para 190.

²⁰¹ COE CM(74)180, Appendix IV, Opinion of the European Court of Human Rights on the Draft Short- and Medium-term programme for the Council of Europe in the General Field of Human Rights, dated 4 September 1974 (document on file with the author), pp 17–18. This opinion was issued by the ECtHR in the course of the initial discussions on a reform of the ECHR control mechanisms. On this, see Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, A, ‘The Evolution of the Right of Individuals to Seise the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 12 Journal of the History of International Law 267, pp 288–293 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

* I am grateful for the input received from Professor Xavier Groussot and for the comments of the editors and reviewer of CYELS.