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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 October 2017
The greater part of the EU budget comes from money paid directly by citizens of the Member States, or by those who do business with them, in the form of customs dues and VAT. Dishonest people therefore have the opportunity to enrich themselves at the EU’s expense by conducting their business affairs so as to evade payment of these taxes which their fellow citizens dutifully pay. Contrary to popular belief as fostered by the tabloid newspapers, very little of the 82 billion or so ECUs that the EU budget represents is swallowed up in fattening the wallets of MEPs and eurocrats, and nearly all of what comes in goes out again in the form of grants and subsidies. This gives dishonest people a further and even more tempting opportunity to enrich themselves at the EU’s expense by obtaining grants and subsidies to which they are not entitled. The most ingenious dishonest people find ways of cheating on both sides of the equation at once, and manage to evade taxes and fraudulently claim benefits simultaneously.
1 See generally White, S. Protection of the Financial Interests of the European Communities: the Fight against Fraud and Corruption (Kluwer, 1998)Google Scholar.
2 See Kuhl, L., “The Criminal Law Protection of the Communities’ Financial Interests Against Fraud” [1988] Criminal Law Review 259, 260 Google Scholar.
3 See ibid.; see also the figures at 12 and 13 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Corpus Juris (see 84 below).
4 For an excellent brief account see Perduca, A., and Ramael, P. Le Crime International et la Justice (Flammarion, 1998)Google Scholar.
5 The French courts, for example, have jurisdiction not only over offences committed in France, but also grave ones committed by French nationals abroad: Code pénal, Arts. 113–6 and 113–7.
6 For England and Wales, the principles under which the discretion is exercised are officially published in the Code for Crown Prosecutors, published by the Director of Public Prosecutions under s.10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.
7 A prominent example is the UK Customs and Excise, which has the widest statutory powers to do deals with offenders—including (amazingly) the power to order their release from prison after sentence; Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 s.152 (a)–(d).
8 A line of argument that has so far not succeeded in England: see Konscol [1993] Criminal Law Review 950; Aujla [1998] 2 Criminal Appeal Reports 16.
9 Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965.
10 As under UK extradition law: see the Extradition Act 1989 s.12(l).
11 Ghosh [1982] QB 1053.
12 See the case of Ghiselli, which failed in Southwark Crown Court on 16 May 1996. The case is described by Kuhl above n2 at 265-266.
13 See the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Community Transit System, 20 February 1997, A4–0053/97 (rapporteur Mr Edward Kellett-Bowman), para 8.2.2.3: “a state prosecutor ‘does not know who to phone’”.
14 Council Regulation (EC, EURATOM) No. 2988/95, 18 December 1995.
15 See the Council Act of 26 July 1995, OJ 1995 316/03, 48; for a discussion, see Kuhl, above n2.
16 “The symbolism of this paragraph is positive, but how can it be enforced?” (Paul Beaumont’s note to the provision as it appears in the Treaty as annexed to the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993 in Sweet & Maxwell’s Current Law Statutes Annotated).
17 Article 280(4).
18 On 21 April, the current Home Secretary informed Parliament that Part I would be brought into effect on 1 June 1999.
19 The British association, the Association of Lawyers for the Protection of the Financial Interests of the Community, goes by the tongue-twisting acronym of ALPFIEC; the French association is blessed with a more musical one: ARPE.
20 Etude comparative sur la protection des intérêts financiers de la Communauté (rapports nationaux 1992); rapports de synthèse 1993, rapport final “Incompatibilités entre systèmes juridiques et mesures d’harmonisation”, in Seminar on the Legal Protection of the Financial Interests of the Community, (Oak Tree Press, 1994). Etude sur les systèmes de sanctions administratives et pénales dans les Etats membres des Communautés européennes (vol 1, rapports nationaux; vol 2, rapports de synthèse, 1994).
21 Professors Enrique Bacigalupo (Spain), Giovanni Grasso (Italy), Klaus Tiedemann (Germany), Nils Jareborg (Sweden), Dionysios Spinellis (Greece), Christine Van de Wyngaert (Belgium), Mireille Delmas-Marty (France), and J.R.Spencer (England).
22 Published by Editions Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris; ISBN 2–7178–3344–7.
23 A number of continental courts, including those of France, use juries; but in so far as they do use them, they do not usually do so in cases of commercial fraud.
24 Funke v. France 16 (1993) EHRR 297; Sounders v. UK 23 (1997) EHRR 313.
25 Daily Mail, 29 August 1997, 8. A similar attack has since appeared in one of the broadsheet newspapers: see the Daily Telegraph, 30 November 1998—and this author’s letter in response, published on 2 December.
26 White, S. “EC criminal law: Prospects for the Corpus juris , (1998) 5 Journal of Financial Crime, 223 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; White, above n 1 at chapter 8.
27 Obviously, the word “completes” is used here in the sense of “renders complete”, not “writes out”.
28 Rawlings v. General Trading Co [1921] 1 KB 635; see Williams, G. L. The Criminal Law, the General Part (2nd ed, Stevens, 1961), 696 Google Scholar.
29 Original text “de la personne dépositaire du secret”. I imagine what is intended here is the person who confides the secret information to the official—in which case the English text would be clearer if it said “the person whose affairs the secret information concerns”.
30 The French text is au détriment du budget communautaire. A better English version would be “a conspiracy to the detriment of the Community budget”.
31 I.e. the scheme in the Corpus Juris.
32 Author’s italics; the French text is “elle est soumise au contrôle de l’autorité nationale . . .”. The English should really be “it is checked by the competent national authority”.
33 I think a better translation would be “made public”.
34 There is a hiatus here, because at present Article 20 says nothing about warrants for arrest.