Although very different in many respects, the EU and Canada nevertheless confront common problems in certain areas. One such common problem is how to manage inter-state regulatory diversity within a federal (or federal-like), multinational system. This paper compares the different ways in which the EU and Canada have chosen to address the problem of national barriers to trade within their internal markets, and the consequences of these choices. It is somewhat counterintuitive for EU lawyers that a full-fledged state may have an internal market that is less integrated than that of the EU; and yet that is the case in Canada. The comparison is illuminating as to the different possible approaches of federal polities to the problem of state regulatory choices and barriers to trade, the paramount importance of institutional choice, and the significance of historical and political circumstances.

The tribunals system in England and Wales has been transformed by the entry into force of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007; among other things, tribunals are now located more firmly and explicitly than ever before within the judicial branch. Questions concerning the relationship between tribunals and regular courts fall to be confronted afresh within this new institutional landscape. Those questions form the focus of this article, which is particularly concerned with the issue recently considered by the Supreme Court in Cart whether, and if so to what extent, decisions taken within the tribunals system (by the Upper Tribunal) should be susceptible to judicial review by the High Court. In Cart, emphasis was placed upon the concept of “proportionate dispute resolution” as a means by which to delimit regular courts' oversight of tribunals' decisions, raising fundamental questions both of legal doctrine (relating to the relevance of the orthodox doctrinal tools of administrative law) and legal policy (concerning the degree of error on the part of a tribunal that a higher court should tolerate in the interests of the efficient, or proportionate, use of judicial resources).

The “good Constitution” in a democratic country seeks to balance the morality of law and the morality of government. The good Constitution can be considered at the levels of abstraction of the relationship to human rights or of the progression from parliamentary to constitutional supremacy. But this article suggests that the level of the balance between the two moralities is more fruitful. The morality of law focuses on individual rights, the morality of government on the public interest. The constant task of the Constitution is to achieve an accommodation by restraint on the part of both the judges and the executive.

Although rare, giving birth in secret or in concealed circumstances still happens in the United Kingdom. The new born child's existence is unknown to his or her biological ‘father’ and or to the wider biological family of the birth giver who wishes to place the child for adoption without his or her existence being revealed to them. Legal decisions need to be made judicially when a local authority seeks orders as to whether it is required to make further inquiries to identify and notify the biological father and or wider biological family as to any forthcoming adoption proceedings. Developments in European human rights law's protection of a right to respect one's private life provided by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) towards a right to personal autonomy, identity and integrity can be interpreted in different ways. However, three positions are argued here to guard against an erosion of women's confidentiality and privacy in these circumstances. First, women's choices of concealment should be accepted with respect rather than perceived as inauthentic and therefore impermissible; this is in keeping with Article 2's right to life and Article 8's right to personal autonomy and integrity. Second, the right to family life protected by Article 8 of any wider biological family and father is not contravened by allowing women to give birth discreetly. Third, openness and transparency, when it comes to exact knowledge of one's parents in this context is not necessary for a child's identity rights, which are also protected by Article 8's right to personal identity, to be legally protected.

Several recent cases have highlighted the range of legal controls that can be applied to expression on social networks and other amateur digital content. This article identifies three trends in the regulation of digital communications. First, such communications are subject to a wide range of laws, including those primarily regulating the mass media, public order and targeted communications. Second, the persistence and searchability of digital messages make such communications more likely to come to the attention of litigators and prosecutors. Thirdly, that the established approach to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR tends to protect speech that is deemed to be of “high value”, and therefore does little to protect much internet content. This article calls for some greater protection to be afforded to communications that are casual and amateur. The freedom to converse outlined in this article does not call for absolute protection, but seeks to ensure that any controls on expression are proportionate. In particular, alternatives to the criminal law are considered.

Where a fiduciary receives a bribe or a secret commission in breach of fiduciary duty it remains controversial whether the bribe or secret commission will be held on constructive trust for the principal. The Court of Appeal has held that in most cases there will only be a personal liability to account. That is incorrect. The duty of the fiduciary is to serve the interest of the principal to the exclusion of his own interest. A fiduciary who keeps a profit for himself abuses the trust and confidence placed in him by the principal. He is bound to hand it over to his principal the moment he receives it. Equity's response to a breach of this duty is to enforce the duty by means of the constructive trust.

The modern legal framework for the protection of the mentally ill was conceived and developed in the nineteenth century. A substantial growth in the numbers of the mentally ill revealed an absence of effective and accessible legal protection for the property of patients with small estates. This challenge was met through the retention and reform of the ancient jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor in the Lunacy Court as the sole instrument of protection. The judicial solution was adopted in preference to bureaucratic regulation, despite the strong forces of state intervention and the reform of the legal system and its processes.

This article aims to map the position of academic legal research, using a distinction between “law as a practical discipline”, “law as humanities” and “law as social sciences” as a conceptual framework. Having explained this framework, we address both the “macro” and “micro” level of legal research in the UK. For this purpose, we have collected information on the position of all law schools within the structure of their respective universities. We also introduce “ternary plots” as a new way of explaining individual research preferences. Our general result is that all three categories play a role within the context of UK legal academia, though the relationship between the “macro” and the “micro” level is not always straight-forward. We also provide comparisons with the US and Germany and show that in all three countries law as an academic tradition has been constantly evolving, raising questions such as whether the UK could or should move further to a social science model already dominant in the US.

EU ‘general clauses’ on fairness offer significant potential for improved consumer protection. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the unfair terms general clause and a related provision by reference to an underlying ethic of self interest and self reliance'; and the same approach is possible under the unfair practices general clauses. This is a significant threat to consumer protection. A more protective ethic may be intended at EU level; and a particular line of argument may be needed to persuade the Supreme Court of this.

There is a trend within the EU Member States to introduce criminal sanctions for cartel activity. Such criminalisation must respect the human rights of the accused. Unfortunately the literature on cartel criminalisation pays scant regard to the investigation of human rights issues. A comprehensive analysis of the impact of the principle of legal certainty (Article 7 ECHR) upon cartel criminalisation in the EU Member States is conspicuously absent from the literature. This article rectifies this deficiency by examining how this particular principle of European human rights law may impact upon the concept, substance and existence of a criminal cartel offence.

In The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart suggested that four formal features of morality distinguish it from law: importance, immunity from deliberate change, the nature of moral offences and the form of moral pressure. On closer examination, none of these supposed features clearly distinguishes morality from law, at least in the broad sense of ‘morality’ that Hart adopted. However, a fifth feature of morality mentioned by Hart – namely the role that morality plays in practical reasoning as a source of ultimate standards for assessing human conduct – does illuminate the relationship between law as conceptualised by Hart and morality variously understood. Because morality has this feature, law is always subject to moral assessment, and moral reasons trump legal reasons. It does not follow, however, that law is irrelevant to moral reasoning.