In this paper, I suggest that taking seriously the way in which the trust is founded on a duty of conscience has far-reaching ramifications for the appropriate attitude towards new forms of trusts that are designed to allow people to enjoy the benefits of ownership without incurring the duties that come with it. The morally freighted concept of conscience that lies at the heart of trust law means that every claim against trustees invokes a demand that the trustee abide by the requirements of their conscience. The conditions on the right to blame others for a moral wrongdoing, and the relationship between blaming and suing in the context of trust law, lead to the conclusion that, in novel forms of trust that are geared towards the creation of a morally bankrupt “orphan property”, beneficiaries do not have moral standing to sue the trustee for a breach of trust.

A taskforce, appointed by HM Treasury, has recently proposed legislation to eliminate certificated (paper) shares and to require the investors currently holding paper shares to hold them indirectly through nominees. It has also suggested that disclosure combined with a common messaging protocol will enable the market to improve the ability of indirect shareholders to exercise their rights. In this paper we make a case against legislation eliminating paper certificates. We argue that the industry does not need the Government to remove paper certificates. If they want paper certificates to disappear, they should develop a model for holding uncertificated shares directly that is affordable for retail investors. The Government should nevertheless intervene. It should encourage the Competition and Markets Authority to investigate the price structure of accounts for holding uncertificated shares directly with CREST, which operates as a monopoly provider for such accounts in the UK. We further explain that the current system for holding shares indirectly disenfranchises investors and argue that this not only affects investors but also deprives issuers of oversight of their governance. We use empirical evidence to explain that disclosure combined with a common messaging protocol is unlikely to cause the market to develop a system that better enfranchises indirect shareholders. Consequently, we propose legislation to give indirect investors better access to shareholder rights.

One commendable aspect of the ruminations by H.L.A Hart on legal positivism, which quite a few contemporary philosophers of law have not fully absorbed, is that he recognised the diversity of the points of contention that have pitted the devotees of positivism against the devotees of natural-law theories. Whereas some present-day philosophers of law are inclined to refer to “the separability thesis” of legal positivism – with the definite article “the” as a signal that there is one defining point of dispute between legal positivists and their opponents – Hart knew that there is no single such thesis. Natural-law theorists have in fact postulated numerous connections between law and morality which putatively clinch the character of law as an inherently moral phenomenon, and legal positivists have posed challenges to each of those connections or to the claim that any unchallenged connection serves to establish the inherently moral character of law.

This article re-examines the traditional account of administrative decision-making under wide conferrals of statutory power. The received wisdom in such cases is that public officials exercise “discretion”, usually defined as freedom of choice. Based on a doctrinal study of the English planning system and related case law, this paper contends that the notion of discretion as choice obscures one of the defining characteristics of modern government. That is, the making of public decisions tackling practical problems with intelligent and expert judgement under legal standards set out in legislation and further developed by the courts. More widely, the paper discusses the foundational role of tacit knowledge and decision-making expertise in public administration.

Shareholders are not allowed to bring actions for damages due to a fall in share value or loss of dividend, which are “reflective” of their company’s loss. Later, this principle also found its application to “reflective” losses of employees and creditors. The Supreme Court, however, in Marex Financial v Sevilleja, unanimously held that the principle would apply only to shareholders and not to creditors. The article argues that, while the majority opinion in the Marex decision is reasonably balanced, the minority opinion went a step further by even doubting the very existence of the no reflective loss principle without properly appreciating what shareholding entails. If the minority’s position becomes the law, it will jeopardise companies’ existence as separate legal entities with the capacity to decide with respect to their assets. Further, if the protection of the principle is removed, companies’ counterparties will have to worry constantly about facing numerous direct shareholders’ actions, whether they settle the dispute with the company or not. As a result, if the minority view becomes the law, it can potentially make the company a less dependable commercial partner.