ALAGA & Co. was a firm of solicitors representing a number of Somali refugees applying for asylum in the UK. Ali Mohamed, a leading figure in the Somali community in the UK, sued Alaga: Mohamed v. Alaga & Co. [1998] 2 All E.R. 720. He had introduced the refugees to Alaga and wanted to be rewarded for making the introductions. He claimed that Alaga had entered into an oral contract with him whereby it undertook to pay him half of any fees it received from the Legal Aid Board in respect of refugees that he introduced to the firm. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Alaga denied making any such agreement. It was unlawful for it to do so. The rules of the Law Society have legal force under the Solicitors Act 1974, s. 31. Under rule 3 of those rules a solicitor may accept introductions of business from other people so long as he or she does not reward the introducers of that business in any way. Under rule 7 of the same rules a solicitor is not allowed to share or agree to share his or her fees with anyone else except other practising solicitors, his or her employees and his or her retired partners. Lightman J. assumed, for the purposes of deciding the case, that Alaga did agree to pay Mohamed for any refugees he introduced to the firm.

THE background to the Cases concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 1998 I.C.J. Rep. is well known; in 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 was blown up over Scotland and 270 people were killed. The USA and the UK accused two Libyans of the bombing and sought their extradition. Libya argued on the basis of the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation that it was not bound to extradite its own nationals but could try them in its own courts, if appropriate. Libya took the cases to the International Court of Justice. It failed in its requests for provisional measures (see Lowe, (1992) 51 C.L.J. 408), but continued with its claims that the USA and the UK should respect its rights under the Montreal Convention and not put pressure on it to surrender the accused. The respondents made preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility of the application.

Ronald Dworkin wishes to read the UNITED States' constitution in terms of political principles, treating it as a source of law deriving from these. But the terms of the constitution, where they are not institutional, are mostly prohibitions and as such do not prescribe rights. Indeed the constitution on the whole does not prescribe rights, but instead refers to or enumerates rights which it does not prescribe. There are exceptions in the fifth and sixth Amendments, but as these explicitly prescribe rights this implies that the other constitutional terms are not prescriptive in this way. The view presented in this article, however, does not endorse the original intention thesis.

There is a third way of reading the constitution. This is in terms of the most prominent though most neglected part of the text, the preamble. This approach provides a reading which is inconsistent with the original intention thesis in that the categories of the preamble are so general that they cannot be confined to purely eighteenth century meanings. The third way is also inconsistent with Dworkin's, because the constitution provides no prescriptive principles except in its preamble, and those do not correspond to the range of prescriptions Dworkin has in mind. The third way suggests we need to read the Articles and Amendments of the constitution in terms of the preamble, and to address specific issues in these terms. This reading embraces inter alia a far wider range of political concerns than Dworkin has addressed and implies a modification of the type of liberalism he has developed.

After years of uncertainty over the precise scope of Article 30 of the EC Treaty, the decision in Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithourd [1993] E.C.R. I-6097 was thought to have introduced some clarity. It will be recalled that in Keck the Court made a distinction between, on the one hand, “production requirements” or “product characteristics” to which the decision in Cassis applies (para. 15) and, on the other, “certain selling arrangements” which do not breach Article 30 provided “that those provisions apply to all affected traders operating within the national territory and provided that they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and those from other Member States” (para. 16). The Court continued that where this proviso is satisfied, the national restrictions are not by nature such as to prevent the access of foreign goods to the market or to impede access any more than they impede the access of domestic products (para. 17).

The primary focus in current analyses of English unjust enrichment law is upon restitutionary rights, not remedies. There are a number of explanations for this; some pragmatic, some historical, some linguistic, some theoretical. The author argues that none of these, when closely examined, justifies a failure to develop a separate remedial agenda for the subject, such as exists in other private law subjects like contract and tort. Indeed, there are powerful arguments in favour of this approach. The existing conceptual apparatus of unjust enrichment law (based on causes of action and defences) is ill-equipped to cope with quantification, valuation and choice of remedy issues. At a theoretical level, the traditional distinction drawn between primary and secondary rights (remedies) is as valid in unjust enrichment law as it is in contract and tort. A separate remedial focus contributes significantly to our understanding of restitutionary rights and has significant organisational advantages. Furthermore, the concerns expressed about the Canadian “remedial” constructive trust concept are misplaced in so far as they imply that remedial approaches are necessarily uncertain. The development of appropriate remedial concepts ought, if conducted in a disciplined way, to increase the coherence and predictability of outcomes, not detract from the achievement of these aims.

The case of Re Rose, Rose v. I.R.C. is a well-known authority for the significance of the last act; equity treats a gift as complete where the donor has done all in his power to divest himself of the property, and to vest it in the transferees. The Court of Appeal followed a first instance decision, Re Rose, Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co., Ltd. v. Rose, whose similar name was purely coincidental. In the earlier case, the unusual provisions of a will made it necessary for one Hook to argue that the transfer of preference shares had taken effect prior to the death of the testator. Jenkins J. held that it had, although registration of the transfer by the directors did not occur until later, because the testator had done all he could to transfer the shares before his death. Midland Bank v. Rose was approved, obiter, by Lord Wilberforce in Vandervell v. I.R.C. In Mascall v. Mascall, it was expressly argued that Rose v. I.R.C. was wrongly decided, but the authority of the earlier Court of Appeal decision was upheld, so there is little doubt that what has been called “the Rule in Re Rose” is correct.

The writer considers the scope and application of the present statutory provision, and discusses possible alternative approaches. She begins by examining the meaning of the word “rights”, and examines the difficulties and inconsistencies in the way the word has been interpreted by the courts. She then considers possible statutory amendment, from abolition, or restriction, to, more controversially, an extension to encompass all rights related to the land, whether personal or proprietary, other than those requiring personal skill or confidence. She suggests that such a widening of the scope of the provision would be conducive to certainty, fairness and comprehensiveness. The second part of the article examines the concept of occupation, and traces the judicial approaches to this requirement. Possible statutory amendment is then considered. The article concludes that the scope of the section should be widened, but that the qualifying occupation should be apparent as well as actual.

THE decision of the House of Lords in Williams v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. [1998] 1 W.L.R. 830, reversing the Court of Appeal's decision ([1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 131), examines the issue of an agent's liability for negligent misstatement. Of course, agents will be personally responsible for their own negligence, even if that tort is committed while on the principal's business, but what is their responsibility for the negligence of their principal? Logically the answer is “none”, and certainly in a company context statements made by directors on behalf of their companies have traditionally led to liability for the principal alone: “a company director is only to be held personally liable for the company's negligent misstatements if the plaintiffs can establish some special circumstances setting the case apart from the ordinary . . .” ([1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 131, 152 per Hirst L.J.). The Court of Appeal's decision in Williams, however, threatened to expand this category of “special circumstances” to such an extent as to make personal liability the norm for directors, at least in the context of small companies.

THE issue addressed in this article pertains to the proper measure of relief to which Pam is entitled in an action in unjust enrichment. There is no doubting her ability to establish the constituent elements of that action. Dave was enriched by the receipt of an incontrovertible benefit because he realised a financial gain from the services rendered. That enrichment was derived at Pam's expense (at least in part) because she paid for the repairs. And Dave's enrichment was unjust because Pam's intention in rendering the benefit was vitiated by her mistaken belief that the car was hers. However, it is unclear whether she should be awarded £1000 (reflecting Dave's gain) or £250 (reflecting her loss). The specific question that arises is whether the second element of the principle of unjust enrichment (“at the plaintiff's expense”) merely determines Pam's standing to sue or whether it also limits her measure of relief. It is suggested, contrary to a growing body of opinion, that the latter alternative is preferable.

In its recent report on privity of contract the Law Commission considered, inter alia, whether reform of section 11 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882 should be entertained at this time. The title of that Act is somewhat misleading but in essence section 11 provides that a life assurance policy on the life of a man or woman for the expressed benefit of his/her spouse and or children, creates a trust in favour of the named spouse or child. Thus the beneficial interest in the policy never forms part of the assured's estate, which result may be of particular importance to the beneficiary in the event of the assured's insolvency because by section 283 of the Insolvency Act 1986 trust assets are expressly excluded from the bankrupt's estate capable of vesting in the trustee in bankruptey and thereafter being available for distribution to creditors.

The importance of the principle of equality to the legal order of the European Union has been underlined by four important but contradictory cases: P v. S; Grant v. South West Trains; Kalanke and Marschall. These cases demonstrate various attempts by the Court to come to terms with what is meant by equality and to decide what protection should be provided by Community law. These, and earlier cases, offer various perspectives on the principle of equality. First, equality can be seen as a rallying cry, a political slogan but little else. Second, equality is a societal goal, a general aspirational principle of citizenship which may serve to inform specific legislative provisions, in particular non-discrimination, but otherwise has no legal force. Third, equality is a general principle of law which is designed to limit the activities of the Community legislature. Fourth, and perhaps most radically, equality is a free-standing, fundamental right enforceable against the Member States, like the equal protection of laws found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution, and even against "private" employers. While it is possible to see elements of the first three perspectives in the Court's jurisprudence, the Court has not embraced the fourth. The article examines these developments and considers how the principles of equality and non-discrimination might be developed in the future.

ARGUMENT by analogy is one of the oldest methods of decision making. Whenever the similarity between two situations induces someone to decide one case like another, an analogy is drawn. Argument by analogy also forms an integral part of legal reasoning. Arguably, every legal tradition employs some version of it to justify judicial decisions. European law has only just started to develop its own distinct jurisprudence. As the various judicial systems present in the European Union struggle for recognition of their legal heritage, the way in which arguments by analogy will be used on an European level is likely to combine different approaches.

Central banks have enormous sums of money in various forms of investments. When claims are made either against the banks themselves, or against other governmental bodies, issues arise as to whether these assets can be attached, and made available to satisfy judgments. The article explains how central banks are treated in English law. It explains the special provision made in respect of their assets under the State Immunity Act 1978. There is wide immunity from attachment, though questions can arise as to the ownership of such assets. The UK legislation is, in some respects, wider than its counterpart, the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976. Recent case law is described in which the English courts have recognised that the public responsibilities of central banks have to be taken account of when determining the extent of their liability to attachment.

There is a growing literature concerning the role of the ultra vires doctrine and its place within administrative law. For some the doctrine is the central principle of administrative law, without which judicial intervention would rest on uncertain foundations. For others, it constitutes at best a harmless fiction, which is incapable of explaining all instances of judicial intervention, and at worst a device which allows the judiciary to conceal the real justifications for developments in judicial review. Christopher Forsyth falls into the former camp. He has written a vigorous defence of the ultra vires principle, contending that “it remains vital to the developed law of judicial review”. The purpose of this article is to contribute to the debate on this issue by putting the opposing view. The article will be divided into four sections.

This article attempts an economic analysis of the policy formulated in Manchester Trust v Furness that constructive notice should not be made the basis of liability arising out of commercial transactions. It concentrates on instances of equitable liability for ”knowing receipt“ where the defendant is required to give restitution of funds which it received in breach of fiduciary duty. The article investigates the social costs of imposing a duty of inquiry on a person receiving misappropriated money in a commercial transaction. It concludes that there are strong economic reasons why a commercial recipient of money should not owe the same rigorous duties of inquiry commonly imposed in conveyancing transactions. However, once the standard of inquiry is adjusted to take into the exigencies of commercial dealings, there are no compelling economic reasons why constructive notice should be rejected as a possible basis of liability in knowing receipt.

OVER the years there seem to have been a number of cases based ultimately on a general principle that a person who takes the benefit of an arrangement will be bound by any associated burden contained in it despite the fact that he was not a party to the original arrangement. Potentially the most extreme application of this principle, and the most controversial, has been in Halsall v. Brizell and cases which followed it. The idea introduced in Halsall v. Brizell and later developed by Megarry V.-C. in Tito v. Waddell (No. 2) is that a person may, in appropriate circumstances, be bound by an obligation which is imposed by the same transaction that grants a benefit of which he wishes to take advantage but is not a condition of that benefit. Megarry V.-C. referred to this as an application of a pure principle of benefit and burden to contrast the situation with the application of a principle of benefit and burden in the case of a conditional or qualified right. In this article the term “pure principle” will be used to refer to the application of a principle of benefit and burden in Halsall v. Brizell and the cases which have followed it. Since the decision in Halsall v. Brizell, there has been controversy as to this most recent application of a principle of benefit and burden, the perceived problems being the lack of clarity and certainty as to the necessary requirements for its application and its potentially far-reaching effects. Such problems clearly influenced the House of Lords when deciding the case of Rhone v. Stephens and, since that decision, there has been some doubt as to whether the principle of benefit and burden can have the effect that has been suggested. A principle whereby a person can be forced to comply with obligations that would not otherwise bind him has undoubted attractions but will be unacceptable if it directly contradicts clearly established rules which prevent obligations binding non-contracting parties.

The devastating impact that psychiatric illness can have on people's lives is beyond dispute. It would be absurd to contend that such harm is somehow intrinsically less serious than physical injury; indeed, over many years, medical research has pointed to the artificiality of characterising it as lacking physical manifestations. Its destructive potential is brought into sharper focus as mental attributes become ever more integral to everyday functioning. Yet, to this day, neither popular nor judicial opinion is noticeably receptive to a cause of action based on proof of a “recognised psychiatric disorder”, which is still often trivialised by the label “nervous shock”. This negative attitude is most apparent when claimants are not, or are not regarded as, the direct victims of someone else's conduct. The very notion of compensating people whose suffering derives from their reaction to the injuring of others often evokes surprise, indignation and disdain.