THE decision of the Court of Appeal in AB v CD [2014] EWCA Civ 229; [2014] 3 All E.R. 667 concerned a distinctive feature of equity's auxiliary jurisdiction. Unlike situations in which a claimant invokes equity's exclusive jurisdiction to enforce or protect the claimant's purely equitable rights, a claimant seeking equitable relief in aid of his or her legal rights must show that the relief available at common law, if any, would be inadequate to do justice. Thus, a contract party (for example) must cross a threshold before an injunction or specific performance will be granted. Equity's refusal to intervene where adequate relief is available at law properly makes equitable relief in the auxiliary jurisdiction special. The ordinary operation of the law of contract, and that of the courts, could be unjustifiably disrupted if every threatened or actual breach attracted these forms of discretionary equitable relief. But can a contract party tilt the balance of discretion towards the grant (or the refusal) of such relief by relying on a particular term in the contract?

IN Relfo Ltd. (in liquidation) v Varsani [2014] EWCA Civ 360, the defendant (Bhimji Varsani) had received US$878,469.35 which allegedly represented £500,000 of Relfo's funds that its director (Gorecia) had improperly caused to be paid away, without authority and in breach of his duties as director. Relfo's liquidator subsequently sued the defendant to recover what it had lost. Though Relfo's proprietary claim failed, the Court of Appeal held, affirming Sales J.'s judgment, that Relfo had a personal claim for the sums received by the defendant on two bases: (1) a cause of action for knowing receipt; and (2) a cause of action in unjust enrichment. In so holding, the Court faced several questions of substantial wider significance.

WHEN do resulting trusts arise, and why? These questions were the subject of serious inquiry in the 1990s, following influential work by Peter Birks and Robert Chambers, which argued that resulting trusts arise to reverse unjust enrichment. The House of Lords in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] A.C. 669 remarked that the Birks/Chambers thesis was “avowedly experimental, written to test the temperature of the water”, but that “the temperature of the water must be regarded as decidedly cold”. Following Westdeutsche, the issue has received little consideration, although academic interest in the debate remains. The recent decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] SGCA 36 considered this issue in detail and is therefore worth examining.

THE English Court of Appeal in Fons Hf v Corporal Ltd. [2014] EWCA Civ 304 has recently confirmed that the phrase “debenture” when used in a charge agreement should be given its ordinary wide meaning. Some caution should be attached to this holding. Although the word “debenture” commonly appears in legislation or in private contractual documents, the precise meaning that should be ascribed to the word varies with the context. But, if the decision in Fons can be taken as laying down a general definition of “debenture”, then it seems that any contract or legislative drafter seeking to give it a narrower meaning would have to provide specifically for that.

There is a tendency in contemporary contract law for judges to “never say never” and permit an open-ended exception from the rule. This nebulous exception is designed to cater for the rare instance where application of the rule would be undesirable in the interests of justice. However, this kind of imprecise exception is deleterious in terms of the unpredictability it generates, as well as the attendant increases in time and costs that result. The “never say never” approach is to be discouraged in contract law where commercial predictability, while certainly not inviolable, nonetheless remains a weighty goal deserving of continued deference.

IN Hämäläinen v Finland (Application no. 37359/09), 16 July 2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that Contracting States of the Council of Europe may require the dissolution of an existing marriage before extending the right to legal gender recognition.

UMBRELLA effects arise where anti-competitive conduct by one or more market actors results in general price rises across the sector concerned. The Court of Justice of the European Union has, with its preliminary ruling in Case C-557/12, Kone and others v OBB-Infrastruktur AG, Judgment of 5 June 2014, EU:C:2014:1317, now addressed the potential legal implications of such umbrella effects. In confirming that the right to compensation stemming from breach of EU competition law extends to umbrella claims as a matter of principle, the Court of Justice has offered its most expansive, and arguably most emphatic, interpretation of the scope and importance of private antitrust enforcement to date.

The doctrine of legitimate expectations is a developing area of administrative law, and many issues remain outstanding. Promises, practices, and policies generate legitimate expectations, but what is special about them? Why do they and only they generate legitimate expectations? The lack of an obvious answer has led some commentators to claim that the doctrine is ultimately incoherent and should be disaggregated. In this paper, we challenge this claim by arguing, first, that promises, practices, and policies each comprise or make applicable a certain type of rule, and second, that having a legitimate expectation is a matter of such a rule binding a public body to act in some way. This rule-based account gives the doctrine of legitimate expectations both coherence and distinctiveness.

Section I shows that the idea, founded on the “principle of legality”, that all legal flaws make a decision void as a matter of law is erroneous. Infringing a legal requirement may not affect validity, or may make a decision only voidable. Section II shows the significance of distinctions between various stages of decision-making processes, and between different types of issues for judges, and argues that case law shows that seven guiding principles operate alongside the “principle of legality”. Section III concludes that these common-law principles reflect professional practice and provide a realistic basis for predictable, normatively legitimate administrative law.