Manslaughter continues to be difficult to define and apply, so much so that in two recent decisions the Court of Appeal demanded that the state of involuntary manslaughter be reviewed and reforms be suggested. The greatest conceptual difficulties concerning this offence relate to ascertaining what its ambit actually is and how wide it should be. For the most serious kinds of homicide the crucial distinction concerns where the boundary between murder and manslaughter should be drawn. After much confusion, murder now requires proof of an intention either to kill or to cause serious injury. Much more difficulty arises in identifying the boundary between manslaughter and mere accident. This raises complex issues as to the relationship between criminal and civil liability.

The World Conference on Human Rights, which took place in Vienna in June 1993, was convened by the United Nations with three principal aims. The Conference was to evaluate progress made in the field of human rights in the period since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948; to consider the relationship between human rights and other priority concerns of the world community, such as development and democratisation; and to examine ways of strengthening the protection afforded human rights and improving the United Nations' human rights programme. An earlier UN conference on human rights had been held in Teheran in 1968 and the General Assembly decided that, 25 years later, reconsideration was appropriate. This decision, taken in 1989, seemed vindicated as events following the fall of the Berlin Wall opened up new opportunities, as well as new dangers.

The Government is keen to get “back to basics” about divorce. The Green Paper which the Lord Chancellor presented to Parliament in December 1993 invites us all to reflect on family values and is intended to provoke a “thorough national consideration” of the whole basis for divorce. It follows proposals by the Law Commission but is less than a ringing endorsement of the Commission's scheme. The Law Commission has advocated a shift from the current “mixed” system (embracing fault and no-fault grounds) to an entirely no-fault basis for divorce. Under these proposals divorce would be regarded as a neutral “process over time” and would not entail judgments into the causes of marriage breakdown. While the Green Paper gives qualified support to this idea, the Government has yet to reach a concluded view.

It is uncontroversial to state that the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) has never been sympathetic to unmeritorious appeals. Numerous cases may be cited where the appellant, having made out a valid ground of appeal based purely upon a technical defect in the trial, is met with the rejoinder that the appeal is wholly without merit and that the conviction will be upheld by the application of the proviso to section 2(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. Serious defects in the trial including the failure of the trial judge to give a direction on the standard of proof, wrongful admission of the defendant&s previous bad character, and even conviction for an offence which technically did not exist, have all been amenable to the application of the proviso on the ground that, despite the defect, no injustice has been done.

I Shall make some brief preliminary observations on Justinian's Institutes 3.23.5, then look at the history of sales of loca religiosa and the liber homo in classical and earlier Roman law, and then I shall return to the text cited. My purpose is to show how the examination of the origins of the text from Justinian's Institutes provides us with an insight into the development of classical and earlier law, how on this occasion the compilers interpreted their instructions to compile the Corpus Iuris Civilis and thereby also perhaps how the compilers viewed the past.

The law describing vendor's and purchaser's liens over personal property can only be described as baffling: there are cases to “prove” and “disprove” almost any proposition. This uncertainty is surprising. A contract of sale is one of the most basic forms of commercial activity, and an equitable lien would convert a vendor or purchaser into a secured creditor by operation of law. The advantages of such a position are self-evident, yet it remains unacceptably difficult to say when such advantages accrue. Fundamental equitable principles seem to support a simple analysis of vendor's and purchaser's liens which might eliminate some of the current uncertainties. This article describes that analysis. It concludes that one party to a sale contract has a lien over identified sale property whenever, and as soon as, all the contractual obligations assumed by that party have been carried out.