It seems to be generally accepted that a person who signs a contractual document may not dispute his agreement to any of the terms which it contains, unless he can establish one of three defences: (a) fraud, (b) misrepresentation, or (c) non est factum.

In 1968, the Tredegar Estate made an agreement with Mrs. Evans, aged 76, whereby Mrs. Evans was allowed to live in a cottage rent and rates free for life, the agreement calling her interest a tenancy at will. Mrs. Evans's husband had worked for the Tredegar Estate all his life and Mr. and Mrs. Evans had always occupied the cottage rent and rates free. In 1965, Mr. Evans had died and the object of the agreement clearly was to provide a home for the remaining years of Mrs. Evans's life. Some two years later, the Tredegar Estate conveyed the cottage, in fee simple, to Mr. and Mrs. Binions, the conveyance being expressly subject to the 1968 agreement in Mrs. Evans's favour. Indeed, Mr. and Mrs. Binions paid a lower price for the cottage because of the agreement. In 1971, Mr. and Mrs. Binions gave notice to quit to Mrs. Evans, then aged 79, and subsequently issued a plaint for possession in the Newport (Mon.) County Court. Not surprisingly, the action for possession failed in both the county court and the Court of Appeal.

The doctrine of acceleration may be described as a rule of construction whereby words introducing an interest in remainder into a limitation of property are liberally interpreted so as to enable that interest to take effect immediately after a premature determination of the prior interest. The doctrine is most frequently encountered in the context of wills. This is partly, no doubt, because wills are often less strictly worded than instruments executed inter vivos; and partly, especially in a modern context, because tax considerations have Jessened the incidence of use of the normal prior estate involved, the life interest, in settlements inter vivos more than in wills. Even so, one of the more significant cases where acceleration has recently been found to apply, Re Dawson's Settlement, concerned a settlement inter vivos.

Of all legal disciplines, constitutional law is the most affected by the European Communities and their law. It is true that the law of competition and restrictive trade practices (to take an example) has, to an important extent, been altered and is currently regulated by Community law. However, the new elements in the European law of restrictive practices are only indirectly related to the nature or structure of the Community and its law as such. They could (with the exception of the new possibilities of judicial review through the European Court of Justice) just as well have come from a traditional international treaty as from international law. For, when we think of the law of restrictive practices we mainly think of what the rules say and much less of how they are enacted—in other words the content of rules and much less their legal nature.

The police use “entrapment” to detect and apprehend one whom they suspect is about to commit a crime by providing him with, or urging him to take advantage of, an opportunity to do so. The practice is much commoner in England than was once thought; it raises a number of relatively undiscussed problems which fall into two groups, one centring on the trapper, the other on the entrapped accused. The first group comprises such issues as: Is the trapper criminally responsible? Does the rule relating to the corroboration of accomplice evidence apply to him? If not, should there be any warning about his testimony? Does his conduct sometimes require the exclusion of his testimony as being unfairly obtained? Secondly, has the accused a defence? Has he grounds for pleading in mitigation of sentence? Before looking at these issues, we shall examine the purposes and dangers of entrapment, and we shall see how the practice sometimes prevents either trapper or accused being criminally responsible for certain offences.

Of the two most often-quoted definitions of the royal prerogative, Dicey's definition as “the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown,” has often received the express or implied approval of the courts. Thus, besides the weight of the authority of its great author, the above definition also enjoys the privilege of official and almost universal recognition and acceptance. It was therefore with great diffidence that the present writer decided to “re-visit the prerogative” and examine it critically. Yet, he has done so in the belief that the passage of time is bound to have had some effect on a definition which is nearly ninety years old and which, when first published, naturally reflected the nineteenth-century theory on this subject.

The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the meaning of “non-natural use” of land as a criterion in determining liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, in the light of modern developments, particularly in the field of public law.