Having supposed a super-norm we may indeed suppose another still superior norm, and so on ad infinitum, like the elephants and tortoise which have been supposed to support the earth. Clearly there is no help in that.

In 2007 the European Commission produced a Staff Working Paper seeking consultation on the development of auditors' liability in Europe. The present article represents the views of the Working Group on the subject set up by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg.

A comprehensive review, or what has been variously described as the classification or mapping or taxonomy, of constructive trusts would require analysis of areas of law as diverse as vendor and purchaser transactions, the perfection of imperfect gifts, fully secret and half secret trusts, breach of fiduciary duty, and accessory liability for breach of trust, among several others. The search for an acceptable, universally acknowledged, principle for the establishment of a constructive trust, which gives coherence to past decisions and provides a clear guide for the future, will certainly prove elusive in relation to the many different areas of law and fact in which constructive trusts arise.

A member of the Bar who appeared before us recently said he was an engineer by training and that what he did when he was looking at a problem was to turn it by 90° and examine it on a different plane.

There are two themes that recur in previous Sir David Williams lectures. First, that it is a considerable honour to be invited to give the lecture. Secondly, that it is a daunting task to do so in the presence of Sir David, particularly in a field in which he has expertise. Since that covers most of the law there is no escape from this dilemma. Let me then acknowledge the privilege of having been asked to give this year's lecture, and confess that it is with some trepidation that I do so. The subject, terrorism and human rights, is not exactly uncharted territory. When I looked into the internet for some guidance on what might be relevant to terrorism and human rights, the response to my Google search informed me that in .03 seconds 32,900,000 references had been found. This seemed to indicate that it was unlikely that I would be able to say anything that has not already been said. But there are some subjects that are of such importance that there is value in reminding ourselves of the issues that are at stake, and if necessary for that purpose, repeating what others have said. And it is with that in mind that I approach my chosen topic.

The question to be pursued in this article has the merit of simplicity even if the response to it proves somewhat complex. The question is this: is law truly a social science? This may seem an odd question to many in the common law world since it is not uncommon, at least in England, for law schools to find themselves located in faculties of social science. Moreover there are a number of individuals, perhaps a considerable number in common law departments and faculties throughout the world, whose research and scholarship undoubtedly qualifies as social science research. So, before one can even begin to reflect upon the question to be pursued in this paper, a preliminary question must first be asked. Why should one wish even to pose the question?

I will not draw a distinction between biological and non-biological – we are not buying Persil or Daz (Stephen Quinn)

The object of this article is to consider, or to speculate about, the roles and purposes of the institution of civil litigation in the 21st Century.

The modern law of unjust enrichment is unique in many respects. In one sense, it is the newest and most significant development in the private law for a very long time. While it can claim ancient roots, as a discrete body of law unjust enrichment has only emerged from the long shadows of the law of contract in the last 20 years. The development and content of the law of unjust enrichment has, to a greater extent than perhaps anywhere else in the private law, been driven and shaped by academic rather than judicial influences. The law of unjust enrichment is also distinguished from the other principal heads of civil obligation in that its focus is on stripping the defendant of gains made rather than making good losses suffered by the plaintiff. Perhaps most controversially, the role or function of unjust enrichment may differ from the other principal parts of the private law in that the source of the entitlement protected is not found within the law of unjust enrichment, but in other areas of the law.

Environmental permits come in many forms and control many activities. On occasion they can authorise one-off events, but more usually they provide authorisation for operations that will continue for some time. Even planning permission granted to construct a building has an enduring effect since it not only controls the building operation that may be completed within a short period but also determines what use of the land is authorised unless and until a new permission is sought. The precise life-span of many operations may be uncertain, but especially in view of the major capital cost of establishing chemical works, landfill sites, waste water treatment plants, etc., the operators' intention is to continue for a considerable time. Over that time circumstances may change so that the terms of the permit, or its very existence, are no longer considered appropriate. The aim of this paper is to explore the range of legal techniques that have been adopted for the variation of permits and the consequences of these in terms of enabling regulatory action and of protecting the various interests that will be affected by such exercises of power. The impact of such variation is most obviously felt by the operators, potentially threatening the viability, if not the fundamental legality, of their activities, but there is also an effect on third parties and the environment.

According to Ronald Dworkin, all judges are by necessity philosophers, and no judge is a better philosopher than Hercules. This superhuman jurist understands that law's empire embraces not just decisions about rights made in the past, but also rights implicit in the theory of political morality that those decisions presuppose. He is able to survey all of the diverse laws within a system and then construct a comprehensive theory of political morality that shows those laws to be as coherent and unified and just as they can be. From this theory not only will right answers in hard cases emerge, but the value of integrity-the value of extending to everyone the rights extended to some so that equal concern and respect is secured for all-will be honoured. In contrast, Herbert, the judge Dworkin introduces as Hercules' nemesis, thinks that law ends just at the point where hard cases begin. Herbert is intellectually flatfooted in the face of legal challenges that Hercules can handle adeptly and accurately.

Regulatory competition is a salient feature of US federalism. The fifty States potentially serve as the rivalling jurisdictions' laboratories breeding constant legislative innovation.

The dispute over the role desert should play, if any, in assessing criminal liability and punishment has a long and turbulent history. “Deserved punishment” - referred to variously as desert, just punishment, retributive punishment, or simply “doing justice” - has moved to center stage in the UK and is on its way in the US, both in academic debate and in real world institutions.

The dilemma facing the law when two innocent parties have suffered at the hands of a wrongdoer is well known and arises acutely in the context of the sale of goods. Typically, in the classic simple three party situation: the owner of goods either gives goods to or has goods stolen by a rogueseller who purports to sell them to an innocent third party buyer. Both the owner and buyer of the goods may well have a personal claim against the seller, but if the seller has either disappeared or has no money that personal claim may well be worthless. As a result, the question of who is entitled to the goods themselves is likely to determine which party will suffer as a result of the seller's actions. The crucial issue is who in this situation is entitled to the goods: this is a question of conflict of title or priority. Who has a better title to the goods, the owner or the buyer?

Intellectual property law has been dealing with botanical innovations in a sustained way for over a century.