Although very different in many respects, the EU and Canada nevertheless confront common problems in certain areas. One such common problem is how to manage inter-state regulatory diversity within a federal (or federal-like), multinational system. This paper compares the different ways in which the EU and Canada have chosen to address the problem of national barriers to trade within their internal markets, and the consequences of these choices. It is somewhat counterintuitive for EU lawyers that a full-fledged state may have an internal market that is less integrated than that of the EU; and yet that is the case in Canada. The comparison is illuminating as to the different possible approaches of federal polities to the problem of state regulatory choices and barriers to trade, the paramount importance of institutional choice, and the significance of historical and political circumstances.

The events which gave rise to the Public Order Act, 1936,1 and the debates in Parliament2 on that subject have drawn attention to the uncertainty concerning the law of public meetings and processions. This uncertainty is due in part to the fact that there is only a limited number of cases directly in point, some of which have not been reported in a satisfactory manner, and in part to an over-simplification in the books of what is an exceedingly complicated matter.

The philosophical concept of acting intentionally does not entail a perceptible time gap between intention and action. We may say of a person who acts on the spur of the moment that their action was intended or intentional; but in such circumstances, intention and action may seem to merge in a way that makes it difficult to disentangle the mental and physical elements of the person's conduct. The author argues that in this context the tools and techniques used by philosophers of mind and action may not provide us with the best understanding of the social practices of blaming found in the criminal law.

The author considers the proposal of the Law Commission that the Rule against Perpetuities should be amended rather than abolished and emphasises the need for a balance between the freedom of the current generation and the freedom of future generations to control property. The article draws attention to the experience of Canada and the United States and suggests that experience undermines the Rule's economic rationale and that the Law Commission should consider recommending the Rule's abolition.

The ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in A v. United Kingdom (Human Rights: Punishment of Child) [1998] 2 F.L.R. 959 that to beat repeatedly a nine-year-old boy with a garden cane, leaving linear bruises on his thighs and buttocks which remained for up to one week, amounted to “torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” contrary to Article 3 of the Convention will occasion little suprise. What will have come as unwelcome news to some is the unanimous decision of the Court that the Government of the United Kingdom could itself be held liable for failing to take measures which could have prevented these beatings by the child's stepfather.

In the history of the modern company the shareholder has held a privileged position, for although the company's separate identity is the fundamental tenet of company law the shareholder's place as proprietor has only recently been questioned. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that for nearly a century the unanimous assent of shareholders has held the status of an overriding authority, able to cure procedural defects, overcome statutory requirements and validate almost any act within the capacity of the company. In its most recent application in Brick and Pipe Industries Ltd. v. Occidental Life Nominees Pty. Ltd., where the consent of shareholders was held to bind the company to a guarantee, we have a striking example of the authority accorded to the wishes of shareholders.

Many of the details surrounding the circumstances when shareholders can sue are shrouded in obscurity, but it is clear that where a company and a shareholder have overlapping claims the shareholder cannot pursue its personal claim if its loss is merely reflective of the company’s loss. The scope and rationale of the rule barring shareholders from bringing personal actions to recover reflective loss were authoritatively restated by the House of Lords in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2001] 2 W.L.R. 72.

This article is concerned with the availability of “proprietary restitution” in cases of mistaken payments. It is argued that the mistake of the claimant is an insufficient justification for proprietary restitution, but a close analysis of the case law demonstrates that the presence of additional factors can justify the availability of proprietary restitution in specific circumstances. The basis of proprietary restitution is to be found in the breach of a duty which arises separately from the claim for unjust enrichment. The significant contribution of this article is the analysis that knowledge merely creates a duty to maintain the fund until restitution is made, and that knowledge cannot establish the breach of this duty. Importantly, breach of this duty is established by a second condition which is demonstrated by the wilful misconduct of the recipient. It is this conduct which justifies the imposition of the constructive trust. By adopting this analysis, the proprietary claim in the context of mistaken transfers can be classified as forming part of the law of wrongs, rather than the law of unjust enrichment.

OPPOSITE-SEX couples are prohibited from forming a civil partnership. Following the introduction of same-sex marriage, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 was not extended to opposite-sex couples, resulting in the unusual position that English law permits same-sex couples access to two relationship forms (marriage and civil partnership) yet limits opposite-sex couples to one (marriage). This discrimination was recently challenged in the courts by an opposite-sex couple, Rebecca Steinfeld and Charles Keidan, who wish to enter a civil partnership owing to their deeply-rooted ideological opposition to marriage. Rejecting marriage as a patriarchal institution and believing that a civil partnership would offer a more egalitarian public expression of their relationship, the couple argued that the current ban constitutes a breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Law students soon learn that the law of anticipatory breach of contract is difficult. Foaled from dubious antecedents, it has been the subject of continuous academic criticism. The main theoretical objections to the doctrine are well known. How is one to explain how a promise can be broken before the time for its performance has arrived? And why should the question whether a repudiation amounts to a breach turn on the conduct or assent of the innocent party?