In preparing the few and elementary observations which I am about to make to you tonight I have wondered if the title I chose was apt or suitable. The Common Law is generally described as the law of liberty, of freedom and of free peoples. It was a home-made product. In the eighteenth century, foreign lawyers called it an insular and barbarous system; they compared it to their own system of law, developed on the basis of Roman and Civil Law. Many centuries before, and long after Bracton's day, when other civilised European nations ‘received’ the Roman Law, England held back and stood aloof from the Reception. It must have been a near thing. It seems there could have been a Reception here if the Judges had been ecclesiastics, steeped in the Civil Law. But as it turned out they were laymen, and were content as they travelled the country, and in London as well, to adopt what we now know as the Case System, instead of the rules and categories of the Civil Law. Hence the method of threshing out problems by debate in Court, and later on the basis of written pleadings which we find in the Year Books. For present purposes, all I need observe is that the Civil Lawyer had a different idea of the relation of the state or the monarch to the individual from that of the Common Lawyer. To the Civil or Roman Lawyer, the dominant maxim was ‘quod placuit principi legis habet vigorem’; law was the will of the princeps. With this may be compared the rule expressed in Magna Carta in 1215: No freeman, it was there said, was to be taken or imprisoned or exiled or in any way destroyed save by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land. Whatever the exact application of that phrase in 1215, it became a text for fixing the relations between the subject and the State. Holdsworth quotes from the Year Book of 1441; the law is the highest English inheritance the King hath, for by the law he and all his subjects are ruled. That was the old medieval doctrine that all things are governed by law, either human or divine. That is the old doctrine of the supremacy of the law, which runs through the whole of English history, and which in the seventeenth century won the day against the un-English doctrine of the divine right of Kings and of their autocratic power over the persons and property of their subjects. The more detailed definition of what all that involved took time to work out. I need scarcely refer to the great cases in the eighteenth century in which the Judges asserted the right of subjects to freedom from arbitrary arrest as against the ministers of state and against the validity of a warrant to seize the papers of a person accused of publishing a seditious libel; in particular Leach v. Money (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1001; Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1029; Wilkes v. Halifax (1769) 19 St. Tr. 1406. In this connexion may be noted Fox's Libel Act, 1792, which dealt with procedure, but fixed a substantive right to a trial by jury of the main issue in the cases it referred to.

Article 87 (1) EC prohibits any state aid in whatsoever form, unless the Commission considers it to be compatible with the common market. This prohibition significantly reduces in many cases the freedom of Member States to conduct their policies in defining the political and economic environment in which undertakings operate. Article 88 (3) EC, which provides for the notification procedure and prohibits the implementation of aid measures before the Commission's approval, also significantly reduces the Member State's playground. Rarely, however, can it be argued that the state aid control could potentially have drastic consequences for the national constitution order. Although the questions of what constitutes state resources and to which extent trade between Member States can be affected are controversial, this article focuses on only one aspect of the definition of state aid, namely selectivity, the application of which may have the most far-reaching consequences for many Member States' constitutional orders. It has to be stressed, though, that this short article does not aim to deal comprehensively with every difficult issue connected with the application of the selectivity test, but is limited to some of its aspects which may have bearing on Member States' decisions concerning the distribution of powers and especially the power of taxation.

“The essence of contract is performance”. So argued Professor Daniel Friedmann in discussing the rationale of remedies for breach of contract ((1995) 111 L.Q.R. 628, 629). The House of Lords’ decision in Attorney-General v. Blake [2000] 3 W.L.R. 625 lends new support to this view. It holds that a claimant’s interest in performance of his contractual rights may, exceptionally, entitle him to recover restitutionary damages from the defaulting party. Measured by the defendant’s gain from the breach, rather than the claimant’s expectation or reliance loss, restitutionary damages transfer to the claimant the profit that the defendant makes by his wrong. Failing any other adequate remedy for the claimant, liability to restitutionary damages encourages the defendant to perform his duty by depriving him of the monetary incentive to commit a breach.

In English law, the recovery of pure economic loss falls mainly within the province of the law of contract. Only in very limited circumstances does the law of tort provide for the recovery of such losses. As Cardozo C.J. explained in Ultramares Corporation v. Touched, tort is concerned not to permit “liability in an indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”. Notwithstanding this reticence, their Lordships' speeches, though not the final decision, in the seminal case of Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller and Partners Ltd. provided a notable inroad into the rigidity of this stance. Since Hedley Byrne, the question has become, instead, how far, not if, pure economic loss is and should be recoverable in the law of negligence.

I. Introduction

The Philosophy of the law has largely accepted that laws are rules although it still struggles with the completeness of that paradigm. Nevertheles there has been no clear analysis for the law of what a rule is and what it entails. This paper is an attempt to do that.

IN the last three decades many acts and regulations have been introduced in Britain to serve the interests of consumers and as a consequence a new branch of law has evolved: consumer protection. These acts concern many aspects of public and private law. Within private law they mainly deal with contract law and the law of restitution. For example, the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 (henceforth CPR 1987), and the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (henceforth CCA 1974) confer a right on the consumer to cancel a contract. This right of cancellation arises in the context of consumer protection. Yet from the perspective of private law it is part of the law of contract. A cancelled contract is treated as if it had not been made and as a consequence each party has to give back what he received under the contract. The contract is unwound. Again, any questions on how to unwind a contract belong only in a contextual sense to the law of consumer protection. On our map of private law they are part of the law of restitution.

The law about covenants running with land is once again behind the times. It is undoubtedly in need of statutory reform. It is also, perhaps, an apt subject for this jubilee issue. For among the articles published in the earlier years of this Journal few can be better known, and none can have given more needed help, than Professor Bailey's The Benefit of a Restrictive Covenant, in which the complexities of an excessively intricate topic of real property law were analysed and expounded with great care and clarity. Published in 1938, it remains a source of valuable guidance to-day. In the meantime there have been many decisions, and there are now proposals for legislation. But in the following pages the reader will not find an objective and comprehensive survey comparable to Professor Bailey's. It is proposed to discuss only one or two controversial aspects and the questions of legal policy bound up with them.

Recent media reports have revealed a substantial number of highly-paid senior civil servants and BBC presenters have been using “off payroll” arrangements and personal services companies to reduce the tax paid on their earnings. This article examines the tax and National Insurance contribution (NIC) savings that can be had by carrying on economic activity through a company rather than as an unincorporated business or an employee. These savings derive from a combination of favourable tax and NIC rates on companies, and can be further increased through family income-splitting arrangements, as witnessed in the case of Jones v Garnett. Several possible reforms to address the distortions and inequity in the present tax and NIC regimes in favour of companies are considered, including amendments to the IR35 “disguised employment” regime and the anti-income-splitting rules known as the settlement provisions. Applying the new statutory general anti-abuse rule, which the Government plans to introduce in Finance Act 2013, is another possible approach. The preferred option, however, is to deal with the root problem and pursue closer alignment of the tax and NIC treatment of activity carried on in different legal forms.

By equitable concession a shareholder may bring a representative action, ostensibly on behalf of himself and fellow shareholders, but in reality for the company, to permit corporate recovery against persons in a position of control who have perpetrated a fraud on the company. Such “derivative” actions form an exception to the axiom, expressed as one aspect of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, that in matters of corporate recovery the proper plaintiff is the company itself.

IN Lungowe v Vedanta Resources Plc [2016] EWHC 975 (TCC), the High Court allowed a claim to be heard in England against parent company incorporated in England and its foreign subsidiary in relation to the overseas subsidiary's operations. The judge considered whether the claim against the English-domiciled defendant could be stayed on the basis of forum non conveniens, and whether jurisdiction could be established over its foreign subsidiary as a necessary and proper party to the case. The overall analysis of the judgment suggests that (1) the claims against the parent company in relation to the overseas operations of the foreign subsidiary can be heard in the English courts and (2) the existence of an arguable claim against the English-domiciled parent company also establishes jurisdiction of the English courts over the subsidiary even if the factual basis of the case occurs almost exclusively in the foreign state.

BLACKSTONE'S Commentaries on the Laws of England was on its appearance received with unbounded admiration. It was felt to be a work of untold originality. The author became at once the Great Commentator. In the eyes of his earliest readers he was not only an erudite lawyer and a charming writer, but also a profound jurist. The Annual Register for 1767—then edited by Burke—contained a lengthy eulogy of the book. The review may well have been written by Burke himself.

IT IS now 18 years since the Law Commission Report which led to the introduction of the reformed R.S.C., Order 53,1 the procedure which still governs all applications for judicial review in England and Wales. The Law Commission has now returned to the field with its 1994 Report entitled Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals.2 During the interval between the two reports, judicial review has undergone enormous change in terms of both thequantity of claims brought3 and the substantive and adjectival developments in the jurisprudence. Moreover, important additions to the reform agenda have been made from a variety of sources.4 The Law Commission's latest contribution could thus hardly be better timed.

In Sutradhar v. Natural Environment Research Council [2004] EWCA Civ 175 the claimant, who lived in Bangladesh, suffered arsenic poisoning from drinking contaminated water. 699 other villagers suffered the same harm. The defendant, a research organization paid for by the British overseas development budget, had written a report for the Bangladeshi authorities which those authorities reasonably and foreseeably took to indicate that the water supply in the claimant's area was safe to drink. In fact, the researchers had omitted to test for arsenic and to tell the Bangladeshis that their tests did not include arsenic. The claimant sued in negligence. The defendant applied to strike out the action. The defendant failed at first instance, but, by a majority, the Court of Appeal (Kennedy and Wall L.JJ.; Clarke L.J. dissenting) dismissed the claimant's action.

In Case C-188/95 Fantask A/S and Others v. Industriministeriet (Erhvervsministeriet) [1997] E.C.R. I-6783 the European Court of Justice provided further guidance on the interpretation of Council Directive 69/335 EEC of 17 July 1969 concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital (O.J. English Special Edition 1969 (II), p. 412), as most recently amended by Council Directive 85/303/EEC of 10 June 1985 (O.J. 1985 L 156, p. 23), and elaborated its case law concerning Member State remedies and procedural rules. More particularly, it was held that a national rule which would have allowed Danish authorities to escape the duty to refund charges levied in breach of the Directive on the ground of “excusable error” rendered Community law impossible in practice or excessively difficult to enforce (Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. San Giorgio [1983] E.C.R. 3595), while a five-year time limit for bringing proceedings under Danish law was upheld as a reasonable limitation period (cf. Case C-208/90 Emmott v. Minister for Social Welfare and the Attorney General [1991] E.C.R. I-4269).

If a pebble is dropped into a pool of water, ripples will spread on the surface of the water; how far the ripples will spread and with what strength depends on a variety of factors, but there will always be a ripple of some kind. The same is true of a decision of a court of law. Notwithstanding what Professor Chayes has accurately described as the “bipolar” character of traditional civil litigation, it is almost inconceivable that the outcome of a civil action will affect no one but the parties to it: unless an exception can be found to John Donne's famous axiom that "No man is an Island, entire of itself”—and such a man, if he exists, is unlikely to bring an action in the first place—the ripple effect even of, say, a simple decision that an individual defendant must pay a sum of money by way of damages to an individual plaintiff will extend to their respective families and beyond. It is not wholly absurd to say of such a case that, for example, the retail traders, the banks, and so on with whom the parties have dealt or may deal in the future have an “interest” which an action by an injured individual may “protect” and, if they do, that interest is certainly "diffuse" and "fragmented" even if it is not “collective.”